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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation exaDines the international history ot the Gulf 
region during the period from 1958 to 1979. It begins with the tall of the 
Iraqi DOnarchy and ends with the tall ot the Shah of Iran. Particular 
attention is paid throughout to the establishment of the new Gulf states 
and their e.ergence into 'DOdernity'. 
In Chapter I we deal with the historical background of the Gulf 
states, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and ODan. Besides the historical background we also deal !1th 
\ 
recent social, economic and political developments within all of these 
states. Special attention has been paid to the culture, religion and 
SOCiety of our subjects since these factors playa major role in the 
domestic and external decision-making. Faysal of Saudi Arabia, for example, 
formed his policies according to his strong Islaldc beliefs. 
In Chapter II we deal with the conflicts and disputes aDOng our 
subjects. Disputes over whole territory, as in the case of the Iraqi claim 
over Kuwait and the Iranian claim over Bahrain or disputes over islands 
which one state believes to be part of its national territory but which 
claim is disputed - the Iranian claim to the two Tunbs and Abu Xusa or the 
Bahraini claim to Zubara, for example, or disputed claims by several 
parties - in the case of the Buraimi Dassis between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi 
and Oman. These claims became important as a result of the oil discoveries 
in our region and the establishwent of new states deepened some of these 
conflicts. There have also been important strategiC considerations at stake 
- for example, with regard to the Iraq! c1ai .. to the two Kuwaiti islands 
of Warba and Bubiyan. 
In Chapter III we look at the involvement of the superpowers in the 
region. Particular attention 1s g1ven to the relationships between 
theUnited States and Iran and between the United States and Saudi Arabia on 
the one hand and that between the Soviet Union and Iraq on the other. 
Attention has inevitably focussed upon military rivalry and the development 
of armed forces. 
In the sUbsequent chapters the emphasis changes. We dealwith the 
region as a whole and look at events as they involve all the countries 
concerned. These chapters cover the entire period from 19~8 to 1979 on a 
daily basis by watching its politically dynamic developments. starting with 
the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and the emergence of the revolutionary 
regime in its place and ending with the downfall of the Shah of Iran in 
1979. That has entailed consideration of the fate of the Iraqi revolution 
and the emergence and fragile independence of Kuwait. Another significant 
landmark 1s the British announcement 1n 1968 of their determination to 
bring their long-established role in the region to an end three years 
later. That in turn leads to a consideration of the politics of the 
establishment of the United Arab Emirates and also of the international 
aspects of the Omani question. The final chapters consider the 'Algiers 
Accord' between Iran and Iraq and the dispute over the Bhatt al-Arab 
waterway. Considerable note is taken of the Kurdish revolt in its various 
phases. The thesis comes to an end by describing the downfall of the Shah 
and the international evaluation of its significance. 
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Introdyction 
The purpose of th1s thes1s 1s to make a contr1bution to 
understanding the international history of the Gulf regton. The countries 
concerned - Iraq, Iran. Saudi Arabia, Kuwa1t, Bahrain. Qatar. the United 
Arab Emirates and Oman - all have distinctive individual histories, the 
main purpose of the thesis is to emphasize the constant interaction between 
domestiC and internal developments and international relationships, the 
detailed discussion of the first three chapters also seeks to bring out the 
individual SOCial. cultural and religious characteristics of all the states 
concerned. It is necessary to stress the diversity of the region 1n order 
to account for some of its instability: On the other hand. the Gulf also 
has a certain unity within the 'KiddIe East', It is proper to consider the 
history of Oman 1n this eontext, but not the history of YeDen. It 1s also 
apparent that some of the states discussed. notably the small ones. can be 
said to be 'essentially' Gulf states. On the other hand, it is apparent 
that other states aiso have problems which also turn them away from the 
Gulf itself. Perhaps the most striking example 1s Ira~ with respect to the 
problem of the Kurds: It has been thought appropriate to consider this 
particular difficulty. however. because 1n turn it has ha4 important 
consequences for Iraq as a Gulf power. 
It scarcely needs to be said that the states listed in the first 
paragraph are not equal 1n size or economic and 1d11tary power. During the 
period under review Iran was able to aspire to the status of a substantial 
regional power. All the other states. in one way or another, had to take 
account of this development. Our stress is upon the extraordinarily rapid 
pace of change during the years under discussion. The enormous oil revenues 
presented both opportunities and difficulties. These tensions are explored, 
though the main focus is upon the international implications and 
consequence5 of the 'oil factor'. 
The relationships between the Gulf states would have been 
complicated even if they had developed without the involvement of states 
from beyond the region. However, there was never any likelihood, given the 
'oil factor' and the general strategic importance of the Gulf, that outside 
powers would not seek to protect or expand their interests. The period 
witnesses the tormal decline in the British presence. for so long the major 
fa·:tor in Gulf politics. Formal withdrawal. however. should not necessarily 
be interpreted as marking the end of important contacts. Increasingly, 
however. it appeared to be the United States and the Soviet Union who 
played the major roles in the region. Both states sought to build up 
support in a variety of ways and with varying success. 
With these considerations in mind, the structure of the thesis 
falls into two parts. 
The first three chapters aim to provide a summary. though quite 
detailed, assessment of the fundamental factors which have a bearing upon 
the international behaviour of the 'actors'. 
The remaining chapters aim to provide a detailed account of the 
complex interplay of the above-mentioned factors over the entire pertod 
from 1958 to 1979. Archival sources for these exchanges are either not 
available or not accessible. Jevertheless, despite these limitations, the 
-~-
purpose of the thesis is to provide a multi-dimensional assessment of the 
international history of the Gulf. 
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Chapter 1 the Gulf States 
~ 
The state of Iraq has only existed since 1920 as a result of the 
British mandate uDder the League of Iations; before that date, under 
Ottoman adDdnistration and earlier. parts of the state were inevitably 
known by different and various nalEs - IesopotaDl1a 1s one example. And, 
while Iraq can be considered as a state, we cannot simply consider the 
Iraqis as a nation. The most fundamental demographic division is ethnic. 
Between 75 and 80 per cent of the population speak Arabic, while the first 
language of .ost of the re.ainder 1s Kurdish'. In addition. within Iraq 
there is the traditional split in Islam between Bhlas and Bunnis~. The 
significance of this religiouS division will be discussed separately. Thus 
the Shias, the Bunnis and the Kurds constitute the three major elements in 
the population of the country. At the sa.e time, however, there are further 
mnori ties, such as the Turcoaans. the Persians (who have been expelled 
from Iraq after living there for a few generations as a result of the 
current Gulf war>,3 Christians, Jews and a few other comaunities settled in 
the region before the arrival of Isl.~. These minoritles are all small. In 
addltion, there is the familiar division between those who live on the land 
on the one hand and thoee who dwell in the towns on the other. The 
lmportance of tribal organi2:ation is disappearing, but tribal 
considerationa still have so_ 1apact on poH tical Hte and ideologies and. 
tn general. on a sense of utional 1denti ty. 
King Faysal. the son of the Sharif of leeca, ... the tounder of the 
HasheJlite dynasty in Iraq. He was born in J(eeca in 1883 but spent two 
decades of his early life in Istanbul - which experience gave him. aBDngst 
other thlngs, the instinct for political survivals. He found hiaself with a 
kingdom as a result of the Anglo-French pollttcal Danoeuvring during and at 
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the close of the First World War. In the 1920s, when Iraq was under Br1t1sh 
control, oppos1tion to the status quo was growing both inside and outside 
the country. The British had little alternative but to rule through a 
friendly and co-operative local adm1nistrat1on. Direct rule was out of the 
question both for political and financial reasons. In 1921, at the Cairo 
conference, it was decided that the best course of action was to create a 
monarchy in Iraq. On 11 July 1921, persuaded by Sir Percy Cox, high 
commissioner under the mandate, the Iraq CounCil of State passed a 
resolution formally declaring Fayeal to be king. The following month his 
installation as king took place, though he was opposed by the Kurds, 
nationalists and Bbia religious leaders. This position lasted for a decade. 
The mandate was then brought to an end and Iraq's independence was 
established after a treaty with Britain had been concluded in 1931. British 
influence remained predoJdnant, despite this step before, during, and 
immediately after the Second World Var, though it was not unchallenged. The 
Hashemite dynasty survived until the 1958 revolution which was a 
manifestation of revolutionary BOvements which began to spread in lorth 
Africa and the Kiddle Bast after 1945. The Iraqi ar., carried out 
political changes rather earlier than in some other countries of the region 
because it went deeper into the social and political structures of Iraq6. 
The revolution, which took place on 14 July 1958, was eventually the work 
of two men - Qassia and Abd aI-Salam Arif - together with their 8upporteTa. 
King Fayeal II, the crown prince, and the rest of the royal fa~ly were 
killed as they were leaving their quarters. Their death ended any 
possibility of restoring the HesheBite dynasty on so .. future occasion? 
However, the establishment of a republic brought neither internal stability 
- since control of it was to be violently contested at intervals - nor 
greater regional stability, since old Iraqi ambitions surfaced and new 
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personal and national rivalries within the Arab world emerged. Iran and the 
other Gulf states were especially affected. 
A new era in Iran's history also opened 1n 1921. That year saw the 
coDing to power of Reza Khan, whose policies were characterized by 
nationalism and BOdernization. On 16 September 1941, Xuha ... d Reza Shah 
succeeded to the Persian throne - which his fat·her had taken in 1925. His 
reign wa5 marked by the SAme two emphases. 
The Pahlavl family had seized control of Persia fro. the Qajar dynasty 
which had established itself in the 17808, some forty years after the 
Safavids had lost their grip over the country. The Qajars, llke many other 
turtic tribes, had Jl1grated from Central Asia to the Kiddle East durlng the 
fourteenth century, but they did not appear on the polltical acene in Iran 
until the beginning of the slxteenth century. Allying with six other Turkic 
and Shia tribes, known collectively as the 'Red Heads·, the Qajars helped 
to establish tbe Safavida on the Persian throne8 • Desplte the increastng 
presence of British and Russian Influences, a sort of independence eurvived 
into the twentieth century. The Qajars theaselves continued to be in 
effective power until 1921, when tbey were overt brown by nationalist and 
reforDdstBOvemeats. The joint forces of aDderate nationalists, led by 
-
Sayyid Ziya in Teheran, and by tbe soldiers of the Persian Cossack Brigade 
at Qazuin, led by Reze Khan, planned a coup. On 18 February 1921, the 
Qazuln Cossacks begaa their advance. Two days later, lesa and Ziya .t 
outside Teheran and coordinate their plans. On 21 February, Reza entered 
Teheran and seized power in a coup that was alJllOSt bloodless·. The 
background to this dl-a_tic change reqUires eo. explanation. 
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Deep in the heart of the Blbous .au ntaiDS, some 110 kilometres north-
east of Teheran. in the village of ilasht in the district of Sawadkhuh, 
Reza Khan was born on 16 larch 1878. He was the son at Abbas AU Khan, 
familiarly known as Dadash Beg, a Dajor in the Sawadkhuh regillent. and 
hiDSelf the descendant of soldiers. Resa hi.aelf joined the Russian-
otficered Cossack Brigade as a very young Dan. He rose froa the ranks to 
officer level and by his thirties he was in co..and of a .achine gun 
detachment. For the tirst halt of his life, Resa Khan was a soldier pure 
and Simple. but it was in 1920 that a change began - for a variety of 
reasons. It was in that year that Bolshevik Russian troops landed at inzeU 
on the Iranian shore. the Gilan Soviet Republic, which they established, 
was SODewhat precarious. there was division between nationalists and 
communists and personal rivalry between their leaders. In 1921, the 
revolutionaries tried to liberate Teheran. but they failed. Shortly 
afterwards, there was a military coup in the capital, led by this officer 
of the Cossack Brigade, Resa Khan, with the help of Sayyid Ziya. At first. 
he entered into negotiations with the Gilani leaders and exploited thre 
spli t between tae natioaal1sts and the Bolsheviks. but in October 1921 he 
attacked Gilan. 
The transfor_tioa of leza Khan into Reza Shah was slow but steady. 
In February he gained the title of Army Commander and in lay he bee ... 
Xinister of War. In 1923, atter gaining popularity amug tlu! people and 
influence in the laj Us <parliament), he ca_ Pri_ I1nlster. In 1925 he 
abolished the QaJar dynasty, the exiled Shah being deposed on 31 October. 
On 12 Dec.aber 1925 he was voted Shah by the lajlia. Reza lbau'. first 
step. after being crowned. as Shah was to adopt the aDOieat Persi.an na. of 
Pahlavi 10 • During the Second World War. Iran was once again caught up inb 
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wider international struggles and in Septeaber 1941 Reza Shah abdicated and 
left for exile and an unhappy death in South Africa. 
When his son, Iohamaed Raza Shah succeeded hi., a DeW era of 
dictatorsh1p and development began. The new ruler was at the centre of a 
series of circles between which there was little contact, except through 
hi. - the court, the iaperial family, the central government, the 
provincial governments. the armed forces. SAVAK. and the police. All these 
institutions functioned independently of each other and each reported 
directly to the Shah. After the struggle for power With the Prime Xinister, 
lossadegh in 1953, the Shah was above all determined to have absolute 
control of the armed forces, whose .. abers had to swear allegiance to the 
Shah himself as well as to God and country. In 1957, he created SAVAK as a 
further means of coabatiug domestic opposition to the Pahlavi reglae". 
This agency requires particular explanation and attentlon. 
Sozgon -1 Etelaat yo ,.,!plat -1 Ieshyar (Iational Ia$or .. tlon and 
Security Organization) was to looa large 1n the subsequent history of Iran. 
Its activlties were feared within the country and they were frequentl, 
criticized abroad. SAVAKwas aotorioue for lta ayste.tic appl1catlon of 
cruelty in operating what appeared to be an all-pervasive eecurity ayste •. 
In the 1920s and 1930s RezaShAh bad possessed his own intelligence system. 
but SAVAK,was specifically the product of a policy of repre$Sion following 
the crisis of 1953. ,It was also aSSOCiated, subsequently, with the role of 
the Unl-ted. States in Iran,a• In the post-war period. thelJatted. Stat •• had 
tnitially been content to work closely with the Unitedliugcloa, even though 
their interests in ,Iran did not invariabl, coinclde'~. After 1953 the 
United States beca_ the dOminant powr. It should be "_abered. that just 
after the coup the .. in instru .. nt of repression .as the ~lltary 
directorate of Teheran, led by General Telaer Bakbtlar. Under his 
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leadership, the two intelligence units - the Ddlitary inteiligenoe and the 
police intelligenoe - were set up u~der the name SAVAK, , peraanent 
American Dission was attached to it. The law establishing SAVAK contained 
three Dain articles: SAVAK was to be part of the Prl.e lini.ter's office lA , 
its Dain concern was to be the obtaining of infor.atloD required for the 
maintenance of national security, and lts officials were to act as .tlitary 
magistrates. SAVAK was thus part of a complex security .yste. consisting of 
(a) Police Units, Xi1itary Police. Town and City Police, the Imperial Guard 
and the Imperlal Iranian Gendarierie and (b) Intelilgence Units l -. 
This structure appeared to achieve IBpresslve results, from the 
standpoint of the regime. By 1963 it seemed to have crushed the 88in 
opposition groups and prevented them from exploitIng polItical discontent. 
Riots were a thing of·the past. At the same tiE, the Shah had been very 
careful not to allow any officer to become too powerful within the 
military. In tllepast,several high-rankIng officers bad been removed 
because of hts fear 'of potenUal threats to hie position. TWO eUllples w111 
suffice. <HIneral BakhtIar, who headed the organization untU 1961, went 
into exile After he had been accused of financial Bl&coDductand 
participation tn plots to overthrow the regi.e. He was subsequently 
assassinated by his OWl. for_I" organization il1 Iraq la19'10 lc, General 
Hassan Patra •• n was' Sacked in 1965 after an attempt aD· tll. Shah1 s Ufe by a 
soldIer. despite the fact that under hIs leadershlp the"security forces had 
been reorganized and revitalized, with the result that SAYAI had became 
.,re efficient. Security units of the ar., stattoned 111 ot' Har Teheran, 
particularly the paratrOops, were well-equipped and headed by _n caNfully 
screened far their 10yalt, to the Shah'? However, these two dls.tssals 
were a reflect1anon the Shah's oWn character. 'urther evidence of his lack 
of conf 1 den can be seen in hi. dle.tsaalln 1955 of Prl.a Xinister Zahedi, 
- '1 -
whom the ABericans had seen as Iran's strongman, and 1n the arreat and 
imprisonment of General Valliollah Qarani for allegedl, plotting to 
overthrow the regime'·. 
The challenge to the Shah fro. the ar., was not accidental. The 
security forces were a more 11kely source of future leadership than were 
the intellectual eU te U'. ilso, since he necesearlly relied upon thea, tbe 
Shah allowed them extraordiaary powers over life and death in Iran. For 
example. 1n August 19'18, when the lex theatre in Abadan caught on fire and 
over four hundred people were burnt to d.ath, public opinion had no 
dlfficulty in believing a widely Circulated account that Isla~c actlvlsts, 
pursued by SAVAK had taken reiugein the theatre and that when SAVAK 
reported, this to the Shah, he had personally ordered the burning of the 
theatreao . It WQuld certainly not have been the only aassacre co.adtt.d by 
SAVAK. According to Halliday, thenu.ber of people killed under the Shah's 
rule was at least twenty thousand, though Abdulhasean Bani Sadar arpes for 
a figure of one hundre4tbousand. The nu.oer of the dead le. Dot huge, 
consid.ring there were 6.000 prisons 1n Iran - a f1pre given to a British 
visitor lnlay 19'15 by ColoDel •. A.laeavl. deputy director oftaeprison 
departmenta'.Jut reliable statistics are difficult to coae by. BYeD the 
slze of :SAVAK 's-u.o.rtailt. varyiq from three thousaadodcl ,iven by tile 
Shah to ten or twnty tl_s tbat aumber suggested by ..... t em, 14 October 
1974. And th ... wer. figures,for full-tl.a eaploy •••• SAVAK aleoa very 
.uch larger Du~r of part-ti. tnfor_rs, up to three .tll10n, spread 
throughout Iranian oOBDUnltle& at hoae and abroad. IcIt of t .. 1ator .. ra 
were work.rs,tar.ret political activists, etudents, teachers, 'and _are 
of guilds or ather assoe1atloosa2 • Besides th1s dlreotrepression, SAViK 
was also respoaeible for censorShip aad propaganda. Por tht. purpose it 
so_ti.s used so •• mbers of oppes1 tlongrovps to promote dlssensiOll and 
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confusion in their ranks. SAVAK also ran the 600-odd governaent trade 
unions. Its activities extended beyond Iran's frontiers in at least four 
respects: esp10nage and CQunter-espionage abroad, liaison With foreign 
intelligence t$ervices and surveillance of Iranian dissidents. Its task was, 
in effect, the 14entlficatlon and destruction of all those who were in any 
way opposed to the Shah's regiE. SAVAK's use of iaprisonEnt, torture and 
even death Beant that nat only exiled or underground opposition groups but 
people generally in Iran were increasingly hesitant to discuss pol! tics at 
all. SAVAKcould attack any place .it wished to. In Karch 1963. for example, 
on the anniversary' of the artyrdom of the sixth I.m the _draaa 
(religious school) was attacked by SAVAIC A nuJlber of students were killed 
and KhOEinl was arrested. 
TheShaha!l1nta.ined other tntelllgence services, partly as a check on 
one another. According to Ie ysweek , Iranlan agents operated 1n the .-
countries 'where Iran hA'd. a strong strategiC interest, particularly in 
Bgypt, the Gulf and Lebanon. It 1s well known that two foreign agenctes 
with which SAYAK had co-operated, under US aupervls1011. were ,the CIA and 
theF8I,whlleother. lntelUgence agencies also worked part-ti_ for 
SAVAK2;a.Its overllUstre1l8th derived tram the fact that it had power to . 
arrest and detaia any person at Will. PoUUcal trials·were held before 
Jlilitary tJ'lbu11.atawll.ose judges were either arJaY officers or SAVAK 
officials. tbeytook place in 'secret with no defence Witn .... s allowed. 
There were three ktnds ot pri80us- pollee detentiou centre.. court' 
prisons. and long-term pent tenttar1es - to which SAVAlt.,lctt. were sent. 
Pre-trial prisoners were locked up 1n saalland. da1Ip cella. with iud.quate 
washing facUlties aad foodsuppl1es. ledlcal treatEnt was practically 
non-eXistent 4IJld prlacmers _re hardly ever seen by a d.octor. Polltical 
prisoners, norecallted ,in court or w110 agreed to _te public stat •• nts 
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renouncing their previous views were given lighter sentences, while those 
who did not recant ~ght well resain in prison after their ter.s had 
officially expired. SlVAI used torture before trials to set tnformation and 
confessions fro. detainees, and after trials to intimdate and pressurelze 
prisoners so that they would aake public confessions. llieged Jlethode of 
torture included whipping and beating, electric shocks, the extraction of 
nails and teeth, botling water puwped into the rectu., heavy weights hung 
on the testicles, tying the prisoner to a Etal table heated to white heat, 
inserting a broken bottle into the anus, and rape24. 
Sufficient has now been said to indicate the nature of the 
instrulltnt at the dtsposal of the Shah. low, however, its activities ... st 
be related to the position of the arMd forces as a whole. Iran has had a 
long Dilitary history, but it did not have a standing national ar., of 
great strength and prestlge25 • Indeed, by 1919, the .orale of its &rEd 
forces had slumped to a degree which led Reza Khan to plan a new national 
aray of 80E 40,000 IItn26 • At that tiE, the IDSt effective combat troops 
still in existence consisted of three uni ts estabUeAecl uncler torelp 
influence: in 1879 a brigade cOJlllllnded by Russian Cossack-officers had been 
set up in the northern part of the country; in 1911 Swedes establlSbed a 
gendarJlerle .tor controlling and protecting the rural areas; and. in 19U5 the 
British created the South Persian Rifles in the &OUt~r~partof Iran. It 
1. understandable, therefore, that subsequently Reza Shah was anxious to 
build up • new ar., to uuderplu hi. state27 • ID 1922. JdU.tary expeDd.ttuH 
accounted for 47 per cent of the country's total bu4get. In 1924 an air 
force was estabUshed, followed, 1n 1933, by a navy'. TIlea. tn rather 
different circu_tances after 1953 Ili. son devotecl alchatte.tlcm to 
lIOdernlz1Dg Ira .. ' s arlltd forces since they had rallied. to hts slde. ... also 
sought to re.rd and aintain loyalty by ateadily iacreaa1118 tile: _l.d." 
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of ofticers. even when. as In 1964. there waa a general economic crlsls2 ., 
The expansion and .adernlzatlon of the armed forces otten appeared 
impressive to external obsergers, Of course. they were designed not only to 
buttress the Shah doaestically but also to deacnstrate the strength of the 
country in the region as a whale. Jaturally. the scale and pace of this 
expansion depended upon econo~c factors. It ls therefore appropriate to 
glance at the development of the all industry at this stage. 
The grant of economiC concessions was a .ajar component of Iran's 
foreign econoD1c policy in the nineteenth century. lasir al-Din Shah (1848-
96) and subsequently his san luzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907) granted a 
wide variety of economic concessione to luropean powers. The BOst important 
of these were obtained by British· or.iu88ian interests:ze, The British wen 
the all concession 1a 1901, and production began ln 1908 - the first 
production in the Gulf region. Indeed, the exploitation of tranianoil was 
In Brl Ush hands u1ltil 1951 when the oU industry was natlauUzed. In 
1954, after lusudeq had been overthrown alld the United States had helped 
to put the Shah back in pmMr. the AEricans acquir" partial' ownershtp of 
Iranian 011. 8P retained a 40 per cent ahare, Shell acqutred 14 percent. 
CFP got 6 percent and. the reaUling 40 per cent waa sbareel out between the 
il va -.3 or tar-lean cCNlpan1es, who had 5 per cent each, and a 05 per cent 
share for a' group of' aillor .... rican caapanles. This new agree.at ... 
supposed to lastU1lttl 1904:ao~ 
The rapid rise of 011 production aDd revenue. til tlaa period 1154-58 
and the substantial' aid pro.lded. by the Unl ted States led to' a aharp 
recovery 10. Iran's economy. However. this advance was aceo.pauled by severe 
inflationary pressures. which both pUShed up the price indices and 
unbalanced. tran'. fo~lgn transact1ons, leading to a large drop iDforelgn 
exchange reserves. In ad.di tion. both 011 reftnues and forelga aiel .lowd 
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down ln 1959 and 1960~1. But 1n the perlod 1962-71 Iran benefited from 
polltical stability and an interest in econoBic and soctal developaent on 
the part of the govern.ent that had no precedent 1n her .adern history. 
Three landmarks stand out: the White Revolution of 1962/3 and the Third 
(1962/63-1967/68) and Fourth (1968/69 - 1912173) lational Develop .. nt 
Plans. In 1910 and 1971 the Tripoli-Teheran agreements resulted in a sharp 
rise in oil revenues that was greatly accelerated by the quadrupling of oil 
prices at the end of 1913. Iran's 011 revenues shot up frOB Sl.1 billlon in 
1970 to S2.4 bllllon in 1972 and S17.4 billion in 1974. They were estimated 
at $20 billion in 197532 • 
• aturally, this huge lncrease caused an explosive growth in Iran's 
economy. In 197213 real gross utional income was growing by 23 per cent, 
in 1973/4 by 34 per cent, and ln 1974/5 by 42 per cent. Bqually naturally. 
such rates of growth produced severe illbalances in the econo.,. There was 
no precedent in the whole history of the world for such rapid growth aDd,no 
way of evaluating the strain it would place on the SOCial fabric of the 
country experiencing it. the benetits were plain, the.pitf.Us le .. ;obv1.ous 
but none the le_ real. Iran' 8 respo~ to this uniquechalleDp _ .. to 
have consequences extendlag,farbeyond her borders331 • Bevenues fro.,oU 
were thecornerstolleof t,he cSJ:Wl' salibi tion to _ke h1s ane1ent qauatry a 
~ern world power. Tbeee revenue. were largely used to supply and train 
technieal and .. nagertal pe~nnel at all sovern.ent levels; tof1nance all 
exploratiou; to purchase military equipment at the IDSt ,sopklat1cl.ted, 
character; aad. as already "ntioned, to finance the five~yearplan 
1973/1978. 
The SUh'. pr1 .. ry goals in developing Ira. were to preserve and 
strengthen his:oVll power aU.d that of hisfaa1ly so as to ensure the 
surv! val of the ,JIlnarchy and to .. ke Iran the c!oa1 .. nt regional power· and 
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protector of the status quo in the Gulf region. 011 was clearly vltal in 
that it accounted for nearly 80 per cent of governaent revenues and 90 per 
cent of the country's foreign eXCbange earnlngs. The Shah _verattached 
pol1tical conditions to the sale of 011. whl<::hflowedto the Vest without 
interruption elurlng the 19'73 'Yo. Kippur war. and the Shah cont11lUed to sel1 
oil to Israel despite strong Arab efforts to dissuade hi •. He reasoned that 
Iran and Israel sbared the .... security interests. And it is now to Iran's 
Arab neighbours on the other side of the Gulf that we now turn. 
SAUDI ARABIA 
Saud! Arabia is the largest state in the Arabian peninsula. 
occupying an area approxlately thesbe of the United States east of the 
JUeslssippl river. The precise si~e of the population ls notlmown 
exact1y3 •• The central 'lnst1tutionot sovernaent ls the .anarchy and It 1s 
claimed that Its authOrity i ls in turn baaed upon Is1a1l1c law -the Shatia -
and on tradition··. 
Rel1g10n is the' first plllar of the BaucH sute. and the BMria is 
strictly enforeedby the gavernaental authorities ln CO'Iltaet "ith the 
religious establishment. the 1lJ..uIi.; Islamc Ideals eoatrtbute 'c~nslderably 
to the unique character 'of tile Saudi polittcal syste.~ tbe funda_ntal 
premise of whfeh 1s the inseparabll1ty of state and TeUgion. Since the 
eighteenth cetitury. the central previllee. lajd. has been the he_ of 'a 
Bdlitant puritanical sect, the Vahhabis. 'ahhablsm ... an .... ntial factor 
in the unification of -the country that us later calle4 the 11ng4oa of 
Saudi Arabit under the leadershlpof Ibn Sauda ,". The hietor1 of this.tate 
since 1931 haa been one of breathtaking econoll1c. ""utlcal andsoc1al 
change. Once agaln, the enabling factor ~s all, which was discoveredln 
1938. By the ti_ that King Abel 11- Aziz bin Saud, who was known as Ibn 
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Saud in the Vest, died in 1953 his government MaS firmly ca-.dtted to 
change. 
The year 1932 is an unforgettable date in Arabian history since 
it was then that the modern klngdaa caae tnta existence. Iban Saud's 
forefathers, however, had already ruled aver parts of the klngdom for over 
twa hundred yeare. The founder of the faBdly. Kaha.aed bin Saud (c.1103-
1192) was the ruler of Dir'iyah, a lajdi principalitya7. In 1144-45, he 
campaigned for a zealous religious revivalist, Kahamaed bin Abd-Al Vahhale, 
and became the patron of his Bdssiani with the spiritual force ot Wahhabl 
revival and the fighting power of Al Saud, nearly all of central Arabia had 
fallen under Al Saud's control by the end of the century. 
The.adern history of Saud Arabia began tn the Winter of 1901-2 
when Abd Al~aziz and forty selected .. natale aver the city wall of Riyadh 
on the night of 16 January 1902. They captured the capltalso that all that 
remained was for hi. to Win over the reet of the country.. It ... to take 
some time. In 1922 he aubdued tILe Ibn Raslliu' capital HayU.'1Il t1ae·· 
mewantlme, he had captvrecl Butera Arabia fro. the Tura. In 191f.:the 
Bri Ush aad pereuadedhla. to ca-operate with Sharif • ..ayn i. the crushing 
of the Ibn Rashicls. Durt. tAe P1rst World Val" the two _lleli41 stu With 
the Bri Ush, :though calw.ys caUSCi:ous of. their own interests. Britaia paid 
the Saudis a mnthly subsidy of .£5,000 til order tolllduce thea not to 
attack westwar<ls~. ¥hen the _r ended, and British protectton decl1Md, 
the Saudis were apin t.an expanatou.ry fraaaot a1ncl. ,,·t.,.ca.e lnto:; 
conflict wlthSharlf Bussayn, ~ had declared hi ... lttbaCal1ph of all 
JosleM. Bewever, 1n 1925 tile HasJaell1tes Wltre drlven'into exUe. A year 
later, tn 1926. Ibn Saud crOWDed hiase11 Itag of the Htjaz. It was six 
years latar that he annoum:ed thatbence10rth ,tlba wlaol. country ehou14 be 
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called the Kingdoa of Saudl Arabia. He coasolidated the atate until his 
death in 1953. 
Abd Al-uiz was 5Ucceeded by his eldest son. Saucl. whoee reign was 
characterized by palace intrigue and heavy spending. Kiag Slaud was also not 
content to spend his .... althat ho •• Be u.-ed. it to interfere, in 
neighbouring Arab pol! tics and even, With, eo_ el1CO\lrage_nt from, western 
gover!l.Jllents. drea_d of chAlleqipg lasser of Egypt'a cla1_ to lead the 
Arab world39 • 
It wa$ at this point, in 1958 f th~t, the only group which can be said 
to represent public opinlon in Saudi Arabia -.the royal t-.dIy. princes. 
shayks and Vlop - Joi.ne4 together to protect the.lastitution of the 
Blnarchy and the unity ot thekins~. by forcing Saud to hand over all his 
power to his younger brother, Crown ,riace, 'aysal. In 1904 Paysal took over 
completely andrul.c until 25J(arch 1975, "'henba.was __ .iuted. by a 
nephew. Kitag IhaUd ca_ .to power. after .the death of Payeal and showed 
very 11 ttle intereat .lo. politica. with the result that CrownPria~ P.u.d 
took a _jor role in day-to-day decisioa-.uing. ICing Pahad euCQHW to 
the throne a;fter hitbrother'e c1.ath in 19&2., Thu.a,clespUe ()bea.ges of:: 
personnel, th.e dyuat" hae .. llltainecl .itself through a period of nplcl 
change.· Yet tluat· cbADse bas not been at .:the expense of the forc •• which 
created the. etat., la the firat place. The laportant"role played dur1as tbte 
periCKl by the- Ula •. ate. from the etghteeath-centur, alUance between the 
founder of Ai.· 6auck.;JIou..dlba Saud al14 Ko~ Iba Abel &,1 Vahbab. The 
Judges. the Q,d1s. and. .the Shalkhs of the larger tribes 1ibwi. conti,"," 
to exercise consi4erable iutl, ... nce as .Jlbers af th1.,tracU tioDal group. 
The highest .tbeological and judlclalpoets bave ben reeerved tor the Al 
Shaikhfaa1'1y.., the clescenclant$ ofJlcha.-cl bin, Abd al-VallbabAo. Yet. 
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despite the .aaifest strength of tradition, it has been the dl.covery at 
011 which has transfor.ed the country's illPortance. 
In recent decades, Saudi Arabia has assuaed an increasingly significant 
role in regional and world affairs by virtue ot Its geographical location, 
its control over'ke, depoei ts of petroleu. and its petroclollar surpluses. 
The country's couiderable aU reserves and ita production capability 8ive 
it an iaportance out of all proportion to its .Ball population or ailttary 
capacity. Its political leverage In international affairs steas clearly 
from econoBlc faetors. Saudi Arabian oU weal th began to flow in large 
quantities in the early 1950s. The first 011 concession was granted in 1933 
and the first discovery was tn 1935. although it was DOt untU 1938 that 
the first exports took place in coamercially significant quantities. 
Thereafter, the country was flriUy oa the path to beco81ng the world's 
greatest oil producerA1 • During the Second Vorld Var, the otlflelclswere 
shut do~ but fro. 1946,Saudi Arabia began clearly to reap the benefits. 
In 1950 the state of Saudi finance. was not alwayseecure. even with high 
revenues, because of heavy spendiagA:a. The post tlon neac111y'·iaproved 
thereaf.ter. By the early 19'10., Saudi Arabia _s procluctag eight mIlton 
barrels a day, with the capacitJ to rl_ to twenty allllon, coapared to 
Iraq's two 81,1110. and l.uwalt'. tllree 811110n. 
Bowever. tt i8 .aotJl)ur purpose to produce a .yete.tic eco11omcacoount 
-
of thedevelop.ent of the iaduatry •. Our iaterest 11e. ln polittcal tat .. . 
1n the confl1ct bet.en the other two veat aU producersaacl !n,lonel .. . 
power. 1a tile Gulf area; in the u_ of 011 as a weapon ottoo111l the Arab-
IsraeU confl1ctc and 1. the proble. of opse and OAPIG. It 18,ia thl. 
connex10n tha1; tile rule of ling Fa,.l was rearkabl., . nat ,oa11in . respect 
to the 4e .. lo,._t of the ail ladustry but _ also with regard to relatiollS 
with the,.United. States. Therule~._. cletermaed to chaRge that 
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relationship. but in a Easured and etticient way. By stepe, Saudi Arabia 
regained the ownership of the lauds ,previously granted to the AR1XCO 
consortiuli. That was one of t-he first signs of a Imve towar<ls 011 
nationalizatlon. In -196'1. after long and difficult _!Ottations. Saudi 
Arabia reached agr.e.ent with the 011 coapanles which included an immediate 
purchase of 25 per cent of equity. and ultiaatelytull ownership of the 
producing coapanles in their respective countries. By the SUDaer at 1914, 
Saudi Arabia increased her participation share to 60 per cent and in 19'15 
she reached 100 per cent. It was an example which the other Gulf producers 
fo11owed"'3 • 
It scarcely needs to be said. therefore., that all tsthe key econoDic. 
factor tn Saud Arabia. 'Hawver. not only is it the Min source 01 revenue, 
it also provides, through AiAllCO, a fraawork for the training ot 
technicians as well as10r the deftlop1lent ofenaller native illdustrie. and 
the encourageEnt ofpr1vate'ellterprises. Xuchattentton .. been paldto 
the develop1ll!nt -af'lIducat.ton 111 the kingdoa. llare generally. two f,lYe-yur 
plans, gui~llt_ econoJlic develop_llt at the 19'10 •. Saudi oU revenues in 
the JI1d-19'10s 'AJIOUnted tobetwen 25 billion aDd. 30 bil110n .)llltar. Otl" 
accountsfor "M'l-y all80ftrnaat r.vellues ....... 
Tile siDgle :BOSt1apottant use of all revenuee has ,been ;1n the 'fielc:l-
of foreipatel, '.especl-..11yto 'Bgypt 111 the Arab-IeraeU wars. X1ag Ita,..1 
granted. generous t11laaelalassl8taJ1C8 to I'gypt, recognized Jgypt' IS 11111 tary 
role as the .tll confrontation «ate in tbestruggl. asalDS't ~1 .... 1, and 
undertook to ca-m<c1tute its own poltcies With thoe. -of.'PrMldent Sadat in 
the use :of 011 as a pol1ttcalwaapan. Durtng the October. 1973 war a.~' 
eJibargo on oiJr>':exporte to tIN Unt tecl States. Portugal aad tJut Jetherl.11tls 
was lntroduced~' In addition theN •• a seDeral poUey at adjusting 
production levels 111 accordance With tbe' ataJlCe takell by COll8u_r couatriu 
-17 -
in relation to the Arab-Iaraell waras• Ilng 'aysa1 bad publicly and 
privately to warn Western 011 _n, newsmen and pol1tlclau tbat 1f the 
West. particularly the United States, did not adopt wbat he perceived to be 
a more even-handed policy concerning the conflict. the Arabs would have no 
choice but to use the oil weapon. 
In this connexion. the role of OlPEC was veryl~rtant. Saudi 
Arabia was one of the founders of the organization with Kuwait and Libya. 
The Saudis wanted it to be restricted to those Arab states for who. 011 was 
the basic and prinelpoal source of national Inca... It has been the Saudi 
view that _~re ate also expeCted to,shoulder certain political 
obligaUons. One Jlinistet reurked that his governJlent regarded OAP!e as to 
some extent a substitute for the .. rioua oil activiti •• of the Arab 
League46 • It would therefore be quite inappropriate to have a non-Arab 
state as a ".ber. Ia these clrcuastances, OAPBC bas co .. to carry out two 
uin funetta.s." It,ts;, a aeau of distributing Arab aU mney to aoa-Arab 
states and it also' atteapte to co-ord.lu.te ecOllOaic d ... lopaaat activity. 
The JlDSt spectacular 'u.. of, aU through OAPBC:' In order: to obtaia a' 
political objective, __ 1, the oUelibargo, was in tact Instigated by ling 
'aysal who .. s ansa red at the ._i"e 42.2 bilUon wblcil the United- States 
suppUed to, Ierael during the October 19'13 war; Payeal ... ablato __ tae 
embargo effectlve"because of hls country's co .. nd.ing share of the world. 
urket at a ti_ of aear peak prod.uctiona7 • 
Thl1 productlon level was In turn the result of growing world 
dependence on 11d41e !a.ternoll~ By the early 19708. tu Arab 011 
produC8re began to realize that oil could. be used. as a powerful WHpon of 
diploDllCY, especially to bring pressure on thre United States and. other 
Western utlas to· ~.rate theit pro-IsraeU policy 1n the I1dd1. last. At 
tht. u_ thearrange_nts at. the U.tted· states wttllSaudl Arabia and Iran 
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were very important. though in turn the Americans could point out the 
importance of the arms weapon in return for guaranteed oil supplies. Iran's 
unwillingness to boycott Israel was a source of irritation 1n Riyadh. 
However. the conflict within OPEC between Saudi Arabia and Iran, involved 
more than their different viewpoints on the question of Israel. In 1969 
Shaikh Yamani; the Saudi 011 minister. said that he would act quickly to 
protect his country's interests it pressures from Iran were to interfere 
with Saudi Arabia's normal growth rate4e • The United States, on behalf of 
the Western industrial world, tried to persuade Saudi Arabia to commit 
itself to increasing its oil output. The country had gradually become an 
important Barket for American goods and services. Following the rise of oil 
prices in 1973, Riyadh acquired the money to expand imports on a huge 
scale. 
Saudi Arabia has received more attention from the United States 
than the other members of OPEC because. of course. it is the largest single 
oil producer and exporter of oil. and also because it has rather a large 
range of options 1n deciding how auch oil to produce. In June 1974 an OPEC 
meeting was held in Ecuador. All OPEC members expected Saudi Arabia to 
express the desire to raise posted prices of crude production by 10-12 per 
cent a barrel, but the country's strong opposition to such a rise prevented 
it from happening-9 • 
EASTER! ARABIA! STATES 
Kuwait, Bahrain. Qatar. the United Arab Emirates and 08an: their political 
develop_nt. 
The Gulf.and its extens1on, the Gulf of Oman. have a.ang their 
ripar1an countries the three major powers already discussed - Iraq. Iran 
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and Saudi Arabia - and a group of emall states, namely Kuwa1t, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Like most Arab societies today, 
the five monarchies/states are post-traditional and peculiarly vulnerable 
to the tension of modernization. Their legitimiZing values are essentially 
rooted in kinship, religion, and customso • These tribal dynasties have 
provided not only the ruling shaikhs but also the power to maintain them -
in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar in particular51 • Before the 
discovery of oil, these states eked out a subsistence-level existence from 
pearling, fishing, seaborne CODDerce and, among the nomads, animal 
husbandry. However, each state is now engaged in a undertaking formidable 
tasks of SOCial, economic and political transformation. 
Because of the location of the Gulf as a waterway giving access 
to the Persian, Ottoaan and Arab hinterlands, it was rather early in modern 
history that it became an object of attention on the part of the major 
powers. Like the Portuguese and the Dutch before them. the British were 
interested in the Gulf for both strategiC and commercial reasons and 
entered into a number of special treaties with these states52 • For example, 
the British played an i~rtant role in the development of relations 
between the ruling f~lies of Bahrain, Al-Khalifa, and the Al-Thani of 
Qatar, as well as in Qatari-Saudi border affairs. Also, it scarcely needs 
to be mentioned that the British were successful in obtainlng oil 
concessions and keeping away the American oil companies from this region. 
The great powers who were rivals for position and influence in the period 
before the First World Var were Great Britaln, Ottoman Turkey, RUSSia, 
Germany and Prance. Hence, at anyone time, there were several important 
outside powers interested ln the area, each with different motives and 
aspirations. The condition of the Arabs themselves was neither stable nor 
favourable in this period, for there was little sense of unity of purpose 
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or direction, or any sense of sovereignty or desire for internal peace. The 
relationships between the various emirates fluctuated widely between co-
operation and hostility. This was the general political condition of the 
Gulf region as a whole before the First World War. 
After 1918, the balance of power in the area changed 
significantly, largely because of the victory of the BrItish and their 
allIes and the defeat of Ottoman Turkey and its allies. Consequently, 
competition between Britain and Germany disappeared. Likewise, with the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish presence was no longer a 
factor. However, in the longer term, British interests were threatened by a 
new presence on the horizon - the involvement of !Berican co~nies backed 
up by their government. However, at this juncture, more needs to be said 
about the structure and circumstances of the individual states. 
Kuwai t: 
The Kuwaitis trace their history back to the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries when Kuwait was settled by groups of tribes (of 
the great Anaya tribal confederation) which had left their homeland in lajd 
in Central Arabia searching for a DOre hospitable environment. Over the 
years, several leading clans of the original wave of emigrants - the Al-
Sabahs, the AI-Ghanims, the AI-Khallds, the Janaats and the Al-Salihs 
amongst others - combined to create an oligarchical merchant principality 
presided over by the Al-Sabahs. 
In 1945, Kuwait was still a traditional tribal prlncipality under 
Bri Ush protection - back in 1920-1 and 1929-30, tor exallple. British 
forces had helped to defend Kuwait against attacks by Saudi forceas~. Arab 
traditional societies have generally tailed to develop a etrict and 
consistent system of succession comparable to the principle of 
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primogeniture in Burope. Succession 1n such tribal societies, assuming it 
was carried out by peaceful asans, usually involved a Ddxture of 
inheritance and election, the latter often restricted to the ruling family 
group. The Al-Sabah. who are at the head of the Kuwaiti system, have been 
ruling since the early eighteenth century. They have their origins in the 
Anaza tribeS4 • From their members were chosen the ADdr, the Prime Xinister, 
and many of the more important ministers. Traditionally. Al-Sabah shared 
power with aristocratic merchant families such as the Ghanims, Saqrs. 
Saliha, Khalids and Jana'ts. To a great extent, power-sharing has been 
informal SG • Power has been monopolized by the easy-going Al-Sabah fam11y, 
as it has been since 1710. The tribes constitute the politically 
predominant sector ot the elite. Latterly, however, Kuwait has become a 
constitutional monarchy, though there have been certain difficulties in 
practice. The Amir is Chief of State and the state has possessed cabinet 
government, a national assembly and an independent judicial system. Given 
its small size, however, Kuwait. like other Gulf countries, has had to rely 
heavily on the services provided by expatriates in the administration of 
government. Xany such positions have been filled by able Palestinians who 
have been resident in Kuwait for decades. 
The 1958 Iraq revolution. together with the Palestine problem, have 
provided a constant external stiBUlus to developments within Kuwait. In 
1961. Kuwait gained her independence and applied for Arab League and United 
lations membership. Both IKlveS were opposed by Iraq, whose attitude 
constituted a real challenge to the new state's independence. Within days, 
British troops were airlifted back to Kuwait and were retained until Qassim 
of Iraq had been pressured into silence by Arab diplomatic activity. 
However, Iraq never gave up its for .. l claim, and until 1Q71 the British 
kept forces in Bahrain and a tank stockpile in Kuwait under an Anglo-
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Kuwaiti defence agreement. On 20 July 1961 Kuwait did join the Arab League 
and on 7 Kay 1963 she joined the United lations Organization. Iraqi 
acceptance of Kuwaiti independence on 4 October 1963 was followed by the 
establishment of diplomatic relations, although Distrust still existed 
between the two states·G • Par example, after 1971, when Bahrain became 
independent, the Kuwaitis stationed planes there to avoid a possible Iraqi 
surprise attack. Saudi guarantees replaced British ones·? 
British support in 1961, which was arguably crucial to the 
survival of Kuwait, has been criticized on various grounds, chiefly that 
there was no good evidence of Iraqi troop movements at the time. However, 
it was not only the British action which was of great importance. The 
independence of Kuwait was also safeguarded by the support of other Arab 
states, chiefly Saudi Arabia, and also, in the end, of Iran·~. That support 
continued, for example, in 1973&9. 
As an independent state, Kuwait has displayed certain distinctive 
characterist1cs. There were three general elect10ns for the fifty-member 
lational Assembly: 1n January 1903, January 1967 and January 1971. Thus 1t 
was the only monarchy 1n the Arabian peninsula to have held free elections 
and developed a significant parliamentary system <apart from Bahrain, which 
held its first election in December 1973)Go. Ideologically, however, Kuwait 
stands with the more militant of the Arab nationalist revolutionary 
regimes. Perhaps for this reason, neither in Saudi Arabia nor in the other 
monarchies does one find a more integrated and seeDdngly stable aaalgam of 
political traditionalism on the one hand and modernity on the other. 
Educational and cultural programmes mounted during thi. period have 
undoubtedly helped to advance the pol1tical BDvements set in train in the 
1950s. Kuwait has come to be considered a .ajar cultural centre in the Arab 
Gulf region. The educational theory is based on Arab nationalisa. This is 
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no surprise because .ost of the educational staff and teachers working in 
Kuwait were Palestinians. The assistance of the press was especially 
valuable during the reign of Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmed. 'ationa11s. spread very 
fast but the Al-Sabah dynasty has survived. It has undoubtedly helped that 
the Amirs in recent decades have tended to be mild, unflamboyant and 
politically astute. They have also demonstrated a sense of civic 
responsibility. Thus, it was a year after independence that Shaikh Abdulla 
aI-salem announced the Kuwaiti constitution which permitted the eXistence 
of a kind of political opposition. Political parties were to be allowed a 
certain freedom. In practice, the Amir remains the ultimate authority, but 
he does consult with some fifteen of the most influential members of his 
clan~l. The Kuwaiti Jational Assembly has little effective autonomy and 
hasrarely initiated policy. However, various opinions can be expressed 
during its dellberations,though constant and vociferous criticism of the 
government is not acceptable. 
Bahrain: 
Bahrain 1s like Kuwait in that it is a tribal entity founded by a 
clan that emigrated from .aJd In Central Arabia. In the ~d-eighte.nth 
century, the Al-Khalifa, who had settled in Kuwait. moved to the northern 
tip of the Qatar peninsula. In 1783 the Al-Khali!a drove out the PerSian 
rulers froa Bahrain - which had been under their control since 17&062 • 
Iranian claims were revived periodically in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and especially during the Pahlavi era. In 1970. however, Iran 
acceded to the findings of a special UJ fact-finding Bdssion sent to 
Bahrain, and formally recognized Bahrain's right to independenoe. This was 
formally declared in August of the following year. At that point, Bahrain 
elected to follow Kuwait's lead in creating an Islamic constitutional 
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monarchy with a Iational Assembly which was to be half-elected and half-
appointed. 
The ruling family, however, does not have to ahare power with 
other groups, as has been stated in the case of Kuwait. The aerchant group 
was not interested in the new Assembly, which was DOre attractive to a few 
young educated groups. Labour and soae left-wing intellectuals did gain 
representation, but their position was not strong. The ruling family wields 
the preponderance of influence wlthin the Bahraini power structure, despite 
the constitutional form of government~a. The challenge from the Left ls 
slgnificant, however, and this has led to an increasing reliance on the 
armed forces to maintain internal securlty. 
As with the other Gulf states, industry in Bahrain naturally 
centres around oil. Although Bahrain shares ownership with Saudi Arabia of 
the Abu Safa field, with over 6 billion in reserves, in fact Bahrain will 
never be a major oil producer - and the wholly-owned Awali field is almost 
exhausted64 • Therefore, since the country was one of the smallest oil 
producers within OPEC and OAPEC, and in the light of the Iranian threat and 
claim over the Bahraini islands, and the competition between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia for supremacy in the Gulf, the Bahraini search for security led the 
government to establish new ties with Saudi Arabia. These ,links were both 
economic and political in character. It could be argued that the Bahraini-
Saudi economic ties are basically polltical in substaace and intention. Par 
example, the large Bapeo oil refinery in Bahrain uses Saudlcrude all. 
although the SaudiS could use their own oil refinery at lees coat. The 
flnancial aid extends from rural development on the 0 .. hand to education, 
the military and police forces (Saudi forces have always been .. en to 
control any public demonstration) and the pre .. on the other. Bahraini-
Saudi banking links are also very strong. It 1s important, too, to mention 
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the opening of the Bahrain-Saudi Highway - a link had been suggested 
between Qatar and Bahrain in the past. The new br1dge a1ao serves as a 
political connexion between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and has clear security 
implications. 
Oman: 
Oman 1s the only country among the Gulf states with a tradition of 
independence dating back several centuries. For many decades Oman had a 
special relationship with Britain and in 1951 signed an agreement by which 
London agreed to Oman's independence, so leng as the special economic and 
political position of Britain in luscat was accepted55 • 
Sultan Said bin Taymer, whe reigned from 1932 to 1970, was the 
most important figure in modern Oman! political development. He was the 
absolute master in the country. It appeared to be a static society. there 
were no hospitals or health treatment. There was no formal education. The 
Sultan's style of rule caused the growth of opposition. In 1955 there was 
the Green Xountain aovement, led by Imam Gallb b1n Ali and Suly.an bin 
Hemyar, which continued until 1962. Discontent continued. In 1970 Sultan 
Qabous replaced his father in a bloodless coup supported by Britain55• 
It was possible to bring Sultan Said's rule to an end for two 
main reasons. In the first place, there was the British announce.ant of 
their impending withdrawal from the Gulf region, which would Bate it easier 
for the Yemeni-backed Dhofaris to threaten the truc1al States, and the 
supply of oil if they succeeded in toppling Said bin Tayaor. Secondly, the 
ruler's prestige and credibility as a ruler had declined. His financtal 
strictness and refusal to enter into any kind of debts made hi. reluctant 
to embark on the development of his country, even after the beginning of 
oil exploitation. He lost the respect of his own people by avoiding them 
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and staying at Salalah, and. in a period marked by the spread of Arab 
national iSD. his ties were with British India rather than with the Arab 
world. 
The new Sultan Qaboos installed a council of Dinisters led by his 
uncle Tareq who had been in exile. This was the first Cabinet in Omani 
history. In the country there are four politically important groups: the 
royal family, the tribes, the expatriate advisers, and the merchant class. 
In many respects, the royal family is still the most important group. Local 
government 1s administered by Walis (governors) and each Wilayah, or 
prOVince, has attached to it a ~ or shAria judge. In the major towns 
there are also municipal councilss7 , levertheless, the royal family still 
has a major influence in key positions in the government, including a 
number of ministerial posts. Certain fundamental matters have been decided 
by the Sultan himself, generally without consultation and almost invariably 
relying on the advice offered to him by expatrIates - if advice was sought 
at all. At any time the Sultan can invite respected Quanis to attend him 
for the purpose of seeking their views on utters of vital importance to 
the community. It is also the case that the Sultan has to pay some regard 
to tribal balance within the country and also to consult with tbe merchant 
communities of luscat and Xattrah, with their minority racial groups (Khuju 
and Baluch>. He must take note of the views of the Dhofarls. In many 
respects, therefore, Oman is a complex SOCiety with a dIstinct history 
which sets it apart, in certain respects, from the otber __ 11 states6 "'. 
The United Arab Bmirates£': 
The United Arab Emirates consists of seven eovereign states -
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ras al Khat ma , Aj_n, Pujaira, and Umm a1-
Qaiwain. Their territories lie on the southern shores of the Gulf, 
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extending eastwards to the Gulf of Oman. Originally, it was planned that 
the larger Shaykdoms of Qatar, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi and Dubai would join 
with the five tiny 'poor' emirates. Qatar and Bahrain refused to join, each 
demanding a more central role than the others were willing to grant. Until 
1970, Iran's claim over Bahrain prevented these efforts being realized, and 
Bahrain took the initiative and lobbied for representation in the new 
federation in accordance with the size of its population. Qatar, which not 
only contested Bahrain's drive to dominate the new state politically but 
also remained itself in conflict with Bahrain over the claim to the Hawar 
Islands, held back. On 1 December 1971, Britain formally relinquished its 
protective role over the seven Gulf Shaikhdoms. On the following day, six 
of them joined the federation. The seventh, Ras al-Khaima, did not join 
until 10 February 1972. The provisional constitution of the United Arab 
Emirates, promulgated in 1971, provided for a preSident, vice-president, 
council of ministers, and a legislating body called the Federal Jational 
Council, which was made up of the seven rulers and a federal cabinet 
consisting of the prime minister and twenty one other ministers. Abu Dhabi 
provided the priDe minister and eight ministers. The legislature is a 
Iational Assembly of some 40 members, of which eight represent Abu Dhabi, 
eight Dubai, six Sbarja, and six Ras al-Khaima70 • 
Abu Dhabi is the most important eDirate in the 
federatlon,contributlng about 90 per cent of the federal budget, in 
addition to financing separate development projects in other .ember 
states71 • In 1966, the ruler. overwhelmed by the problems of oil affluence, 
was deposed by faDily agreement - with British encouragement - and was 
succeeded by his brother Shakh Zaid - the President of the United Arab 
iDdrates. Since then, Abu Dhabi's history has been marked by SUccessful 
policies in social affairs and econoide development. It has grown in 
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international stature in the Arab world and beyond. In Dubai. the ruler. 
Shaikh Rashid bin Said exercises direct rule. The most i~rtant 
administrative body is the Dubsi Xunicipal Council. originally founded in 
1957 and given a character and corporate existence in 1961. The council of 
thirty members represents different sections of the community. Its 
decisions must be ratified by the ruler. but with his consent it can make 
local orders, and has power to Bake contracts and own lands. 
In general. therefore. it can be suggested that the 
Federation was consolidated with greater ease and success than many had 
forecast. Abu Dhabi. followed by Dubai. was pre-eminent. but the 
disparities were not so enormous. either in size or wealth. as to make 
practical co-operation impossible. 
Qatar: 
Discussion of Qatar in the twentieth century must begin with 
the AI-Thani, who emigrated from the Arabian peninsula and settled in Qatar 
about the end of the seventeenth century72. The Al-Thani tribal ancestry is 
linked to the large Xadid. one of the major Qatari tribes. The AI-Thani is 
the largest ruling family among the Gulf states. which helps account for 
the stability and institutional simplicity of its political system tOday. 
The remarkable figure for the history of modern Qatar is Shaikh Hamad bin 
Abdulla who reigned from 1913 to 1949. Under his rule. Qatar was nearly 
isolated from the general political development of the Gulf and maintained 
relations only with Britain and Saudi Arabia. 
Qatar's relationShip with Bahrain has frequently been of 
central significance. The history of A1-lhalifa's ties with Qatar -
according to local reports in the Gulf area - goes back to the great 
emigration of the Arab tribes fro. the interior of the Arabian peninsula in 
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the eighteenth century. During this period. they passed through Qatar when 
its leaders were the Al-iussallam73 • They stayed for some time and then 
continued their travels until they reached Kuwait. In 1760 they emigrated 
back to Qatar where they settled at al-Zubara. On 29 July 1783 the island 
of Bahrain was conquered by Al-Khalifa. thus putting to an end Persian 
domination. There was then much tension and rivalry between Qatar and 
Bahrain in the first half of the nineteenth century. However. in September 
1868 an agreement was concluded between Shaikh Xuhammad bin Thani and the 
, 
British representative. Pelly. It made Qatar for the first time a party to 
the maritime truce74 • Subsequently. Bahraini-Qatari relations improved. and 
even became amicable. Qatar continued to pay its share of the tribute which 
the Bahrainis paid to the Vahhabi state. However, the situation changed 
when the Ottoman Turks reached Qatar in July 1871 and re-established their 
presence in Doha. One of the reasons why the Al-Thani allied with the 
Ottomans was an attempt to have the annual tax cancelled. In the last 
quarter of the century there were a number of occasions on which the 
Bahrainis raised their claim to Zubara, but Qatar categorically refused to 
admit it. From 1902 good relations generally prevailed until 1935 when 
Qatar offered an oil concession which caused the Bahrainis to reme.ber 
long-forgotten Zubara. This issue has never completely faded. 
Prior to the production of oil in 1949. Qatar was one of the 
poorest communities of the Gulf region. Its relatively large population 
made a precarious living from pearling and fishing. Its subsequent 
development has transfor .. d its economic basis within a short space of 
time. In 1970, a year before its independence, Qatar became the first of 
the small states to have a written constitution. It provided for a council 
of ministers and an advisory council. The advisory council, established in 
1972, consisted exclusively of members appointed by the ruler. The council, 
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although designed to represent .ajor social and economic interest groups in 
Qatar, has no authority to do acre than recommend. It 1s not empowered to 
initiate legislation of its own accord. Being of Wahbabi fundamentalist 
persuasion, like their Saudi neighbours, the ruling family have favoured 
the re-affirmation of Islamic laws and principles in public and private, 
expressed, for example, in the ban on the importation, manufacture and 
consumption of alcohol. Permission to open cinemas was somewhat reluctantly 
granted only in 1970. In general, therefore, Qatar can be said to offer its 
own distinctive blending of tradition and modernity during this period of 
transi tion. 
Culture, Religion and Society 
This brief survey of some of the salient structural aspects of 
the region is necessary but in itself insufficient to account for the full 
context in which political decisions have to be made. terms like 'Iran', 
'the Arabs', 'Islam' or 'tribalism' oversimplify the realities of 
political, social, religious and ldeologica1 life which are as eomplex as 
the pattern of events to which they give rise. For example, there is a 
basic division in language between Persian and Arabic, a division which 
might also be seen to a large extent as ethnic. Similarly, distinguishing 
between 'Sunni' and 'Shla' ls only the first step towards understanding the 
variety of ISlamiC culture and ideology. Some BOre remarks on this latter 
pOint are necessary. 
'or losleas theaselves, Islam has always been a eivilization and 
a comprehensive outlook on the world. It is not merely a 'religion' in the 
privatized and restricted sense in whieh that term is often used in the 
West. In the Ioslem view, at least ideally, there are few or no aspects of 
individual and social life that .. , not be considered as immediate 
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expressions of Islam or which give scope for the working out of its 
implications. Ve must also not ignore the fact that IslaJdc culture 
differed from place to place and was shaped by its own regionally varied 
history as well as by present social realities. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, to learn that Islamic culture in Saudi Arabia is very different 
from Islamic culture in Iran. Similarly, Islamic culture plays different 
roles at different social levels, whether these be defined in terms of 
region, race or economic class. 
Generally speaking, in the Gulf region, religion remains a vital 
force in all soc1eties, no matter to what sect individuals or countries 
belong. If we take Iran as an example, we can in many respects consider it 
to be a country which has been the most advanced, developed, industrialized 
in the entire region, but that has not significantly altered the extent to 
which Iranians have continued to be aware of the religious dimension of 
human existence. They have remained convinced of the binding character of 
the &bario. For this reason, it may in some sense be suggested that 
traditional religious beliefs have st111 much the same potency as DOdern 
political ideologies. On the other hand, with the rise of modern econoaic 
and secular education, political ideologies have also come to the fore in 
Islamic societies, albeit within settings quite different from the original 
European homes of these ideologies. For example, in the decade or so before 
the 1979 Iranian revolution, a new revolutionary ideological trend emerged 
and changed the climate of opinion among a segment of the intelligentsia. 
Indeed, it played a major part in the overthrow of the Shah. 
Since lapoleon set foot in the lile valley, Islamic lands have 
suffered so .any defeats and threats to their existence that their power 
and glory has tended to become a memory of a remote past. The threats grew 
even more alarJdng when Western pressures continued, in one for. or 
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another, long after political domination had begun to recede. These 
bewildering and unhappy experiences produced a cumulative eifect, an 
indelible feeling of having suffered indignity together with a sense of 
injured pride7s • That psychological condition was a material factor in 
political responses. The section that follows looks more closely at the 
divisions within the world of Islam, though a comprehensive religious 
analysis is not possible76 • 
Kore than 98 per cent of the inhabitants of the Gulf region 
are loslems. Although probably more than 80 per cent of all Xoslems in the 
world adhere to the Sunni sect of Islam, most of the 55 million Xoslems in 
the Gulf region are Shias77 • This 1s due to the fact that nearly all the 
XosleDLS in Iran and slightly DDre than half of the J(oslellS of Iraq are 
Bhias. The division between these Islamic sects, Shias and Sunnis, began as 
a political dispute but came to be distinguished by legal, theological and 
ritual differences7s • Shias always showed a greater tendency to political 
resistance to constituted authQrity than did Bunnis. Shias Simply never 
recognized the legitiDacy of their rulers. Besides the countries already 
mentioned, they were to be found in Bahrain and the Indian sub-continent. 
Persians whose ancestors emigrated to Kuwait, Bahrain, the U.A.E. and 
Eastern Saudi Arabia, brought their Bhia beliefs and practices with them. 
In addition, periodiC missions were sent out from Qum in Iran to Bahrain 
and other Gulf communities. The prinCipal holy cities of the Bhia are lajaf 
and Karbala in Iraq which, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, were 
visited each year by Dany thousands of pilgrillS fro. Itanand other parts 
of the world·79 • 
As has been indicated, the appeal of the Bbia aect has not 
been restricted to one particular ethnic or linguistic community. However, 
in other contexts within the regian, a particular religiOUS emphasis has 
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blended with cultural and historical factors to produce a distinct quasi-
national consolldation80 • One example of ~his is lbadi •• , which has become 
an integral part of Oaani national culture and a political force whch has 
shaped the development of Omani SOCiety. It is worth notIng that the 
structure of Oaan1 society 1s such that one cannot really seaparate 
religion, culture and political history·'. As Wilkinson has suggested, 
Ibadism is productive of egalitarianisa in an area of the Xoslem world 
where there is such a well-developed sense of hierarchy tha- one Ddght 
almost speak of a caste-system. Oman has been split on religious, ethnic 
and political lines since the eighth centuryQ~. the Ibadi ideal was to 
restore Islam to its pristine conditton at the time of the prophet. The 
Ibadis are therefore Islamic fundamentalists of strict observance, seeking 
to establish a 'community of the just', They are also fiercely egalitarian, 
in contrast to Sunni and Shia losleme. The Ibadi do not believe that there 
must be a permanent and visible head of the ~ but that, if a suitable 
person is not available, the true leader remains hidden and the community 
as a whole might have to conceal its beliefs. Over time, lbadism eventually 
became the ideology of Casni particularism, and is today the official 
religion of the state. On the other hand. not all ODanis adhere to lbadi ••. 
All along the coast there are Sunni Iosleas and there 1s also a large Bbia 
presence. Xeny of the ancestors of the latter arrived in Oman tram the 
other side of the Gulf over three or four hundred years ago and they are 
heavily represented in the merchant class, the ruling ta~ly 1n Oman 
follows the lbadi sect. Its adherents deny legitimacy to the succession of 
Caliphs, except for the first two83 • In principle, they are 1n favour of an 
elective i .... te but in practice the AI-Bu Sald family has obsedrved the 
custom of dynastic succession··, the Ibadis are generally noted for their 
11fe of prayer and piety. They rese.ble theVahhabis in their tendency to 
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look upon other Koslem sects as religiously lax in comparison w1th 
themselves. However, the legitimacy of the government and the purity of 
Islam has not become a major issue in Omani life. The religious base in the 
country as a whole is still strong and is a potent influence in the 
development of the nation and its people. In general, however, Ibadism has 
served to emphasize the individuality of Oman in the Eastern Arabian 
worldss;. 
A comparable position exists in Saudi Arabia with regard to 
Wahhabis~~. The role of religion 1n the forging of what was to become the 
Saudi state has already been noted. It is now appropriate to look more 
closely at that religious emphasis which was to beCODe, in effect. also a 
political ideology underpinning the Saudi structure. The AI-Saud Wahbabism 
has given a sense of purpose to generations of Saudis by uniting the 
disparate tribes and principalities, often at war with each other. into the 
present-day state. Wahbabis prefer to be called Xuwahidin. or 'unitarians' 
denoting thereby their strict DOnotheism. They abhor any notion of 
glor1fying or deifying their spiritual founder. Likewise they deplore 
visible signs of spirituality. For example, they are buried in unmarked 
graves so that no one may be tempted to revere the dead. This rule applies 
to kings and commoners alike. The question of the worship of sainte proved 
especially controversial. Any such suggestion was deeaed to be idolatry by 
the VahhabisQ7. Ibn Saud himself put the general position forcefully in 
remarks he made in a speech on 11 lay 1929: 
'They call us ·Wahhabls· and they call our creed a -Wahhabl- one 
ae if it were a special one .••• nd this is.n extremely erroneous allegation 
that has arisen from the false propaganda launched by those who had 111 
feelings as well as 111 intentloy towards the .:lve_ut. Ve are not 
proclaiming a new creed or new dogma. .u~d ibn Abd Al-Wahhab did not 
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come with anything new. Our creed is the creed of those good people who 
preceded us and which came in the Book of God -the Quran - as well as that 
of his lessenger (the Prophet Xohaumed, prayer and peace upon him).' 
He further stressed that they respected the four laams and continued 'It is 
a creed built on the oneness of the AIDdghty God, totally for His sake and 
it is divorced from any ills or false innovation. The Unitarian creed is 
the creed of dogma which we are calling for and it is the one which will 
save us from calamity and catastrophe···. The Vahhabis subscribe to the 
most conservative of the Islamic schools of jurisprudence·~. 
The Wahhab16 strongly beHeve that because the Shias have not belonged 
to the heart of Islam, at least as they have conceived that heart, they 
have rightly only received a fraction of the attention devoted to the 
Sunnis. The Wahhabi hostility towards Shias should be understood as a point 
of more general antipathy towards Shirk (the association of anyone or 
anything with God). levertheless, in practice, the Saudi rulers have 
generally tolerated the Bbia communites as long as they did not cause 
problems or engage in offensive religious rituals in public·a • And it is 
important to .entlon that, despite the impression of a monollth given by 
Saudi Yahhabisa, thereare aany local differences in religious observance in 
Saudi Arabia. Yet there ls no ainority in Saudi Arabia to compare with the 
Bhia of Al-Hasa , either in size or activity (numbering as aany as 400,000). 
The Bhia of Al-Hasa look for guidance to the great Shia shrines of Karbala 
and lajaf in Iraq and to the Xujtahids (exemplars) of Iran·'. 
It could be said with some truth that just ae Shialsa 
served to unify Iran. Vahhabisa unified Saudi Arabla. In both cases, 
however, what began as a tool of state consolidation beeame a conservative 
brake on state policy·a. The leadership of Yahhabisa is closely tied to one 
hereditary faDdly and also allied to the large by faJdly-contro:led 
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political system. Prom the beginning of the modern Saudi state, its rulers 
have moved steadily to moderate Wahhabism without destroying its 
ideological force93 • 
These three examples - Shiaism, Ibadism and Wahhabism -
serve to make the central point that there is considerable diversity within 
the world of Islam notwithstanding some appearances to the contrary. The 
next section will also demonstrate the pluralism, in ethnic terms. that 
lies behind supposed national identities. 
When Westerners hear the word tribe it generally awakens 
the image of nomads, and certainly each of the Gulf countries has nomadic 
life within its frontiers. In this region. however. it is not the nomadic 
tribes which are the decisive social force, but rather the sedentary 
population who equally claim a tribal lineage. Moreover. for all. marriage 
and family relations reflect the dominant 1mportance of k1nship~4. 
Tribalism in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia is very different from the 
Iranian experience. In Iran. tribalism is politically significant in as 
BUch as tribal identities COincide with ethnic ones. as with separatist 
Devements among the Kurds. Baluchis and others. In contrast. in the Gulf 
and in Saudi Arabia all tribes, almost without exception are closely 
integrated into the government apparatus and are represented among the 
ruling elite. The exceptions are perhaps to be located among the merchant 
class in Kuwait and Bahrain'., 
Language is also an important factor in relation to 
tribalism. In Iran. about half of the population speak Pereian as their 
native language but in t~ north-west are the Turtie-speaking !zeris, 
kins:men of those Hving 1n nearby Soviet Azerbaijan and 1n the north-east, 
Tureomans also have their bloo4 tlesQver the Soviet border. To the 
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southeast of Isfahan, in the central Zagros. the Bakhtiari tribes and, west 
of them, to the Iraqi border, the Lure both speak a dialeet of Persian. In 
the southern Zagros are the Turkic-speaking Qashqas. Most of the people 
along the Iranian coast of the Gulf and Khuzistan, east of Shatt-al-Arab, 
speak Arabic. although many of them also speak Persian. They are called 
Rawilla Arabs'6. lorth of the Khuzistan and Lurs tribal area are the Kurds. 
with their own language, Kurdish. which itself has many dialectical forms. 
In south-eastern Iran. the Baluchi tribes dominate the entire area and also 
figure prominently in Gulf society and politics. especially in Oman and 
Dubai. They are mostly Bunni Ioslems. Finally. other ethnic groups are or 
have been present in small numbers: the Jewish community, Armenian 
Christians and Zoroastrians, followers of the pre-IslamiC religion of 
Persia".a7. 
There is one safe generalization to be made about 
these Iranian tribes - that no generalization is valid. SoDe tribes are 
almost totally nomadic, others have settled in permanent villages, and 
there is a substantial difference between them. Tribal loyalties vary 
greatly, ranging from the intense to the lukewarm'S. This very great 
diversity in tribal structure, tribal loyalty and the extent of nomadism, 
1s of considerable importance with reference to the development of 
nationalism in Iran since between a sixth and a quarter of the Iranian 
population are members of tribes". Generally, tribesmen were less 
responsi ve to the appeal of nationalism than were peasaats. Loyalty to the 
tribe was generally stronger than the peasant's loyalty to the Village, and 
hence more of a barrier to the acquiei tiOD of a higher loyalty - to the 
state. As agricultural methods improved, there was an increasing tendency 
towards permanent settlement. At the turn of the century, the .oat 
important tribes, politIcally speaking, were the Kurds, the Qashqas, the 
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Lurs, the Bakhtiaris, the Khamneh complex, the Shahsaven and the Turcomans. 
During Reza Shah's reign, no programme to subdue the tribes was announced. 
nor, in all likelihood, did Reza Shah carefully calculate a plan for the 
destruction of tribal power. He wanted absolute power in a unified and 
controlled state, and the autonomy of the tribes had to be destroyed for 
the achievement of this goal. Other aspects of Reza Shah's programme were, 
however, even DOre effective than Dilitary action in destroying tribal 
cohesion and potency. The railroad and the new road system enabled the army 
to patrol formerly inaccessible tribal areas and to ensure the collection 
of taxes. On the other hand, by helping to ward off foreign inVasions, the 
tribes can lay claim to have helped Iran acquire and retain a unique 
history and distinctlve culture, ele.ents that have proved extremely useful 
for the integration of nationalism. 
When we look on the other side of the gulf, we find a 
comparably complex blend of tradtional and modern loyalties in the emerging 
states. At a superficial level, ideas and tastes of the cont.mporary West 
were being avidly adopted and appeared to be obliterating what remained of 
a conservative and indigenous culture. levertheless, what is perhaps IIOst 
striking of all is the resilience of the basic elements of traditional 
society - Islam, the tribe, and the family. They continued to shape Gulf 
societies'oo. Of course 'traditionalism' can embrace many things. For our 
purposes, we will take it to 1nvolve at least four d1fferent forms of 
social organization: a desert patriarchal system, an urban-i~rial system, 
tribal city-states,and theocratic co..unitles '01 • Ioreaver. it is werth 
noting, politically speaking, that (Iraq apart) the trad1t10aal polittcal 
leadership of the Gulf region has been sch mre euccessfulin adapting, 
integrating and oontrol11ng the often disruptive forces of change in their 
territories than have other KiddIe Eastern leaders,02. 
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Ionetheless, traditional societies in the Gulf area are a mosaic of 
religious. ethnic and linguist1c patterns. There is lees of a religious 
complexity than elsewhere in the Kiddle East. However. Iran and Iraq have 
or have recently had Christian, Jewish or Zoroastrian mlnorltiee'Q~. These 
minorities were allowed to elect their own representatives to the Xajlis, 
but members of these groups could not occupy command posItions In the armed 
forces or major decision-making positions in government under the Shah and 
recent events will not have brought about any enhancement of their status 
and role '04 • Apart from these minorities who were given a substantial 
degree of cODmUnal autonomy, slavery was a recent reality. In theory, they 
were at the very bottom of SOCiety, but over time those who were attached 
to ruling families often became merged into the ruling elite themselves'Q&. 
It is well-known that the trading connexion of the Gulf with 
Africa had been followed by the establishment of political control along 
the East African l1ttoral through the Omani dynasty of the Sultans of 
Zanzibar. Thus BOdern Omani SOCiety conta1ns some ethnic mixture which 
stems from her past ties with India, Persia and Africa'os. In addition, it 
is worth ment1on1ng the presence of the descendants of o.an before the Arab 
arrival. And it is no accident that many Ohofaries and Baluchis who came 
from 'Iran' and 'Pakistan' in the seventeenth and eIghteenth centuries had 
not adopted Ibadism. They were predoldnantly Sunni. Then again, the small 
Omani Shla populat1on is largely to be found a.eng the well-establiahed 
.. rchant class, descendants of Persians who had settled in the country. 
Indeed, at many levels in Oman 1t is posSible to identity Persian 
influences. According to Cottrell. these influences were also atrong in the 
Red Bea area and the bulk of the inhabitants of Aden and Jidda were 
Persians who spoke Arabic. 107. 
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Another influence in Oman stems from 1ts contacts and 
commerce across the Indian Ocean - the Khajas or Ha1darbadis were 
originally of Indian extraction. One great difference between or among the 
various ethnic groups of Omanis 1s worth noting. Both Persians and, to a 
lesser extent, Baluchis settled on a tribal basis but 'arabized' themselves 
by adopting Arab customs and traditions as well as the Arabic language. 
Amongst the older generation there were still many who could not speak 
Arabic even though they had been born in Oman. In addition, they tended to 
retain their Indians customs and traditions. Until recently. they lived in 
an enclosed area within the Omani capital and prohibited any race, apart 
from their own, to enter the d1strict 1oe • One other small group ought to be 
mentioned, namely the Zutt or Zututt, who might be thought of as 'gypsies'. 
They possess the lowest classification of any group within Oman' 0$. 
Finally. Omani society has had to try hard to assimilate the 'Zanzabaris', 
people of Omani origins but linguistically and traditionally Africans and 
racially a mixture of Arab and African. 
Oman 1s unusual in its complexity but a blending of different 
elements is also characteristic, to a lesser degree, of mest of the small 
states. The Gulf region is. almost by definition. one of contact and 
commerce. Intermingling is just what we would expect. In the case of Oman. 
we might even be able to 1dentify six main categories of people who can to 
some extent be differentiated occupationally and geographically: first. the 
coastal population. with a tradition of trading and fiShing; secondly, the 
population of Bat1nah, who are heavily involved 1n agr1~ulture; th1rdly, 
the settlement of interior Oman; fourthly, the nomads 'Badu'; fifthly. the 
Shihuh of the Xusandam Pen1nsula"o; and finally the Dhofarie with their 
strong links with the Yemen and Bast Africa. 
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This analysis of Oman. taken ln conjunction wlth what has been 
said about Iran, indicates how difficult it has proved to apply concepts of 
'nationalism' imported into the reglon. It is to this problem that we turn 
in the final section of this chapter. 
Of course, in the West itself the concept of 'nation' has been 
the subject of much debate and disagreement"'. The literature is too large 
for extensive discussion"2. However, we take as our starting point Robert 
lisbet's comment that 'modern nationalism cannot be understood ... apart from 
those rifts and clefts in the traditional structure of hUman loyalties 
caused by economic and social dislocation, which left widening masses of 
human beings in a kind of psychological vacuum' "~. Arab nationalism as an 
ideology and as a factor in KiddIe Eastern politics is a recent 
development. It was hardly known before the beginning of the twentieth 
century and it was only after the First World War that a coaprehensive 
doctrine of Arab nationhood was elaborated. Thereupon, politicians in Iraq 
and Syrla, enjoying a .. asure of independent action and able to exploit the 
rivalries of the great powers 1n the JUddle East, began to attempt to 
create a state which WDuld embrace the entire 'Arab nation', Arab 
nationalism was a reaction against Ottoman tyranny, and against the 
centra11zation policles of the ComDdttee of Union and Progress. It gathered 
strength and some coherence during aDd after the First World War. The great 
Arab Revolt of 1916 originated 1n that part of the Otto .. n Empire least 
effected by the centralization pollcies and it was alao the l.ast 
politically conscious. Some writers would place the begtnnings of Arab 
nationalism much earlIer - in the Wahhabl BOvement tONards the end of the 
eighteenth century. but such views seem at odds with the historical 
evidence. The Vahhabis were not nationalist by any acceptable definition of 
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the term. They were purists, rather, who wished to restore Islam to what 
they took to be its original purity. As we have seen. their concern was 
with IosleDB rather than Arabs. They directed their zeal against lax. 
backsliding or heretical IosleDB rather than towards the creation of an 
Arab national state. 
Matters are rather different in the case of Iran. We have 
outlined its political developDent earlier in this chapter. By our period. 
it was polItIcally. milItarIly and in terms of population. education and 
the establishment of a 'middle class', by far the most powerful state in 
the region. Alien influence had been present over Dany years, but Iran had 
not in fact beco.e a dependency. The 'nation' was still intact. Prom long 
practice, it had achieved a feat of balance between Russia and the West. It 
was now capable of exercising a degree of power that could only be 
Challenged by forces engineered from outsidethe Gulf region. Hence Iranian 
pride and nationalism seemed whole and undivided, notwithstanding what has 
been said about the ethnic complexity of the country. We should not forget, 
however, that racial differences between Persians and Arabs, so much loved 
by older writers. are less clear than was once supposed. The people of iran 
are a racial mixture. So too are most Arabs. The differences between one 
group of Arabs and another may be greaterthan those between a group of 
Iranians and a group of Arabs. This point could be elaborated in a variety 
of contexts throughout the Gulf region. Sufficient has perhaps been said. 
however, to indicate that the question of nationalis. in the Gulf ls, in 
effect, every bit as complex as it has been in the history of Europe. As in 
Burope and elsewhere, lt has provided simultaneously disruptive and 
unifying consequences for the region'. internal and international politics. 
It 1s to these aspects that we now turn"3. 
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Chapter Two: Cpnflicts And Dispytes in the Gulf Reiipn 
Since the discovery of oil in the Gulf in the 1930s and 19405. it has 
been a major and recurring source of conflict in the region. This is 
scarcely surprising. given that the KiddIe EAst as a whole produces 35 per 
cent ef the eil in the world, of which 15 per cent comes from the Gulf 
seabed: in total. the offshore Gulf is known to contain 10 per cent of the 
world's proven reserves'. 
The absence of Dany clear and unambiguous boundaries in this vital 
region is in many ways a legacy of the lengthy domination of the Gulf by 
the British. The British presence had frozen disputes rather than solved 
them. for claimants were both deterred from pressing their claims and 
relieved of the necessity of resolving them. There was an obvious 
possibility that claimants might in future seek Violent solutions. 
Traditionally, little attention had been paid to territorial boundaries 
since jurisdiction over men had been of much greater significance than 
jurisdiction over territory. It is also important to mention that the Gulf 
region has a rich and varied history of human settlement and occupation. 
Iearly all of its surface has been settled by people of Bany 'nations' and 
tribes in the past. It is not, therefore, surprising that both islands and 
mainland territories are subject to conflicting clai.a2 • Additional scope 
for territorial disputes bas also been created .arely by the introduction 
of the concept of the BOdern state and what was at stake bas been greatly 
aagnified by both known and prospective oil deposits. The area of 
contention has also extended to the seabed of the Gulf itself. The first 
serious attempts to establish territorial boundaries in Bastern Arabia 
followed the First World War, but their frontiers were not fully 
demarcated. The dangerous possibilities were revealed by the quarrel 
between Abu Dhabi, Oman and Saudi Arabia concerning the AI-Buraim1 OaSiS, 
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which began in 1952 and which led to the expulsion of Saudi forces from the 
area by the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1955. This dispute and related issues 
were finally settled in 19743 • The section which follows looks at this 
particular issue in SODe detail. 
Al-Buraimi is an agglomeration of nine settlements: Hili. Al-Qatarah. 
AI-J1m1. Al-Xutaradh, Al-Ain, Al-Kuw.aiqi, Sa'ra. Hamasa and Buralm1. The 
name Buraimi is taken from that of the biggest village4 • Buralmi was the 
strategic key to inner Oman and the Gulf Shaikhdoms. The oasis measures 
about six miles across and is roughly circular in outline, containing a 
plentiful supply of good water brought from the nearby hills in underground 
channels. Whoever held Buraim1 in force could overcome the Gulf Shalkhdoms 
and much of inner Oman besides. 
With the creation of new Arabian states in the twentieth century, the 
likelihood of border disputes increased greatly. Perhaps the best-known 
quarrel concerned this Saudi Arabian claim for a major extension to her 
territory. the total area involved being much larger than merely that 
occupied by the collection of small villages. The claim advanced by Riyadh 
in 1949. for example, would have involved the loss of some 80 per cent of 
the territory of Abu Dhabi~. The Saudi claim could be taken as a logi~al 
extension of aspirations satisfied in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century when the Al-Saud succeeded in establishing ~litary and 
political control over the plateau of the Arabian peninsula and 
successfully took and maintained control over the littoral areas to east 
and west. At the same time, they pushed north to the Euphrates and south 
into Yemen as far as the coast. There bas not been an uncontested inch of 
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border on the entire circumterence of what is formally acknowledged to be 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
In 1800, Buraimi was occupied by a Vahhabi expedition despatched 
from lajd: a force of horsemen and camel-riders made a journey of five 
hundred miles across the desert to seize the oasis, hard by the foothills 
of the Kajar mountain range of Oman. The Saudis continued their occupation 
until 1818 when they were expelled by the Bgyptians. But in 1824 they were 
successful in regaining their position in the oasisS • During the long reign 
of Faisal bin Turki, known as Faisal the Great <ruled 1834-38, 1843-65), 
the British had several contacts with AI-Saud. In 1843 Faisal returned from 
Cairo where he had been held captive by Xuhammed Ali since 1838. When he 
first sought to occupy Buraimi, the chiefs of the area applied to Britain 
for protection. They were informed by the Bombay government that since the 
Egyptians no longer posed a threat the British position was not to be 
extended. Britain had no intention of interfering in the politics of Arabia 
further than was necessary to maintain peace in the Gulf? 
In 1865, Faisal died and was succeeded by his son Abdulla. In 1866. 
the British government gave military aid to the Sultan of Oman and 
encouraged him to oust the Vahhabis from the territories of Oman. Later 
that year, however, the differences between the British and the saudis were 
reconCiled. They arrived at an understanding, based ona declaration made 
on behalf of Amir Abdulla, dated 21 April 1866. In April 1869, the Vahhabi 
agent at BuralJ11 was shot dead, when Sa1yld Azzan of o.all sent troops that 
ended the Vahhabi occupation. Thereafter the oasis fell .are and DOre under 
the domination of the Bani Yas tribal confederation of Abu Dhabi-. 
During the period fro. 1871 to 1913, with the Turkish ocoupation of 
AI-Rasa (Eastern Saudi Province), there was not much change in the 
position. The Turks did not exercise allY jurisdiction over Buralm!. The 
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British government Itself was not In favour of any Turkish expansion in 
Arabia beyond those parts which were already actually in their hands. It is 
important to note that In July 1913 Ibn Saud was said to have written to 
the Shaikh of Qatar that the Shaikh should expel the Turks from his land. 
To complIcate matters, the old Shaikh Jassim bin Thani died and his son 
Abdulla, the new ruler, was reported by the Political Agent at Bahrain to 
have arranged to meet Ibn Saud. It was suggested that Ibn Saud mlght force 
the new ShaIkh to evict the Turks or else he would himself take possession 
of Qatar. The Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai were also reported to be 
making ready for a Saudi onslaught. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi was 
understandably fearful of an attack as he was then in control at Buraimi -
which Ibn Saud claimed. The Shalkhs threatened to call their Bedouin 
followers to repel any Saudi incursions. If this were not enough to tax 
British policy, Ibn Saud could also threaten Trucial Oman, which was being 
disturbed by the Xuscat rebeillon. 
It is against this background that we move into the '011 era'. The 
situation which has been outlined was confusing and contentious but, 
arguably, not of major importance. It was the development of Oil-wells and 
their location which raised the stakes. Territorial disputes became 
inevitable and much more than prestige was involved9 • In 1949, S.udi Arabia 
and Oman clashed over control of Buraiaii the Saudis wanted to control the 
area because ARAICO, operating in Saudi Arabia, were prospecting for oil in 
the area. In 1952, Saudi forces, with ARAICO's assistance. occupied the 
oasis - the oil company also helped to prepare the legal claims to support 
this occupation. In 1954, the Saudis and the British both .ub~tted the 
documentation of their claims to international arbitration. In the 
meantime, British-offlcered forces occupied the Villages. After 1955, the 
Buraiml dlspute was dormant for a While. Muscat administered three villages 
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and Abu Dhabi six. The Saudis did not accept this outcome, but decided to 
leave matters where they stood for the time being'O. In 1959, the United 
lations became involved in the Buraild dispute. DiplomatIc relatlons 
between Britain and Saudi Arabia were broken off following the Britlsh-
supported occupation of the area. Talks were resumed at the Un1ted lations 
in the presence of the Secretary-General both in 1959 and In 1960. In that 
latter year he sent a representative to the area and he continued his 
mediation efforts even after the resumptlon of Anglo-Saudi diplomatic 
relations in 1963. 
The dispute was not finally resolved until after British withdrawal 
from the region and the establishment of the United Arab BDirates. It was 
settled in 1974 by virtue of a final agreement by which Saudi Arabia 
renounced its claim to Buraimi in return for the cession by Abu Dhabi of a 
streth of terr1tory that gave the Saudis access to the Gulf east of the 
base of the Qatar peninsula. Moreover, the Zararah (Shaiba) oilf1eld, 
located on the Abu Dhab1-Saud1 border, was to be d1vided between the two 
states '1 • 
A cognate case was the claim of Iraq to the whole territory of 
Kuwait. It has already been ment1oned, but a few additional comments are in 
order. Iraq's aspirations had been aired by Baghdad politicians in the 
1920s and they were repeated in broadcasts from King Ghazl's private 
station in the years just before the outbreak of the Second World Var. It 
is important to note that such clai.s were being .ade before there was an 
awareness of Kuwait's enormous o11-wealth. IncorporatIon was not a eudden 
whlm on the part of General Qassim'2, 
- 61-
However, his claims were undoubtedly sparked off by envy of 
Kuwait's vast petroleum reserves. Interest in the Gulf first began to grow 
with the development of the new oil fields at Zubair and Rumaila in 
southern Iraq in the late 1940s and with the opening of the ter~nal at Fao 
on the Gulf in 1951. Iraq's unsettled internal condition, however, 
continued to preclude the formation of a coherent Gulf policy. Xeanwhile, 
Kuwait production continued to grow. In 1960, its total production was 
already in excess of 80 million tons. The Iraqi revolution of 1958 was a 
major development in the history of the Gulf and its DOre general aspects 
will be cons1dered at greater length subsequently. We confine ourselves 
here to its specific implications in regard to Kuwait '3 • 
The revolution turned Iraq into a major exponent of radical Arab 
nationa11sm in the Gulf area and the existence of conservative regimes 
appeared as an obstacle and menace to the security of the revolutionary 
regime in Iraq14. Iraqi-Soviet links were immediately established with the 
revolution, links which were to culminate eventually in the Iraq-Soviet 
treaty of 1972 by which the Russians gained the use of Iraqi facilities in 
the Gulf region. In 1968, after the British announcement of impending 
withdrawal from the region, the United States made clear its hope that in 
the long run Iraq WQuld orient itself DOre towards co-operation with the 
West. The Russians charged both the United States and Britain with 
attempting to create a ~litary bloc in the Gulf against Russia.However, 
this is to anticipate. Despite the significant changes brought about by the 
revolution, l~ttle practical interest was taken in the affaire of the lower 
Gulf. Kuwait alone attracted serious Iraqi governmental interest between 
1961 and 1963. 
There had always been some contact between Iraq and other Gulf 
states. For geographical and historical reasons, the strongest contact was 
-62-
with Kuwait's. There were long-established econoDic ties between Kuwait and 
southern Iraq. Kuwait was dependent upon Iraq for the supply of grain, 
fruit, vegetables and even fresh water. On the other hand, Kuwaiti ships 
carried much of the trade of southern Iraq. Between July 1958 and April 
1961 Qassim's attitudes even to Kuwait appeared no different from that of 
former Iraqi governments. They combined a grudging acceptance of Kuwait's 
separation with a reluctance to give overt recognition either to that 
separation or to the common border'·. On 19 June 1961, the 1899 treaty 
guaranteeing British protection for Kuwait was abrogated and Britain 
recognized Kuwait's independence. Six days later, Qassim held a press 
conference in which he announced that Kuwait was an integral part of 
Iraq'7. The haste with which the claim was mounted can be explained partly 
by rumours Circulating in the spring of 1961 that Kuwait intended to join 
the British CODmOnwealth of lations on achieving her independence. It can 
also be partly explained by the state of Iraqi dODestic policies in 1961. 
With increasing internal opposition, the Kuwait claim was a meaus of 
shifting the attention of a politically fragmented nation from domestic to 
foreign affairs. 
On 1 July, at Kuwait's request, British and Saudi troops arrived in Kuwait, 
to be replaced in September by an Arab peace-keeping force established 
-
under the Arab League,e. The decision to withdraw the peace-keeping force 
was later taken on the grounds that the threat to Kuwait's independence no 
longer existed. In December 1961, Hashim Jawad, Qasslm'. foreign Dini.ter 
announced that Iraq would reconsider diplomatic relationa with any ~ountry 
which recognized Kuwait. In practice, the Kuwait dispute isolated Qassi. 
from all Arab neighbours and it solved no internal problems. By the ead of 
1962, Qasslm had no friend left 1n Iraq except a weakened cOmDUnist party 
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and a handful of army officers, and none left outside, except the Soviet 
Vnion, itself increasingly disturbed by the Kurdish war and far more 
concerned with Egypt than with Iraq. Worst of all, the proldse of social 
revolution begun in 1958 had started to falter. Land refora was in deep 
trouble; industrialization could aske no headway; development plans could 
not be launched. and oil revenues were beginning to falloff. It is against 
this background that we must ask what had prompted Qassim to make the 
claim. 
First of all, as a military leader, Qassim was used to issuing 
orders to his subordinates, both civil and Idlitary, assuDdng that his 
country would be with him. He sought to shift the focus of a divided nation 
from domestic to foreign affairs. Secondly, the Kuwait oil revenues looked 
increasingly attractive. Within a short time, Kuwait had become a major oil 
producer, production having reached the figure of 60 million tons, which 
has already been alluded to, from 17 million tons in 1950. The Kuwaiti oil 
revenues provoked envy in Arab lands and attracted the jealous eyes of Arab 
leaders who sought to achieve pan-Arab goals through territorial 
aggrandizement. How far Qassim was hoping to use the claim over Kuwait as a 
bargaining counter in subsequent negotiations remains a matter for 
conjecture.! bargaining counter would certainly have been of value, both so 
as to assure a favourable border settlement and so as to persuade the 
government of Kuwait to abrogate its defence treaty with Britain'·. 
Qassim's regime was overthrown in 1963. The Shaikh of Kuwait grasped 
the chance and sent a congratulatory telegram to Colonel Arif, who replied 
in the same vein. Following negotl'aUons between the twa countries, Iraq 
recognized Kuwait's independence and the two countries agreed to promote 
mutual econoaic, commercial and culturalrelations20 • Also, in return for 
Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty, Kuwait declared its willingness 
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to end its defence treaty with Britain and indicated its intention to work 
towards closer links with Iraq in the lang term. As a short-term indication 
of its special significance to Iraq it offered a financial contribution to 
the Iraqi economy. On 21 October the two countries signed an agreement for 
a ~30 million interest-free Kuwaiti loan to Iraq. 
The Balathist coup of 1968 brought about a new situation. Together 
with Iaseeris., Balathism has been the mast prominent revolutionary 
movement in Arab politics ln the eyes of the outside world. Revolution is 
presente~ as the necessary means to overcame the profound disparity between 
the aspirations to unity aDong the Arab peoples and the reality of complete 
dlsunity in their national life. The Balath as a party was organized in 
1940 in Syria by Said Jalal, Salah aI-Bitar and lichel Aflag. It emerged 
into the open in 1943 and held its first congress in 1947. Though the 
Balath ideology was essentially the product of Aflag's mind, it was a blend 
of doctrines and principles derived partly from Arab culture and partly 
from western thought. The Ba'athist ideological formula projects a vision 
of Arab national unity based on the glories of the Arab past. While 
recognizing Islam's seminal contributions to Arab civilization, the 
Ba'athist ideology is essentially secularist and socialist. Aflag built the 
party on three principles: that the true nationalist mavement should spring 
from the masses; that the Arab nationallsm of the entire Arab world 1s one 
and indivisible; and, BOst important of all, that popular revolution was 
lnevi table:21. 
Thls background helps to explain the frash tensions that developed 
in the early 1970s. The projects Which had been developing in collaboration 
over the previous few years were brought to an abrupt end in December 1972. 
Reports circulated of an Iraqi .tlltary build-up on the Kuwaiti border. and 
it became apparent that Iraq was strongly pressing its claims to the 
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islands of Varba and Bubiyan which dOminate the estuary leading into 
southern Iraq. Xore ls said subsequently concerning these lslands. It was 
the case that possession of them would have increased the .1ze of Iraq's 
Gulf shore - and its offshore oil rights - and allowed it to develop a much 
deeper water point in the Gulf. When negotiations proved fruitless, Iraqi 
troops occupied Al-Sam1tah, a border post in the north-east corner of 
Kuwait. Saudi Arabia iamediately came to Kuwait's aid, together with 
theArab League. and secured Iraq's withdrawal. Relations with Kuwait 
remained tense until the end of the 1970s. 
Iraq's claim to Kuwait, although unsuccessful. was a major one, 
involving many different parties. It was fundamental since it was a claim 
to the entire territory. If it had been successful, there would have been 
no Kuwait. The AI-Zubara dispute. on the other hand, arose over a BOre 
modest matter. the claim by Bahrain to a piece of land on the northern 
coast of Qatar to which we have also already referred but which now 
reqUires amplification. 
At present, Al-Zubara forms an integral part of Qatar. Bahrain'. 
claim 1s based on the historical ground that Al-Zubera was the ancestral 
home of the ruling Al-Khalifa before their conquest of Bahrain in 1783. It 
appears that during the nineteenth century and before the Britl.h 
government concluded the agreement of 1916 with Qatar, the Shaikh of 
Bahrain claimed sovereignty over the whole penlnsula of Qatar22 • The 
British government in India took the view as early as 1873 that the Shaikh 
had no clear or important rights in Qatar, and that he should be 
restrained, as far as pOSSible, froD making difficulties in the area. 
Subsequently, by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913, the Br1ti.h 
undertook not to allow the interference of the Shaikh of Bahrain in the 
internal affairs of Qatar. 
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In the new circumstances after the end of the Second World War, 
fresh negotiations began. In 1949 an attempt was made to reach a mpdys 
yiyendi between both countries, with the result that the Shaikh of Bahrain 
agreed to disclaim the ownership of any oil resources which Bdght be 
discovered in Al-Zubara. provided that the Shaikh of Qatar agreed neither 
to interfere with the luaiym tribe <Bahraini subjects living in Qatar) nor 
to rebuild the old fort at Al-Zubara. However. no formal agreement was 
concluded by the two parties relating to these matters. The issue therefore 
remains legally unresolved, though only occasionally does it become 
contentious~4. 
The presence of so many islands in the Gulf and their unequal 
distribution among its states is a special source of problems. While Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, for example. have few islands, Abu Dhabi claims over two 
hundred. What is a naturally complicated geographical and juridical 
situation has been rendered DOre controversial by human agency as when 
efforts have been made to convert sand shoals into islands by erecting 
cairns on theDP5. 
One of the largest claims to Gulf islands was the Iranian claim to 
the Bahraini islands. The Iranian claims were revived periodically in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and especially during the Pahlavi era. 
In 1970, however, Iran acceded to the findings of a special VI fact-finding 
Bdssion sent to Bahrain and formally recognized Bahrain's right to 
independence2s • Besides the Bahraini islands, however, the fallowing 
islands have been focuses of controversy. We shall now outline the issues 
involved~7: 
(1) Warba and Bubiyan 
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Although the claim to the whole of Kuwait seems to have been 
dropped, the claim to these two Kuwait islands seeas to be at the heart of 
contemporary disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraqi interest in Warba 
stemmed from the development of the port of Uam Qasr during the Second 
World Var. In 1954, Iraq put forward an additional claim to SODe 4 
kilometres of Kuwaiti-controlled coastline, west of Warba and Bubiyan. When 
the Bhaikh of Kuwait rejected the clai., the British proposed that Kuwait 
should lease the island of Warba to Iraq, which in turn formally rejected 
this proposal in 195628 • 
To play an influential role in the region Iraq needed a 
strategically secure outlet into the Gult and this led to territorial 
conflict with both Iran and Kuwait. Iraq's major means of access were 
through the Bhatt-al-Arab and the port of U .. Qasr. In April 10e9 Iraq took 
full advantage of heightened perceptions of an Iranian threat to press 
again its request for the right to station its forces on Kuwait soil so as 
to protect the area adjacent to U .. Qasr. In 1973, Iraqi troops crossed the 
border and occupied a Kuwait ailitary post, an act which naturally elicited 
Kuwait's strong protests. Iraq claimed that control of the islands was 
necesary for the safeguarding of the passage to Iraq's naval port of U .. 
Qasr251 • 
With the end of the Bhatt-ai-Arab dispute betweea Iraq and Iran in 
1975, Iraq found it increastngly difficult to justify the coatinuing 
presence of its forces on the Kuwaiti coastal strip of U .. Qasr. The 
deCision in the sa .. year to drop support for Liberation Pronts in the Gulf 
and her settlement with Saudi Arabia of a border dispute 1. July 197~ aade 
the grounds for occupation look even .are fliasy. In 1977 Iraq announced 
her intention to withdraw her forces froa Kuwait, aDd 1a 1979 both 
countries concluded an agreement giviag Iraq access to the deep-water 
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facilities at the Kuwaiti port of Kina Al-Shuwaikh. Despite these DeveDents 
towards better relations between the two countries, the primary long-term 
consideration in Kuwaiti foreign and defence planning remains its unsettled 
border dispute with Iraq30. Iraq's professed Detive for wanting the two 
islands has become that of improving the port of Fao, but it is clear that 
Iraqi possession would also improve its clai8 to offshore areas believed to 
be very rich in oil. 
(2) Hawar Islands 
Rawar lies between Bahrain and Qatar. It is located about one mile 
off the western coast of Qatar and can be reached on foot at low-tide~l. 
The dispute started in the 1930s, when the APCC oil concession was granted. 
There was no Bahraini claim before the granting of the oil concession. The 
islands had never been inhabited on any peraanent basis. In 1936 a Bahraini 
military garrison was stationed there~2. It became plain at that time that 
the issue was primarily one which concerned possible oil reserves beneath 
the seabed. Indeed, the subsequent discovery of oil was a DAjor factor in 
activating this still unsolved dispute. 
(3) Abu Xusa and the Tunbs 
These islands were disputed between Iran and the Arab !~rates in 
the late nineteenth century. On 30 loveaber 1971 Iran occupied the three 
islands that belonged to Sharja <Abu .usa) and Ras al-Khi_ «Tunbs). Down 
to the present, the issue of the ownership of these islands has remained a 
major source of irritation in Arab-Iranian relations in the Gulfa~. 
(4) Other disputed ls1ands 
There are other islands in the regton which recently have been 
subject to dispute between Gulf countries. For exaaple, the status of the 
islands of Umm al Karadia and Qaru 1s disputed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
They l1e between sixteen and twenty-five miles off the shore of the leutral 
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Zone. Kuwait considers these islands to be under her full sovereignty. but 
Saudi Arabia considers thea to be under their joint sovereignty. Other 
examples include Birri and Abu luayr, dIsputed between Iran and Sharja, and 
Bir Bani Yas, disputed between Iran and Abu Dhabi34 • 
It is safe to assume that all the insular problems that have been 
touched on will remain sources of conflict in the Gulf region until its 
off-shore boundaries have been demarcated. That in turn will require a more 
favourable general atmosphere ~n the Gulf than presently exists35 • 
Finally, in this chapter which has concerned itself with many 
disputes of greater or lesser importance, we turn to the dispute between 
Iran and Iraq which, to an extent. overshadowed all others. In September 
1980, the world was shocked by the news of the outbreak of the Iraql-
Iranian Gulf war in the region of the oi1fie1ds which constituted the main 
source of Western energy. Partly for this reason, of course. It was also an 
area of superpower involvement. This region has naturally attracted a great 
deal of attention in recent years. especially since the Iranian revolution 
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Conflict between Iran and 
Iraq had intensified with the rapid development of the 011 industry, the 
flood of wealth into the area and. after 1911. the withdrawal of the 
Bri Ush. 
Iranian foreign policy was aimed, first, at protecting the country's 
own national security and. secondly, at assuming respoD81bI1ity for the 
stability of the region and Its states. Also signIficant was the army's 
pressure for more weapons and the anXiety that any successful revolutionary 
IIOvement aJlOng Iran' s neighbours would be a direct t~eat to the Pahlavi 
regime. Revolutionaries would be.able to encourage similar movements 
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inside Iran. Finally. the freedom of 011 tanker navigation was a major 
concern. Revolutlon in Baghdad in 1958. with the fall of the Hashemite 
dynasty and the beginning of a Ddlitary regi .. threatened to undermine the 
Iranian position. Iran's attention. for a ti .. , focussed an the Gulf and 
on Iasserism. The Shah saw the Iraqi revolution as a direct threat from 
the Soviet Union because of its Influence on and ties with Baghdad as 
demonstrated by milttary assistance and other treaties. The presence of 
the Soviet Union in the Gulf was a source of great concern to Teheran3s• 
It also produced informal relations with Israel. which led to cooperation 
between the two countries, with the support of the United States. and the 
provision of assistance to the Kurdish rebellion from Teheran. 
The revolution of 1968 had certainly changed so .. of the bases of 
Iraqi foreign policy, which had been independence, Arab SOlidarity, 
friendly relations with Turkey and Iran and neutrality in the Bast-Vest 
conflict. The newly-established ties with the Soviet Union under Qassla 
forced Iraq to terminate the foraal agreements with Turkey and Iran, an 
action which aroused the hostility of Iraq's non-Arab neighbours. The 
domestic war with the Kurds led alDOst to arwed conflict with Iran. In 
1965. however, under Arif. Iraq promised to establish 'strong relations' 
with Turkey and Iran by ueveloping trade and econoaic aDd cultural 
relations with thea. It would take BOre than that to 1~ove relations with 
Iran again. Their antagonism had deeper roots than the 1958 revolution, as 
shown by recurring disputes over such issues as the Sbatt-al-Arabwaterway 
and Kurdish nationali ... 
The Bhatt-al-Arab dispute can be considered as the _in border 
problem between the two countries37 • Bhatt-aI-Arab is a large and wide 
watercourse into which both the river Buphrates and the river Tlgrisflow 
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near 'Karmat All', running togewther and creating one river which ends in 
the Gulf, separating Iraq and Iran. According to the second Ardrhom treaty 
in 1847, the Ottomans gave up the town of Xuhaamarah and the left bank of 
the Bhatt-aI-Arab to the benefit of Iran, but these transfers did not 
include the Shatt-al-Arab itself which remained under Ottoaan sovereignty. 
This arrangement had been confirmed in the 1913 protocol which settled the 
Persian-Ottoman borderline. According to this treaty, Iraq considered the 
Bhatt-aI-Arab as a domestic river on its land and under its sovereignty, 
while Iran considered it to be an international river. in which case, 
according to international law, the borderline between the two countries 
should be the middle of the river. 
The League of lations dealt with the dispute when it decided after 
some time that there must be direct talks between the two countries. In 
1937 the two parties reached a border agreement by which the Iranian 
government admitted the border corrections made during Ottoman rule, and at 
the same time secured a small change on the Shatt-al-Arab borderline to the 
Iranian benefit. The Iraqi government agreed to give up four miles of the 
Shatt-a1-Arab in front of Abadan for the use of Iranian 011 Shipping. Iran. 
however, abolished this treaty in 1969. Iraq took the issue to the Security 
Council of the United lations and the struggle continued between the two 
countries until 1975 when they signed an agreement during an OPBC 
conference. 
Due to the fact that that the preliminary talks ware held in 
complete secrecy, we cannot be sure precisely what was said. Although no 
agreement was reached in them it 8ee_ that the atBOSphere laproved. The 
ground was laid for the Algerian-sponsored talks between Saddam Hussein and 
the Shah. During the last session of the OPEC Beeting. on 6 larch 1975, the 
Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement was .ad. public. Iraq dropped its claim on the 
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Shatt-al-Arab and the two parties agreed that the mainland border would be 
mapped out according to the Constantinople Protocol of , January 1913 and 
the border survey of 1914. It was accepted that this agreeaent also 
contained the plan for the river boundary. The two countries further 
confirmed that a line drawn dawn the middle of the Bhatt-aI-Arab would 
constitute their boundary. They also accepted a plan for a mixed comDdttee 
for navigation on the Shatt-aI-Arab. The Iraqis abolished the agreement 
after the outbreak of the war with Iran, claiming that they had only agreed 
to sign it under duress as a result of the Shah's military pressure. 
Indeed, the agreement did accomplish most of the Shah's goals, which can be 
summarized as follows: explicit recognition of Iran's boundary claims on 
the Shatt-al-Arabi implicit recognition of his status as guardian of the 
Gulfi an end to the Kurdish movement, (a feature of the agreement whose 
implications will be considered below). It had become a .atter of some 
urgency for Iran to come to terms with Iraq. Iraqi encouragement of the 
Baluchi separatists had become troublesome, especially in the light of the 
massive military aid furnished by Russia and Iraq. The accommodation 
reached in 1975 between Iraq and Iran ended this tension somewhat, though 
later reports that Iraq could soon be rivalling Libya asa terrOrist 
training ground were disquieting. Ioreover, the war of October 1973 in the 
KiddIe East had highlighted the need for a revision of Iran'S policy 
towards the Arab world. Relations with Iraq and Egypt improved after 1975. 
Iraq presented indeed the aDst direct threat to Iran. It, was the 
next largest ,power around the Gulf, a major Arab power but, one with 
persistent differences w,1 th her fellow-Arabs. a raclical_regi_ beset by the 
Kurdish proble., as we shall see, but dissatisfied with its own access to 
the Gulf and for long able to threaten Iran's access in the Bhatt-al-
Arab.ln posing a threat to Iran. Ir~q enjoyed three assets. In the first 
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place, Iran's oil installations and traffic were vulnerable both to low-
level guerrilla activity and to high-level Bdlitary technology. Secondly. 
Baghdad had a good supply of such sophisticated equipment through the 
Soviet Union. Thirdly, there was the potential backing of the Soviet Union 
itself if things got out of hand, especially since the Soviet-Iraqi 
agreement of 1972 had provided the Russians, in the facility made available 
at Umm Qasr, with their best window on the Gulf. On the other hand, the 
enhanced regional importance of Iran constrained Soviet attacks on Iran, 
both over her rivalry with Iraq and regarding her claims in the Gulf, and 
in these circumstances the noraalization of her relations with the Soviet 
Union continued. Of course, it scarcely needs to be stressed that the 1975 
Iran-Iraq agreement was bilateral in character. It did not inaugurate more 
general co-operation between Iran and Arab states as a whole in the Gulf 
area, despite the fact that it was precisely at this time that there was a 
growing international recognition of the wealth and strategiC importance of 
the region. Local anxiety about the possible interference of external 
predatory powers did not in itself lead the Gulf states to positive co-
operation on sensitive areas. 
It was no accident that the 1975 agreement dealt with both the 
Bhatt-a1-Arab dispute and the Kurdish issue as they could not be separated 
from each other. Iran gave major support to tbe Kurdish rebellion as a 
means of supporting its case in relation to tbe Shatt-al-irab.She further 
used the Kurdish rebellion, with ABeriean support, to attract the Iraqi 
army to the north of the country and to diminish SoViet influence 
generally. However, a new factor arose, especially after the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war. Iran and Iraq shared wany interests, the aost iaportant beihg 
the development of their oil industries. The two countries were leading 
members of OPEC, especially after the 'oil crisis' of 1973. So, as a result 
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of the Bhatt-al-Arab agreement, Iran stopped her assistance to the Kurds 
illJlediately and withdrew her troops from Iraqi lCurdistan.Thus, the 1975 
agreement reBained of BaJor signiflcance because, as long a. it lasted, it 
removed the threat to Iranian securlty posed by Iraq and contributed 
towards diD1nishlng Soviet influence in Iraq. 
We conclude this chapter by turning specifically to the Kurds3s . We 
have already noted that it is difficult to define to which race individuals 
in the different communities in the Kiddle last belong. People considered 
to be Kurds emerge from the mixing of races after .. ny invasions. As the 
chief of the Kurdish rebel organization in Iraq, Kulla Kustafa, has 
reBarked, the Kurds are those who feel that they are Kurds, exactly as the 
French or GerJll5us are those who feel thellSel ves to belong to those 
national1 ties. 
In Iraq the Kurds, as was briefly noted in the first chapter, 
constitute the third .. Jor element in the population. They had proved 
dffficult to assimilate. Language had been a _Jar stu.bUng block. The 
Kurds speak an Indo-Buropean language close to Persian but Arabic has 
remained the official language of the central government and of the 
institutions of higher education in Iraq. Iven .are important has been the 
sense of ethnic or 'national' identity that the Kurds have developed, . 
especially in the twentieth century. Whatever their origin. they were 
almost all converted to Isla.. They beea .. part of the vast Iosl •• e.pire 
and were often its staunch defenders. Froa time to tt ... particularlY~D 
the seventeenth and eighteenth cen~uri.s, Kurdish dynast! .. did arise. but 
they .. elled to 114ft laeked cOhealon and have been unable to austain . 
themselves. In the twentteth ceatury, a sease of Kurdish Identity based on 
language, closetrlbal ties, custOM and a shared history has tnspired a 
Kurdish nationalist .aveJlent. However, these polittcal groupe have 
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generally lacked sufficient unity and eo-ordination to achieve lasting 
results. levertheless. of all D1nority groups in the region the Kurds have 
been the most difficult to assiD1late because ot their aumbara and their 
geographical concentration, their inaccessibility in the .auntain regions 
they inhabit. and their cultural and linguistic identity. Bven so, many 
bilingual Kurds have assimilated into Iraqi SOCiety sufficiently for them 
to play an active role in Iraqi governaent and SOCiety. 
The Kurdish issue has constituted a central problem tor all Iraqi 
governments ever since the creation of the state of Iraq in 1920. This 
difficulty has had both internal and external aspects. In 194e, the Kurds 
applied for perD1ssion to organize a Kurdish pol1t1cal party, but their 
application was rejected on the grounds that such a party was nationalist 
and therefore it would not operate on the same basis as other parties which 
accepted the legitimacy of the state. It is also relevant to note that in 
his demands on the Iraqi government Kulla lustafa called for a federation 
of Kurdish tribes into a Kurdish province, the establishment of a Kurdish 
minister in the Iraqi cabinet to handle specifically Kurdish affairs and. 
finally, cultural independence for his people. 
The coup of July 1958 brought QaSSi8 to power, in alliance (at the 
outset) with a loose grouping of Co..unists, Kurds, Ba'athists, lational 
Democrats and Arab Jation.lists. The Pree Officers syapathized with the 
Kurds. and Qassi. offered to co-operate with their leaders in a partaerehip 
with the majority Arabs within a framework of Iraqi unity. A large au.bar 
of Kurds who had been in exile were allowed to return and those in prison 
were released. lost i~rtant of all, of course, was the return of lulla 
lustafa al-Barazani from the Soviet Union where he bad been living. Be was 
given a triumphant entry into Baghdad, was put up in the palace of Juri's 
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son, and was given a state-owned car and a cash allowance for hi.self and 
his retinue. 
However, the honeymoon between Qassi. and Kulla al-Barazan1 did not 
last long. Xutual suspicion developed between the two, as each perceived 
the other as a threat. Qass1~ who had brought al-Barazan1 back to Baghdad 
partly as a counter-force to the Arab Dationalists, soon began to fear that 
deDands for Kurdish autono.y within the Iraqi state, if truly granted, 
would lead to Kurdish independence and the disintegration of Iraq. Indeed, 
in 1960. al-BaDazani complained to the Soviet leaders on a visit to Ioscow 
about Qassim's treatment of the Kurds. He sought to persuade the Soviet 
government to put pressure on Qassi. to Deet Kurdish de .. nds. In this he 
was unsuccessful. In his absence. Qassim began to Danoeuvre against him. 
When Kulla Kustafa did return it was not to Baghdad but to his own homeland 
in rebellion. 
After the fall of Qassi. and the accession to power of Arlf, the 
situation did not change significantly. the Kurds were once again in 
rebellion and by 1965 open hostilities were taking place. This time, 
however, the Iranian connexion helped to tilt the balance in favour of the 
Kurds in their offensive against the central govern.ent. By Dece.ber, Iran 
was in open conflict with Iran on the issue. In June 1966 an Iraqi-Kurdish 
twelve-point peace plan was fraDed which would have recognised Kurdish 
Dationallty but it provoked in turn a reaction from the quarter of the Arab 
nationalists who regarded. such an adJIisslon as a betrayal. Atter 196&. it 
was the turn of the Sa'athiste to grapple with the proble •. By the autulIIl 
it was clear that there was not going to be a tresh start. Clashes took 
place between goverlllll!nt forces and Kurdish troops. By 1969 the Kurds were 
receiving massive aid fro. Iran and Iranian units were fighting inside 
Iraqi territory. This aid, together with the situation on the Shatt-al-
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Arab. helped to turn the tide in favour of the Kurds. In tbese 
circumstances the Iraqi government concluded an agreement witb al-Barazani 
in Karch 1970. This agreement, which proved to be short-lived, temporarily 
ended his connexions with Iran and tbe contact wbicb bad been establisbed 
with Israel. Between 1970 and 1974 the situation between the Kurds and the 
Iraqi government deteriorated. as a result of a series of steps taken by 
both parties. Growing 1so1ation and assassinat10n attempts led al-Barazan1 
to re-establish ties with the Shah wbo was tbrougbly alarmed by the extent 
of Soviet influence in Iraq. On 31 lay 1972, President lixon of the United 
states directed the CIA to advance 116 million 1n aid to the Kurds and tbis 
was supplemented by massive Iranian belp also. Jotwithstanding this further 
deterioration, it should be noted tbat in fact the Iraqi government bad 
gone a good distance towards meeting the demands of the Kurds. Tbere is a 
possibility that without external involvement some kind of mpdus yiyendi 
would have developed. In 1974 a further major outbreak of fighting took 
place but it went badly for the Kurds. By the winter of 1974/5 the Iraqi 
army was close to complete military Victory. Advancing some nine miles into 
Iraq. it was only the assistance of Iranian forces that kept the Kurds in 
the figbt. Then, as we have seen, in larch 1975 came the Iranian-Iraqi 
agreement by which Iraq accepted the Bhatt-ai-Arab channel boundary and 
ceased assisting Iranian dissidents and Arab and Baluchi minorities in 
Iran. Iran in turn ceased assisting the Kurds, and the collapse of Kurdish 
resistance followed almost immediately. There could not be a BOre graphic 
illustration of the relationship between internal proble .. and external 
involvement which. as tbis chapter has demonstrated, esisted in a 
multiplicity of contexts throughout the region. 
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Chapter Three: The Suptrpoyers And the Gulf 
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the British, despite the fact that the British tried to pretend that the 
Gulf was a British lake. The abolition of the European oil concessions in 
Bussia after the October revolution in Bussia had made the British even 
more anxious on this point in the early post-war period. For example, they 
had signed an agreement at San Remo on 24 April 1920 with the French. This 
arrangement, however, led to additional pressure on Britain as time passed. 
The United States would not recognize the agreement unless the British in 
turn agreed to an 'Open Door'. This was accompanied by attempts to threaten 
British interests by closing the door to British companies in areas under 
American sovereignty. The basic fact was that the British had no wish to 
depend on American oil. They argued. in any case, that an 'Open Door' 
policy could only exist in relation to a fully sovereign state. The 
countries of the Gulf were protectorates and within a British sphere of 
influence. However, in 1928 the Americans did succeed in reaching an 
agreement with Iraq and in the years that followed American oil companies 
gained further oil concessions in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
It was developments during the Second World War which made American 
involvement in the Gulf region possible. One result in 1941 was that the 
British government agreed to an American sea inspector in Bahrain. In 1943, 
the United States claiaed a consulate in Bahrain but such an office was 
initially opposed by the British because it might lead Saudi Arabia, Iraq 
and Iran to make similar claims. In 1944, however, after long discussion. 
it was agreed by both sides that the American consulate In Saudi Arabia 
could also operate in Bahrain. During these years. the Vulted States gained 
facilities in both Saudi Arabia and Oman, In 1942, an agreement was signed 
with Saudi Arabia which resulted in the creation of the Dhahran base. With 
British consent certain llmited facilities were also obtained in Oman. Thus 
the United States did build up a certain base of influence in the Gulf 
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region but the British still retained their supremacy and Washington did 
not seek directly to challenge it3. 
In retrospect. this period can appear to Dark the beginning of the 
American bid for predominance. By the Second World War, however, geological 
reports concerning American oil needs, plus the special survey in 1942, 
pOinted out that the Kiddle Bast rather than the West Indies would be 
likely to be the main centre of exploitation and developaentA • It is well 
known that the most serious clash between both governments, the British and 
the American. started soon after the war had oome to an end. Following the 
Second World War, initially in reponse to a Soviet attempt to dismember 
Iran, the United States built up its position through a combination of 
Vigorous diplomacy, covert intelligenoe work and an extension of economic 
and military assistance to friendly governments. But the United States had 
many other conoerns world-wide and in the first two decades after 1945 the 
Gulf region did not become a major focus of American attention. It was not 
until 1968, with the British announoement of their withdrawal from the Gulf 
in the near future, that Washington took a significantly greater interest 
in the region in its entirety. There was the obvious possibility that the 
Soviet Union might seek to fill the vacuum left by the British withdrawal, 
either directly or through their friends and supporters in Iraq. From this 
perspective, an Iran-Saudi Arabia tWin-pillar guardianship of the Gulf had 
a great deal to commend itself to the Americansa • 
Let us look more closely at the American relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. The country's growing importance to the United Stat •• stemmed 
partly from its political and diplomatic value as a stable .anarchy hostile 
to communism and other forms of radicalism and partly from ita economic 
importance insofar as it controlled acre than a quarter of the world's 
known deposits of petroleum. It dominates the Arabian peninsula 
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geographically, bordering both the Gulf and the Red Sea, and lies to the 
south of the Israeli security zone. Decisions its leaders ~ke regarding 
the use of its huge financial reserves have a significant impact on the 
Vestern economic system. As the dODinant oil-producing and economic power 
in the peninsula and as the centre of the Islamic faith, it plays a key 
role in the maintenance of stability and security over a wide area. It 
plays a key role - in recent years a moderate one - in the deliberations of 
OPEC. It was becoming the seventh largest world market for United States 
goods, services and technology, exclusive of arms sales. 
a! course, the relationship had earlier roots. In 1933 Ibn Saud had 
faced severe financial crisis because hie main source of income, the 
taxation of the ~ <pilgrimage) had been undermined by the world slump of 
these years. Such was his plight that in return for £50,000 in gold he had 
given an oil concession to ARAMeO, which established ties between a major 
United States oil company and the Saudi state. As a result of the outbreak 
of the Second World War, the H411stopped again and Ibn Saud was once more 
in need of alternative sources of finance. He required £10 million a year 
to run his country and SOCAL decided to get the BOney from the United 
States government. That DOney was forthcoadng but Vashington also becaae 
apprehensive that British influence over Saudi Arabia might grow. there was 
a conspicuous strengthening of bilateral ties. For example, the United 
States Air Force began construction of an airfield at Dhahran near the oil 
wells£. By 1947. Saudi Arabia received an esti_ted tl00 .UUon in aid 
from the United states. In 1950, ARAICO finished the pipeline from Eastern 
Arabia to the Mediterranean, originally an idea conceived by the United 
States lavy which wanted to get supplies of oil for its Sixth Fleet 
operating in the Mediterranean. 
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In 1953 King Saud succeeded his father, and a temporary storm took 
place in the relationship between Riyadh and Vashington. The Saudi Arabian 
authorities tried to acquire some independence by signing an agreement with 
Aristotle Onassis to build a 500,000 ton tanker fleet to transport all 011 
not carried by ARAleo's existing tankers. ARAleO fought back, and was fully 
supported by the United States administration. King Saud's visit to the 
United States ended this period of coolness in 1951 and he agreed to renew 
the Dhahran lease for another five years, in return for continued American 
military support. In 1958, Saudi Arabia received a 525 million Foreign 
Assistance Act grant from the United States while in the same year she 
experienced a 535 million drop In revenues as a result of the cuts in the 
price of crude 011. The general incompetence of King Saud added to the 
difficulty of doing business. A combination of American pressure and Arab 
League advice helped to bring about a change at the top. The AI-Saud family 
executive power was taken from King Saud and handed to his younger brother 
the Amir Faysal. 
These developments are sufficient to indicate that In the specific 
case of Saudi Arabia, the United States had replaced Britain as the 
country's chief military supporter from the late 1940s. This occurred not 
only because a mutually beneficial commercial relationship seeDed to be 
developing through ARAleD but also because of a tension in British-Saudi 
relations occasioned by the Buraim! Oasis dispute which has been discussed 
in the previous chapter. the American support for the Saud1s 1n this matter 
was no doubt related to the British-American competitIon for all 
concessions. ARAICO supported Saudi Arabia. whereas Britain was the 
defender of the Shaikhdoms (Abu Dhabi and Xuscat)7, 
Under Faysal. the Saudi-American relationship which had been 
developing since 1933 was firmly established. though he spent no more DOney 
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on arms sales than the former king had spent on cars and palaces. However, 
unlike other 'clients' of the United States world-wide, Saudi Arabia's 
steadily increasing oil revenues meant that she did not need to look to 
Washington for financial aid. There was, therefore, no 'dependency 
syndrome'. In oil terms, however, the United States was totally supreme and 
no other European countries could establish a foothold. Indeed, in oil 
terms in the reg~on as a whole by 1958 the United States had replaced 
Britain. The oil share in the region in 1950 was 56 per cent to Britain, 
and 33 per cent to the United States but by 1958 the proportions were 
exactly reversed. Even so, it was not until a further decade, with the 
impending British withdrawal, that the United States had to begin to 
grapple seriously with the wider implications throughout the region of this 
SUbstantial stake. Saudi Arabia was obviously of very great importance. 
Even so, the relationship between Riyadh and Washington was more 
complicated than this account may so far have suggested. It did not begin 
and end with questions of security. It also involved the application of 
Western technology and training in order to develop the entire economic 
infra-structure of Saudi Arabia. Here was a complex and massive operation 
with social implications at many levels. Jevertheless, at the turn of the 
1970s, it was to the United States that the Saudi government began to look 
in security matters. For its part, Washington was keen to strengthen Saudi 
Arabia. As George Ball was to wr1te subsequentlY, 'We sold military 
hardware to the Shah on the assumption that he would be a protector in the 
Gulf and we would stay out of it. It today the Gulf i8 to be protected. we 
ourselves must pull the labouring oar, yet, to be fully effective we shall 
need the co-operation of the Saudis.' That was also true in the earlier 
period. though then, as later, there was an awareness of the difficulties 
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of creating rapidly an effective and BCdern ar.ed torce 1n a country with 
.paroe manpower. 
In turn the Saudi-Iranian relationshIp could become pIvotal since 
the United States also believed that it required a close connexion with 
Iran. Saudi-Iranian co-operation existed in different fields but it took 
its most important form in the Gulf area. Iran had the larger role as a 
result of its bigger and fully eqUipped fleet and army when compared w1th 
those available to Riyadh. It was already the case that Iranian military 
missions operated in certain Arabian states - Oman and Yemen. But although 
Iran was involved to a limited degree in the Arabian peninsula. Saudi 
Arabia continued to see itself as the dominant power there, both 
politically and Idlitarily. At the same time. it was Iran's policy which 
caus~d more concern to the Soviet Union, especially Iranian involvement 1n 
Oman. where Iranian troops were aiding the Oaanis in suppressing the 
guerrillas of the Popular Front for the L1beration ofDman. The latter were 
aided by SOViet-backed South Yemen, which appeared at times to be on the 
brink ot war with Oman. 
The strategic, polittcal and econoDic significance of Saudi Arabia 
assumed new dimensions with the October 1913 Arab-Israeli war and the 
ensuing crisis. Aacngtheiamediate consequences of the war and the 
subsequent oil embargo was the energy crisis. The Gulf regia was d1reetl, 
l"Il'tolved. The purchasing power of oU-proclucingstat.stncrea.d 
SUbetantially with the rise in 011 ptices. Israel beca. BOre dependent j' 
tha& ever upon the United States. The Western powers became divided on SOlie 
basic prInCiples underlying their policies towards the Kiddie Bast. Until 
the 1913 war. the Saudi leadership had been unable to translate the 
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kingdom's economic importance, derived from its oil resources, into 
political importance beyond the regional confines of the I1ddle East, and 
not always with succewss even there. The longstanding belief on the part of 
Vestern governments - in particular the United States - that cheap oil 
would be available in almost unlimited quantities for years to come ended 
with the 1973-4 oil embargo. 
It was in 1971 that the two big OPEC leaders, Paysal of Saudi Arabia 
and the Shah of Iran had agreed, for the first time, to take action against 
oil companies that refused to pay taxes. They also used this agreement to 
show their peoples publicly that they were not controlled by foreign 
influences. On the subject of raising oil prices, OPEC members had agreed 
to divide the organization into three blocs all. a regional basis. The most 
important division, which had been agreed upon earlier, for our purposes is 
thre Gulf bloc which included Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates. It also agreed that Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran 
would act on behalf of all of the group. 
At the beginning of 1973 there was a huge general demand to use oil 
as a weapon in the battle aga1nst Israel. especially since the world's 
dependence on and demand for oil was too great to be ignored. There was 
much discussion in the various Arab countries all. this latter. On 21 June 
1973 the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddaf1, nationalized all the 011 cOllpauies 
in his country. Jewsweek magazine described the event as the start of au 
oil wara • It is laportant to note that the Libyan decialon bad been made a 
JIOnth after King Paysal' s warning to ARAiCO in Kay 1973.. The second 
warning to the United States was through the .. nagersaf tour all companies 
whom King Paysal met in Geneva. The A_rican reaction eae_ to have been 
that this was bluff and that when 1t CaDe to the point the Arabs would 
never act together. legotiatious went on with the Arab producing cQuntries 
- 92-
and also through Egypt and Saudi Arabia. on the other hand, Shaikh Tamani -
the Saudi oil minister - paid a visit to Teheran to get the Iranian view on 
the subject of a possible Arab oil boycott. ling raysal delivered his 
tormal warning to the United States at a press conference in luly 1973. In 
August the Saudi warnings becaDe stronger. In an interview on American 
television,'King raysal threatened the United States that he would indeed 
use the oil weapon unless it lIDd1fied its attl tude towards Zionism' o. 
In fact, using oil as a weapon or tool was a long and difficult 
operation. Initially it would appear that King Faysal had been far from 
convihced that oil and polities should be wdxed up and it took time for him 
to be persuaded. It was apparent from the fact that the Congress tried to 
complicate the delivery of Phantom aircraft to Saudi Arabia in lune 1913 
that the Americans themselves were Ddxing arms and polities. There were 
also rumours that military aid to Kuwait might be cut off, thus exposing 
that state to possIble Iraqi aggression. Gradually, however, the Saudi plan 
took shape. The first phase was an attempt to put pressure on the United 
States specifically to change its attitude towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. If that did not succeed, the second phase would cOlle into 
Operation. Saudi Arabia would reduce its all production'1 • 
On 20 October, Saudi Arabia did J01n the campaign to imple_nt an 
011 boycott as a. result of President lixon"s announceJD!nt altha Allerican 
financial aid to Israel amountlng to $2.2 billion. The United Arab lid rates 
lad the way inannounclng<a boycott'of the United States. bang !uropean: 
states, the letherlandsand Portugal were singled out for .... retreat .. nt. 
tt' has sometimes been supposed that SaUd! Arabia forc.dthe' United Arab 
IJlira.tes into the front Une and: to take this iniUal step. there t. DO 
doubt that the boycott was a aajOr step' forward til self-assertion on tbe 
part of the Arab countries. .ever~beleS$~ the weapon was not qu1te as 
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effective as had been hoped, for the following reasons. So .. oil continued 
to escape to the United States through the oil compani •• , either with the 
knowledge of the country in which they operated or not. It was also the 
case that the oil companies decided to divide an equal share among their 
customers. Thus even the letherlands. which was in theory belng totally 
boycotted, did not suffer very significantly and had both reserves and 
alter.native supplies. Thirdly. the policy of raising the volu.e of oil 
production, which had been general throughout the Arab oil-producing 
countries in the period leading up to the outbreak of the war, had resulted 
in there being a surplus of oil on world markets. It was difficult to make 
the sharp impact that was immediately desired. Bqually, countries were not 
prepared to keep on the boycott indefinitely. It came to an end in larch 
1974. Of course, throughout this period the non-Arab producing countries 
continued their oil production throughout the boycott '2 • 
levertheless, it can be claimed that the embargo helped to bring a 
change in Western European attitudes, in particular. It was the occasion 
when one might say that the Gulf countries 'came of age' internationally. 
They were led, in one way or another, by Saudi Arabia. Stepping onto the 
world stage in this Danner was .ignificant. but it did not take long for 
sharp disagreements about pricing policy to emerge amongst .any of the 
states who had appeared to have found a degree of unity. Iran wanted a_ 
higher price than the Saudis did, the reason being that the Shah urgently 
needed to solve his econo~c proble .. and additional re .. aue would gratly 
assist his Five-Year Develolp .. nt PI.n'~. Of course, the ~h did not 
advertize that he had other aBbitlonstoo. He wanted aD e .. n stronger ar-, 
to enable hi. to "intain his control over his country and to extend Iran'. 
influence in the Gulf are. generally. Saud1-Arabia, for her part, clal .. d a 
reasonable price for oil because her flnanc!al elrou .. tances were auch 
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better than Iran's. Iraq was closer in her opinion to the Saudi stand. 
while smaller countries such as Kuwait and Qatar were .are sywpathetlc to 
the Saudi point of vlew'4. 
It is now appropriate to conclude this consideration of the Saudi-
American relationship by certaln general reaarks. It can be described as 
being' special'. It had its genesis. as we have seen in the aajor role 
played by American 011 companies in the development of Saudi petroleum 
resources 1n the 1930s. Subsequently it was fostered by governaent to 
government co-operat1on and assistance. It became apparent that officials 
in the governments of both countries believed that the preservation and 
enhancement of this relationship could provide a basis for resolving 
political, security, econoDic and energ1 issues facing the United States 
and Saudi Arabia. From the perspective of Vashington. decisions taken by 
Saudi Arabia could affect the United States balance of payments, the future 
of the dollar, the Amerlcan, indeed the world energy equatlon, and the 
performance of the world econoDy as a whole. It is not surprising, in these 
circumstances, after the shock of the events of 1973, that the United 
States applied itself afresh to the resolution of the Arab-Ieraeli 
conflict. We now turn to the other • pillar' of the so-called 'twin-pillar' 
policy - Iran. 
From the perspecti va of the superpowers during thi& period Iran 
ineVitably appeared the key country in the Gulf region. ladeea perhaps in 
the KiddIe Bast as a whole. Its physical 81ze i8 cODS.1derable <slx hundred 
and twenty seven .thousaad square ailee.uearly _ven tt.a aa big as the 
Uni ted K1 ngdom) . Its population was substantial - in 1976 it amuntea to 
approxiaately 33~ llilllon people. Its natural resources, especially its oil 
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wealth, seemed to be mak1ng it a power with genuine international status. 
It appeared, for BUch of our period, that ~he economic and industrial 
transformation of Iran was one of the major successes of the .adern world. 
As a superpower, the United States had built up its position in the 
country, following the Second World War, by opposing Soviet attempts to 
dismember Iran. However, there was no disguising its appetite for oil. By 
the 1950s, United States investments in oilUelds in Iran allOunted to $596 
million, and it controlled about 40 per cent of the production, especially 
after the 011 nationalization by Kussadeq. Britain was still in the lead 
with nearly 50 per cent 'S • lussadeq had been castigated by the British, the 
Russians and the Americans. the British alleged that he was trying to shift 
control of British oil into American hands so they accused him of acting 
under communist instructions, thereby hoping to incite the United States 
against h1m. In fact, Xussadeq tried to enlist United States support, but 
with very poor success, because the result of the 1952 ABerican 
pres1dential election brought Eisenhower and Dulles, deterained antl-
Communists, to power. iven though lussadeq was not a ColmWnist. they saw 
him opening the door for Communist influence. given Iran's geographical 
position on the border of the Soviet Union. But it shows that Yashiagton 
Idght have accepted hi. if he had been able to cODSolidate his position and 
stabilize the situation. In the end, be was overthrown by a coabiuation of 
internal and external foes ls • On the other. hand, the Soviet Vnion did not 
take advantage of these developments. Stalin dled in larCh U~53 and the 
uncertain position thereaftere2q)lalas why nothing was 40ne when Kussadeq 
fell in the foUowill8 August. At that tt_ .. General Zahedl _8 plotting 
against hi. and his governaent in collusion with the Shah and of course the 
army had strong ties with tbe United Stat ••. There is no doubt that 
Vashington, and specifically the CIA, playe, an active part in organ1z1ag 
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t.,··, ' ,. < 
the coup of 19 August 1953 that ousted Xussadeq17. Priacess Ashraf, the 
1.. l;-
'Bha:h's twin sister, played a major part 1n restoring her brother, too. This 
t.erican assistance in the restoration of the Shah increased the dependence 
r, ! , 
cif Teheran on Washin~ton. A new settlement was _de with foreign 011 
<tnterests as a result of which five American companies gained a 40 per cent 
.bare .of Iranian production. 
In Iran -as in Turkey - ln general American aid was welcomed and the 
t~adership of Washington accepted. Both of these countries had contrived, 
~re or less successfully, to remain independent during the colonlal era. 
The appeal of the United States at this juncture was not so much that it 
was the ancient pioneer of anti-colonialism but that it was the new leader 
ot the West and their natural and powerful defender against the old and 
famUar threat posed by Russia lEl • After the Second World War the United 
-st~tes had indeed been successful in dissolving the British and Soviet 
~pheres of influence simultaneously. Teheran seemed to be acting astututely 
and reasonably in inviting this third party to take an interest in reducing 
the long-standing claims which both London and Koscow had to exercise 
Influence over the region. The Soviet attitude towards Xussadeq had been 
... 
ambivalent from the start. His anti-British senti_nta that made him 
~11ing to undermine the British concession naturally commended hi. to 
lOscow. Yet he was an aristocrat, a landowner, a conservative who 
distrusted the ~ussians, and he was generally friendly towards the United 
j 
States. There were two events which built up the Russian attitude against 
bi •. First of all, in 1944. he had been the author of a bl11 that 
,·t"·;',.: ',., 
prohibited any Iranian goverament fro. negotiating oil conce •• lons with 
f~eign countries without express parlia .. ntary approval. Secondly, 1a 
APril 1952, he had renewed the agree_at on A_rican aid to thear_d 
;~."., .;~ ," . - , . 
torces. Xussadeq's government was inforBad by the Soviet Union in a forsal 
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note on 21 Kay that the renewal of the agreement had placed the Iranian 
army under the control of a foreign power". In general. Soviet interests 
were rather different from those of the United States. The Gulf appears, 
from the perspective of Ioscow, to be an area that offers good prospects 
for extending its polit1cal and mil1tary influence. However, it cannot act 
precipitately since, if the Mlddle East were to CODe under Soviet influence 
this would have far-reaching repercussions on the situation in Europe as 
well as in Africa and Asia. In a curious way, therefore, it can be argued 
that geographical proximdty inhibited the Soviet Union rather than 
providing it with an advantage. 
It will already have been noted that the American position was 
consolidated by means of arDIS sales. However lit should be clear that 
Iran's steadily greater 1ntegration into the international system of 
capitalist relations enabled it to establish a much more diverse pattern of 
economic ties. Thus insofar as it can be said that the United States 
'ruled' it did so through arms sales, through SA~AK (whose importance has 
already been discussed), and through trade and investments. On the other 
hand, Iran's capacity to reeist US control lay in its being an 011 power 
and in being a key factor in American/Soviet relatione in its region. 
American trade and investaents improved atter the fall of Xussadeq. Between 
1956 and 1974, ADerican tirDlS in Iran accounted for a third of all the 
capital investDent. After the oil boom. in 1975 the United states accounted 
for 21. 6 per cent of Iran' s non-milt t.ary lmports, whUe;1,t bad. been 13 per 
cent ln 1970-1. Despite that, ADerica had beCODe less ,involved. in Iranian 
affairs and petroleum issues, though it .reained d.eeply lnter •• ted. America 
was pleased not to be blaaed for lts aid to Iranian armed. forces, but it 
was so_what disappointed that its ald was not ~eceSS4ry on the scale lt 
~ad been hitherto. Some AEr.ican observers were afraid that the United 
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states mdght lose the eo-operation of Iran. This was because the original 
basis of American involvement in Iran had been Teheran's fear of tbe Soviet 
Union. At that stage a powerful outside backer bad seeBed necessary. low, 
however. it seemed tbat Iran was bent on trying to become an international 
actor in its own right and to display its independence as against both the 
United States and the Soviet Union20 • In this developing situation, the 
United States was not sure that Iran could be kept dependent on American 
arms sales. There was, therefore. a distinct loosening of the relationship 
between the government of the Shah and Yashington. It now .. emed 
increasingly to be based on hard economic bargaining. I nde.d , in 1976-7, 
the Shah hinted in interviews that if aras sales to Iran were curtatled he 
would retal1ateZ1 • Trade with the Unt ted States would be reetricted~ Be 
would reconsider the assistance Iran gave in promoting regional stability 
in the Gulf area. He would be willing to buy arms fr~m the Soviet Union. 
Pinally, he hinted that he Bdght raise difficulties in relation t~ the 
current non-proliferation agreements. Improving Itanlan/Sov1et relations 
made the United States think seriously abOUt these latent'threats to her 
interests in the Gulf, with the result that Yashington -t have, been less 
upset by the eventual fall of the Shah In1979 t-.t would have bean 
expected in view of the earlier close ties. . .' . 
The Shah was able to follow this lees altgaedlnternattonal atance 
partly because his domesUc situation in the 111<1,,"'1"0.' a,.,.ared lOt 
unfavourable - subsequent events SlOtwtt,staHt'fl!.It llPI*ared. that the anay 
and the pollee were loyal to hi. and were effective. Although .any urban 
po 11 tical elemente were st1l1uAequiyocally 'OppOeiad to' the "'8UIII, 
organized political opposttion ... qutesceht. Boonolltc eleftlop.a.t was 
advancing at a very satisfying pace ana aUn ••• ue. wereincreasiag. 
loreaver, all eeolloJlie.tecltu)loglcd. ....... bureaucratie ell t. hael •• rged 
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which possessed substantial cODpetence and appeared to be politically 
neutral. There was. therefore. a certain irony in a situation whereby the 
Shah, who owed so DWch to the United States, particularly 1n the Ddlitary 
sphere, now seemed on the brink of self-sufficiency and detachment. 
Rowever. both the military and economic aspects of this position need 
\ 
further exploration in the concluding section of this chapter. 
When the Shah visited Washington 1n July 19'73. American otficlals 
encouraged him to consider the Jiost advanced fighter aircraft ill the 
American arsenal. the P. 14 and the P. 15 as posS! ble ad<11 tiona to the 
. 
Imperial Iranian Air Force. This encouragement was proof of the dramatic 
change in the American attitude towards Iran's longstanding interest in 
acquiring sophisticated military hardware ftom the United States. In 
comparison with the American resistance to Iranian proposals for weapons 
purchase in the early 196013, the new attitude indicated clearly that the 
United States had recognized Iran's newly developed econoa1c and political 
capability. Indeed, earlier in 1973, the United States bad agreed to double 
Iran's inventory of 1.45 and C.130s, and also provide Tehera.withan 
aerial refuelling squadron as well as several hundred helieo~tere. 
including not only treansports but aleo gunships ° and antleubarlne cratt. 
The Shah even told an interviewer that Iran would be obtaintng laser-guided 
bomb eysteJlS, the JIOSt effecti.,.tactlcal weapon'deU'-rYo ••• used by the 
VB Air Force22 • 
The American JliUtary relationship with '"tru dit •• bact;'to the late 
1940sj in otber words. the illittal 1 nvo 1 yeatnt 'of the United Stat •• after 
the Second Vorld Var was JI1Utary. In 19:42 and 1043 a 118 JIt .. 1on wae sent 
out to advise the Iranian &ray and pndUllert •• 'tCol. Il. IOrrAa SChwarzkopf 
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was put 1n charge of the Iranian gendarmerie and he reorganized this 
lnternal security force long American lines. American influence continued 
throughout the post-war period. and the contract for atlltary and 
gendarmerie advisers was renewed several times~3. 
The United States assumed a position of major influence as a result 
of the 1947 agreement to extend the American Ddlitary and gendarmerie 
~ssions to provide for the purchase of military eqUipment in the United 
States. A 1948 D11itary aid prograBme gave Iran $60 Dillion worth of 
~litary equipment. Col. Schwarzkopf was considered particularly valuable in 
maintaining the power of the Iranian government. However, the real 
psychological dependence increased after the return of the Shah in 1953, 
when the United States had an uneasy relationship with Britain in 
influencing Iran. The United States now became the more dominating power in 
Iran in ways we have already noted. It was also reflected 1l't. AlIez:-i;ca I"~. 
ever'-growing share of lIl111tary suppUes and advisers, ,and ia01v111,&;. aae;! 
goverruaental programmes. The Baghdad Pact of October 1955. 0&", • J)e ,.-eu" as 
part of this process. 
I'" , 
Since that period of the JI1d-1950s. the tlnited ,St.t~s baa, ~~ 
chiefly concerned that Iran be ant1-Coaaun1s~, aa~i~30vl.t 4n~poseeea 
large Jlilitary forces. In 1961-63, during the.J'~~~edya~ni.~r.t1Ql1. it 
was seen that it II1ght be lmportant to Aaerle:an8trategle: aa~ evonoale: 
interests to have an Iranian government with a broader internal base of 
support - greater efUciency. DOre popularity. le. ,cor",pt10!L~'-' tun. 
eXisted in the 19505. But, at least accerdina tol(alU4&1. ,~re were no 
fears of a Soviet attack on the lraDlaD arllY.,Th~,~hba4 be. at_cl , 
because of what had been happel1ing, iDSide rat}wr, tw ,outside lr.au, auc1 
that was what _de US critici •• of the Shall,'s gQver'-llt illerea .. by the 
, .' -.., -
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troD 125,000 to 100,000 men2A • However, within a few years, Washington's 
41eq,iet had faded, which _de it possible for Iran once IIDre to increase 
tbeflow of American arms. Two developments resulted: first, Iran began to 
. develop a regional policy for the first time and to face lasser's Egypt and 
Republican Iraq; secondly, US policy shifted from the grant to the sale of 
arms On oredit-purchase, especially after the Iranian oil revenues 
increased2s • 
Since 1968, after the British announcement of withdrawal of forces 
from the Gulf. Iran faced the ulti_te question. How could it best secure 
for itselt the greatest oontrol over its own externalenvironaent under 
these historica new circumstances? Por more than a century, not only had 
the Pax Britannlca been a constant irritation to Iran in the south, to put 
it mildly. it had also had the beneficial aspect that it provided a 
protective shield against encroachments by other outside powers in the Gulf 
Atea. The British plan to withdraw forces frena the area in 19'11 compelled 
Iran to specify its vital intereets in terms of three i-.ediate and primary 
objectives: first, to safeguard the Shah's regime against internal 
subversion sponsored by any hostile state or group; secondly. to ensure 
uninterrupted passage of shipping throU$hthe Strait of HorJlUz, the Gulf 
and the Shatt-al-Arab; thirdly. to protect Iraniaif 011 reaources and 
facilities on and off shore against any deliber~te or. indeed, aocidental 
d.1sru pti on2 E. • 
To secure these objectives Iran decided to rely first and fore.ast 
on its own military strength in the Gulf area. There were three 
Circumstances conducive to the adoption of this posture: first, the liD1ted 
atiility of CBITO to cope with regional security proble .. ; seoondly. Iran'S 
outstanding conflicts with other Gulf states; and thirdly. uncertainty 
surrounding the future stability of the Truoial states, Bahrain and 
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Qatar27 • Ioreover. in the wake of the British announcement, Iran let it be 
known that it was determined to take Britain's place as the dominant 
military power in the region, that an alliance of Iran and Saudi Arabia 
WDuld constltute the 'tw1n-pl11ars' of local strength, and that the United 
states would supply these states with the necessary arms and training to 
enable them to carry out thls function2B. 
By the 1970s, arms transfers were expected to increase as an element 
in the lixon Doctr1ne, indicat1ng a United states comDdtment to Iran and 
serving, it was assumed, as an alternative to a direct involvement. the 
arms transfer relationship took on some of the attributes of a treaty 
relationship. In these years the Amer1can preference was for building up 
the army gradually over two decades. In 1972, however, the United ~ates 
agreed to sell Iran any conventional weapons it required and later, in 
1973, OPEC raised the price of 011 by five times which caused the largest 
arms boom 1n history2$>. Details of Iran's defence budget,and of V.S. 
military sales, reproduced 1n the following tables, give an idea of the 
scale of these transact1ons~O: 
1. Iran's Defence Budget, 1970-77. in USI Billions at current prices 
1970 880 , increase on previous year 
1971 1005 17 
1972 1375 29 
1973 1575 11 
1974 3680 141 
1975 0325 72 
1976 8925 41 
1977 9400 5 
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2. US Dilltary sales to Iran, 1950-77 in $ millions at current prices: 
1950-69 757.0 
1970 113.2 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1977 
396.8 
519.1 
2157.4 
4373.2 
1021. 0 
1458.7 TOTAL 1950-77 17.009.4. 
The dimensions at the arae boom released by Iran's outlay on defence 
had escalated from $78 millions in 1954 to $241 millions in 1964 and thence 
to $3680 millions in 1974. Prom OPEC's price r1se in 1973 to 1978 Iran 
spent 31 per cent of its total expenditure on atlitary provision and 
between 50 and 80 per cent of that ml1ltary expenditure was going on 
purchases from the United StateeS':al. By 1975, the United Statea had emerged 
as the most important of the twenty-eight states supplying weapons and 
.tlitary services to the Gulf countries, whlle the United States had been 
responsible for well over 50 per cent ot the worldWide arms trade. The Gulf 
states accounted for as Elch as $19.5 billion of arJlS32 • It was one of the 
mest rapid bUild-ups at .tlltary power under peactlme conditions ever seen. 
The reasons for the arms sales to Iran were clear. They were both strategic 
and economic. They were todetend the interests of the united States and 
pro.,te 1ts influence. Another factor, not ofte. Entlou4. we to Ughten 
the burden of weapons develop_nt in the Unlte4Stat .. 'it.lf. the 
respens! veness ot the Uni ted Stat.. was eonstdered Il8pOrtant .ad rea_uri ng 
by the Iranian government t whil.arms lnfluenoe 1ft the region could tn 
turn be helpful to the UnltedStates. It .s&asuEd that theUalted State. 
would have influence ovsr the actual .se of the aras supplled,particularly 
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in any intense or widespread conflict, Finally, the 4r~ eupplled were seen 
primarily in their regional, above all, in their Soviet cODtext. 
\. 
AlIIerican mi 11 tary suppliers, Uke GruJIJIIIlu, Lockheed and 
Westinghouse, took over key positions in the economy and Western arms 
dealers and governuents tried to tempt rulers not only to purchase their 
products but to invest in their arms industries33 , For the supplier state, 
the provision of arms holds several potential benefits: first, it may serve 
as an opening into the recipient's SOCiety and provide a key channel for 
influence; secondly, it may serve as a visible symbol of its commitment to 
the recipient and thus act as a deterrent by bolstering a regional balance 
of power; thirdly, it may serve as a qyid pro qyo in the bilateral 
relationship, creating an entangling dependency for the recipient and 
binding it closely to the supplierj and finally it may provide a Deans for 
conflict management insofar as the reCipient depends upon the supplier tor 
fresh stocks. In the Shah·s case, his virtual mania for buying large 
amounts of up-dated and sophisticated military eqUipment from abroad had 
free rein from 1972 when the fixon administration underwrote the Shah as 
the policeman of the Gulf, and agreed to sell him whatever non-nuclear 
weapons he wished. The Shah coDDdtted himself to billions of dollars worth 
of armaments, often buying the, latest weapons while they ware stUI on the 
drawing board34 , 
The scale of this operation began to alara eveu the Pentagon.· By 
1980 it predicted that there would be 150,000 "ricaM 111 thl whole Gulf. 
area, of whom 50.000 would beln Iran. What k1114 of coatt_a't 414 this, 
entail and what would be the consequence.? It was true tbat; t. V1l1t.e4 
States hoped in. all of thls toavoidtheaeed for 4 direct Idlltary role. 
American assietance had en.bled the Bhah gr •• tly toexpaa4 hls ar-ay and.: 
create from scratch u:a1r' farce and .• na.,.,-. The acoompanying table 
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provides a detailed assessment of the scale of military aid. The figures 
represent roughly seven per cent of all United States aid to foreign 
countries under the military assistance programme35 : 
3.American military aid to Iran under the military assistance programme 
1949-1969 in S million: 
1949-52 
1953-7 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
16.6 
133.9 
73.0 
90.9 
89.1 
49.2 
33.3 
70.1 
27.1 
49.9 
93.5 
75.3 
85.8 
50.9 
In the whole period froa 1946 to 1970 Iran was esti .. ted to have 
received a total of $1365'.6 JI1Uion in IIlli tary aid, 80me $830 aUlion 
coming under the 1d11tary assistance progra..e and the remainder in the 
fora of credit froa the US goVernment. It was becoming 4iftlclult to avoid 
asking questions about the purposes to which all this a1d .tSht rsallybe 
put. The puppet could become the puppet-master in circuaata.cs. which it 
would not be too difficult to envisage. Th$t in turn raised further 
.' 
questions about the relationship between the 'SoViet Union and Iran and it 
is to the other superpower· s role that we nOw turn. 
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It has often been argued that Soviet interest in the Gulf has been 
not so much poll tical as econoJlic, but po 11 tical considerations have never 
been absent from Soviet economic policy in the region. By increased trade 
with the oil-producing countries, the Soviet Union could promote its 
political interests. Given especially the growing need for additional oil 
for Eastern Burope and the cheapness of Kiddle East oil, the purchase of 
oil from KiddIe Eastern countries seemed a logical way to balance trade 
relations and to recoup the Soviet credits that had been extended to them. 
In the past there had been a reluctance to import oil from non-Commun1st 
countries in case there were any kind of crisis37 • But this argument had 
been rejected, because the oil imports would be quite small and for that 
reason the question of security hardly arose. Such general considerations 
apart, the Soviet Union naturally had most to do with Iran since the two 
countries shared a common border. 
Soviet troops had been stationed in Iran during the Second World 
Var, but after considerable d1spute were persuaded to leave. In fact, some 
years after this event, President Truman indicated that he had sent Stalin 
an ultimatum, informing hiJl that the United States would send troops to 
Iran if the Soviet Union did not leave and had in fact ordered preparatiOns 
to be made for the despatch of American land, sea and air forces. As we 
have seen, the policy of resisting Soviet intrusions, had been the starting 
point of United States intervention in Iran and. that remained a constant 
concern in the first decade after the end of the war. In earth.rn Iran, a 
pro-Soviet regime had been established in Azerbaijan in 104e. with a de .. nd 
tor an oil concession to the Soviet Union. Ioscow agreed to withdraw it. 
~ .j 
troops froa the area asa resul t of so_ AEric.an pressure but It hoped to 
retain an oil concession in the north with the consent of the Iranian 
goverlUllent. Thus, by the ~nd of 1945, the Shah, with aray .up~rtt regained 
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sovereignty over Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union did not react Bdlitarily to 
this setback, but it did redouble its demands for an oil conc •• sion3~. As 
Soviet pressure continued, the Iranian parliament was In two minds, but 
eventually parliament turned down the Soviet request. Politically and 
economically, therefore, the Soviet Union appeared to have suffered severe 
setbacks. The situation remained fluid, however, tor some time. It was 
still possible that separatist and communist-dominated regimes might emerge 
in Azerbaijan or Kurdistan which might bring some economic compensations. 
And there was always the possibility that a COmDUnist regime might be 
established in Iran itself. There was a native 1nstrument for the 
achievement of such a goal 1n the form of the Tudeh Party. 
An earlier Communist Party - founded in 1921 - had been crushed by 
Reza Shah, and under a 1931 law it became illegal. Hence, when it becaae 
possible to form a party again after the allied invaSion of 1941, it was 
decided to call it the Tudeh Party (Party of the lasses). Its expansion and 
development, however, has been handicapped by a series of tnternal splits. 
The first major rift occurred in 1948 and revolved around the issue of 
loyalty to the Soviet Union. Although the founding members of the Tudeh 
Party were larxists (and as was shown later, staunch supporters of the 
Soviet Union) they did not call themselves Communists3 -. As with other 
foreign Communist Parties, however, the Soviet Union treated the Tudeh 
Party as an instruaent of its own foreign policy. Its existeace provided 
Ioscow with an opportunity to play an acU va role in Iran bet.en 1944 and 
1947, during which time the Tudeh Party was a significant factor in the 
political life of Iran. Even aome'reports BAde by American obeerYer. at 
this time noted that the Coaaunists enjoyed wid.spread support at thts ttme 
and could have won an election. In tle IUssadeq pertod, the Tu4eh Party at 
first refused to support h1a, and oaly altered c ita approaoh 1n the latter 
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part of 1952, by which time the initiative had slipped from lussadeq's 
grasp·"". 
After 1953, Soviet-Iranian relations became generally tranquil, with 
the exception of the years between 1959 and 1962 when the Soviet Union was 
extremely critical of Iran's military links with the United States, and of 
the 1959 treaty between Teheran and Washington. Soviet criticisms did not 
end or change when the Shah announced in 1961 that he would not allow the 
Americans to station missiles on Iran's soil, which was one ot the main 
issues in Soviet-Iranian relations. It was, nonetheless, a satisfactory 
conclusion froD their standpoint. Since then, the Soviet relationship with 
Iran has been largely economic, since there is a considerable volu .. ot 
trade between the two countries. A major crisis in Soviet-Iranian relations 
was only likely in two situations: in the event ot a major US-SOViet clash 
OI" the emergence of a strong revolutionary lIIOVement inside Iran which the 
Soviet Union supported. The fragility of the Baghdad Pact proved to the 
Soviet Union that there was no immediate threat to its security. In 1963 
Leonid Brezhnev paid an offtcial visit to Iran. Dozens of agreements, large 
and small, dealing with economics, irrigation, hydro-electric power, trade 
and cultural exchanges were signed and iaple .. nted. One could even describe 
SOViet-Iranian relations as friendly. Both countries derived considerable 
advantages froD their trade with each other. 
This pattern continued', In 1966 agree_nte were signed for Soviet 
participation and aid in the' construction of a ateel .U1 ,a. Asfaban. a 
uchine tool factory, and water works and hydro-electric poweretationa on 
rivers whose courses ran along the Soviet frontier. the SovletVnlon,even 
began to supply the Illiperial IranianAray with a certaill amunt ofar. and 
equi pment on a cash baets. Bushess tie. were further strengthelled during 
the 1967 v1s1 t to Xoecow of PtlE'f(11l1aterta1r Abbas Hov1ed.a. " turning 
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point was also reached when in 1970 Iran succeeded in exporting natural gas 
to the Soviet Union through the Igat trunkline. A second and parallel 
sasline was negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1977. Under this later 
acheme, Iranian natural gas supplied to the southern republics of the 
Soviet Union balanced the deliveries of Soviet natural gas to Eastern 
Burope·l. 
Ionetheless, as we have noted, prior to the 1979 revolution, Iran 
was dependent primarily on the United States and, to a lesser degree, on 
other Western countries for the provision of arms. lotwithstanding this 
association, Iran on two occasions turned to the Soviet Union for 
alternattve arms supplies. In January 1967, in the wake of this period of 
normalization between the two countries which we have been considering, the 
Soviet Union and Iran concluded an arms agreement for 1110 million, which 
provided for the delivery of several hundred armoured personnel carriers, 
anti-aircrat guns, military trucks and various iteas of SDIIlll arms. The 
deal did present the Shah with an opportunity to demonstrate his 
independence of the United States, but it did not include any hardware of 
signi ficant JIi 11 tary value. The deal was facilitated by the attracti ve 
financial terms offered by the Soviet Union. The arrangement did 
nevertheless cause a considerable political stir since it represented the 
first instance of a member of a Western alliance (Iran was a .ember of 
CEITO), turning to the Soviet Union for arms supplies. 
The second agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran was signed 
during an official Iranian delegation's visit to laseowin love.ber 197e. 
Valued at 1414 ~111on, it was also a product of a period of 18proving 
relations between the two countries. Deliverias commenced the following 
year and included 200 ZBU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, an 
additional two hundred and flfty armoured persaDnelearrters. two hundred 
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1SU-85 airborne assault guns and several thousand each of 8A-7 hand-held 
surface-to-air missiles and SA-9 vehicle-mounted low-altitude surface-to-
air missiles. This was material of a different order of sophistication from 
the previous agreement. However, after these orders were delivered in 1978, 
there were no further agreements between the Soviet Union and the Shah, 
although clandestine shipments of Soviet arms reportedly made their way to 
Iran42. 
The strength of the American position in Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
despite the complexities and nuances which we have noted, was balanced by 
the strength of the Soviet position in Iraq, although that too, as we now 
suggest was not without its complications from the Soviet standpOint. 
We have noted that Soviet actions after Yalta were interpreted in 
the United States as an attempt to create a belt of Communist or client 
states along the borders of the Soviet Union both in Europe and the Xiddle 
Bast. Washington's response to Soviet moves in Azerbaijan. which we have 
recently discussed, constituted its first clear stand against the Soviet 
Union following the Second World War. We have seen that. as far as Iran was 
concerned. hopes of subversion, whatever they Bight precisely have bee~. 
gave way to a different kind of relationship. In the case of Iraq, there 
was no initial foothold such as Azerbaijan constituted ia the immediate 
post-war period to constitute a basis for posSIble Soviet influence. We 
pick up our analYSiS, therefore, in the troubled years of the Did-1950e in 
the KiddIe East generally. It appeared that in the years from 1956-58 the 
Soviet Union concentrated their quest for at least influence in Bgypt. 
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Soviet activity was aroused by three events in 
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particular: first, the Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956; secondly, the 
proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine in the presidential .sssage to 
Congress on 5 January 1957; and thirdly, the Iraqi revolution of the summer 
of 1958. 
The combination of these events in the KiddIe Bast seemed to make 
the area much less stable than it had been for years. War and rebellion 
were everywhere to be found, and it seemed that small nations survived only 
when under the wing of great powers. The Soviet Union entered the area most 
conspicuously through their prograame of assistance to Iraq after 1958 and, 
as already mentioned, their association with revolutionary left-wing groups 
throughout the region4~. Iraq was of particular strategic value to the 
Soviet Union for the following reasons: first, it is located on the Gulf, 
and able to supply the Soviet Union with naval facilities and airfields; 
secondly, it is a major oil exporters, able to guarantee the Soviet Union a 
substantial supply of oil; and thirdly, its resources can be used by the 
Soviet Union's Eastern European allies. or resold for hard currency in 
Western Europe. Soviet-Iraqi ties were an indication that the Soviet Union 
was groping for a new strategy in the KiddIe East and was extending its 
competition with the United States to new areas. This new emphasis in turn 
reflected changes in Soviet strategic interests, partly as a result of the 
enhanced importance of obtaining access to KiddIe East oil and gas 
(especially, later on, in the wake of the October 1973 war) and partly of 
the new importance of facilities in the Eastern Xediterranean. Also, the 
new Soviet policy reflected an awareness of new profits to be .. de in the 
KiddIe East and a determination to gain SODe share of the~ The interest ot 
the Soviet Union in these aspects was of course not confined to Iraq. By 
the mid-70s it had become clear that there was a marked increase in Soviet 
interest in strengthening relations with countries possessing extractable 
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~uantlties of oil and natural gas - Libya, South Yemen, Saaalla, Algeria 
and Afghanistan all increased their share of Soviet econoBic or military 
aid .... lonetheless, the Iraqi relationship reJl!llned as 'epecial' as the 
American with Saudi Arabia. 
The overthrow of the Iraqi acnarchy in 1958 marked the great divide 
tn recent Iraqi history. Qassi. co-operated closely with the Comaunists and 
wi thin a few months they becaJle one of the country' 6 strongest polt tical 
forces. Xany key poSitions passed into theIr hands. including. to all 
intents and purposes. the revolutionary tribunal Under Colonel Xahdauwi set 
up to carry through a largescale purge tn the country. However. while 
using the Communists, Qassim had no intention of allowing them to dictate 
his policy. Even so, they played such an active role that they came very 
near to achieving power in Iraq. However, the lationallst-Communist 
honeymoon soon came to an end. as the latlonalists suddenly became aware 
that a Communist Victory would lead to the complete subordination of 
national to Communist aims. As a result. the Iraqi Comaunist movement 
suffered a setback from which it bas never recovered. The aassacres of 1959 
left deep scars; people were only waiting for the bour ot retaliation and 
Qasslm's pan-Arab rivals happened to be the worst eneBies of the 
CollJllUnists. 
The decline of Communist power was a great,disappointment to the 
SoViet Vnionj during 1958 and 1959, Iraq had been the BOSt proBistng Arab 
country, alch IDCre than lasser's Bgypt. Diplomatic ties betWeen Ioscow and 
Baghdad were restored IJ1l1edlately after the revolution of ;JUly 1958, and 
the Soviet Vnion offered to assist Qassl.'s regt. 1. every poeslble way£fl.. 
In fact. on 17 .July QasslJ1 allnounceci that Iraq-. relattons with foreign 
Countries with which the former regime had come into conflict were to be 
rebuilt and diplomatic relations with thea to be restored, Incl~dlng the 
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Soviet Union, Communist China and Bgypt·£. These newly-established ties 
with the Soviet Union forced Qassim to terminate the formal arrangements 
with Iran and also with Turkey, which remained only on paper, and aroused 
the hostility of Iraq's non-Arab ne1ghbours. Pormally, he withdrew from the 
iaghdad Pact on the 24 Karch 1959, and he also showed unnecessary hostIlIty 
towards the Vest. The Shah 1nterpreted these developlents as a potential 
wedge of Soviet power extending through the very centre of the KiddIe Bast. 
In pan-Arab circles, it was hinted that Great Britain supported Qassim 
against Iasser, and went so far as toofier him arms. Qassim himself, 
however,preferred to purchase arms from the SOViet Union. He blamed Britain 
rather than the Soviet Union for the Kurdish uprising. He also more or less 
challenged Br1tain by staking a claim to Kuwait. 
Qassim's pOlicy isolated Iraq from almost all Arab as well as 
'estern countries by streSSing Iraqi independence rather than Arab unity. 
He excited many local jealousies. Against this background, his increasingly 
heavy dependence on the Soviet Union's military, economic and cultural 
assistance was understandable. The 1969 econoDdc assistance agreement was 
the f1rst of a series 1n which Iraq sought Soviet economic as well as other 
forms of help. Since Iran was Iraq!s biggest and strongest neighbour it is 
easy to understand why the Shah interpreted the revolut10n in Baghdad as a 
~lrect threat from the Soviet Union.·? The traqis were stooges for Xoseow. 
It seemed likely that the partnership between Xoscow and Baghdad would 
dlsrupt:the prevailing pro-Vestern status quo in the GUlf. the twO 
countries had clearly shared aims. The detectlon of Iraq fro. the Baghdad 
'act not only weakened the Jorthern Tier at that organizatIon but also 
seeied to suggest that the Soviet Union would bawelcoaeat the head of the 
GOlf:' ' 
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T~ese anxieties are understandable but in fact. deUberately or 
~',1i,'fiS~,they were exaggerated. The primary concern ot successive 
\'~l)$~1ps in Baghdad was wi th their own secur! ty and aU"! val. The 
J~~ci~'l:lprobleD was a constant anxiety and placed a severe constraint on 
".~f.~.l'pl adventures. Iraq's resources, though substantial, were not 
~,!l,H7J.!te. ,Hostility to the Vest, founded upon tdeological conslderations, 
cU..4;~ot ~bate but Iraqi power was severely limited. The fact that Kuwait 
" ,/., ~. ",t- _ 
414 surviVe can be taken as one illustratlonof this weakness. 
~,~~theless, trade between Iraq and the Soviet Union continued to expand. 
~~~,$b4re of the Soviet bloc countries in Iraq's foreign trade rose froD 17 
~~.ce!lt ;In 1960 to 21 per cent in the following year. A !lew cultural 
.~ .... nt was Signed and miU tary collaboration continued .. Since the June 
~ ... the Soviet Union had deUvered arms to some states in the Kiddle Bast, 
~ I • .. . 
a~d. Iraq \liaS one of them. Soviet arms became DDr. crt t1ca~ than ever for 
~~y:pt~nd .Syria, and only slightly less tor Iraq which also became a front 
~~~tate of sorts, deploying forces against Isr .. l and Jordan. and which 
~~o face.d the mounting threat of araed conflict with hernelghbcur Iran. 
In the area of social and cultural relatiOns, the Ilu-bar of Iraqi students , .. ' . , 
~!M4Yl~g _die1ne abroad was increased, and the ~"let tln,lon agreed to 
\t~~ annually a number of such students in its Bedieal instltutions. These 
"',1""" " _ 
were tokens of an intimacy which seeJDed firJll.y estabUshed. 
It was in relation to Iran that the value of the eonnexion with the 
~~~:e't. Union for Iraq Jlight be tested. The United S~t •• c~early ,~eldthe 
~~,bAsle views of Iraq as Iran. Washington considered Jas'dad a 
~~~~1:>H~1alng influence throughout the entlr. reglon .• kindot s,..t!",,. 
.~~~Q~d wi.th both superpowers ate,hillS each other.',. supplies to their 
t~~~l\f'e clients. Ever slnce Qassl-' a l"evcluUon., Russ1a had be~n to '. 
~~tX I!"aq, with sophisticatedwaapons. and its .Uli;ary aid froll 1958 t'o 
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:"ma totalled about $2 billion. Various agreelBents CODtlOUdated the 
:bllatloDShip. For example, in 1972 Iraq signed a tifteen-year treaty 
~,l.~lving military co-operation. Two of its articles are ot particular 
.lntereet, numbers 8 and 9. The forJler stated that 'In the event of the 
4e1relopment of s1 tuations endangering the peace of either party or creating 
·.tueat to peace or violation of peace, the High Contracting Parties shall 
contact each other without delay in order to agree their posiUons with a 
vie. to removing the threat that had arisen and re-establish peace' and the 
latter added 'In the interest of the security of both countries the High 
Contracting Parties will continue to develop co-operation in strengthening 
t-'lr defence security' 47. It is perhaps not surprising that the Shah was 
'alarmed by these two articles. In order to reassure hill, President Jilton 
promised to sell Iran any non-nuclear weapons it wanted in unlimited 
quantities and also to provide the necessary technical training. He also 
promised to help Iran support the Kurdish nationalists. The failure of the 
~let position in Bgypt, of course, helps to explain why the Soviet Union, 
~or its part, wanted such an agreeJleDt. Iraqi knowledge of American-Israeli 
co-operation with Iran on the Kurdish problem increased antagontsm towards 
the United States. Various border incidents suggested that the cold war 
was about to become hot. 
It is iaplicit in all that has been said in this chapter that Iraqi-
laerican relations were never close but it is perhaps necesaary to confirm 
'tht. point. It was Bri taln which had continued to be tlle _jar external 
tallvence in Iraq until the 1958 revolution. There was never an • ... rican· 
paaaae. Qassill's general stance against the Vest did not a11.ow the V1\i ted. 
. St,tes any opportunity to expand its influence. bdeed, after 1967 
tUplo_tic relations between the two countries ceased. There see_d little 
~p~tuaity to Bend fences with ~ghda4 while the American Qonnex1on with 
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'::.lran'becaEso close. The Soviet influence in Saudi Arabia was comparably 
.1ight. 
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Chapter Four: The Iraqi ReVolutipn and the Gylf. 1958-53 
The military revolution in Iraq in July 1958 not only caused the tall 
of the monarchical system but led to the introduction of measures which 
suggested a socialist orientation of the new regime and created uncertainty 
as to Iraq's future alignment. Soon after the revolution, ideologically 
radical groups came out into the open. An intense struggle ensued between 
Ba'athist and Communist factions, each competing for the support of leadlng 
army officers. Despite Qasslm's fear of Communist influence becoming too 
great and despite his preference for playing one faction off against the 
other, . there was growing tension between him and lasser, and a pan-Arab 
attempt to overthrow him made a short-lived alliance with the CommUnists 
possible. There were swift defensive reactions in the Gulf and beyond. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait developed links With Egypt and, In addition, Kuwait 
drew closer to the Shah. Iran was reported to have ordered general 
mobilization and to have strengthened her forces along the Iraqi border. 
U.S. m1l1tary aid to Iran was stepped up, resulting in a Soviet diplomatic 
campaign against the U. S. -tran relationship. A further effect was to 
disrupt growing Arab cooperation on economic issuoes, espeeially that of 
011. 
Beyond these precautionary _asures, the internatiOnal reperCUSSions 
of the Iraqi revolution for the Gulf were slow to develop during 1959 and 
1960. Continuing Arab resistance to the Bri Ush role in the area was a IIOre 
obvious feature of theaeyeara. 'Fighting over the Buralld QlS1spersisted, 
with Scouts led by British officers surrounding ilAlIasa"Ulase 1'1l searcb of 
guerrillas and to put a stop to the laying of JI1netieldj,·WhUean ~atte.pt 
was Dade on the life of sayyid lhmed bin Ibrahim, iini.tet of tbe InteriOr 
to the British-backed Sultan of Oman. Aair Sal1h tbn lea al-Harlthl. the 
representative of the Imam of OMn. in rebelliciiagi.lnst the sultan; was 
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aUietally received by King Saud of Saudi Arabia and the I-.m and his 
aesQCiates were feted in Riyadh as the king's guests. On 19 October 1959. 
i'nan interview with the Cairo daily AI-Ahnujl, !air Faysal denied that any 
centacta were taking place between Saudi Arabia and Britain over the 
renewal of diplomatic relatiOns. though he had previously Bade clear that 
such a restoration would be possible provided Britain was willing to work 
for a solution of the disputes outstanding between the two countries, and 
by the end of the year diplo-.tic sources at the Vnited lations were 
reporting near agreement on prel1J11nary steps, to be taken in search of a 
.. ttlellent. During 1959, the I._ of Gan also vis1tedlraq, Syria and the 
Soviet Union, to which he had been invited by the Soviet ComBdttee for 
Solidarity with Afro-Asian Countries. In Itsrch 1959 a court in St Belena 
dismissed an application for a writ of hAbeAS cgrpus to release Abd al-
iahman al Bakr, a Bahraini nationalist leader imprisoned there aince 1956 
after being convicted of plott1ng thellUrder of the ruler and his British 
adviser. Sir Charles Belgrave. 
The years 1959-60 wre also _rked by an unsuccessful Soviet attempt 
to woo the Shah of Iran. In July 1959.tbe BritiSh government bad protested 
to the Soviet Vnion at the highest level abollt'Sovlet broadcasts 1n Persian 
denouncing the Shah and his govertuleut, and 111 the following mnth, as Iran 
celebrated the sixth anniversary of the overthrowal pramer XuhaJllllad 
lassadagh, there were anti-Savietde.,n&trations'throughout the country and 
Soviet embassy staff were ordered to stay indaora;.Yet in July there were 
alreadyelgns of a change when the verbal propaganda _r •• brought to an 
end and talks were begun. Tile 11111ts 01 any such rapprocM.nt beca. clear 
the following year when. on 22 Septeaber. the Sonet V.tOIl of1.I'''econo~c 
aid to Iran if the Shah would dellY the Vni ted.. $at •• the use. of base. for 
any poes1ble attack an the Soviet Union. Two days later. the Shahaa14 at a 
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t.)eraa press conference that Iran would reciprocate if her aighty northern 
aetghbour proferred friendship, but that his country would not buy 
'rleadship at any price. The Shah certainly found it .. a1er to develop 
~.l.tionships with the Soviet Union's rivals at that tl ... Iran was 
Fe.ported to have signed an agreement with Japan, which i.cluded the 
4ropping of restrictions imposed the year before on the import of Japanese 
lood.~h ,On 4 October the Shah opened the Vest German lildustrlal Fair 1n 
Teheran. Two days later, in a speech opening the eleventh session of the 
Senate, the Shah promised that Iran would remain a .. mber at CBITO. Iran 
agreed to adopt an austerity programme to control 1nflation, balance her 
budget and halt the drain on her foreign reserves. Such a programme had 
~n made the condition for further loaas from the I.I.F. aDd the U.S. 
ggv.rnment. Xeanwhile. the 1. I. F. approved the stabll1sation plan proposed 
by the linister of Finanee and annouaced that it had entered tnto a stand-
by arrangement authorising the government of I rail to draw the equivalent of 
$35 milllon during the next twelve .onths. The FuD4. also agreed to 
postponements from January 1~61 until July 1963 of payaents of $17.5 
milion in sterling drawn by Iran in July 1960. In 'a&Ution the IIIK Bank 
of Aaerica announced that it had authorized a ••. 3 million credit to Iran 
tor the purchase of silos with a capacity of 60.000 tone of grain. 
4t the SAme ti •• there were already signs that the Iraqi 
r,e14tionship mght benefit the Soviet Union. botb. 1n tar_of. C10H 
Z:elAt10nsh1p with Iraq and of disruption ill theGuU reslon of a kind 
uafavourable to the Vest. In the first place. Qaeei.·. clUUcultle. with 
tlvtIraqiCoJIIIIUn1st Party were reaolved. when, at the ~lul.'Of Aupst 
~9. 1'tsleadersh1p publ1clycondeaed its owncr1111ul act ... aot1ODaHsm 
aM;. aiecalculat1oDS. Two days later,on 5 Augu.t~ .. ~S61. accepted. an 
lavttatlon from Khrushchev tovls1t 1Qaco~. On 27 December 1959 Iraq a~ 
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the Soviet Union signed a technical t~aining ag~eeDent, whe~eby the latte~ 
would assist in setting up ten big cent~es fo~ t~aining l~aqis in the 
fields of radio, telecommunications. oil. agricultu~e • .achinery, river 
transport. elect~icity. metal sheet cutting. road-building and air 
cOJIIJIUnications. According to the Iranian newspape~ ite1aAt, two days befo~e 
the ag~eement was signed, Soviet oil experts had begun building an offshore 
drilling platfo~m in the Gulf. In April 1960 it was announced in Baghdad 
that the Iraqi Xinister of Planning. Dr Talat al-Shaybani. in his capacity 
as acting Xinister of Oil, had signed an agreeDent with the Soviet 
Technoexport Organization under which the Soviet firm would carry out oil 
explo~ation ope~ations in the Khanaqin area. The Economic Planning Board 
autho~ized the linistry of Indust~y to ratify a contract concluded with the 
same Soviet o~ganization to ca~ry out surveys and to draw up plans fo~ 
imp~oving navigation on the Tig~is and Euphrates rivers and Shatt aI-Arab. 
The Soviet Union was expected to speed up its economic aid to Iraq, and it 
was denied that there would·be any change in the terDB of its loan 
agreement. Xikoyan devoted much of his visit to Iraq to exploring ways of 
expediting work on fo~ty th~ee industrial and development projects 
specified in an earlier agreement of Karch 1959 . 
. Secondly, one of the IK)st per&1stent sources of conflict in the 
region, the Shatt al-Arab dispute, erupted on 16 December 1959 when, after 
a shooting incident, Iranian frontier guards ware reinforced alo~the 
Iraqi frontier near the disputed area. Special precautions were also taken 
t(:) protect the au refinery at !badan .. The Iranian XajU. accu .. d Qass1a of 
adopting an aggressive policy towards Iran, 4nd the Shah declared that Iran 
would defend its rights and its integrity in the border di.pute. Teheran 
Radio attacked Qassill as a, red servant of. black 1-.peria11sm.Both the. 
United States and Br1tainadv1aed JIOderAt1on in handl1ng the 41spu\e. and. 
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It'seelled clear that Iran,'despite cIvllian deJlOnstraUollS and the 
aevements of tanks, armoured cars and aechanized units of artIllery. had no 
wish to let the crisis escalate. The Shah interrupted ~i. ~oneymoon to 
confer with his Xinister of War and other officials, but officials in 
public seemed to be back-pedalling the affair, 'and the army chief of 
information referred to military activities 1nthe area as routIne 
.. noeuvres. The preDder Eghbal, speaking at a news conterence in Lahore, 
said he did not believe that the SOvlet,Unlon was behind the present 
dispute, and at Rawalpindi on 29 December he declared that although Iran 
would tight back with all her Jlight Uattaekdd by Iraq. and seek 
assistance trom her allies, the Iranian government was confident of its 
legal position and held open the door for negotiations on the disputed 
border. 
Thirdly, there was obvious fear anexpeetatlon of an Iraqi bid for 
tuwd t in the wake of Qassill's revolution. In·April 1959 the Bgyptianpress 
reported that Communists troll Iraq had attempted to overthrOJf the 
government of Kuwait, but hadbeenfolled bytlle'luwa1tiauthOritles. In 
August 1959 the Cairo weeklyiou2;,l-YpQMf d clalmecl to be in passesslon of a 
secret document giving detaUs of an Iraql pla.'to auex, by force of arms 
if necesary, Kuwait and otheron"produeing .. te. 1n the Gulf so aa to 
solve Iraq's finanCial criais.in lovember ...... 1;y-olle Co1lllU1liets, 
including IraqiS, Syrians," Lebanese and lranla.swerearrestecl 11Lluwait 
for, according to the publ1c ,security depart_.t. Or-ganlz1ug a cell there. 
theestabl1shment of Kuwait as an Independent state 1n1061 .v tHse ,t.ars 
andexpectat10ns realized. 
On 19 June 1961, tile cancellatton of tIM1.99 ... g ..... nt b1ttween 
Britain and Xuwait was annoGnce4. Reneeforth. luwalt was to aseuM full 
responsibility for its inteJ'ul.1l4 ext_rulaffairs. An exchange Qf note. 
-126-
between the two countries was signed. providing for consultation on matters 
of mutual interest and for British assistance to Kuwait if requested by 
that government. Kuwait then formally applied for ... bership of the Arab 
League. Delegations from Saudi Arabia and Jordan arrived tn Kuwait to 
congratulate its Ruler on his country's independence. Arab League Secretary 
General Abd al-Khal1q Hasunnah stated in Dama.scus that the League Council 
would meet as soon as possible to discuss the Kuwaiti appl1cation. He 
indicated thatthe Council would undoubtedly welcome Kuwait as a full 
Dember. 
On 25 June 1961. General Qassim laid claim to Kuwait as an integral 
part of Iraq on the grounds that it had formed part of the wl1a1et 
(province) of Basra under the Ottoman Empire. In Kuwait a state of 
emergency was declared and news agency despatches reported large-scale 
demonstrations aga1nst Iraq's 1ntended annexation plan. The government 
issued a statement affirming its determination to defend the country's 
independence and seeking support from all peace-loving states. particularly 
from sister Arab states. On 27 June. Kuwait alerted its British-supported 
army against any incursion fro. Iraq. leanwhile. the UAR. the U,S.A., Saudi 
Arabia, Iran. Jordan and Britain announced their support for the . 
independence of Kuwait. In Baghdad. General Qassi. was reported to have 
received Dany cables froll all sections of the Iraqi public urging him to 
extend his declaration of sovereignty over Kuwait to all other links in the 
chain of territories along the shore of the Gulf. The Iraqi UJ delegate, Dr 
Adun Pachachi, said tn lew York that Iraq would oppose Kuwait-. adJll1.ss1on 
to the United rations. 
On 29 June 1961. the ruler of Kuwait, Shaikh Abdulla al-Salim a1-
Sabah, held a press conferenee at which he reported his people's 
deterJll1.nation to defend their independence. and he issued an official 
-127-
statement denying that Kuwait had ever been under the control of the 
Ottoman Empire, citing documentary evidence of Iraqi recosn1t10n of 
Kuwait's independence. On the same dAy, Britain diverted. a commando carrier 
,nd other warships fro. the Far East towards Kuwait and alerted other 
forces nearer the Shaikhdom. AI-Ahram, the Cairo datly newspaper, reported 
that two Iraqi brigades. fully armed. and equipped had Deved to the border 
of Kuwait. Pravda accused Britain ana the Unit,d Stat •• of trying to 
exploIt the sItuation to protect their oil .interests. In Kuwait, the 
formation of a Jational Guard. was. announced.. Volunteers were issued with 
arms and. units of the armed forces .. were .,ved to the frontier. Britain was 
reported to have appealed to the United States the UAR and. other countries 
in the Kiddle East to Join her in restrainlng Iraq fro. attacking Kuwait. 
King Saud sent a cable to Qassi. in whlchhe appealed to hi. to avoid any 
action likely to break Arab solld.arlty.and. lead. to foreign interference in 
the affairs of the Arab st.ates. 
On 1 J u 1 Y 1961 a Sr 1 ti sh force compr ~s i D8 ~OO .r 1 ne cOJlUlllndo and. 14 
Centurion tanks, supported by 12 Hawker Hunter jet fighters, landed in 
Kuwait, and a few hours later Baudi Arabiall forc;es alec entered tu 
Shaikhdom. The Supreme Council and the Ruler Aadrequeet.d~lltary 
a&sistance ~rom Britain and Saudi Ara~la after,the government had begun to 
mass forces on the frontier in preparation for· all. invasion. lr.q's reaction 
to this action was revealed by the Iraqi delegate to the Untted lationa 
when he lodged a counter-co~lalnt with the Security Council, el~lB1ns.that 
Brita1~·s intervention in Kuwait constItuted .11. armed tbr .. t.~o the 
security of Iraq. It is.also'illpOrtant to .-l1t10n that 011 2'.JII118 Britain 
informed Qassim that Kuwa1t .s.~ 1ndependeutstate .&IUl tut allY threat to 
her sovereignty would be. a ... tter of grave concern to Br1tain. 
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Xeanwhile, British forces In Kuwait moved to forward positions about 
five ~les from the frontier. Iraq called the landing in Kuwait a direct 
threat to Iraqi security and called on all Arabs to unite against this 
tyrannical imperialistic aggression. An extraordinary ... ting ot the Arab 
League Council was convened in cairo to discuss Kuwait's membership of the 
League. The Iraqi delegate, Abd al-Husayn al-Qutayfl, aaintained that under 
the League Charter a unanimous vote was required for admittance but the 
Saudi delegate argued that the Charter stipulated that only a majority vote 
was needed. The meeting was adjourned until 12 July pending the completion 
of the Secretary-General's consultations with the governments of Iraq, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
The UAR and the Soviet Union demanded that the Security Council order 
the withdrawal of British forces from Kuwait since Iraq had renounced the 
principle of annexation and given an undertaking in the United lations that 
it would pursue its aims by peaceful means only. The leader of the Kuwaiti 
delegation to the Security Council told the Council on 6 July that Kuwait 
would not request the withdrawal of British forees until it had received a 
guarantee of membership of the United lations and a renunciation of Iraq's 
threat of annexation. The British delegate pledged that British forces 
wOuld vanish from Kuwait as swiftly and as effectively as they had arrived 
1f Iraq dropped her aggreSSive annexationist policy towards the Sbalkhdo •. 
In a further BOve, the Soviet Union vetoed a British resolution ai .. d .t 
Winning UI recognition ot Kuwait's independence and deterring Iraq fro. 
annexing the state. lmaediately afterwards. the Security council rejected a 
VARresolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of British adlltary 
torces from Kuwait. During the .... period. Iraq urged the postponement of 
the scheduled Arab League Council meeting owing to the great dangers factng 
the Arab world fro. the imperialist trio - Britain. Prance and Israel. The 
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further Qassim went in his statements the greater appeared the division 
between Iraq and other Arab countries, as AI-AhraM reported that nine Arab 
governaents. the UAR. Saudi Arabia, Yemen. ICrocco, Tunisia. Libya. Sudan, 
Jordan and Lebanon had declared themselves apposed to Iraq'. request for 
postponement of the League Council meeting. The London Obseryer stated that 
the British government was now prepared to accept the replacement of 
British troops in Kuwait by a UI force - provided the Ruler was agreeable. 
On 12 July. fallowing a meeting between the Ruler, the British Under-
Secretary for War and the British Political Resident in the Gulf. it was 
announced that three British battalions. together with supporting units and 
the aircraft carrier Bulwark would be withdrawn from Kuwait. This 
constituted nearly half of the total British force there. On the same day 
also the League CounCil met. The Secretary General proposed either General 
Qassim should withdraw his claim to Kuwait, recognize its independence and 
register such recognition with the Arab League and the UI Security Council. 
or the Arab League Council should farm an Arab force to be sent to Kuwait 
to replace the British forces. The Iraqi delegate walked out of the meeting 
in protest, but was later persuaded to return. The UAR declared its Support 
for the second alternative. with the proviso that the Arab troops concerned 
Should come from countries Which did not border Israel. 
During a revolution anniversary speech in Baghdad. Qasslm demanded 
that the British' get out of our land' and on the second clay of festivities 
barechested Iraqis, dressed as ancient Babylonians and Assyrians arched 
past Qassi. shouting '(Uti&! t 1s ours'. Qasslm warned tJaat tae WChllcl take 
land from the Shaykhs of Kuwait and S1ft it to the pe_llt. U lie aa111ed 
control of that area. It is perlulps worth noUng that,. State of ICuwa! t 
1. mainly desert. 
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On 19 July British forces began to withdraw froll Kuwait and on the 
next day came the admission of Kuwait to the Arab League. Again, the Iraqi 
delegate walked out. On 21 July the League took initial steps to send an 
Arab force to replace British forces in Kuwait. A few days later it was 
reported in Beirut that Kuwait had informed Arab League states through 
Sbaykh Jabir Ahmed al-Sabah that the arrival of a token force from various 
Arab states would bring about the full withdrawal of British forces. Kuwait 
was also offering to earDark oil revenue funds for general Arab development 
projects. On the following day, 25 July. in Iraq, citizens of Kuwait. of 
other Arab states and Palestinians working 1n Iraq were given the same 
rights and privileges as those enjoyed by Iraqis under a law proDUlgated 
that daYi the decree also granted to Kuwaiti and other Arab oapital 
investments in Iraq the same treatDent as was accorded to Iraqi. General 
Qassim reiterated his claim to 'liberate' Kuwait on , August during a 
speech at a oornerstone-laying ceremony for a ra1lroad equ1pment factory. 
when he was reported to have said 'We will not aocept half-solutions'. 
the Arab League Secretary-General arrived tn Kuwait to 8ign an 
agreement with the Ruler of Kuwa1t regarding the replacement of the British 
torce there by Arab League troops. On the next day Iraq demanded that the 
Arab League cancel Kuwa1t's membership and aot collectively to eU.inate 
the defence agreellent between its Shaykb and Britain. On 17 August Britain 
announced that she had agreed toa request by theiuler of Kuwait to 
withdraw British troops froll the s.alkhdom. 
Durt'ng that ti_ IP,c was holdllrg negotiations with the Iraqis. Por 
exalDple, on 23 AuguSt, after a nlnety-w1nute .attng with -., • • _bereof 
the Iraqi negotiating team, General Qassi. issued aatate.at .. ,188 that 
negotiations were being r •• uwed at a time when Iraq was being subjected to 
strong iaperialist pressure fro. the British l.perlallst base lntbe 
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JfSUl"peddlstrict of (uwai t and froll 1rresponsible eleaents whose actions 
.... ,ef service only to imperialism. On 24 August the Iraq-IPC negotiations 
· .. re· resumed. Before the meeting, Qassim took the IPC delegates on a tour 
to~ .. ,the achieveJlents of the revolutionary regiae. OIl the following day. 
tbe,,;·lrltish Alabassador to Iraq, S1r Humphrey Trevelyan, returned to Baghdad 
~l.llawtng ten days of consultations in London on the 011 negotiations and 
other.·tatters . 
. In Kuwait, internal pol1tical deyelop_nte were taking anew shape. On 
2't~'iugust,SAaykh Abdulla a1-Salam al-Sabah announced that lCuwait WDuld 
held,.its first general election on 1 Jove lIlberto choose a Const! tuent 
asseJibly to draft a new'COnstitution. A further IPC _ating was held in 
irAq On 28 August following the earlier session. The company's delegation 
cmuanted on the Iraqi points of view presented at the previous meettng. 
Later, Baghdad Radio said that he company's delegation was hopeful of 
arr! ylng at a satisfactory solution, and it added that Qassi. had told the 
lPC "representatlvesthat Iraq would not retreat fram its existing pOSition. 
Two.;days later, the IPC representatives agreed to a 3-week balt .for 
consu.ltations with the company's Board of D1rectors. On the sa_ day. the 
Shaikh of lCuwai t issued a decree pro'Widlng for the estabUsh_utota 
. 'or:etgn Department whieh l«JUld be exclus!"ly respcms1ble for the coadu.ct 
et;JCuwait's external affairs. 
The,COlIIJIIIlnder of the Iraql Air Force, Jalal al-Awqati. left tor the 
Sov1et.Union at this point, leadtng a ten-an aission. 10 rUS08 tor the ; 
atasionwas disclosed. Qassiafollowed his nor_l patteraef attacks and 
~tions.On '1 September, .1n a speeCh to &SI"OUP of offlctals at the 
14ucat10!l' 111listry he was reported to have accused'Br1tleh lapertal1sa'ot 
&ttellptins to incite cUsturDatl08SiDstdelraq at a time. wtten M!Ott.tiOD 
bet-..n IrAq and the IPCwere 1 .. progress. A few days later, in ~.lt. tla 
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:'itst<:contingents of the Arab force began to arrive. In all 3,300 Arab 
.~: ,(1.200 froll Saudi Arabia. 1 t 200 froll the UAR, 400 fro. Sudan, 300 
.c !T'OJI Jordan and 200 from Tunisia) were to be !mved. to Kuwait and their 
'tWticl1-up was expected to be completed by 1'1 September. an the salle day. the 
:.l.r~;ot Kuvei t ordered the election of a Constt tuent Assembly to be 
,..$po1led until 2 Dece.ber. Iext day Kuwa1t Radio salel that the Iraqi arllY 
.... · .. ttnieel the previous week when ordered to invacia Kuwait. Shay1th 
AN"Ua-al-Salam asserteci that the agree.nt fOf' Sri Ush. protecUon of 
.... , reJUlned unaffected. He also dieclosecitlaat a Kuvei t1 economic 
... ton would tour Arab countries to cieteraine thesneeds.anci opportunities 
for'-I"W41t1 investment and that there was no possibiUty of direct 
'a,ottations on the differences between Kuwait and Iraq other than through 
Ae Arab.- League. 
During this period, Iran had its own conflict,,1 th the Comaunists and 
tU::Sotrlet Union. For example. on 21 June 1961 Premer AU Amini told a 
press--:conterence that 'saboteurs' of the governaent's ;progra_ of land. 
telora would be severely punished; whether their political- views were left, 
NJht· or neutral. He acidecithAt Iran hoped to finct a_au of re.,ving her 
,.II1"nurstandl nge with the Soviet Union and l-.provlb.g relations between the 
' ... countries, though without ignoring the1r lnteru.Uooal collli tlillent. or 
breattng;off ties with their Vestern ,frlend.s aad·.1Ues. It waSt reported 
*batihe was alluding to the statellent '01 a laticel 'tont, leaele~ Kartlll 
8tlQabl t ;Oll17' June calling for a revision of Ira.'. 19M 19ree_nt with a 
ecm~t1ij. of 8 Vestern oU-coap4niea. anci for '. ~nt,af the 
~".try' 8 _Jabershi p of CUTO, since 'thes.· agreeMnts bad "'D.51ped .. 
allepdly.when the oat1a%L was not abl.'eftn. to,co_nt 011 tH _tUa afthe 
paet.~ . In another press confeteace.OII.- 24- June, Prellier" A11 A1d1l'- salel,that 
during the first fifty days af his governEnt the foreign exchange position 
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tad baen 1Bproved. largely as a result of the extraord1nary facilities 
extended to Iran by the United States. 
On 16 July the governaent warned that the police would uee whatever 
... sure.were necessary to block a rally by the opposition 'ational Front 
.cheduled for 21 July. And on that day the police repelled CODUnists and 
other anti-government demonstrators who showed up in protest at the 
sovernDent ban on the lational Front rally. The rally was planned to 
COincide with ~he anniversary of th~ fall of the four-day rule of Ahaed 
Gbavam in 1952. Two days later. Iran protested against alleged Soviet 
efforts to bring about the overthrow of the govetnJlent. Foreign JUnister 
Husayn Qhods lakhai complained to the Soviet A~S8ador about the SoViet 
Union's hostile interference in Iran's internal affairs by .aans of recent 
IOscow Radio broadcasts. The following week, Iranian officials were 
reparted to have warned lational Front leaders nat to attempt new 
demonstrations on Constitution Day 5 August. Whtle the Iranian-Soviet 
tension was rising in this way. American and West German relations with 
Iran were improving. On 3 August the United States and West Germany were 
reparted to have been conferring wtthlranian official. On the poss1bility 
of extending a loan of about S50.000.000 to cover the deficit in the so-
called development budget for' the country' ..... n-year plan. On 17 August 
it> .. & announced in Bonn that the West Ger_n governMnt bad agreed to 
grant Iran a long-tera credit af DX200 Jliilion 'C$50Il1ll1on) and provide 
_q>ort credit guarantees of up to DJl550 .1111on (18'1 1I1111on) tor laporte 
of West Geran goods and equipMnt to Iran. Two." later Iranian 
officials said that the Soviet Un-101l had used deft1l! teforprl" to aupport 
charges that CEITO had plotted atoll1e attactw all part. oftJaeJUddle Bast. 
including Iran. The Shah. aD 4 lavellber. called for a partner.hlp,·af the 
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kited States and Iran to transforJl Iran into a showplace for the non-
CbDuuist world. 
On the following day, however, the lational Prontcalle4for a 
reasaess.ant of Iran's bilateral mutual defence pact with the United States 
and ber obligations to CEiTO. It cla1aed that the agree .. nts did not 
represent the people's views since the Kajlis was not representative of the 
people at the time the agree Dents were undertaken .. This was followed by 
PreDder ADdni's announcement that the Shah had sent hi. 4 directive calling 
for all possible Deans to stallp out corrupt ton , to illlprove tax collection, 
to establish real justice, to attend to the needs of the people and to 
establish rule by the people. It was aleo announced at thlstime tbat tbe 
Shah Kuhammed Reza Pahlavi would be crowned on 14 lay 1963 at the climax of 
the 2,500th annlversdary celebrations of Iran'S aonarchy. The Premier a180 
declared that Iran had paid off $69 1I111ion in forei·p loans and that, 
through cuts in imports and a national austerity programme, tbe country had 
auaged to end its trade deficit. 0u1'1 .ovellber it was officially 
announced that, following a .et.lllgbetween JultusBol.as, the US-· 
Ambassador in Teheran, and the Pri_ JUniata!',.. aloali and auoutr1.ght grant 
were being _de available i_diately by the :Ualt1ld States. The; loan was 
intended tor the completion of several· oithe allCGDd :tlve-year ·ple 
projects, including overdue payments to • 1luaberof>;contraetOl'S"l' ad the 
grant for new public works to __ growing uneapla,-.. tf. ~becountr,. ... On 
the SUe day the Iran Pan American 01l:Coapany -(t'ACl .wasr.ported to have 
struekoll at an off-shore well which wastobe·cawa · .. ·Darlus ~1.· 
·As &loh as Iran had to atrugglelnteraaUy,wttb. _t;toaa'Uati&acl 
COllllUn18tagl tators. Iraq was 1ll,. siJlilar atat •• On·16 .Septe~ aJl 
official adlaission of aned revolt amug·the Kuf'4a OflortherD'.lraq ~ .. , 
_de in a broadcast by BagD.dadIa41o,whlcll.cla~that it taadbeeaput 
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4oa"."y::tbe army. But on the following day travellers fram Iraq reported in 
,.'rut,;that the Kurdish revolt was cOntinuing. Also the regiE's failure 
.'DiMr Kuwal t was highlighted by the wi thdrawal of Brl Ueh troops and then by 
",' .. 
" .. iSbaykh Abdulla ai-Salem al-Sabah1s related .departure OIL avleit to King 
,Sau4.;:A ·few days later, on 22 Septeaber, the United States announced the 
.p_:o.Uehment of full diplo_tic relations with Kuwait. Britain and Kuwait 
ai.agreed to establish diploJlatic relations. the Foreign Office in London 
&allOuacing·that J.C.B.Richaond. British CoJilsui-General inluwa:tt, had been 
appOiated ambassador and Khalifa al-Ghunayam, a lerchant and member of the 
hwait &urrency and Develop_nt Board, was to baeo_ Dbassador in London. 
'.rla_! t 1 t was also announced that the wi tbdrawalof Bri Ush troops was 
O_lete~ It was reported from Cairo tbat the UAR linistry of Foreign 
Ufa1rshaclofficlally 1nformed the Kuwait gcwern_llt of the VAR decision 
t~:;.3Ccbange diplomatic representatives witb Kuwait at ambassadorlal level. 
"Qass1m put a brave face on 1 t and at least kept up the war of words. 
Ie told a press conference in Baghdad on 22 Sept •• ber that Britain, with 
iJt;e::;belp of the Un1 ted States. had.eng1Aeered the 'urelis). upri8iag. He 
~ltteatened to close the British' embassy 1n Baghdad it, BritallL cl1d not atop 
wlaa'tidl. called bostile acts endangering the securIty of Iraq. Iriti$h 
ot:Uelals on 24 September denied the aeeueatio1l8 Ol'e.Brt ttsh co.,l~c1ty; ttl 
"be',lurd1sh revolt. A report i.Baghdad that IraaiaIL author1t1 •• bad 
U'l'es:te(i'Kulla lustafa al-Barazan1. accused of lea41ng tJae !","i.nr.volt, 
.',dented by Iranian security and officials in Teheran, but on' October 
ll"Ih1wra the Iraqi newspaper. claimed that lueci.Baruaat, 'brot1aerof" 
.' luU., XUstafa. had surrendered to Iraq's ar., Autltortt1 •• ' 1t. tClrtEuJt. Tbe 
tncFFore1gn Kinieter, Hash1.,'Jawad. told the VI General' ...... !" cae 
Q;:tabef'"that Britain's agree_nt With luwaUwae.':tllNat tGother'AT.b"']', 
coun,trtes and to the enttre;)Uddle·last' area .. ln~ th.:.at1tt., MlDt'atlO11S 
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,: .. t .... dad between Iraq and the oi 1 companies were broken ott. An IPC 
·· ...... _n said the Iraqi demands included a 20 per cent participation in 
. _tco.-pany'. capital and an increase in .Iraq'. ijO percent share 1n aU 
.~pt':4lU,tSIOn 15 October, Baghdad Radio accused oil coaptaiesoperating in 
"'Cl:of exploiting the wealth and violating t~e rights at the people, 
~~1ng intrigues and hatred and violating the provisions of the all 
.. t •• .-at . 
\,\':'.5] British troops were replaced by Arab forces. proble_ of another 
"l!t. arose tor Kuwait and its allies. On 12 October 1961. in a note to the 
.• ab"League, the UAR officially requested the withdrawal of it. troops 
temlD8 with the Arab League force in Ituwait. 4118,ed friction between 
Spun and Jordanian contingents was the reason givell. In a cable ill the 
'oLlenag week to the Ruler of Kuwai tt President lasser explained that 
tJJet:e<was undeniable evid.ence of a conspiracy to disrupt relations between 
theUAReontingent and Kuwait, for which reason he proposed the .withdrawal 
Qf(hls contingent. On 22 October Ii Kuwaiti representattvehanded President 
~"'r: a not. from the Ruler of Kuwat t uktng hiato recons1der his, 
*1.10n. At the end of that IIDnth, Gn,30 Qctober,.tae SOviet Unio~.'"toed 
i •• Gaission of KuwaIt to the l1I as proposed~b1t •• UAR. The PONl'sn :' . 
; •• ,.ter,Shaykh Sebah al-SaUaal-Saball eai41a'ivwait that Ai. gover.naellt 
., .. ld',apare no effort and u.,. all cl1plo_ttc_ •. aEiP~a.secur.lCu_1:t" 
4Qini.otl to the world body. It was.nnounc.d in c.l~o;that.'~1ARtroQ,..;la 
'-..1t'would return home .800D. 
,Itlctherparts of the Gulf. otller territoriall ... ,.· • .-- t •• Qbjeet 
otyaegottations. On 15 October. ,lei1&1 Saud d,1SCussed. the Bllrall11 0&$1.' 
,.,..tton with the Bri Ush govern.lt" repreqntJU •..• nda.a,.an,.ad < 
• .,H$S8.i,hop. that a peaceful solution WQuld be reached. two.eke lat.eF. 
the,.;.s.ud,ldelegate to the VI accuaec!' Britatnof Nv1Jlgperpetrate4 further 
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•• ~.t.aggression against Oman in the previous six weeks. He spoke during 
. " . 
ili:. •• bateon the Qmsn question after the Polf tical COJlllllttee overrode 
:~.ttt.l'Ii:!.ndAmerlcan objectiotls to hearing a delegation of Omanis. On the 
.,'10110",n8 day a spokesman for Said ibn Ta}'llOr. Sultan, Of OJIan, d.eniedthat 
•• tlah 11111 tary action of any kind was taking place in Omll. 011 30 
.o..llbertthe OIIIlnl office tn Damascus reported that ODanl CCIIII_lldos had 
"tatad a British military camp at lizwa and set fire to it. A few days 
tateti;;nationalists from OIIan won the endorseDllnto! the UI political 
eOildttee for their seven-year old campaign for·lndependencefrom the 
SU!tlncf Xuscat and Oman. In the follOwing year, On 5 larch 1gea. the 
watker··of the Illam of Oman told al-Thawroh newspaper in Baghclad that the 
l_mr\and. other Duni leaders might seek dlplomaUorecognlt1on for a 
.. ,.,tat.'"'state of Oman. He had been In Baghdad since 25 '.bruary tor talks 
wi*,,,, Iraqi ofUc1als. 
, However, it was the Kuwaiti-Iraqi, issue that eontinued to attract acst 
att.ll'tlotl. On 17 December 1961, in a speech broadcast by Baghc:ladlad.l0 • 
••• ta'renewed. Iraq's ela!. to Kuwait; On tlleMlleH5ia,. Kuwait Inforaed the 
arlt>tAt.gue that Iraq had seized lOluwaitt ships ott the portot BaSTah 
aud."ud tuued a decree freedngall Kuwaiti chpoetts tn Iraqi o:baUs. On 23 
hMllbttr Qassill said that Iraq would again mobilize its forces to liberate 
[uwaU)· • .'·ftls statement was.de shortly after the •• 4 of tutu.ttl 
4ipa,t:Ml1t of finane6 and ecollOJlie affairs anaounced -ill' a radio broadcast· 
: .... t·'the government had decided to, establish a fud' for tlnanclq'eeonoll1c 
.se.tOpMflt' ·pro.}ects; in the Arab atates.Bri taia T84Qte4 to ..... wect. Iraqi 
".,.itlbj' putting 200 serviee_nolla 12-houralert. ,Ira'tlareapo •• 
• ..,'the 4ttenUonof the n&tcurtty <CouneU ,to8rttt ... prPQOat1Olttl'lthe 
' •• 11. Batt. _hUe Kuwait tn tUl"U'protested. to '~1le SecurltY'CChfnollagalnst 
tQ\';.~contlnued pressure aad ooncentratloa of .nt taryforces. ICu.it, 
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IcNever. proceeded with its first election to the AsseJibly. When Kuwait 
Iad~ announced the final results of the voting. the ..... 4id not include 
any:aember of the ruling Al-Sabah family. 
On 1 January 1962 the State Depart_ntin Yash1astonbegan the new 
year ,by affirming American support for the Sbaikhdoa. It said that 4n1 
atte1lpt"to threaten Kuwait· s independence posed a tbreattothe peace of 
the ·Arab world, and added that the tJnitedStates regarded Kuwait as a 
sovere1gn independent state. Two days later, the arEd forces at Kuwait 
ope.ad large-scale ten-day _noeuvres to test the state's detence. agaiut 
i·avasion l while in thesaJlle week it 'wasanMullCedthat three Jorda111an 
aoldlera, serving in a medical unit with the Arab League forc .. iii lu_it, 
ha4 'been captured by the Iraqi authorities whed theyetrayed ~v.r the 
Itaql"'Kuwait1 border; The new political develOpments tn Ka.it were taken a 
stage further on 8 January when the RuIerof Kuwait issued a law setting 
forth the const! tutional system which was' to p-..aUfcir the proviSional 
:Period of one year during which the ftewly-elected Constituent As .. ably 
would draw up the framework of parliamentary gGverDtent. On 17 January, the 
lulerappointed the first Cabinet under the ter_of thel.tett.' 
Cft$Utution. The ministers would beco_.Jlbersif"the Constituent 
",ely. 
"J(eanwhile. Qassi.' 5 interiAl prable_ oftM'«urd18huprisias and the 
oUcoafUot with Vestern ooapallt.s _"ed the, Satftrests Of·luWlllt. It ._ 
repOrted on a January 1962 1n T".ran that abou.t.aOO ,l(uTcliel trl....... '" 
&riac1'wi th 'ba~ooi:as and .,rtars,wre Ught1 ag SOMru.llt force .. til ~, 
northera Iraq. At the sa. tiM Quai. revealed tllat tll.lO ..... at ha4 
r.,.i •• d notes fro. the British aae blerl~Jl 8Ofti ..... t.'.l1t .. ~". to 
muM ugotlatlon.swlth theoll coapant •• In Iraq aDd to agree to 
aNt1tration. Furth.er contl"09.r.,~_s occasion.ed __ 11 the Vn1t8dStates,' , 
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B~ltl~h, West German, Pakistani and Danish firms were amang those affected 
by .. ~. notification in the official gazette requiring thea eitaer to give up 
~helr.cooJllJlercial agencies or to form coapanies in whi4 Iraer's WDuld hold 
at least 51 per cent of the capital. This gave effect to a law passed in 
January 1960 and it affected 26 firllS holding 410 agencies. 1 few days 
later, Qassill denied reports of a cease-~ire arranged.,wlth Kurdish rebels, 
although three days earlier there had been reports 1n Beirut that 
negotiations had taken place. On 16 January, in an address to the fourth 
conterence of Iraqi engineers in Baghdad. Qassl. called. for the surrender 
qf Kurds who had joined the revolt in north~rn Iraq. On the other hand, on 
27 January. the acting Ddl1tary governor t 111 Ghalib Aziz, ordered the 
immediate release of 299 Kurds detained in connection with the attempted 
insurrection led by Xustafa al-Barazani the previous septeaber. 
As fast as Iraq was JIOving away from the 'est 1 t was maving closer to 
the.Soviet Union.On 6 February, 011 X1uieter ~ha"'~ Salaan and the Soviet 
Embassy's EconOmic Counsellor in Baghdad reviewed .. a contraC?t for the ule 
ta, Iraq of an iD600,OOO Soviet drUling rig .. TAe ,contract aleo provided for 
the tralning of Iraqis in the use of therlg by Soviet techulcl~. This 
contract was followed on 28 February by an Iraqi-Soviet VD.1on Qultural 
agreement which would provide at 1¥St,~70 ~"l.t '80holareh1pe for ,raql. 
to study in Russia. Dive Soviet .tu~nts ~u.ld COIII8 to Iraq to learn 
Arab~ct and teachers of Arabic andlussian.~ld " .• xo~d .•• the 
foll,?wl~ aonth. however. diplolllltic ditf1eultie •. lNt.ntQ~rfaca bet_., . 
Iraq and other countries. On 1'1 )(arch, IraCl '.~O\I~ed t. :recall.,ofclt. 
fU1VQY t,o Japan. which had recognizad KURi t and Q~."tla.fal.,o,r,tD8 ;.day l.-aq 
recalled 1 ts ambassador to Iranlnprotest ag.1 ... t~tlae ·preaelltatl,,1l of 
credentials there by the Ku_! t1 aabassaclor .•. QI).:t~ naxt day, th,:UAI'( 
~dor to Kuwait presented. Ill. erect.nt1.1 ••.. A~ the .... ~t .. , Iraq'. U. 
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~epref!iM!ntat1ve, in a letter to the Security Council. said that Iraq would 
!~1~1 peaceful .aans to restore its legitimate rights in Kuwait and 
rebutted Kuwaiti allegations of prQvocative actions. OQ 20 larch, when the 
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq. Abbas Aram. left forT.her~n to aaeume the post 
of Po reign Xinister in the Cabinet of Premier AU Amini. he said that his 
departure was not connected wJ th the recall of the I~raqi ambassador from 
Iran. 
T~e improving Kuwaiti economic situation surely d1d INch to explain 
Qas~im's perSistent claim. For e~mple. on 25 larch 1962. an agreement for 
-
a leuwait! loan of about KD 7 million to Sudan to improve her railway 
networ~ was Signed between the representatives of the JPlED and a Sudanese 
delegation. On 3 April. the KFARD also granted a ~ seven and a half 
JD1111onloan to Jordan for various projects, ampng them the Yarmuk river 
scheme and the expansion of the Jordanian phosphate coupany. On 26 April. a 
five-man delegation representing the West German. De .. g .arrived in Kuwait to 
study a project for the construction of an iron and steel plant powered by 
natural gas. On 19 )(ay. the Xinister of Finance,approved pay.nt of KD2 
Jlillion to Lebanon as the first instalaent of a ICD 5 million loan Bade to 
Beirut JlUnicipal1ty under an agree.nt signed an 16 February lllst. On 20 
lay t:t was reported that the Cabinet ~ would shortly 4tecuse a btll fQr the 
•• _ , '0 • ",', 
oreration of a national company. to, ullderta.ke all goveru.ent constructiou 
projects in Kuwait. The bl,ll had been drafted by a lOve nt_at caDittee and 
referred to the Cabinet for aci_ion. On 30 lay Shaikh Abdulla al,,:,~~e. a.l-
. , . ' . . , . ." ;,~ 
Sabah officially inaugurated AminoU • s new 100. 000 bId r,t11lery at JUD4i . 
. ' . - . .', "', ' 
Abdu1l4. the new plant br1nsil18 .lI1noU' a total refl~capac~t1 up t9 
150.000 bId. Two weeks later,. the JOC eJlbar~d on a, proJ~t. to:lac~a .. the 
cruele 011 processill8 CApacltyof It.IliJUl.al-~dl refinery to. 60.00~ bId. 
thereby raising refinery tbrau.,hputfr.om; 190.000, bId to aeo.ooo 1>/4. 
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jOt.o~~r, at the time Kuwait was facing Qassim's claim over her territory 
.~~ was peacefully defining her frontiers with Saudi Arabia. On 15 June, a 
rtiWlilH delegation left for Saudi Arabia to hold discuSsions with Saudi 
authori ties on the demarcation of the frontiers betwe.~; tb two countries 
and an the administration of the Saudi Arabiailuwalt leutral Zone. 
Saudi Arabia, at this time, was reshaping her political, SOCial and 
econoDdc views, both internationally, internally and regionally. On 17 
lar~h, King Saud received the former ruler of Qatar,· Shaikh Ali al-Thani. 
On the following day, he issued an o£ficialstatement pledging full support 
for Syria against Israeli aggression: Twe days later, the Cabinet met under 
King'Saud and formulated the country's domestic and foreign pollcies. Wlth 
regard to the latter, the king declared thefollowitig dbjectlves: co-
operation with all luslim countriesjsupport for'the Arab League and 
un1ticaUon of all the Arab worldj settlement of the Buraial problem before 
resumption of relations with Britain; and re';;'est~blishmerit-of relations 
With France. To underwrite his objective of ·suppdrt for and co-operation 
with. the Arab world, on 1 April ICing Sa~d ~rder.dthat t1 "Billion be given 
to'·the Algerian government in accordance with the: .tab League Council's 
decision to provide iDlJllediate and effectlvefin&n~lal aid. Another aspect 
bfBaudi activity was' to be seen in King Saud'. ·"pening of~the;coD.f.renc. 
of Wotld leaders of Islam held in Xecca beSinnlug'dll 18 Jay. 
-, • ; '_.>1. ~, ~lc. ,1 J,;" ' ,--; 
In the eConomic field. regulations for the protection and 
.~ouragement of national industries were proJiulga~'d. ' tbe _tn POlnt~ were 
8.sto11ows: equipment. _chinery and spare parte't.rt~for'u .. 1n any 
new industry would be ex~mpted irom customs dtiti.~ithe stat • .«mld provide 
1'.Iid'tor the construction of' DB" factoHes and fot .1II,io,.....'hod.iq.: 
products·of iocal industrieEi:would be exempted:froa export and aU other 
duties; the government would be authorized to tate BeaSU res , such as t~rt 
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r,,~r1ct10ns, tariffs, and grants of financial assistance to local 
1 .. ~ustries for their protecUon. The provisions were not to apply to 
industrial firms already enjoying specialprivileg~s. ,On 3 June, the 
~trec:~Qr General of the Saudi Income Tax Depart_nt. Sba,i~ Abc! al-Jal11 
AbcS,al-:Jawad, was reported to have said. that his office ,,~uJd ask the 
appz:-opt;'iate UN committee to loan tbe services,ota cha~~erect. accountant to 
aseist;1n the auditing of the accounts of 011 companies and ,other large 
co-..rcia1 firms operating 10. Saudi Arabla. It was reported a few days 
later that the government had,concluded a contract with theUl' Special Fund 
to establish a pilot experiEntal farJl and.grlcultural research ~entre 10. 
the eastern region, in the Qat1f oasis. The fUlld was to furnish $680.6,00 of 
the estimated cost of 41,371,600, the remainqer to be provided by the 
go",uJlent. The FAO was to organize staff and I:~nistez:', ~e five-yur 
pZ:-°Fa.Jllle. 
\c ,In another part of the Gulf pol1 tical event,s ,~re ~pl:D,g r~ther 
d1fterently trom what was happenl,ng in: Saudi Ar~b~~.:On 18 larch., S~lltl1 
raUb ibn A11. a brother of the exUed IaJl ot Qall. Anci _Jl~ of ,an " 
. h,.~>, ,A 
OIIIlnl,.4e1egat10n vislt1ngBaghdad. opened. an ~~,oft1ce tb.er~,.A 
spoltee,aan for the delegaUoD, saidthatYahy~ 1bu,#-Q4.qlla tfQulC\az:-(1ve in 
.. ,...... ' ;. ~ , . ., ,- ',> ," . :. < , 
Baghdad shortly to take charge of tl1is ofti,ce\ ,~,.!.,he ,toll,Q'.f:1~~>d.ay .. "1\ 
inquiry 1n Lomon was told by, tile ~l1ci tor-Generah"Slr-;John 119~1!'" '\,hat 
"', ~ , • "- _ _if' -," -,. - .:i' ".. " 
t~,. Brt tlsh liner D4r.A. which ,had su.nk 1~ th~ vul.f;t,~ .pre.vlous ".prU",wt th a 
,', I' ~ • • " • :' ' .'" ~.' - ,," . :-' '(~" '" ", " 
lQ$~oC2.36 lives,' ha4 been esab()taged by a ti_ ~b., B.a4d.e~ ~ha~ there 
, , ' , ,_., •. ' '.v -,-,>-"., 
was ~1ttle dO\Jbt that it tta,s,t~e work Of. o.ni.,re1)el,! ~"~''''~,'~,. 
. ,", .. . ... ,. , '.' - ." 
QllJan~.o,f.fice in Cairo ,d~:qled ,~~e, alleg4t.lontha~, ~Jll;;~l!~~,,~~ ~a9t~~~. 
the \)QJ4~ all the vessel. '. ~~e.k Jatet. a,,: ~nl delegation. 1_ 'by Shalkll 
SulYll,lln t..bn H1~r and. ,Shaikh ~a~1~ ,.1~. A11 •. ~r:+ved 1.pa_~ue, tZ:-,C?:1l , 
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Bashdad to inform goverJUlent leaders thereof the latest developments 1n 
tbe ODanl problem. 
z~c ", While the OMnl conflict continued. the Kuwa1 t1 COUUct had subslded, 
at:least for the ti_ being. aud on -19 June Kuwait cel.brated the first 
A.1l1versary of its independence. The Ruler orderedth. pa,.ent to all state 
.~flclalsand employees of a gratuity equivalent to~O per cent of.their 
baSic .onthly salaries and all good-conduct prisoners who had served a 
portton of their sentences were ordered to be Teleased. On the follow1ng 
4ay.Sh4ikh Abdulla al-Sa11m al"'Sabah attended the opening ceremonies of 
al-Sabah haspi tal. It had a 675 bed capacity. the Deputy Pri1ll8 lini.ter and 
Fore1!!11Unister was able to tell the Cairo weekly AkbhAr Al-Sb •• b that 73 
friendly states had so far recognized the· state t)f Kuwait. )(oreover, the 
economy continued to flourish. It was disclosed that crude 011 production 
tn lay 1962 had alllClunted to 57 t 811. 580 barrels, 19.1 per cent higher than 
tn 'Kay 1961. The daUy average during that period was 1.848,890 barrel. 
coapared with 1.566.290 in Kay 1961. The average production figure for the 
ti;rst five months of 1962 was 1,131, 140 bId. collpAred with 1.616.508 for 
the sa_ period in 1961. an increase of 3.6 percent. Acting on the 
l'et::!o1lllenda"tion ot the EconoJl1c and.lndustrial COmmittu, the tint.tel' of 
'inance and Economic Aftairs had apprcrt'ed a proposal for contnlcttagthe 
British ;firm, Industria.l and Process I1lg1neer11lg Couultants, to a_a>.· 
eo.ehensive survey of the country's industrial potential. t.',luwaitl 
governMnt bought complete. centrolef Kuwait! Aina,.. 'Qa l' July a 
tunisian delega.tion, led by the >,under-Secretary of. the :~1U1Stry~'OfPlaanlD8 
nd'.Develop1lent left Kuwait _ere it had beenha.tag d.~""l"collceralD8 
thead31n1stration of assistallea. under DOl>. 
;~,"'b: Iraq. the governilent 8igned.in JUU'1962uagree_nt on ~olloalQ.ad 
iechllieal eo-operation with Sfleden Which provided forparttclpatl'Oll'of 
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Swedish groups ln the industrial, power, transport, co..unications and town 
plannlng projects of Iraq's economic plan. Sweden would provide experts and 
8Cholarships for training Iraqis. On 1 July the Soviet Vnlon and Iraq 
ilgned a protocol providing for Soviet technical a .. lstaace tn extendS:ng 
the Baghdad-Basra standard-gauge railway 3Q ~les northwards to U .. Qasr, 
tile new port which Iraq was building on the GuU, about one mle from the 
Kuwait border. As Kuwait celebrated the first annlveraary of 1ts 
independence. Qassim in the following month was preparing for the fourth 
anniversary of the Iraqi revolution. Two days beforehand, on 12 July, came 
an untimely report from Ietanbul that heavy fightiD8 between Kurdish 
tribesmen and Iraqi land and. air forces had broken out 1~ lortheastern 
Iraq. On 14 July, a m1l1tary parade was held in Baghcl&d to celebrate the 
anftiversary of therevolutlon¥ PreDier Qasslm addressed graduate. at the 
IUttary Callege, during which he criticized Britain for haviag granted 
luwait bogus independence. announced" that a national au company to explOit 
Iraq '. 011 weal th would soon be set up. andproaieed election. to the 
national assembly. On 21 July, .lkhan Jlenehltov;,"tor.r Soviet _.s.dar 
to the Unl ted States. said in Baghdad before le.vtq for J(oscow that Iraq 
and the Soviet Union had reached. complete unc:leret.neltng on ge_ral world 
1ssues. A week later, secur1t,forces uncovered an undersrouad eo..unlat 
cell headed by allan caUed <Abdulla Saud and three •• bare of tl.e outlawed 
Communist People's Unlon Party. However, this 41d not alter Iraq'. 
laternattanal alignment. On 25 'tupst the X1n1etl'f:af ,ld.ucat101f'aa1l0uaoed 
that Soetal1st countries hadgralltetl 497 teUowslllptu .ao by tile eo .. tet' ',' 
Valon, 10 by Yugoslayia, 20 by Bulgaria, 12 by last aerany and. 35 by 
Czechslovakla. A few days later. the's" York .ert1d 'kllNu •• baned;,by 
the .Uttary Governor-General, n.4 salth .l-'bdl~ n.e order_14th. baa, 
.. dietated by the general" tn~"st. :¥h.ther\ •• tgeflerale tater.st· ' •• 
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_rved' by the government· s Kurdish and Kuwai t1 policy remained 
~u.rStionable. On 1 September. the IPC pIpeline through lurdish territory 
In'D:oi-thern Iraq was reported to have been cut and the flow of 011 hal ted. 
bIl9 Septeaber. official sources in Washington thought it werth denying 
that'the US was offering either JIOral orlllllterta.l support to the Kurdish 
r •• olt. Iraq prepared a formal and futile protest to the International 
Io'netary Fund against its acceptance of Kuwait as a'.aber. 
WhUe QassiJll was claiJl1ng and protesting; applying tor assistance and 
loans, Kuwait and other Gulf stateswere'enjoylng hIgher increases in their 
already consIderable 011 production. ~For example, on 6 July It was reported 
that the Japanese Arabian Oil Co Ltd. bad coapleted 31 wells tn its 
offshore concession In the neutral Zone betweeuluwait and Saudi ArabIa. 
Vell no.30 was tested as a dual producer with II. daily output of 7.S&O. 
bartelso 'The flow at well 10.31 was ',2"0 bId;' on 20 Ju11 calli! a company 
announcement of the completion ot its permanentab1pp1~g facilities at Ras 
al-Khafj 1 in the leutral Zone. A Kuwait .tssiot led 'bY Ahmed al-Biahr. 
technical assistant at the Xinistry of Finance alld!conoaic·Affaira, left 
tor a tOur of the ShatkhdoJlS of t>ubal, Sharja,' ljllln, Va al-Qalwaili.Ras 
al-ICha111111 and Fujatra. The two-week llission was to aka reco .. ndatloQ 
concerning the most approprIate' aethods 'of 'chanuUhg tuwa'ltI"'tlunotal 
a"lstance to the ShaikhdollS.At the sa. U •• ' it 88 reported thAt bl' a 
recent press conference in Cairo Shaikh Saqr ibn' SUltan al -Qaslm1. IUler 
Of'Sbarja, confirmed that he had .ipad au' oU canoe.ioa· qr .... ilt with 
tOhn v~ leeom, which had tai:en oYer the DhofarcoM:eH1.oDIt>fotlft:lt'!li14' 'by 
ti ties' Serviete and Rich'fleld.' 
. Iran's _thed of consol1dating its pr'-'ee 8ltd. pdel' t1l"tht, Gulf ... 
'a distinctive as the contrastllg paths ot SIludljnbta and Iraq~Oa 'Slu1, 
the Shah returned from a tour-cb.f vlsft'to Pakistan. A coDUDique issued 
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from Rawalpindi announced that the Shah expressed ooncern over 1fghan-
'4kistanl relations and offered his assistaace in aolviag their 
41ffereJlces. President Ayub IChan accepted. Internally, Iran had a budget 
cr~is .. which led to the resignation of Preair Allini OIl 18J,uly 1962 and on 
the following day the Shah appointed issadulla Ala. as PreJl1er in his 
place. ,Prellier Alam told a press conferenoe :tbat Iran'. foreign policy 
WlJUld remain unchanged. Do_stically, he promsed to continue fighting 
corruption, implementing social andad.Jl1nistraUve reforE and carrying out 
land retarDS. Dr Amini, for his part, expre$Sed regret at a aews oonference 
that his complaint, _de a few days before •. about tardy eoonomc aiel from 
tbe United States and the outtlngQfl ,Of -.1l1tary aid Jw:l caused. 
misunderstanding in tae State Deput_nt. he bl&Jled the .. tactors for his 
govermaent c s fall. On 21 July, Ala. presentedlde new cabinet to the Shah • 
. retaining eight previous members. TAe Shah ordereel the new governaent to 
prepare for national elections to both. housesoi parUa.nt. On 11 August 
the Shah oancelled the 1250,000 yearly salar, allo_nce ot Cl:"o~ Prince 
liza for a year in order to belp the budget. Pre.a1er Alam uid that hle 
goverD.llent had reduoed the budget d.eflcit froa$70, OO.OtOOO to 27,000,000. 
Tbe total expenditures of the revised budget were $787,000,000. Acoordina 
to a new linlstry of Labour plan. all factory ..,FlEer. in Iraa would 
henceforth be g1 ven a ahare in the profts _de by the1r firlE. On 25 August 
1962. US Vice-Pres1dent Johnson eoded a two ... y.goodwUl visit to~ Iran. 
Iranian policy was nevertAEtl ... to_lntalna ,.tuelly uti.fact.ory 
relation.hi p with the SoViet l1n10nwhwe 1 t wu,auouDCH .1a-e.pt4laber . \llat 
• pledge had been obtained fro. Iran tbat, JU] foreign rocat .... WOUld,. 
estabUshed. on Iranian terr:1tory. On 24 October tlae De"ty'o,..tp . 
liu1ater, J(asoud Furoghi, ar,.lvecl 1 •. JlasQQw to exoha:np tran~it agree.nts 
to tacill tate the mve_llt of goods ,bet .. a tb.e:Bov1et Unlon.aD4., ,ran. 
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At the beginning of the following DOnth another sort of crisis arose in 
Iran. On 1 .ovember hundreds of Kullas condemned rule by decree in an anti-
government demonstration in Teheran. Three weeks later, it was disclosed 
that security forces had captured 15 persons connected with the 
assassination of Malik Abedi, the Fars provincial head of the land reform 
programme. In the following week, the government suspended a Yotes-for-
WODen decree to avert a protest demonstration called by religious leaders. 
On 22 January 1963, Teheran police dispersed a crowd of businessmen. 
religious leaders and landlords protesting against the Shah's reform 
referendum, due to be held on 26 January, and policy broke up a hunger 
strike in the Iranian Bmbassy in Washington by anti-government students. 
The 14 students were given suspended sentences of 30 days in jail. Over the 
following two days, workers supporting the Shah's reform programme beat up 
students at Teheran unive~sity. it was reported. for shouting Slogans 
denouncing the ruler. The clash with 2,000 workers came after police broke 
up anti-government demonstrations by religious leaders. Security forces 
patrolled the univerSity. Two days later, Iranian voters went to the polls 
to decide on the Shah's land and social reforms. It waa announced later 
that 5,598,711 voted in favour and 415,000 against. Unofficial yotes ware 
cast by 271,179 women. The Shah issued a decree authorizing the government 
to impleDent the Six-pOint reform prograame. 
On 18 February, Prime linister Assadulla Alam reSigned, together with 
his Cabinet, and on the following day he presented a new Ufteen-.liber 
Cabinet to the Shah. On 9 Xarch,the Agricultuf'e lint.tar retaiped bee.u •• 
ot lack of economc co-operation ·In the govenuaent. ~'4a,. later, the 
Premier announced the appohtment of GeILeral IsaU 11.h1 •• Agriculture 
I1nlster and of General Ariana as co_nder of the southernaray with 
orders to enforce land reform 1IL the Qashqal area. On the following day the 
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government ordered air and ground attacks against southern nomads warring 
against the land reform programme. The military governor of Fars predicted 
that rebel leaders would be hanged within 24 hours. This event was followed 
by the Shah's dedication of a $67 Billion dam named after hi ... lf, which 
would bring power, irrigation and flood control to Khuzestan. 
Meanwhile. Iraq's internal and external difficulties worsened. 
although on 26 September 1962 it was reported that Shaikh Rashid and 2,000 
Kurdish tribesmen had crossed from Iraq into Turkey. leaving their arms at 
the frontier. As part of his struggle with the Communists, Qassim banned 
the Lebanese Communist weekly al-Yoqt accusing it of discrediting Iraq, and 
ordered the conf1scation of all issues enterLng the country. Good relations 
with the USSR continued despite this move. On 8 October an Iraqi military 
mission returned from Koscow, where it had viewed Soviet army manoeuvres. 
On the other hand, relations with the Arab League deteriorated further. 
Iraq announced 1n mid-October that 1t would not co-operate with the Arab 
League and would not contribute to its budget. A Foreign Kinistryofficial 
added that the League disregarded its charter by admitting Kuwait. On 17 
October. a spokesman for the Kurdish rebels, Kamuran Ali Badir Khan, said 
he would ask the Security council to assure the Kurds the right of aelf-
determination. A petit10n would be sent to the Council President. Valerian 
Zorin, calling for an end to the Iraqi government's campaign of genocide 
against the Kurds. Adnan Pachachi, Iraq's chief delegate to the VI said the 
charge was absolutely false. In the following week, Qass1m 8414 Preeident 
lennedy's decision to blockade Cuba was a threat to P'4ce and aa aggr.asion 
against peoples struggling for freedom. On 30 October, Bagbda4 ladio 
reported that Qassia had rece1vedthousands of telegra .. , 1a support of the 
government's Kurdish policy, The telegra .. e-.phasized brotherhood between 
Arabs and Kurds. Three days later, however. on 3 lovember. heavy fighting 
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broke out between government forces, including air force, infantry and tank 
units, and Kurdish rebels near the Turkish border. On 10 December Al-Shorq 
newspaper reported the discovery of a Communist headquarters 1n Basra by 
security men. The party leader was arrested and letters were found which 
proved Communist collaboration with the Kurdish rebels, conveniently 
linking together QaSSiD'S basic problems. 
While Iraq was involved in recurring conflict with the Kurds, Saudi 
Arabia was engaged in the Yemen where conflict with the UAR led to a break 
Indlplomatic relations with the latter. This factor led to a closer 
relationship with the United States when Prince Faysal paid a visit to 
President Kennedy at the White House on 4 October 1962, though on 28 
Jovember the prince rejected President Kennedy's proposals for a settlement 
of the Yemen conflict. On 3 January 1963 Prince Faysal announced a general 
mobilization of the armed forces and charged the UAR and the Yemeni 
Republic with continuing air and sea aggression. Within two days, the High 
Defence Council decided to open military training centres throughout the 
country and the United States was asked for the return of its jet fighters 
to the country. Washington agreed to send a destroyer to Saudi waters as 
well as the fighters. The High Defence Council took a further decision to 
withdraw Saudi forces from Kuwait and the diplomatiC position was improved 
on 16 January when Saudi Arabia and Britain agreed to resume diplomatic 
relations. There followed a Saudi request for French arms. 
The Kuwait affair was gradually being wound up. On 28 January Baghdad 
RAdio reported Qassim as saying that he had not attacked Kuwa1t because he 
did not like Arab blood to be shed. Qassim did not reveal the .. ans by 
which Kuwait would be liberated. Three days later. Jordan coapleted the 
withdrawal of its forces froD Kuwait. On 4 February. the Arab League 
announced the dissolution of the token force 1n Kuwait in view of the 
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encouraging situation along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. On the same daYt 
Saudi Arabian forces completed their withdrawal frOB Kuwait and Sudanese 
forces were ordered to leave. As the crisis ended. eo did the rule of the 
-on who had initiated it. On a FebruarYt Baghdad Radio announced the death 
of PreSident Qassim in a coup dtetat. All frontiers and airports were 
closed. Radio announcements were made in the name of the lational Council 
of the Revolutionary Command. Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif was appointed 
transitional President of the Republic and a 21-meaber cabinet announced. A 
new point in the international history of the Gulf had been reached. 
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The Daterial in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, 
taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at 
the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of subsequent 
chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this 
chapter. It has not been thought sensible to provide more detailed 
referencing: 
1. Keesin,'s Contemporary ArChiyes 
Vo1.XI: January 1957- December 1958: pp.15285-18566 
Vol.XII: January 1959- December 1960: pp.16567-17838 
Vo1.XIII:January 1961- December 1962: pp.17839-19156 
Vo.XIV: January 1963- December 1964: pp.19157-20500 
2. The liddle East Jpurnol The Kiddle Bast Institute, Washington. 
Vo1.12: 1 July-15 September 1958, pp.418-447. 
Vol. 13: 16 September -16 December 1958; 16 December 1958 - 15 September 
1959: pp.77-442. 
V01.14: 16 September -15 December 1959; 16 December 1959 - 15 September 
1960: pp.63-455. 
Vol. 15: 16 September -15 December 1960. 16 December 1960 - 15 September 
1961: pp.41-444. 
Vol. 16: 16 September -15 December 1961; 16 December 1961 - 15 September 
1962: pp.60-507. 
V01.17: 16 September -15 December 1962i 16 December 1962 - 15 Sept.~r 
1963: pp.104-445. 
Vol. 18: 16 September -15 December 1963: pp.104-143. 
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3.Sumpar1 of World BrQadcasts; Part IV; The Arab Wgrld. Israel, 
Greece, Turkey, Iran 
Daily Series. Published by the Konitoring Service of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. Caversham Park, Reading. Berks. 
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Chapter Five: From the Fall of Qassim to the British Announcement 
pf Withdrawal 
The period between the fall of Qassim and the Six Day War of 1967 
brought little stability or peace to Iraq, and conflict persisted in Oman 
and, at times, in Iran, but these years were equally striking for dynamic 
economic development and diplomacy in the Gulf, together with a marked 
readiness to co-operate and negotiate for the relief of tension. 
Iraq continued to be the source of tension mest difficult to relieve, 
though its new leaders did move quickly to defuse the Kuwaiti crisis and to 
repair relations with other Arab states. On the day after the overthrow of 
Qass1m the Council of Kinisters in Saudi Arabia decided to recognize the 
new government in Iraq. The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union 
recognized the government of President Arif on 11 February 1963. On the 
same day, with Upper Volta's de iure recognition of Kuwait announced, the 
total number of countries which had recognized the government was eighty 
one. In Iraq. after the Coup. the Revolutionary Council ordered the 
elimination of Communists reSisting the revolution, and on 14 February 
Communists fought government troops in Baghdad. On the following day, the 
SOViet Union expressed its concern about the arrests of Communists and 
Pravda alluded to the wave of terror and persecution against Iraqi 
Democrats unleashed by the new government. Determined to improve the 
general political and economic situation. the Oil Xinister, Abd a1 Aziz 
Watari, said that the government would formulate a new 011 policy based on 
SOund economic principles, while the border between Iraq and Kuwait was re-
opened on 16 February. The contingent of Sudanese troops fro. the force 
organized by the Arab League 1n the summer of 1961 beca .. the first to 
leave in recognition of the changed situation. Equally encouraging were the 
peace negotiat1ons between the government and representatives of the 
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Kurdish rebel leader Barazan! which began in Baghdad on 19 February, though 
the Kurds Jalal Talabani and Selih Abdulla AI-luaufi streeeed that Barazani 
.ust endorse any agreement, and this development was followed by the 
release of Kurdish political prisoners. 
On 20 February. the Iraqi Council of linisters lifted the restrictions 
imposed by the former regime on exports to Kuwait, while in Kuwait the 
linistry of Finance lifted the ban i~sed in December 1961 on the 
conversion of currency and financial transactions between Kuwait and Iraq. 
Iraq also abolished visas for Kuwaitis. and Iraqi Airways announced 
resumption of daily morning flights between Iraq and Kuwait via Basra. In 
the following week. on 13 March. a jOint communique issued in Kuwait and 
Ioscow announced an exchange of diplomatic relatloDS between the two 
countries. These events were crowned by a delegation led by Kuwait's 
Foreign Xinister, Shaikh Sebeh al Ahmed al Sabah Which paid a two-day visit 
to Iraq to congratulate the new Iraqi regiae, by Kuwait's application for 
United Nations membership on 19 April 1963 and, on 7 May, by the Security 
Council's unanimous approval of Kuwait's applioation. In Beirut a few days 
later, the Foreign Xinister, Sebah, said en route for the Uaited lations 
that Iraqi and Kuwaiti differences were faaily disputes, and fa~ly 
disputes come to an end. On 6 June, British offioials 841d that Kuwalt had 
Dot asked for revision of the defenoe agreement with Britaln. 
While Iraq-Kuwait and Iraq-Kurd relations were undergoing a proce •• of 
normaHzation, those between Iraq and the Soviet Union were ptUng.are 
difficult. On 16 Karch, the Iraqigovern.nt protest eel totu Soviet 
Embassy in Baghdad against recent attacks on the Iraqt .... , tn Jloecow, 
on 5 April, the IrAq liM., q,uoting the lilt tar, Goveraor-General. reported 
that the property of the Co..unl.t Party in Iraq had been 1~uDded; and on 
9 April calif! the return of thirty six stud.ents fro. the Sov1etUn1on. after 
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the Iraqi Embassy in Koscow had requested the authorities there to 
facilitate their departure. The students had been protesting against the 
U.S.S.R.'s propaganda attacks on Iraq. In the following week. eleven DOre 
Iraqi students arrived from Koscow with reports of ~streatment by Soviet 
officials. An Education X1nistry official said that 1.300 Iraqi students 
reBained in the Soviet Union. In Basra. officials reported on 16 April that 
they had seized a secret Communist Party Library of 25,000 books and 
periodicals. At the same time, it was reported that the IUs11m Brotherhood 
had been distribut1ng pamphlets attacking the government. On 6 lay. the 
Soviet ColDDunist Party declared its support for the Kurdish revolt of 
Kustafa Al Barazani. A few days earlier, on 25 April. in a one thousand 
word memorandum. the Kurds had demanded, among Bany other things, the 
election by Kurds of a Vice-President of Iraq. A clvil court, on 14 lay. 
granted the request from the authorities to dissolve the Iraqi Communist 
Party, and ordered the closure of party branches throughout the country. 
The Kurdish issue now became central. On 18 lay. Jazim Jawad. charge 
d'affaires at the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, said that most Kurdish tribes in 
Iraq were opposed to Barazani'sdeand for a Kurdish state in lorthern 
Iraq. On the same day, it was announced that Jalal Talabani. another 
Kurdish leader, had arrived In cairo where he conferred with PreSident· 
Jasser and others on the Kurdish situation 1n Iraq. leaving agala ·fOT 
Beirut two weeks later. At a press conference in Belrut on e June. Tal,bani 
_id that Kurds wanted free elections for an Iraqi COnst! tuent ..... bly so 
tbat the whole people. and not a single party, would run the country. 
Talabani then flew to Vienna to begin a tour of Buropean·capltale. lul'llug 
decided to delay his return to Baghdad. On 9 June, a adlltarycourt 
sentenced two students to f1 ve years laprlsolUlltnt for displaying 
provocat.ive notices about the Kurdish rebellion. On the folloWing day. the 
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governDent announced resumption of the war against the Kurdish rebels and 
de.snded their surrender within 24 hours, subsequently 4iecloa1ng details 
of a plan to give Kurds decentralized rule. For their part. the Kurds 
published their plan for the future of their country. BaShdad Radio 
reported on 12 June that the Iraqi army was advancing from Arbil, Kirkuk 
and Sulaimaniya in an attempt to launch an assault on the .sin centres of 
the Kurdish forces. leanwhile, the Soviet government denounced the Iraqi 
government for undertaking military operations against the Kurds. A little 
later. Baghdad Radio reported that 165 Kurds had been killed and 35 wounded 
in recent fighting between government forces and the rebels, and that 
government troops had cleared ten villages in the Dehut area. A ~11tary 
court sentenced two army lieutenants to five and seven years hard labour 
for activities which were connected with the Comaunist Party. Baghdad Radio 
added cn 15 June that the Kurds had suffered heavy losses and fled from 
villages under intensive army fire. Army control was soon established in a 
further fourteen more Kurdish villages. 
Iran shared with Iraq an unstable internal situation during this 
period. On 19 Karch, Iran'S Xinister of State. Jahangir tafazzoli. 
announced that ten government troops and thirty four rebels had been killed 
in recent clashes in Southern Iran. The rebels were prate.ting"agaiuet land 
reform. two weeks later, police and security farces brake up demonstrations 
against-reforms in Qua. the deaonstrat10ns had latted for flve days. In 
Teheran, meantime, Taffazoli announced the bannins of '1 of the capital's 
141 newspapers and magazines. Pri .. Minister Alam anuouace4 • 15eO.OOO 
increase in defence spending, brlnging the total to 110&,000.000. On 2 
June, the lational Iranian 011 Coapany (.IOC) and a Buropean-t.erlcaa 011 
consortium agreed on the construction of a 1140 ~llloa all reft.ery aad 
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natural gas complex in Teheran. But the activities of rebels and certain 
4eaonstratlons pushed such news into the background. General Bahram Ariana, 
eo.mander of the Southern Army, said in a press conference that Habib 
Shahbazi, chief of the Sorkhi tribe and a rebel leader in the Shiraz area, 
had surrendered. On 4 June, the pollce rounded up more than 130 religious 
deaonstrators who were attacking the Shah's reform programme, and on the 
following day the government forces in Teheran had-to put down religious 
riots. Several private and government offices were attacked and twenty 
persons killed or injured. Teheran was placed under martial law. General 
Hassan Pakravan, Teheranls security chief. hinted that Pres1dent lasser of 
Egypt was behind the rioting. Riots on the following day in Shiraz resulted 
in 5 dead and 37 injured. lore than 200 people were arrested, including 
four religious leaders. The Premier said that the governaent had smashed a 
plot to overthrow the Shah by sabotaglng Teheran'S public utilities and 
educational institutions. The Shah took refuge for a time in the summer 
palace at Sa'adabad. Forty-e1ght hours later, tanks fired guns over 
demonstrators in the capital and the crowds were effectively dispersed. 
About 30 religious leaders had also been arrested earlier, along with 
lullah Rouhaolla Khomaini, an anti-reform leader. On the sa.a day. speaking 
at a land reform ceremony, the Shah blamed the riots on black reactionaries 
f1nanced by a fore1gn government. Within a few days. the Shah was saying 
that general elections would be held at the end of the SUDBer. despite the 
recent rioting and that wcmenover the age of 18 would be able to vote and 
run for office. 
Iran wae also'encounterins difficulties with her u1ghbours. On 4 
June, the Foreign Xlnistry of Kuwait accused Iran ot vlo1atlag its 
territorial sovereignty at the head of the Gulf, This was followed on 15 
June by the Saudi linister of Petroleum and Klneral Resource. protesting, 
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1n a note to the Iranian government, about the deaarcation of offshore 
areas 1n the Gulf, but on 19 July the Iranian governaent approved of a list 
of 20 companies as bidders for offshore areas in District 10 1, areas which 
were subjects to d1spute with Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The three 
governments had expressed a desire to settle their clai.a over these areas 
by negotiation. In the matter of oil, it was notable that during all these 
troubles crude oil production in Southern Iran in July was 6,024,000 long 
tons compared with 5,497,000 in July 1962; total production for the first 
six months was 41,668,000 long tons compared with 35,768,000 the year 
before. Refinery throughput durIng July was 1,561,000 long tons, compared 
with 1,396,000 the year before; throughput that year was 10,430,000 
compared with 9,962,000 the year before. 
If oil output in Iran was rapidly rising 1n this way, so was tension 
1n Iraq. On 16 June, three officers found guilty of coamunist activity 
within army ranks were sentenced to terms of up to five years hard labour 
by a court-martial. On the same day, a communique broadcast by Baghdad 
Radio said that the army had killed JIIOre than 300 followers of the KUrd1sh 
leader Kustafa al-Barazani in Xosul and. on the following day. the Soviet 
Defence Klnlstry newspaper Red StAr alleged that the Iraq1 govern .. ,t was 
engaged in a genocide operation against· the lur4&. Two days later. the 
Tlheran JournAl reported that 80~2,OOOIraql tribes .. n had aoulht refuge 
in Iran since the Iraqi government renewed hostilities aaaiuat tbe Kurds. 
It was announced in Baghdad that Iraqi troops had cleare4 the Dluarta 
district in the Akra lDuntain range. The aray appal"eDt.ly Ilope4to cut .in 
two the territory held by Kurdish rebels by driv1ns throu,hAkra. Zlbar and 
Barzan to the Turkish border. A spokes.an for the lini.try of I.tional 
GUidance called a statement by I&Qa. 011 15 June a break td th reoop11.4: ' . 
practice and a flagrant interference in an internal affair which only 
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concerned the Iraqi people. The ~ statement had accused the government 
of adopting la2:i methods of mass extermination in Kurd1stan. The Soviet 
Union had warned, DOreover, that it might terminate its programme of aid to 
Iraq if the government continued the military operations against the Kurds. 
On the same day, four ministers were reported to have resigned in 
protest against the resumption of host111 ties against' the Kurds. They were 
the two Kurdish members of the Cabinet - General Fuad Arif, Xinister of 
State for Kurdish Affairs and All &ba alShaikh Kahmud,Jfinister of 
Agriculture - together with two independents, laji Talib, Xinlster of 
Industry and Kahmud Khattab, Xinister for Kunic1pa11ties. In their letter 
of reSignation, the independent ministers were reported to have asked also 
for the expansion of the Cabinet to include other nationalist alawents -
1. e. other than Ba I athists - and for general elections. On the following 
day, the Iraqi government denied that the two non-Kurdish ministers had 
reSigned, but did not mention the reported resignatian of the two Kurdish 
ministers. The Iraqi chief delegate to the U1i1t1!cf lationa,Adnan Pachachi, 
told a press con.feren.ce that foreign quarters WeNt inciting rebellion among 
the Kurds. He pOinted particularly to inflammatory broadcasts froaEast 
Germany and, by implication, the Soviet Union as well. Two days later, it 
was reported in Beirut that 26 Communists bad bet!ll"executed in Iraq for 
their part in the Kirkuk massacre in 1959, while the Kl11tary Governor-
General of Jortbern Iraq announced on 2 July the execution of eleven 
Co1lJlUnist criminals for acts of anarchy at Xosu1', !)ahuk' and 1'&1 'leU in 
1959. A day later, Baghdad Radio announced thitaCo..m1t1t att.apt to 
aehe AI-Rashid military caap had been erushed", 'Ynvest1gatlo.a'clleclcieed 
that Barazani Kurds as well as Communlsts had a hand tn the attempt, Within 
forty-eight hours, the gaver-nEnt reported a 8jOr Victory over Barazani, ' 
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followers in the north east of Iraq. It said that the. rebels had been 
p~shed back to within twenty miles of the Iranian border. 
On 9 July. the Soviet Union. in a note from Poreign Itnister Gromyko 
to the Iraqi Ambassador in Xoscow, drew the attention of Iraq to the threat 
arising from interference by other states in events in lorthern Iraq. The 
!lote implicated Syria. CEITO members Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. In Beirut, 
Pathi Kamal, acting Consul-General, denied thatSyrtan military units were 
engaged in military operations with the Iraqis in lorthern Iraq. A day 
later. on 10 July. the Soviet Union declared that it would raise the Iraql-
Kurdish question in the Security Council unless outside interference 
ceased. AN Iraqi spokesman declared on Baghdad Radio that the Soviet Union 
had no right to speak about genocide. On the same day, a former military 
commander of Kosul. Brigadier Hasan Abbud. was sentenced to death by a 
military court in Baghdad on the charge of coamunist outrages 1n the 
abortive Shawaf uprising in Kosul in 1959. The following day, Baghdad Radio 
reported that about 400 Kurdish rebels had been killed in a battle with 
government troops in Jiorthern Iraq the weekbefo!'4t. Pachaoh1 oODlplalned to 
the Seourity Council that the Soviet UnioD wasinclting the Kurdish rebels 
, while the UJ Economic and Social Council refused. to0onsider a Soviet 
charge that Iraq was seekiDg the physical exterJpiQation,of _er,KurcU.sh 
Il1norlty. 
A statement was issued by the IU1tary Governor, iaallld _Uh, on 21 
July. announcing that JaMl al Haydrt, Abel al-J&:bbar Wahbl andJluhaJ184 
kIlh al Abasel - _mbers of the central oo_ttee,oft"Co~i.~ Party, 
had. been hanged. The three were invQlved. it wae. _id.1Jl~" .atte"t,of3 
.. ., ..' ~ " " . .'. 
July tose1ze aI-Rashid ca-.p. Forty-eight hourela'tert'~.tll."ore18n JUni.try 
~nnounced that six d1ploJllClts fro. the Bulgar16U:,.f.nd last Ger ••. Jl1.io~ 
had been expelled because. they had cODi t.ted ac~s inconsistent with their 
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diplomatic responsibilities. On 25 July, a revolutionary court sentenced to 
death twenty one DOre men arrested during the abortive plot of 3 July. 
Yineteen were soldiers and two were civilians. On 29 July, ten Iraqi 
students of atomic science were called back from the Soviet Union because 
ef an alleged provocation campaign against them, accordiftg to Luay Tahrin, 
secretary of the Atomic Bnergy ComDdttee in Baghdad. Pour students were 
aentto continue their studies in the United States and six to West 
Germany. 
leanwhile, the Kurdish revolt continued, and, according to a report 
from the Kurdish side, on 31 July, Barazanl had successfully withstood 
drives against him in Western Kurdistan, but partisans of the Kurdish and 
1)eDOcratic Party on the southern and eastern fronts had suffered a 
succession of reverses. Within a few days, this report was followed by 
Baghdad Radio's announcement of the capture of the towns of Barzan and 
Xazna by the Iraqi forces. A week later, a communique announced that the 
army had cleared Kirzatur in north west Iraq of lurdish rebels. Arif 
declared over Baghdad Radio on 15 August that Barazan1 had fled to the 
Iranian border. Three days later, Iraqi officials ware reported to have met 
with representaatlves of Barazani in an attempt to end the Kura1sh 
rebellion. Kurdish sources Said the meeting took place at the iurd1sh 
village of Raniah. It was also reported, however. that Barazanl had 
rejected an Iraqi peace offer. Kareover, an Iraqi air force delegation_left 
for Dauscus for talks on eloser milt tary c~operatoion, and forty-eight 
hour'$ later, !rtf, on an official visit to cairo, _t 'W1th •• ""r fbr 
reconciliation talks. These events were explained by a ~pOtt'la Beirut 
that, despite the successes, id.l1tary operationi'againattile turcls in 
Jorthern Iraq had sloWed down due to lack' of aaunit10n atid .nltary spare 
parts needed for Iraqi weapons made in the Soviet Union. 
-162-
".nwhile, the booming oil economies of the smaller Gulf States, as 
well as Iran and Saudi Arabia, facilitated the restoration of friendly 
relations between Kuwait and Iraq. In Qatar, for exa~le, the Qatar 
Petroleum eo.pnay had announced that the erude oil produotlon during the 
first six aonths of 1963 was 4,404,000 long tons; this compared with 
4.235,000 long tons in the first six months of 1962, and increase of 3.5 
per cent. In Kuwait, it was reported on 21 June 1963 that erude 011 
production in Kay 1963 was at a da11y average of 2,121,920 barrels, as 
co~ared with the 2,017,000 record of June 1962. the daily average for the 
first five months of that year increased by 0.09 per ceut, coapared with 
the corresponding period of 1962. the Cairo daily al-Aira. on 27 June 
quoted informed sources in Kuwait regarding an .gree .. nt reached between 
Iraq and Kuwait settling their dispute over Iraqi c1ai85 to aoverelgnty. 
Accordingly, Kuwait had agreed to loan Iraq III 10 million froa the Kuwaiti 
Pund for Arab Economic Development and an addltioul loan of ID20 1I1111ou, 
repayable over 20 years. In return', the Iraq govern_at had agreed. to 
recognize Kuwait's independence. After two cloeed .etings, the lati c .. 1 
Assembly in Kuwait, on 24 September 1963, issued. a .tate.nt eapowering the 
government to grant Iraq a loan to finance developaent proJect., ,aDd on the 
foUowing day the lational Assembly decided to .... t.bUsh 4ipl.oat.lc 
relations with Iraq. 
On 2 October, the Kuwaiti PriM JUnister.Sabah A1 Salaa 'l-Sabah, 
.rrived in Baghdad for t.lks with tAe Iraqi 80veruent on r.lat1QU between 
tbetwocountries. two days later, Iraq announced reco,sait1oa Of Kuwait'. 
independence and. sovereignty, and. au 12 October • delegati. bea.d.edby the 
Iraqi Prime Xinister, ·Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, 8igu.d. •• a,ree .. atuD4er wbLch 
Iraq would get an tnterest-free loaD ot 1D 30 1I1111oD froa Xuwai t •. to be 
repaid. over 25 years. 
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Iraq's internal instability persisted. On 12 October, a writ was 
~. against Xulla Xustaia a1 Barazani and 54 oi hie followers, ordering 
them to appear before the military court of Xosul withS:. _ven days or face 
trial in absentia. Rashid Salih, the Military Governor Oea.ral, told a 
preaaconference in Baghdad on 19 Octobertbat a spy network distributing 
.au.yand plotting against the Iraqi republic had been uncovered. On the 
fOlloWing day it was announced that Syrian troops 'were fIghting against the 
fUrds in Jorthern Iraq. This was conflr_d seven days later when talks were 
held with Syrian Dilitary leaders on detailed arrangeBents for the 
deployment of military units, and on 31 October it was learned that Colonel 
Abel al-Sattar Rashid had been naJMd as cOlllllllnder-la-chief of the lational 
Guard, replacing Lt. Col. Kunzir al Vindawt'l who was taking up a poet in the 
SyrIan-Iraqi military union. On 11 lovember, an eDergancy Baath party 
regIonal conference established a new regional leadership under the Pri_ 
lintater. Sadi, the Deputy Pri_ Xinister. and ,four supporters were turned 
out of, office. Two days later, the governaentwas reported to have put down 
an attempted coup allegedly led by Sad!. He aDd hi. followers _re deported 
to ,ladr1d. Supporters of Sad!. however, temporartly regained the 
aac:endancy. Following his deportation. forces from the lationa} Guard 
deamstrated against the new regional Be. , atlLleadenshlpan4 protested 
agalast the elections. It was also reported that eeven ._bers at the new 
leadership. a.,ng whom were Poteign tinister Shabtb a"Ad Inter1or-JUntat.r' 
Sawad, were ordered to Beirut to ate way for th. u.t1onal8a'.tb 
t.aciersh1p toaettle :the 418pute. A clay later. the uttoaal leatleNhtp 
cleclared that the conferenee "which established tIL.'.w l ..... mtp. •• "'. 
ttlegal and hence so was the leadership. There were aleo reports in Beirut 
of clashes 1n IC1rkuk an4 JIosul betweenuu14entttted.·dleslde1lt ele.uta and 
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SJr1aD troops stationed there. It was claiaed that attempts were made to 
aabotage oil installations in the two cities. 
President ADd al Salam Arif announced on 18 IoveDberthat he had 
aucceeded, with the aid of the army, in overthrowing the Ia'athist 
governDant. He ordered that the lational Guard should be disarmed and 
anaounced a new Revolutionary Council wlth hi ... lf as its president. 
President lasser announced his support for the Dew government, and, in 
Xoscow, the Soviet Union was reported to have denounced the Ba'athlsts in 
Iraq for the attempted overthrow of the government. Artf named Bakr Vlce-
PreSident and a new cabinet was formed, with Tahir Yahya as Prlme Xinister. 
Thirteen new men were appolnted, eight of whoa remained from the cabinet 
that the Ba'athists had trled to overthrow. This was followed by !rif's 
policy statement on 21 lovember pointIng out that neither the Ba'ath nor 
any other party had any legal status. At his first news cenference after 
the abortive coup, Arif offered to make peace with thelurds, calling them 
'our brothers' and stating his dete~natiOB to set the new regime on a 
neutral course. He sald that the government would abide by aU past 
commitments - the 17 April cairo pact, as well a8 the .ore recent 
agreements for union with Syria. In a subsequent broadcast, !rtf urpd the 
Kurds as good Xuslims to surrender-to the governlent. He offered them a 
personal promise that they would not be harraasecl if they retuned and ... id 
that confiscated property would be given back. Du.rlng this per1.a4. lrU was 
plannlng to form a natlonal front of pro-Iasser.groupe. The political 
partles iDvlted to join were the Arab lationaU.t XovaMntt t. Arab 
8octal1st Party, the SoclaUst Union J(Qvement, a for.r Ba'.athtiat group, 
and the Independence Party. 
By the beginning of 1964, both tnternal aad exterul re1atlo_hips 
••• DIed to have taken a turn for the better. On 1. January 19641t was 
-165-
flDounced in Ioscow that work on the nuclear reactor being built in Iraq 
with Soviet aid would be completed by the end of that ,year. The reactor was 
to be, ~sed for industrial, medical and agricultural research. The British 
Aircraft Corporation was reported to have ~igned with Iraq's Air lini.try a 
contract worth more than ~1.5 million for the supply of Jet Provost 
training aircraft. At the same time, it was anno~n~d that Iraq's reveDue 
from oil had exceeded l110 million in 1963, which was t15 adlllon acre than 
the oil revenues during the previous year. The Central Bank discloeed that 
deposits in banks operat1ng in Iraq had doubled compared with the period 
before the lovember 1963 revolution. 
,The KUWait-Iraq relationship, too, was in better su.pe! On 20 l)ecember 
1963 Kuwait had announced the appohtmeJ1ts of Sa1e!. Yaqub ShaJlDIIU5 ... 
ambassador to the Soviet Union. and,Xuhammed Ahaed Abd al-Latif as 
aJIIbassador to Iraq. In Iraq. on 18 January 1964. it was reportecl that 
po_ports for travel between Iraq and Kuwait N!lre to be abolished; " 
1e!eDtity cards would be sufficient. On, 24 Janu.ry, the Iraqi goverDDent was 
reported to have charged a 6~ial technical co_tt .. with conducting 
ISurveys of proJects to supply fresh water from tile Bhatt .l-Ar.b to Xuwait 
preliminary to joint talks between, tl1e two cou.~~~i •• du.+1na the _oond half 
~t 'ebruary. ,:i 
As to the seconcl JIOst tapert.ntissue, the Xurd.ieh r.'bell~o~.on 10 
ie,bruary military operatiDDs between Iraq and the Kurds were stopped. lrif 
.nd lulla Kusta!a al Baraz.n1 brQadcast orderetQr a ~f1re over IJghdad 
la4~o. The President accepted the national dAta of ~. JgrclWJl ~.thren 
within the fraaework of the Iraqi nation .• ncl proateed 'o.OODfl~ thls la,. 
the provisional coust! tuti.cm. He adeled tbat ~tf.1 ••• ucl· ~ •• l~ta he,ld or 
iaprleoned. in connection with the .J(urdlU upr1.11l8 wou.~d be nl .... d.nd 
aU, BWeable property which bad. been sequestrated would be retu"*,. Pl •• 
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cia,. later, Jalal Talabani, a representative o1.Barazani arrived tn .Baghdad 
at the head of a four-Dan delegation to negotiate with Iraqi officials on 
~d1.h demands for autonomy. It was also discloeed two day. later that the 
soverDJlent had decided to fora a Higher CoJlDl1ttee to4irect the 4evelopment 
Qflorthern Iraq. 
·On 1& February, the release of 450 detainees held in connection with 
the lCurdish revolt was ordered. During a prese interview in Rania an 24 
,.truery, Barazani said that the ceaseUre &gree.nt was intended to hal t 
the bloodshed, and that secret clauses still under negotiation would open 
the way either to per_nent peace or to a reDewal at hostilities. 
leanwh11e, in Baghdad, Arif told reporters that there was absolutely no 
questlon of negotiations about Kurdish national rishts because Kurds and 
lr-abs were brothers - one fa1l111. the big fmly of Kurds anc1 Arabs .. Two 
daJslater, two hundred IICIre Kurds were released ,fro. 'prison. On 29 
February. Talabani was reported to have said that he had accepted under 
protest the ceasefire agreement. Resaid that he bad ordered 0,000 .an 
~nder hi6 command in the Bulai_nya and .Kirkuk regiau to conttlluetrainlng 
tnlUerrilla tactics and to be ready for anything. Baghdad Radio declared 
an 1 Kttch that a further 450 Kurds had been re1..-4. CD ·12 larch, 
Baruan1 _t w1 thArif aad. Interior linistar Rash1"Cl .. Uh1n .lanla. It was 
r!&ported that they talked about the .ans of' oannrtingthe c._flre 
agreement into a lasting polttlcalpeace. 
During this period, when Iraq,.. 'busy,trying to .. lta·~IO .. r_nt 
fJ.: ... lI ,and· stable, IranwH enjoying rapid ecoACmtc: clevel.,..at '01,.-, 
41fterent kinds and in association with _ny different "COUntr1 •• Accotcl1-D8 
to 'the bead of the Soviet .CAspian 8ll1pping 0Fpllizat1oa. .l:r .... VSSR tra4e 
was on ttae lncrewase. On 21 September ,1903 aCzecblaan of 120 IItlUon, to 
~ake ·the fo~. of a ·capi tal .1nftatMnt lnlranlantnd.ustrl ... s ade to 
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{Tant and on the S4De day a trade agreeaent between Iran and Ceylon was 
renewed and the ban on the import of Ceylon tea was lifteel. A delegation 
was sent to Kabul to complete negotiations f·or the sipiq of a new trade 
agreement between Iran and Afghanistan. The trade agree.at between the 
European Bconomic Community and the govera.ent was initialled in Brussels. 
The agreement was the first purely coaaerclal pact to be signed between the 
B.E~C. and a third country and ltwas expected to co_into force in 
January 1964. On 4 October. it was announced'that the Czech loan was to be 
used to expand Iran's sugar industrYi the construction of .. ven new 
factories was to be the focal point of the.progra .... On the ea. day. a 
spokesDan for the Teheran Blectric Corporatlon .• nnounced that a Dew 
prograame to expand the power supplyta the capital WDuld cost 150 Dillion. 
Two days later, the Shah cere.anlally inau,urateda new parliament after a 
suspension of two and a half years. IUs ilUlugural addre ... tr .... d.the 
country's close ties with Turkey. Pakistan andotber allies in CBITO. The 
Shah said that priority would be gJ.ven to iadustrlaUzat·iou. laud retorm, 
and to aid. tor the co-operatives in tb,1a progra .. fortH development of 
Iran. 
Ten days later, on US October 1903, Pree1dent "-Gaulle of Prance 
arrl ved with his wife and aeeollpanied by the 'reach Poreip Xi1llster . 
)laurlce Couve de lurvllle, to begin a four-day state vi.it. hOauUe'. 
echeduled talks wl th the Shah aK· Premer A ... 4011a A1 .. conQ.~H4ttJae;;.., . 
prospeet of French credl ts to aid the Iranian fi",",..r ••• 1o,..llt'plan •. 
¥hUe the French visit was lnprasre_.theBrUleh ~r"'llt" .. _tJae;y .. 
Iranian governaent annoullcecioll 18 October a Briti.h toas., -PIIO.'~Uy long-
teralof t2 million for the flaallclngof ,.Iect .. proJectalathe,Tkt.rcl 
hvelop .. nt Plan. Sau &sUa; taDirector althe 'Plan arsaa1zaUaa .. ·: 
reviewed the progress of the ',Plan and ~ited the. Jdghlighta tll~ 
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CO.aunications. agriculture and Industry. Before his departure. de Gaulle 
agreed: with !lam that a joint cODission of Prench and Iranian experts 
.hauld work out details of French aid to Iran. The aid Was expected to be a 
co.b1aatlon of short-term credits for .. chinery and equipment. together 
With long-term cash loans directed to industrie •• including petro-
che~cals. da. and electric power projects. as well aa the-direct provision 
of heavy machinery. Another agreeBent signed in ~d-Octaber was between the 
VS AID to Iran and the Pars Cotton GInnlngand 011 1111 Coapany for a loan 
intended for the construction of a terDinal for the bulk reception and 
storage of vegetable 01ls. The loan was .. de under the Cooley Loan 
Programme and was the first of Its kInd to be .. de to an entirely Iranian 
Company. On 8 lovember. the French Chamber-of Deputies was reported as 
having allocated 4 million francs for technical aid progra .. _ to Iran and 
on the same day talks opened in Teheran between the X1nister of Bcon~cs 
and the Commercial counsellor at the Czech Bmbaeey on a possible 150 
Ddllion credit. A week later. the Shah handed over the deeds of 1.200 
houses built with US aid in villages which ha( been wrecked by an 
earthquake. On 17 lovember. the Sa1zgitteriuduetrlebau of West Germany 
announced its plan to build a new sugar factory at IsfAhan. 
Then President Leonid Brezhnev of the SOYlet Vnion arrl .. , on a 
seven-da, visit at the invitation of the Shah. The 91sit was to colaclde 
With the final arrangements to slgn an agr .... ut for jOint projects between 
the two countries. among the. the conBtructlonofthe daa ant .. Arae rlver 
and the dredging of the caspian Sea swa-.p. In hi. epeech to ·t~ 'arUaaent. 
Brezhne. said that the Soviet Unioa ... ready to vant'1:ecJaaical and 
eCOlloJlic aid to Iran. On 22 JO\l'eJiber talks at tu1foretptracle Coapaa, 
ended with the formulation of-VSSI-Iranlan transit agree .. nte. Coaplet.' 
agreeBent was reached on IraniD routes for Sovlet goods and all Soviet 
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routes would be available for Iranian goods. The Iranian government also 
applied to the United Kingdom. the United states. Prance, Vest Germany, 
Japan. the World Bank. the Export-Import Bank <EIII BAlI) and the 
International Xonetary Fund <IKF) for loans totalUng .. arly $140 .U11on 
in order to finance schemes contained within the third Five-Year Plan. 
Pinally, it was announced on 6 Deceaber that the EXIIBAII would provide 
credit to Iran for purchases of US highway .aintenance equipment. It was 
also reported. on the same day. that Iran would purchase 80,000 tons of 
A.rican wheat. 
However. one untoward incident had aarred this harmonious econolde 
diplomacy. On 21 lovember the Iranian government announced that Soviet jet 
fighters had shot down an unarmed Iranian aerial survey plane over Iranian 
territory. Two officials were killed. The tncidentoceurred during 
Brezhnev's visit. Following a protest from Teberan. the U.S.S.I. agreed on 
11 December to pay half the damage sustained. though without accepting full 
responsibility for the incident. 
On 20 December 1963 it was reported in Iran that the linistry of 
EconOmics had drawn up a plan for the expansion of trade wtth, the Gulf 
States over the next three years. Under the plan, the lini.try would 
negotiate for a reduction in· shipping and air frelght rates whU. the 
government would support investDents in the textile and ceDent Industries, 
provided factories were located within 1001ms of the SQuthernooa.t. the 
Iranian 011 companies were reported tOAave struek aU at Bu.hAn. "'1" 
8hlraz ,and at a second exploratory well near Kazeroun. On :5 I.uary li64 
1 t was reported that France had granted Iran cre41 ta for '800 _1110' 
'rQCes ($60 1I11110n) for the purcu .. of· Freach aehlaarJ OI'to .et the 
ooets of French consulting eugh.eer1ng fir.. Cred.i te were to be \etUi." 
1n 1964 and 1965 only. It was further learned. that the Dtrector'ot the Plan 
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Or!anization, Safi Asfia. was in Germany to sign .x.cuti~e agreements for 
123~lllon Karks out of a total credit of 200 millioD Karks ($50 Ddllion) 
af German aid to Iran. The forEr sum was to be used for t1le Sefid Rud Dam 
project and its irrigation network. A ~ek later, an asr .... nt was reported 
to have been concluded between the Japanese fir •• Shibaura Blectric and the 
Paath Electrlc Company of Iran. Parts WDuldbe supplied by the former and 
radiOS would be assembled in Iran with the help of Japanese technicians. 
Alongside these developments, production of crude all was vigorous. 
In South Iran the figure for 1963 amounted to 70.497,000 long tons. 
\ 
compared with 63,461,000 long tons for the previous year. Total refinery 
throughpout at Abadan was 17,566,000 long tons in 1963 compared with 
17,316,000 in 1962. In a speech to 011 workers at Abadan on 19 January the 
Shah predicted an extraordinary development of· the oil industry 1n Iran, 
and expressed the hope that Iranlan production would rlse to 100 milUon 
tons annually in the next two or three years. He attached particular 
importance, however, to the problem of transporting and selling all. On the 
following day, Premier Assadolla Alam announced the resolutions adopted at 
the 5th OPEC conference and reaffIr .. d Iran's lcy.ity to'theorsanizatlon. 
Porty-eight hours later, Ala. was instructed by the Shah to tate over 
personally the direction of the nntatry of Pinance in addlt1011to III a , 
other duties. 
On 31 Ja1luary, the Iran .ational AIrl1nes:Corporation ... repOrt.d to 
uve concluded an agreement with Pan _rican World Alrwa,.. to':provl4e 
technical and management assIstance over a perlQd at tkr8e ,.~.otb.r 
announceJllents seemed to provide further conUration 01 Ira.-. I"&p1d1,. ~ , 
Increasing technical proficiency. The. trail .atlou.l eaapall, ... · .. 14tobi 
produciag buses already at aa .stl_ted rate of four bund.re4 pet".year - a 
f1gure4ue to expand to l,eOO· ualte a·,ear. A co-operat1on .sre .... t 
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between the Institut Francais de Petrole (IFP) and the Iranian Plan 
Organization was s1gned 1n Teheran on 11 February. under wb1ch .the IPP 
WOuld act as consultant for the establishment of a l~ petrochemical 
complex in Iran. On 26 February. followi1iga two-day,_ttug between 
representati ves of the ll'IOC and the Iranian couaort 1 UlIl a cOlDIUnique was 
issued urging the increase of exports from !badanand nottng with 
satisfaction the new discoveries made in the Agreement Area at larun and 
Karanj. Scarcely a day seeEd to pass withoutannounoeaente concerning such 
.mbitious international projects. 
The most important doJlestic political eMnt during thtstta was . 
11am's resignation on 7 larch after 19 mnths ii oftiee.The Shah appointed 
BAsan Ali .Wansor to replace him. Ala. was appointed Chancellor of the new 
Pahlavi University, and a new cabinet was appointed. On-taking offiee. 
Xansor made a number of declarations pledging that he wuldtaokle ourrent 
econome problems. review and reorganize the country's administrative 
u.chinery and implement the Shah's social refol':Jl pIau. 
Saudi Arabla seemed to be following astaUar breaklleclEd.evelOpJlent 
pattern. Foreample, on 20 December 1963. at ,the.J1~t1gatton~ofthe Prtae 
Xinister Amir Paisal, a Pord Foundation tea. was bt'Oughtto l114dh to .M:ke 
recommendations for a comprehensive reorgtJll~t1on oft .. ad.a1lltatration. •. 
the. Xinistry of the Interior had been graatedatl: allocation ofS! 1'10, ' 
lI111ionfor that purpose. On 25 December. tlle GOuacU of· liut.tertl apprGftd 
theallocat1on of SilO Jltlllon for buUding 'teaporM"J"televle1011. etattau 
t!1Riyadh and Jidda. The station was to be totalled byt'" 17SAray Corps 
of Engineers. The CoullCll also.approved the aUoeattoa:'of 81f3.,I6&.?&O -for 
the ,first phase of the steelworks project udon the 8Ovenmeat' 8 " per 
c.at share .of a new 011 refinery.' Afe"dayalater. ell 31 Jalluar,..1t .. ·· 
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announced that the two British companies which had won the contract to 
repair the M'aan Xedina Hijaz railway would begin work in Ilid-February. The 
line would be open wi thin thirty DI:lnths. This event was followed by a 
report on 5 February in London that the British governaent had authorized 
the export of 300 anti-tank missiles to Saudi Arabia costing about Sl.4 
alII ion. The contract also provided for training Saudi Arabian soldiers in 
the use of the weapons. 
Barly in January 1964 it was announced that the government would 
participate in an Arab summit conference in Cairo. King Saud would lead his 
country's delegation. In the following week. Saud .at 'with President Jasser 
and Vice-President Abd Al-Hakim Amer in Cairo. He aleo met the heads of 
state of Iraq. Algeria and Jordan. On 5 February. the Saudi government 
expressed a willingness to resume diplomatic relations with the UAR on 
certain conditions. On the following day. Paysal told the correspondent of 
the Landon Observer. Gavin Young, that the government would not recognize a 
Yemeni government controlled by a foreign state. Referring to the 
forthCOming discussions between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. he said that the 
government might seek compensation for attacks upon its territory by 
Egyptian forces based in Yemen but he believed that peaceful eo-existence 
with their Egyptian brothers should be possible. on 16 Pebruary, U""Ahro1l 
reported that Saudi Arabia and the VAR had agreed to a meeting in Riyadh on 
1 larch to settle their dUferences. The meethg was to be attended by the 
tra~l-Algerian good offices miSSion which had visited Saudi Arabia earlier 
that month. On 3 Karch it was announced that dlploBatlcrelatlons with the 
VAR would be resumed immediately. 
There were also develop_ute in relation to Kuwa1t. OIl a larch an 
agreement regulating Saudi Arabia's and Kuwait's rights lin the Jeutral 
Zone was signed following discussions in Kuwait between 011 Itn1ster Ahlll1d 
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Zaki al-Tamani and the Kuwaiti Finance I1nister. In Ku~it itself, oil 
production continued to soar. On 24 December 1963. the_ Ku .. lti governaent 
announced that 011 production in Ku~it and Ku~it·. ahare in the 
production of the Ieutral Zone and the off-shore area exceeded 100 million 
tons between 1 January and 23 December 1963. The average daily production 
of crude 011 by the Ku~1t 011 Company <ICC) for 1963 amounted to 1.932.798 
barrels, compared with 1,633,656 during 1962. On 14 February 1964 a new 
agreement was announced with the !Berican Independent Oil Company (!ain01l) 
regarding three offshore islands of Kubr, Qaru and Umm al-Karadla. It 
lncorporated extensive revisions of the terms of the original 1949 
concession agreement. It was followed by the announcement that the Xinistry 
of Finance and Industry had decided to begin negotiations with the US firm 
Foster Wheeler Corporation for the construction of the projected 100 tons a 
day ammonia plant at Shuaiba. 
Political problems as well as economic growth were also belng 
tackled. On 11 Kay. Kuwait Radio announced that the ~r bad contributed KD 
1 million from his private funds for the bulldillg of dwellings for luwai tis 
of limited income. Five days later, 1n a speech during caremuies at Aswan 
in Egypt. Premier Khrushchev wa6 reputed to haft Jade hoetllerearks about 
the Kuwait Aa1r. On 21 Kay. the Ku~lt aabassadOT in Cairo. 1CU11d. Al-
Adasanl. COll11llen t i ng on these remrks. said. that, tcuwal t was proud. of her 011 
revenues being used 1n the service of the Ku_i~l. and for the raiSing_of 
their living standards. Two days later, it.wa. report.din Kuwait that the 
'oreign Xinister had called on the Soviet • .naasedor with-. letter of 
pt'OtHt. Officials in Kuwait would break off d.1pltnatlo relations with the 
So.iet Union if a sat1sfactory apolDgy was ILDt _defor.lbruao.",". 
COlID!nts. 
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In Iraq, Arif was in 1964 busy consolldating h1s new-found stabillty 
and the union wi th the UAR. On 16 larch he announced t.~t a provisional 
Constitutlon would soon be proclaimed, perhaps after his return from India 
and Pakistan. On 22 April. the Xinister of Justice, laldl al-Khatib, was 
reported to have said that the provisional constitution, which the 
President was said to have examined in its final form, prevented any groups 
from forming political parties which tried to dominate the people and the 
country and cause them damage. He added that the constltutlon would be 
passed by the Cabinet. A few days later, the Baghdad press was reported to 
be expressing satisfaction that the provisional constitution was expected 
to proclaim socialism as Iraq's objective. On 30 Aprll, the Cabinet 
approved the provisional constitution. A few days later, Arif published the 
new constitution declarlng Iraq an Arab, Islamic. independent and sovereign 
state with the aim of Arab unity, beginning with constitutIonal union with 
the UAR. He indicated that he was seeking Bgyptlan support against the 
aa'atbist regime in Syria and against the return of the !a'ath party in 
Iraq. On the following day, VAR Vice-President Abd al-Hak!m Aaer began a 4-
day state visit to Iraq. On 16 Kay. a new law governing the latlonal 
Revolutionary Council was published, which restricted the membership of the 
Cciuncil to 20, with the President as chaIr_n. Its functlons would include 
issuing the budget. ratifying internationai treaties and agreements 
prOclaiming general mobilization, declaring war, aceepting a truce and 
directing the affairs of the republic during tbe three-yeartransitlon 
petiod in a unner ensuring 'Protection of the ".veluttoa and the 
acbievement of its alms. It could also graat the !resideat eXceptional 
powers, including all functions of the Councll for one Jear, renewable 
Whenever needed and at the discretion of the PreSIdent. 
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On 20 lay, Arif, who had arrived in Cairo ten days earlier, met with 
!PreJlier (hruschev. During the following week, a mUtery union was agreed 
:with the UAR. It was signed in Cairo and approved by the Revolutionary 
,Council on the following day. In a further 1~rtant development on 8 June, 
.,i twas reported that Iraqi troops which had been fighting the Kurds in 
,1orthern Iraq had finally returned to their per_nent barracks. 
In Saudi Arabia during this peried the.81tuatiqn was e~tirely 
different because King Saud began to 10$e his power over his government. It 
was reported on 22 larch 1964 in Beirut that. a council of Saudi Arabian 
Viama had met at Riyadh to consider a demand by Xing Saud that hie powers 
as supreme sovereign be restored. He had handed .the powers to Crown Prince 
Faysal the previous January. In the following week, on 28 larch. Saud 
submitted to deCisions of a council of the royal family and of reUgious 
l.eaders reducingh1s role perJlllnently 1n the following ways: withdrawal of 
the Royal Guard from Saud's personal command and; its transfer to the 
DefenceXinistry; transfer of Saud's personalguar;-d to the Interior 
I1nistrYj abolition of the royal court. which would be replaced by a 
epeoial royal office; and reduction of royal .expenses to a reascmable 
aDKJuntj the funds saved were to be added to .& <1~velopment ~d&et. TJ:Le 
king's income would be re<1uced fro. about $40 mUllan a year t,o $20 
1I11110u. Forty-eight hours later, RadloJ(ec(!a .. Wo¢eaSi thete,~ of Royal 
J)e~ee 10 52, signed by Faisal, approvinl;Cab1n.t;J)ecls1on 10. 753. This 
wa. followed on the following day by another ~oadcu.~. of tlut text of; the 
,.~XI and royal family deciEiion on the transfe,,~ of state pawns troJll Saud 
to Paial . 
. On 1 April, the Cabinet approvedta.,.agree_1lt with luwaitprov1dlng 
f,Qr tile partitioning of the Saudi ",ab1a-Kuwal.t .• eu.tral ~on. ,_nd its 
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territorial waters for administrative purposes, while maintaining existing 
arrongeaenta tor the equal sharing of its natural r~$ources. On 12 April, 
tie Cabinet passed a special appropriation of SR100 million from the 
seneral reserves for stre~gthening the armed torces. Four days later, the 
British press reported that Saudi Arabia was planning to bulld a modern air 
defence complex which would include high and law altitude radar. rocket-
equipped. supersonic aircraft and ground-to-air IIl1ssi.les. The government was 
said to be negotiating equip .. nt purcbases with America and Vest European 
firms. The British papers attributed the decision to the recent raids on 
Saudi territory by Egyptian aircraft based in Yemen. ten days later. in the 
Couf88 of a speech to a public rally in Taaizz, President lasser denied 
that the UAR harboured any evil intentions towards the people of Saudi 
Arabia. He called for a new era of brotherhood and understanding between 
Saudi Arabia and the UAR in order to preclude the .possibility of Britain 
'sowing dissension within the Arab nation'. 
Three days later. the .inister of Petr.oleua a~d lineI'd Resources. 
AJu.d. Ya_ni, announced that the cQntract tor theUrst phase of the iron 
and steel rolling mill proJect would Decawarded to.the British tirm 
V.H.A.Robertson and Co. Ltd. Initially, the plant ~~ld produce reinforcing 
bars and sections, with production to start in .~wo years, 1;1111 at a rate of 
4e.OOO tons per year. rising to 60.000 tau. Other pba~s of tAft project 
envisaged. the addition of a 200 ton per day steel .and she.t .. tal mill. OR 
1& x.Y. a trade mission led by the Xinister of Commerce and Industry weRt 
to Britain to promote further Anglo-Saudi aconoaic ~elatioD8. Ta1. wae 
-aaluta' background of continu1ng oU expansion. -
), 1r&.:o'. annual revitw of operat1-ons for 1"3. "P'lbl1s~dt~tweek'i 
indicated that crude production totalled 594.591.071 barr.ls~ exc::Mdill8 the 
1.~ total by 39,535.283 barrels. Average.da.Uy·prqduction wa.,l.6~91018t 
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an increase of 7.1 per cent over 1962. As a result of the company's 
exploration, development and research programmes, gross total liquid 
hydrocarbon reserves increased by 1,522 Ddllion durin~ the year; estimated 
" .. '-, 
remaining proved reserves at the year-end were 57.811 Ddllion barrels. and 
remaining proved gas reserves increased by 566 standard cubic feet. 
bringing the year-end total to 24.096 billion standard cub1c feet. Refining 
"" ~ ii.,· ~ 
and exports reached record levels: Ras Tanura had processed 97,441.801 
., 
;. .... , 
barrels. total exports had risen to 583 Ddlllon barrels. AraBCo had 
relinqu1shed 277.306 square miles of its concession to the government on 24 
. . , 
.' 
larch 1963, and progressive relinquishments by 1993 would reduce the 
compamny's exclusive area to 20.000 square JI1les. less than 3 per cent of 
its original exclusive preferential areas. 
On 2 lovember 1964. the Ulama signed a ~ deposing Saud ibn Abd al 
A%i% and pledging allegiance to Faysal as king. An official holiday was 
declared for 3 lovember. On the following day. a joint meeting of the 
Cabinet and the Consultative CounCil, chaired by !Ddr Khalld Ibn Abd al 
; 'f· 
Aziz confirmed the fotwa and pledged allegiance to the king. The latter 
"~ "'. ~. -. ,~ :r, -, • . r ',., 
said he accepted the kingship only at the people'. insistence. Royal Order 
. . 
10 27 stated that the Cabinet would remain in it. existing form. On 5 
". . ~'. f '. ,~r" ,;. ;,.,j ~ ': ~' "i 
Joveaber. a general amnesty was granted on Faysal's acce •• ion to the throne 
, :" -,.' .. , . ,;! t; .~.~ -." .~~ .. :~.,;, ". .;:" .;~:: ,,; " 
and on 18 Jovember Royal Decree 10 14 was issued. a.anding Articles 7 and 8 
J :r '. ..~ .. " 
of the Regulations of the Council of linisters, aking the king ~ead of the 
\" - :',' ,"i ~(71 . >; ,:'< 
CounCil and making members of the Council responsible to ht •. 
~: "'~ '. " .,.. ':-k . ',;, 
The flurry of positive economic activity in the aid-stxtl •• was 
. .' ~, "'-" _' .. ' ! . " .. . . .r ~; 
, .', ", " / ~, " - - . 
accompanied. however. by old familiar signs of dtsruptiO.: co.,laints about 
.' '. _~ :~''': .. :;~._._:' ; "("" .. ;i.:< ",,-.:.,.,~' ,.-, ;.' , 
British interference, threats to the Shah. and renewed lur~i.h revolts. The 
"~,,,:~- .;~. ,,:~,', ',' "'.:' -t~. "~ ~. 
situation in Oman also occupied the headlines. On 16 October 1963, a 
'~,l:' ,., ( 1 .~ ~.,. ~'; , 
British Labour !p, Robert Edwards, in a aemorandua to the Untted lations, 
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&Cc\Ieed. Bri Uah troops at having used ieuan _thoda tn OIIIln 111 1955. oa 
10·, October, however, Britain won the support 'ot • UI survey tea. agatnt 
ar.b charges of suppressiou iu OIIIln. net ...... .,reo"r, bael toulld. DO 
e •• unce of .cUve fightlq iu the .r .... o01ltrary to report. fro. au agent , . 
at. I .. Cbal1b ibn AU in Saueli Arabi. anel Cairo. Berbert'de JUdeliag. the 
tu..' ah.ael, indic.ted tbat local goveraor8 aad sbaitH fro_ .11 over oaa 
.. lel t~t in gener.l they did not _at the bratheN GbaUb. aDd T.Ub ibn 
1U. ··or th.ir chief supporter, Sul,...n lba.lla,.r. to returD to the 
couatry. On the following day, I .• 'Uff .... Jo .... ;·Ior_r c.pt.ln ill the 
.ecat .nd o.u Pield Porce. 1a a letter· to. the nauy t,lllUph, 4eal_ the 
alleptloDS of Idwards that there Md beea atroc;Ut .. la tlut Sultall's 1955 
~isu. In. UI Trusteeship debate. oa. 3 J)ec.llber. ·SFI. called tor. 
co.1ealon at iuquiry iu luecat alUl cau .• BriUeJa Hlegate stated. ta 
reply that the de R1ddlq report shOlleCl tbatth •.. aOQu_tioJUI ad.e ag.inst 
Brit.iD were false. 
On 19 February 1964. la_ GhaUb ibn AU.; i who .... living ill: exUe, left 
a..,hdad for !)e._seue after • f1fteea-day y1si t to Ir.q. IeIhMd. Radio 
4uotecl hi. ae .yiag that Pr.sident Abel al Salaa .ArU hael a_red hla that 
Iraqstoad by the OIIIlai people iu the~r atte. '0 reGOftf' thelr.rlgh~s .nd 
tutr sover.ignty. In Daaecua lie accu .. d Irl~'. oI'Z.a41ag a 
... laforc •• Dt of a thou_nd troope to QaD •. ,a".i ~.u_ ottllis .. aclclecl 'we 
fta4our_lv .. obUged to asttor 901un •• NeaK.litUy eo,.... 'roa.'rab 
NUatr1es aad frtendly peact-lovtag .. ttou' ./.~.I'''xtpy. GlaaUt. &lao 
eai4 .... n al-Hafiz, Pre.ldeat of'Syria' ai levolutt_rJj:c.aoU.,Md 
ooatlr-n hi. countr,'. readia_ to sapport:tIatt;;retDlutiOD ,of: the QaDi 
puple '.in all dolllalolukuntU. tile,· recoftrM tr"u.ca.d. t*pu4eaoe. Ga' 
Sept.Mer, tu n fact-tIDeliDl, _.19n 0_0.. arrive' '.,De_a, Saud! 
&rebla. Pive cia,. later, the,·'UJ· 1ll_10lll.1t for "'_it atte .. _tias Iau. 
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llIaltb'lbn AU aDd _Jabera at the o..n IevalutionaryCounoll. The tollOWing 
-kar the Clulir_n ot the Oan Cultural Co..ttte. in Cairo, Jluha.-cl a1 
..-t'Ul1, asked the VI 1I1_10n to 8.8"e tllat o.nlaehau14be tranted the 
J'tShtot • If-deterll1natlon. On 16 sept."r, thell1a1on 1.tt tor Lonclcm 
.ad :lew York tor turther tala. It.s:to cont.r laLaaclcm ·with the Sultan 
of .Qaaa, Sald lbn Tayaur. The laue carried an into the tolloWing year. On 
I"ebruary 1965, a tl.,.-nation specialCOD1ttee ottha 'United latloY 
(Afghanietan, Coata Rica, lepal, l1gerla and. Be_pl> reported that a 
eerlous internatlonal probl •• had de"loped In OaaaadcaUecl o. tILe laa 
&ad the Sultan to avall tILe.ael.es of tbe 1acl11ti .. 'at the scad afflces 
CGIIII1ttee, and on the Unlted 11ngdo. to facUttate u4 encourap 
aegotlatl0... Thls was followed by the o.aal repreeeatatlv •• ' elai. ln 
Beirut con 13 Pebruary. that Qant rebel. bad kiUed2'1 Britt. aolclteraand 
_t flre to a Jdl1tarypl .. and a petroleu. tank'during the .. et." 
In the lower Gulf. 1. Sharja. a aew l".'laad bee. rai eecl. , ,Ona5 
lunbe 1965 the ruler of SharJa, Shaikh Saqr bia SVIta al-Qa8tat, •• 
depose4by _-.ben of hi. faa1lylUUl as replaotKl by8ba1kb .. ltd 'bill. 
JlUb_d al-Qula1, hla cousln. Shatt SeqI' clealect:tlaatllt.faatly bact 
OftrthroWD. hl. aact blaaed. a Brltlah colonia1iat plotal .. at atoppias 
Sltarjaand the other True1al atates fro. co-opetatt., with t~ 'ball League 
aa4LUJerationlst Arab .tatea. The ru11. 1.at1,. ',Gat. otlMtr,laad, 
clatadtluat b.e .. 4epoaed for aoandalous bOa.taur<anctM,leot >ot t _ 
_ Uara ot hle 'people. ,the Br1tlah poUUcal,qnt "tlliDu1tal aDOUaoHo. 
the _.day that Irltal:a'" 'nactJ to cleal "'til SJaalkk DaUcl ... ruler fIf 
Sllarja aad It. depen4eacl ... 0. thetollaw1q daf, ;;..,wa Iaclte reported 
'lat.,the hither .aoutlveof *he Arab 80ctaUft ·NOD. ,.ta '.lnq .• ___ 'bua4er 
_if to discuss the lapartaUat eo.plracy whtch bad "eulted til the 
depositloll of Sbalkh Sa'll'. Two days later, all 28 Juae, Shaikh Saqr arrlvecl 
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in Baghdad and was given an ofticial _lco_. Be .. ld an attempt to 
...... inate hia had been .. de on 10 June. Be clal.ad that Brltain had 
clep0ee4 hia because he had asked tor an aEnement to to uaJust and unequal 
treaty concluded 140 years betore. There was all In the couatry, he _ld, 
but Britain had not yet explolted it. Be accu_d the Briti.h of trying to 
prevent the Arab teague fro. carrying out it. developEnt plans In the Gulf 
ell1ratea. After two days, Saqr left Baglldad on a tour of Arab capl ta1s 
where he planned to explaln the 81 tuatlon In the Gulf to goven.nt 
leaders. Be proa,tsed to return to Baghdad ~o struggle tor to liberation 
of the Arab Gulf. On 1 July, the Arab League's per.anent Arab Gulf 
. coDadttee held an e_rgancy .etlD! ln order to dlscuss the Gulf sltuatlon 
aad • the pressure being exerted there by Brittn laperla11 •• '. 
After a Deeting with President lasser on 3 July, SeqI' said that the 
VAi would back hls atte~ts to regaln hl. posltlon .. ruler of Sharja. On 
the .. De day. AI -jullhuriJA reported that 11ag 'ai_l would 'Vistt Qatar and 
Dubat in accordance with Brl Ush plau to estabUsh aa lrabbloc 1a the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, co-operat1ng Jdth Brltal-n aacl heaclecl by Saudi 
Arabia. In Cairo, on 5 July 1ge5, the ~rab 'Gul1-coatttee r.jectH 
Brltain's offer that Arab teague ald to the Truclal States be _de through 
the Brltlsh-sponsored Develop .. nt fund tor to Trucial Coast (DPTC). A 
resolution coacleJlMd Britain's rajectioaat irab'League develo,..nt 
pragr ..... for the Gulf as a violation of interaatloaal procedure. 
leentary General Abd al Dallq llaaauu ccm1errec1 with Britlall -,*_dor 
.1rGeorge I1ddleton and explained Arab 'Vle. of :the -OUlt.Uuatlon. Saudi 
Arabia the next day contributed t1 .UUon to~'he :D.P.Tqa_ -oa'l July &l.::. 
IkJpMr accused Saudi Arablaaf .ld.illS with a Britto pia. to doabate the 
GIllt arM. 
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The first conference ofrulers of the Gulf states ended in Dubai on 8 
iUly, With a pledge for co-operation for future development and economic 
c! .' , 
aid. On the &aBe day. in a letter to UJ Secretary-General V Thant. Shalt 
Saqr accused Britain of violating the Vnited .ationa charter. A Saudi 
Arablan spokesman said that his country's .ative in aidtng the Trucial 
States was to raise the standards of their peoples and to help them 
Wi thout interference in their tnternal affalrs. V_r Saqaf, personal 
representatlve of King 'ayeal, denied on 19 July that Saudi Arabia had 
contributed to the DFTC. Saqqaf reputedly told representatives of heads of 
state that Saudi Arabla would partlcipate in teague development progr .... s 
for the Gulf. On the same day, Shaikh Saqr accused Britain of having .ade 
aeveral attempts to assasslnate him in ca:oPeration With the ruler of Dubai 
and his cousln. Be crlticized a British statement that the DPTC was ready 
to receive contributions from Ilddle Bastern countries, saying that this 
Would help Iran to colonize the Arab Emirates. In addition. he called for 
the abolition of the agreement Wi th"jrl tain, anclthe DFTC. and urged the 
teague to establish a central bUreau itl Cairo to defeDc! Gulf tssues." On the 
fOllowing day, British Foreign secretary. Ilchael Stewart said that both 
Britain and SaUdi Arabia wet-e givtng &1 aUlion to the DFTC. 
On 22 Septeaber 19&5. the Vnited latione asrH4 to debate the 
question of o-.n, and on 14 DeOelibet ot the ... year,' the VI Trusteeahlp 
Cob1ttee called for the i:ae4tate elta1utlon afBritt., doll1utlon 1" any 
fOra in Olan. Britain was reque.ted to cease 611 hpre_h'. actlons, 
Withdraw lts troops, reIeaM polltloal prlsoners and perll1t the return of 
polittcal exUes. On 2& A~rtl196&. uflSUcce88fu1atte.t. wer. lade to 
aaaasslnate the Ruler of J(uacat al1d' eMn. Sulta~ Sald'bln TaYlur, during an 
at'ay parade at Salala. lc¢orclUig to Wita ..... t three ot the fl •• attackers 
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~r. killed and two escaped. Elsewhere, on 21 larch 1960, a US-sponsored 
~.racle lI186ion arrived in Bahrain. In Bahrain on the following day, .tudents 
~.anatrated for the release of those detained since riot. a year before . 
. In the following week, Jordan agreed to send two army officers to Bahrain 
.,t.;,train tbe ar.y, at the request of the Ruler. Talks on Bahraini-BriUsh 
relations opened in London on 11 lay 1960; an increase in the rent on 
Britain's base was on the agenda. Rere. at least, Britain's role was Ie •• 
controversial. 
On the opposite side of the Gulf, on 21 January 1985, Prellier Hassan 
Ali Jansor was shot and seroiously wounded by XUhaDaed Bakhavi. a high 
.ohaol student in Teheran. The Shah called a Cabinet meeting and appOinted 
Finance Ilnister ADir Abbas Buviyda to take over. lanaor died on 28 January 
and was succeeded an the following day as Pre~er by Buviyda. Then, on 28 
April a 22-year old conscript in the royal guards atteapted to a __ lnate 
the Shah. Be killed two guards but .. then shot dead. On 18 June, luhaaed 
Bokhari and three accoaplices were executed for baving plotted agalnst and 
carried out the assassination of Pre~er Baeaan All lanser. Two other 
accoapUces were sentenced to Uf. illFisoa.nt',Dlteplte these events, the 
regiE re_ined stable and the pattern at interaat.1pnal 11te ... reauEd. 
On 9 July, it was learned tbat tILe SJulh.'. v1s1t to the Soviet Union was to 
be extended from a 9-day to a 13-4&y vi8lt. Tbi U.S.S.I. had offered to 
build an industrial coaplex CO.18i. a .te.el ell. a _elliu teol. plant 
and a factory for agricultural machinery in eachaP88 tor .Iranian natural 
pa. 
The revolt of the Kurds ... still part of tlle. pa~tern pf international 
dealings. On 3 January 1985, the lint.ter of the Interl~r, 'SUbhi Abd al-
Baatd. appealed to the Kurds to belp the .. ut~1tJ •• restore concUtlQIl8 tn 
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~irarea to normal. Al jUwhyniy' said that a number of Arab and Kurdish 
• .14:1.er.e bad been aJibushed and treacherously tilled on the JallJa_l-
~yaania road the weet before. On 22 January. Is .. tSbarif Vanly a 
.,at .... n for IUstafa al-Barazanl, asserted in Beirut 'that Iraq had ignored 
~dl.h national autonoay and collplalned that union with Igypt was entered 
l.Jl~w1tbout prior cODBultation with the lurete. He alao aaid he would 
.liver letters of appeal to friendly countri .. and the 111' to prevent 
aaQther ~ and resolve their national qu •• tion justly and peacefully. In 
~ ,following week Hamid warned tut force alght have to be 8.,,10yed to 
.intein law and order in lorthem Iraq and pledged that Iraq would uphold 
IvTCUeh autonoay. Three .eks later, Al-Thaura ai-Arabi,. reported that a 
~rdl.h emissary, Aqid Agu, had arrived in Baghclacl to d:l.ecuu with the 
saver_nt the reconstruction ln the lorth. OIl '1 Karch, Kurdlah leaders 
-'NNpcrted to be expecting a sovernaent reeulIPtloD of the tar agalaat 
~clturcls in the lorth. Arab presa reports had lndicatec1 that tILe Ira'll 
prrleons in the lorth had been reinforced and the arJl1 was ready to 
attack •. In the following weet, Guidanoe JUnlster Abel al-larl. Parbaa _ld 
~t tbe goverllEllt would not renew the war ap1_t tlle lur4el, but at the 
.... t1 .. he warned that anyone dlsturbing the peace anywbere in the 
country would be punished accordlngly. Be adfle4 that the .,.,....t at aray 
,""ita .. nor_l procedure. Pive da,. later, . De f • .,. li.laterJluu1. Bu_in 
aI-Habib declared that the 81 tuatian i. 1lOI'tur. ,Iraq ... qui. a. 8DSt of 
ta.Kur41eh tribal chi.falJad declared thelrlopl1:J to t. P"r"'llt. 
<:' ,On 28 larch, AI-Juabyri,. publ1ahecl a tlUrteu-po1llt propaeal froa 
RuUa lustafa to Prea1sr Tahir Yah,., aet1D1 torJlet1aitioaot ,tbe lunllah 
...., .. the bast. of Seosrap1110 boundar1 .... tile o~'loa ot~,. ,ae" 
~.r'ot that should include all IunJ.lah .,...alD.. tile Jlaaul 41nr-.ct, tJw 
~tlau of a lini.try far IunUah Attalra, a.aU1as tbat ·lurU llipt. U_ 
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the Kurdish language in schools, courts and official departments in 
'or-thern Iraq. On the following day, a dlplo_Uc infor_nt In Beirut said 
that alaost 50,000 soldiers of Iraq's &5,000-_n &r., had been .. seed in 
the 'orth for an assault against the Kurds. On 5 April, Yahya returned to 
Baghdad after three days of talks with President Jaseer In cairo. The 
latter was reported to have urged Iraq to resume its caapalgn against the 
turds. On 20 April. Iraq denied reports fro. Beirut of an ar., and air 
force assault against the Kurds in Dehuk In the Iosul district. Two days 
later, In '..an. Farhan, attending a conference of Arab infor_tion 
.tnisters, denied there was any fighting in the north. On 28 April. the 
Co~ttee for the Defence of the Kurdish People'. lights released in Vienna 
an appeal to the t1J Secretary-General to take up the Cause of the Kurds at 
the Uf. Kare reports of fighting continued to circulate in Beirut but the 
govern.ent claimed that only armed .kir~.hes against bandit. had taken 
place tn the northern area. Two days later. the laghdad press denied 
reports from abroad of negotiations between the goveru.ent and the Kurd •• 
Incidentally. at this ti.e. several .eBbers of the Ia-ath party .. re 
arrested when security forces raised and found docu .. nts In a Baghdad 
suburb. 
Arif tried to restore a stable relationship with the Kurds. On 13 
1une. in a visit to the north. he stressed the .. ed for national unity and 
appealed to the Kurds to d.stroy the _boteursalid restore atabUtty to the 
area. In the following week, the goveru.ent annouilced that pensiOns would 
be paid to taBdlies of the _rtyre of the Iosul revolt atasad by Abd &1-
Vahhab al-Shawaf in Karch l~g against the regi. ot qa .. t •. OIl 23 June. 
President Arif expressed his supportot the Gulf state. and apake of the 
wotherly tie. l1nking Ira .. and Kuwlt. Ie &l.o'.tel that 'the KurdS. Bds1ed 
by Jllustafa al-Baruani, were now returning 'to the right path. Pour days 
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later, under a new law pardoning those who had recanted, seventeen ar.,. 
officers who had defected after the February 19&3 revolution against Qassi. 
and joined the forces of al-Barazani, were reinstated. On 4 July, eix pro-
lasser cabinet .aabers resigned. allegedly Over d1fterence. with Ar1f 
concerning the proposed union with the VAR, the Kurdi.h proble. and the 
near-tinal agreeaent with IPC. The announce .. nt of the acceptance of their 
resignations caBe a week later in a preSidential decree. Replace .. nte were 
appointed. Kurdish sources in Burope reported the uee of .adem artillery 
by Kurdish tribeSBeD .. They charged the governaant with increasing nepal. 
boabimg in the north, while on 24 August, the governaant denied plane to 
uee poison gas against the Kurdish rebele. On 10 Septe.ber, Arif aade an 
I 
inspection tour of the lorth, and on the next day a lational Defence 
Council was for.-d, headed by the President, and lncluding the PreBier and 
the Xinistere of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affaira, and Pinance, plus the 
Ar., Chief of Staff and the commanders of the air and naval forces. 
Then caae the dra .. of an attempted coup. It was folled by President 
Arif's brother, acting Chief of Staff Abd al-Rahsan Arif. The ringleader, 
Razzaq fled the country and arrived in cairo, acca.panied by his wite and 
faatly and eight officers, OD 1& Septeaber. Be .s reported to have 
intended to decalre a aerger between Iraq and the VAl while Preaident Arit 
. . 
. 
was attending the Arab conference at Casablanca. Bazzas .. appointed 
Preaier and a new governaant was forBed on 21 Septe~r; ouly four of ita 
.abere were new. On 2 October a coa ttee began an iuveatigation into-the 
,;, ~ c:. 
abortive coup sponsored by Razzaq. 
At the sa_ tt_ it was reported that the Kurda bad lau.ched a new 
otfensive in the lorth, inflicting considerable ~. TbI, bad 
established a rebel radio station, and on 24 October, lurdiah tribea ... 
:~ , r;" 
captured a CARE convoy of supplies a.d an official, a certain Yalter C.Cox. 
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Three days later, Cox was released unharmed. Baghdad Hews reported on 31 
October that a split had occurred between the lurdish leader IUlla lustafa 
al-Barazani and his followers. On 16 .0ge~r. Abd al-la~n Arif clai.ed 
that &TIE captured fro. the Kurdish rebels bore the Israeli star insignia. 
lleanwhile, the goverllEnt noJlinated its aeabers for tbe unified Iraql-UAR 
political leadership. They included the President, the PreJlier. the 
Ilnisters of Defence, the Interior. Unity Affairs, Finance, Coaaunications, 
Culture and aational Guidance. Planning and State, and the a~ssador to 
Cairo, Rajad bald. 
Then ca.e a series of anxieties concerning the Co..unists. The 
govern.ent ordered the arrest of fifty co..unist leaders and the 
confiscation of several .cbile printing presses and pa~hlets on 9 Deceaber 
1965. The first state security court be~an the trial of 81 persons (11 in 
absentia) accused of plotting to overthrow the regiae with the help of the 
Coamunist party, and the trial began also of nine leaders of the outlawed 
Ba'ath party. A decree was issued releasing fro. house arrest Abd al-Kari. 
Farhan, a foraer Ilnister of Culture and Guidance, and Subhi Abd al-Baald, 
a farBer Kinister of the Interior, both of who. had been confined following 
the 15 .Septeab8r coup. 
On 7 Dece.ber, a DeW ~overD8ent offensive was reported by the lurds, 
but ten days later, Bazzaz, recently returned fro. an inspection of the 
forth, said that the ~verllEnt would rec~ize the lurds as a nation, as 
an ethnic but not a pelt tical entity, wi th their DWD language. Two days 
later, the Iranian governaent claiaed that 100 araed Iraqis had attacked 
Iranians inside Iran, stolen soae cattle and killed two border guards. 
Baghdad Radio reported that soae border guards had been arrested by Iraqi 
authorities after crossing the border into Iraq accoap8nied byaoae Kurdish 
infiltrators. On 24 Dece.ber. the Iranian governaent charged that Iraqi JIG 
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jrete ud killed one persoD, injured eight others aad caused heaYJ cIa_~ 
Whea strafiag four Iranian border Yillages for ttbe third clay ruaDiag. CD 
t .. taIloring clay, the goverDEnt l~ a strong protest With Iraq about 
it. laereaslng bulld-up of border forces. On the __ day AI-laMr reported 
a .. w attellpt on the 11te at Jlustafa at-larue.i. TWD daya later, Iraq 
dealed Yiolat1.g Iranian air space or attacklq Iunliab rebels I_Ide Iran. 
lapct",d lews reported that Iraqi pIaDeS haci'cba.d re .. ats of the png of 
lull. Kustefa al-Berezan! aDd struck at forCes a.d eupplles 88.t fro. 
outside Iraq. On the saE day. the Iraniaa goverUeat _.t troops aDd jet 
fighters to the disputed area of the border. 'orelp IiDister Ara. accused 
Iraq of abusing Irau's frleudshlp aad gOod rill, aDd suggested a .. tiJl8 to 
discusS a peace settleEut. Iraq said it Wuldco-operate iD a. 
lDyesti~at1oD of the iacidents. It.as reported a tew days later tJaat 
.zzaz left on 31 Dece1lber for otficial talks 1D Saudi Arabia. 
On 1 JaDuary 1~ there _s heavy flghUagbetwen Iraqi goverueDt 
troops and lurds, aDd several houses rithhl Iran wre reportedly da_~d by 
guDflreduring Iraqi-Kurdish' bBttles aear t~ botder; until S JaDuary , 
fierce fighting coDtlDUed. CD t'he .. n day 'the ItaDlaD softr .. nt as 
hall4ed aD Iraqi note of protest agaiDst the 8Ul'ply ot _tertaI"and .oral 
aid to the hasurgeats iD aorthp.rDlraq, and '!¥eater alir 'AbbAs 1kwtecla _ld 
IraDtlbuld withstaad aggressioD aad hadbegt.a'bulldlJl8 upaaftlforcee til 
tJaeCulf aga1DSt eneru1 threats. Twnt,.lfciur bOuts later, ~.tdeDt &rtf 
aCCUsed IraD of aiding the lurds, aDd OIl tJae ' ... cIa,,'j.Ci:iq Iraqi CIllef 
'1,1. ,_ " ~, , , : ,", _ ' , '._ '. ,t, -' ,,:' • '<,~, ~, ~' , 
at Staft. Abel al-laJt.a Arlf accused lra'D at opeDlD8 ita border. to Kurds 
... aterian, supportiDg thea: Be .ld that IfOylec1a _cl"~~·tlllAr_nl 
a~ agreed OD a<plaa for Ult~rfer.DCe laJraq·.i.t~raal' atfaira. Artf .. 
o .. ' , ,l" ,'- \ : 0': t, - _ '" _ '.,' "k. :"",.-,:1-,',';.. ,'. -
reported to bve recetftc1 a abable iBIllpaeDtOf IIbdera arllil tWit da,. OIl 
the following da, the Iraala. goveraaeDt catesorlcally dealed aldlag tile 
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Ita~ or ~t1Jl8 with BarazaDl. whUe ArU pleclgecl hi_It to flght his 
.at..,'s .nemes. la repl, to a letter trem Iraq Prell1er Buzaz D1l 8 
Jaauary. Bovieda said tbat a joiat co.-eaion to draw up aa _ada for 
.... talks should be appolated before ... at OIl a pUsrlap to Iraq. 
CD 11 Jaauar,. Iraq ~ia accuaecl tile IraIli .. 8Oft'--Dt of 
prcmx:atloD aDd threats, but OIl tbe follow1aa da" Buzaz aDDOUnced that 
:tra~ aDd IraD bad agreed OIl a peace _ttl_._t iaclud1q tile wi tbdrawl of 
ITaDlaD forces to a reasaaable dlstaace froa tile bonier, .. eDd. to the 
'ulattJl8 propasaDda ampalgns aDd tJae eetabU ... t at jolat co.mttees to 
discuss border problellS. Pa,sal of Saudl Arabia asreect OD the __ clay to 
... his good offices in the dispute between Iraq aDd IraD. IraDiaD offlcial 
sources aD 13 January. howver. deUed bDwledp at eucb .. .."..._Dt. aJLcl 
iDIraq further goverueDt-lurcUsh tightlaa tD 11rkut. bulaDd. SUl,...Dia 
was reported. After a few cIa)'S, tbe IraDian .,..rDEat thaU, aDDDUDCed 
.ltsacceptance of tbe peace settle_llt propoeals. OIl 20 JuU&rJ. the 
Irauian goveruent announced the arrest of 55 .m,ers of a eacret 
organization., the Islallic laUns Part,. De, _re acQUaed of plottiD8 an 
ar.d uprisiD8. p8Jclaalogical .. rfare.terror.blooclabed alUl chaoa. The 
a,.., -. asking death _nt.aces tor vipt oftMa •• prlllOJl .ateacea for 
fort,-aeven4 In Iraq OIl 3 PebruarJ _ .. ral.ludl .. 1 ........ ,-. AlTMtecl tn 
~ladad following the a .... iDIIUoaof a~U'" &raJ aftloer ...... aye 
later Arif _t.. with lasaer la Cairo OD tlMa. ' .... lraqi jot_ 1 __ ,...1,. 
laaeer. proll1sed hls support iD tlae cupalp: aplaft tlMl ,..,. ,_11e .,.U 
4lecla..s hlsopposltloa to la1aalc ~ acti .. t)arooupaut: _ I1dcll. 
-.. tt 1ISp8ClallJ 1_ IraD, Iraq aad 1«YP't. 'or ~. part., ....... 1 a .... lecl 
to the Valted IaUoas OD l' 'ebruaFJ tol .... ti .. t. 'Iraq' • .tlepcl ;pol1CJ' 
.of pltt'8eCutlO1l of tile lur41aJa-people. oa 11 JIatoQ. "1M"" 'lewolal-.d 
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~"'1ICAle Kurdish surreDders. but tllere wre also reports at Ma., 
tlptJ-a later 1. the mDth. 
011 13 JlarcJa. the eecoDCI etate eecurt tJ court 1 ..... a pracla_tio • 
..... 11. tJaat for.r prealer £rit alleS Iaaaq aad 15 ...., offtcers pretsellt 
t __ lftS 11l court to ..... r cluarpe ot attellpU88 to CJftrtJuoow Arit _Ue 
.... atte1ldlllS the Casabla.ca COIlfereace. 1'My ..... ta be tried 11. 
...... tl. If they faned to aurreacler withl. thlrt, ,da,.. 'he flf'8t eecurlt, 
court a1l1louDced tut It .auld try t., _ oJlarpd Wi til pasLlssl. 11 1esa1 
paphlete pertai.l1lg to the ba1lDed IusU. BrotJrerllaad. ,Qa 19 "rch. 12 ar., 
officers ere d18111ased after the d18COW1'J ot aD aU .. coaaptracy to 
cwertbraw the 8over ... t . 
. It tBS auouDCed OD 24 .. rch tlult ·Preat.r _sa wou14 l_d'. 
clelepti01l to the usm 1. the follow.l.Dg "th. It •• a1ao reftalecl tat 
Pre&ldeatde Gaulle had accepted 'all lDntatt .. to.t.tt Iraq. OIl , .. 
follaw11l.g day. &rif's brotJler. Jct11lg Chief ot· Statf ,bel Al ....... ·lr1t. 
left for Woacow to obtale • .-.s a14. ,.' ;, 
ne. caE the UDespect •• OlD IS April :llOe,;PNstdeat _tt._.ieter of 
tJae I.tartar lbd al-Latlt al-DlnTaJl, JUuat*~ttttllluat.., ...... la AbdUlla 
ucJ 88vea aides dted 1ll • "Ucopter .... 1JI •• , ...... Beau, ....... t]ae 
c:DDSt1 tutl0. beda. actt. preetdelt't."iBe' l,,-.ct ....... arJ 'cul"hV aad 
cloaec1. ,the froatler. OIl 15 lprU,·.lbcl ~-..... : ' .... " ...... J'Md In. 'the 
80ftet UDioD, 81M! the fUDerat af t)ae,'te1l .. kf'i'lW: at. :&rtf'''''ld la 
~. I day later, PresideDt Artf _& burled with full II1Uta!'J JaODOura. 
aDd Abel ai-laIn •• Artf '.s. elected"..t •• ,."1""' • .,...,., ... 1 ' .... 
co.tt.tUt101l at ajat1lt; .. tlag of tbe Ce'blwt -.ct', ... tt .... ' Def.ace 
concU. ·lrlf pleqed to eoa'ttllue'ttllt, JIOUelW,Md' .... ..,,';Jal.·1Irathttr.'I 
... Cabtat was .. .cIoa 18 6pr11. "., ...... Det.ace "l"'r"~;'bd.l"'bla 
al-Iqa,li, wkJ was a ri.al .. _.*te; tor tJae' ·,....ldttaoy ..... '.111 to 
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~lcl, dlftereDt vieE aD pollc, talents t~ lunls. as clroppecl fro. tJae 
cablaet. 
,. OIl 19 April, &Tit _lel tJaat lurdlab ~llbt • .,..14 be preee~ WitblD t. fr __ work of local acla1llistratioD. "~aaz· aleo. revealed tbat tlaere were 
.. tr.m aDd clifferiDS ylews coacerllllll tbe.acbdDl.tr~t1oa aDd t .. elecUoD 
ot.~ ae. presldeDt followlDg tbe death of A~ al-8al".Arif. luauf al-
Ja1laDl ws appoiDted ODeler SecretarJ of ~ ~relp JI11l1~I'J' repl~~lD8 
Glaesl •.. al-lJaalaf as peraDeDt repreaeDt&tt,. at.:tlae VaJ~ latl0"'" On 20 
'pril, Razzaz repealed aD orcler pl.ct. f1!8: ~r41" l_den uDCler 
restricted resideDce iD tbe Itrbala cl1&~ri9~., but .. the toU •• clay. 
, ,.- ' , "-"'" " i" I 
Arlf "1l1ed that the govern.Dt .. rea~, tQJ~.lOtla~"_W1~ t~ !urcl1ab 
rebels. Arit aDDOUDCecl that the draft oil ap-ee ... t .1~tl.11ed bet ... the 
, ' , . '" . " ..., . .,,', ., ~ 
SQYern.Dt aDd tbe IPC .auld be publ1clJ,,"4e~tecl 
OIl 12 lay. accordill8 to Iurdl&la eource.t cmtr ~ thou_DC! IO"n-tDt 
eolcl1ers tere killed ill fierce f18bt11l8_r:~adua aDel Ba.",d ... 
.... bsequeDtly reported oYer ODe thousaad lurds "",.,..D. ,tilled _ eo_ two 
,.. '-",'. " . ,.,., ., 
tbou$aDd lDJured til the flShUq, All I~,."" -14 t .. ". Kurds bad 
caueed so_ cia_sa to oU. iD8tallatioDS but t~ .. rat~pD8 ~ DOt beeD 
~ffectecl. On 25 la, it _s.all~pcl tbat. Ir: ..... ~~1-.1~~t p_ bacl 
~tr'ed Oil Iraqi RIG fighte,... Ylol~:tl., l~.l ••. ,~r ~~ < Jl".~~ 
preyiousl, attacked borderyUlapso: ODe, ~rl.!I~~,r. )u,t,.~~llartl.1 
DOt, •• Saudi Arabian ~l1tarJ .laptloa fIT"~ t ..... ct .. 21 .. ,for 
. '.' ~ ,,,r~,- ,,<v~'!.~ p '" •• ~~ "" c ': " ' 
IDdeed, tJu! JUra lM5-e& ... tDe8lllt4}, •. ~"'l of,~.~~ctl .. 
~lploacJ aDd co-operaUoa lya,.tH Gulf. bqt~ytor::;lqIt!l~ "', .. ~f1c 
pur~s. In Saudi Arabia. for .gaple. oa 1 JUM lM!5. tllere .. DeWS of a 
lt&t of ar. wJalcb tJae ~~nt. W. I!PIpt tG;,J"7 t",." ~" .. ~.~ .' DIa tile 
":It. da,. tile lu_t\1 tia,"" ot. '1~, !"~n .alMl.CpIIIe"'t>Sbal~ 
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.'11' aI-Dad .1-Sa'bU, declared tlaat la.it wauldbe tile th'at to carr, 
ilt a' dectatoD to cut off Arab oil frca tbaae' etatee wIllela "pported 
"' •• 1, provided the other oil-produclDg cauatrles-&audJ Arabia, 'Ir.q, 
ill-tl. aDd Liby • ..:. A81'eed to such .. aurea. 11q l'a,..1 recelftd lu.itt 
CrOWD Priac. Sluaitll Sabah .l-Sale. ai-BallO OIl 12"''''." ... three Ita,. later 
'.,..1 aad Sabah issued. joiat state_at·.'l.·..att ... ' qreecl to"take 
.e;sta bri1lg about atabllit, 1. ,.... Dart., 018 .... 104. 't"'Iu_itl 
~et ... t eigecl aD agree_Dtwlth traa ta"f •• ·• jolat ca.tttee to 'atud, 
tllectlspute oftr the cIe_rcatioa of t .. COItlantal· ... 1t tat_ Gulf. ne 
Bauctl SOftrueat, oa 20 Juae 1965, .lpeel a. q ..... tWit* Qatar far 
4t.1d11l8 •• d de_rcatiag the 1aad .acteeallOndariee.lMhM. , .. t_ 
OGaatries. OIl 8 July 1965 a luwalt del.gatioa, 1 .. byUai.r at,t_ace, 
t .... atry .Dd CollErce Shaikh J.bir.l-n.ct .1-J.bt1"._t 1ftt' saud!· 
ga.era.RDt officials aDd agree.aDts ware reac"'ae'tte elitist_at tie 
Beatr.l ZODe, the escba.goa ot aU 1atataU_ aa4 ·co-.,.ratl_ ·ta _ter 
atudtes. OIl 10 lugust, tie Saudi ga..tueIlt a:lste4 i·-.lIOrM" ~-.t Witla 
"erdaa pnwidiDft for .D .... 1 dtvlel_ ot re ...... ·ltoll wrecllt1CCJtiere4 
la tlle reUaqvlalled areas, ... 4eUMattD8 'tW" .... rt .... ".. ...... at 
.... l.ter ".tified b, ,.,aala1ld lluaaai •• oa."':I1iRu ... · .... _ .... tft,..l 
.".... to tora .jol.t Va.-Saudi co.aIttee '-'tcr~1Ifit1. a.ttetalilU'iII ;,.,..1_. 
_tweeD tlleir t.o cou.trlee. 0.10 .aepteJllbf"" ..... t &ralda 'ajNecl tCt""lp 
.t.uace aad ooDStruct • eautal "raad;Uul~ I11III1 ... ,. .... "~l, >~ .. al-
ett_tll a84laa al-Dai ... ,aDOtller.,.._at. )OD~.iOc'toMr ... r •• oWi,.· 
.. t .... luval ta.a Saudi Arabia coaceru. tile .atra1 ' .... ~ ..... _ .',' "; 
.000 .... r 11l Baudi Arabia. a"" •• dec .... ""Iptet· U.··.IUhl+' ....... t 
titli Kuwtt. 
la,011 .ad,..,lftlc8·d..rI_'t.l.,. .... i~ ... t ··Ira1da~~l .. ·• 
at.raa8~;1ea4. oa 11 tare. 1 ... ·;;WIICO·,ttr .. lMk*aoI .. ,..tt ...... ~tl.MI4;·lartl 
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•• It. oa strea •. Bstt_tecl output .. 30,000 bId. , tew clays l.ter, 
"thuda •• rclecl a 16. '1 1I11UOD coatr.ct to tbe Chlyoda Qell1cal 
Iaft...rlag aad CoastructiOD CoIlpSD, of J.,.D for c:aaetnacticm of • 12,000 
.,4 reftaer, .t Jidda. 
~: ,··,.,.1 clefeDeled hts call far .a IelaJdc __ t coat.reaoe OIl 2'1 Jrarch 
, •• 'epeecb to distiaguisbecl pUgrtE la IIIcOa apl.at.crttlcla fro. 
I'Nsldeat .a&&er. OIl the au issue, 'aysal recei98cl Ku_it Uateter of 
'oritp 'ffairs aDel ectiDg nDister of FiM .. aad 011, Babab al a-cl al 
l.btJ!~ Ora 12 'prll, the IiDistry at Petral.u. alld UMralleaourcea .iped 
•• agree.at with nGAS tor a 88DPhysical aurYey castiag SI 1,683,000. Two 
days l.ter, the JliDistry of eo-rce aDclI-..try.elped a coaeultatlft 
~ .. _at wi th Arthur D. Li ttl., lac. of ~. hi ted Stat .. tor acldee OIl 
l'lel.strial aDel'acoDoalc developEat. aa4 OD tbe __ clay aa· Ira.l •• aU 
aleg.tin .rrived for talks. 011 19 April. Fapal flew to Paktetaa far • 
'tM-etay state .i8it. appareat} J eeeklag .. pport for Ilis proposal af aa 
Islall1<: au..s. t .. tlag. but· the autCOllB was tat .a,..1 aDd PNIIldaat 'yub 
1M. laaued • jotat co ..... lq .. pled«t1t8 claear ecoacudc, tecbatcalaact 
cultu .... 1 co-operatioa. Brl Ush ParU .. atary .... r-Secretary at tile Boai'd 
.":tr .... Lorcl Ihodes. arrl.acl OIl 20 April 1a ;:._1 ' .... abl. faria tour of 
t<lae 'cou.try aDd _tiap witla ofl1el.1 •. ,...... .. ,.lat.r, •• ,.1 recelftCl 
'.8~y ... lst •• t Secretary tar lear lastera aM'8auU &ala.Uta1,.., .. ,.,.d 
.. t •. 'Ie .Isa aet Lord Ilaaclee. A· .. k later. ft""J.-tJae U ..... yof 
Da'1Iaoe.a. j.iaUan atpect coatracta witla the Brlt1eb Aircraft COrporaUn 
aDd Rawer 8iclclel_, tar ~1td-to-atr at_n ... ad .. radar ........ , aDd the 
"'uytt_ a.aoncedtbat Fa,..1 ... 14 "181t\'he hi .. aut ... 21 
"'-. 
", lhHas thie period. rl",alry bet ..... ,..1 ' ......... ·coul. aot be 
l __ acl~ tllDuslloa a J .... F.,..1 dee1ad t ... ~at. te1eelO _11 ... 1-.c1 at 
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.... 1": .... sa1d tbat his KG"ra.Dt aDd· tile VAl wrebratbers. Saudi 
..... w.a·s 11ltenaUoaal status aDd actint, as ceria'.l, tacr .. alD8.OJa 10 
iJ .. · 1106, tile n office la saudi Arabia baca-. a Nllna! n Dffice for 
~- .. tire Arab1aD PeDiD8Ula. 1 four-.. 1D ot1 delesattaa errl ... 'alu.-it 
ftJr '\alta os tbe leutral Zoae off More boa.clay,. 0a:11 ,,_ ... 'a,..l as 
I'eOehed by Presldeat Jobsoa aDd ... pest"af Juaauf',.t a baDquet «l98D b, 
tJae' Presideat. fhreeclaJS later, 'ayeal _t VitbV na.t aad o11otftclals 
t. lew York. Oa the "'_y. tile Saudi .... ,....t decided to ral_ ita 
... a1 cODtribut10. to tbe n tecJullcal atd PftIIT'4- '"..50,,000 to 
'1001'000. 
Oa 1 August, the Baud18O"rue.t,auauacecl Ma:CIpJI081tl_ tot .. VAl 
'propaal to postpoDe the fourth Arab!.,eu_t. COIlf4trellCeru4 _tdt_t ·It· tbe 
-.ett. did Dot take place It would freeze ItathaM:I&l ca.it_.ta to 
• __ t:-l1aaplred bodies, but oa 22 AUgUst the pYttnalit,_14 It '_1. 
aAere to its ts.Daaclal co.at_DtS'to t1le ua1t .......... ·,,~ 
. At bo_. DO 14 July.tbe tiaiaterof PetFOl ••• DlI11leralleaourcea 
_Uied ot1ler IliDlatriestbat .all~alcati_ IdtlnoU c.,.U .. ., .. atbe 
410 .. tlarough it. Oa 25 July. tile SaucH. aad:.".ltl IOftrUI!uata eKebaaged 
l_tru_ntsaf raU t1catioa JOO the avee ... tHtor piDtl tlaa, tM .. vat, Zoae, 
"lglaa-ll,.Slped la faytf- OIl OJw.y.OD -ttle'~follawt .. ~.., .. ,..t'Neet ... 
• {Spa.t .... 1a4ustrlal delegati .• a ... klD«.,ellLap18Itall_\f,I,..',.la'tlle ,. 
of' .... aFea aad 'a AupatSpal11 .S; .. t.,.., ...... l .... ·'.,u.,"' •• iral. 
1'8&1G1bi· •• daftshore area. of tbe led Sea .. , 
I. otlutr parts of tbe Gulf.t ... rewre' ......... tll_acl.l.rucl .' 
CUll ?relat ""I.,..te.l.'.J ... IMfk.,Oa,a~.f"'l:·_tal ........ "toi'ift· 
."'.'a'l IlilUoa fortbe •• atlltUHI'J,facUttl ..... ,;, .••. __ l ;,.l1t 
·af .... 000 startt.I .ta Jut, 1908. 0a3J,JI .. ~,1...,.f;:t.uUli"0PIC8ecrtt.FJ 
.... r.l, ~1s1te4 tbe luler ofA_ ... .,1., au-.:·~lNt~; .. t.a{;8dta •• oa 0 
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'i~~. Dubal Petroleua, a subsidiar, of tJae VS-owed CoDUDeDtal 011 CcDIpaD' 
:(COIa&). &truck co.-retal 011 iD tJae oft~ &rea ot Dubal. OD 1e JUDe, 
Q.t~. Dubai. Sharja. 1J.D, 0_ al-Qal_1D. las aI-Dala aad PUjalra 
decided to CODvert fro. the Gulf rupee to tlMi 'Saudi ~1"1 as a reaul t of 
t.1.ie\!5 JUDe cleval uaUoD of tJae ladiaD rupee.'~ Abu m..bl adapted tJae BahralD 
.~ r ' . s, ~. " _. ,': '. 
4liUlr aDd tbe Sultaute of Jluecat aad o.D .. u1adecl4ecl~ 0. 20 JUDe. 
BrtU .. agreed to pay Sbarja t100.ooo aDDua!lJ tii,. i.e reDt ot laact aDel 
: i"" ~ t:. '. " 0 • ~ e:' '~'o • '. ' 
aervlces to estabUsh a Jlilitery baae. Pa,-eDta wre due to beglD aD 1 
i~lust. CoDCo a1Ulouaced OD 1 Jul, a ..ca1Mt ~_rCl.1 strike lD its 
Offshore Dubsi area. 
a. 6 August Shalkb Sbathbut .us ctepaaecl bY ~"rs of his fudl, .Del 
his'; place was takeD by his bratJaer maaikhzatcl: 'bill BultaD. ftere' wre DO 
.~ ':'~ :" ~ > j !..,~ ~. ", .-*,'. , ' ". .:', ~. 
lacideDts fallowiDg tbis oustlll8. OD the .. rt _,Sbalk1a SUtJabUt ... 
VaBted teaporary asylua lD Bahraln. two daYS later. SUlth ~1d. pleciRe4 to 
uDder take largescale clevelopEBt projects. 0alllOUS1" perbaps. tlMt fa~r 
Bri Usb Labour aiDlster. Cbrlstap1ler "Jhe~~ ~tta~bd"l ttaJa defeace 
speDdlDg 1D the Gulf States aartly betore ; :;"":'1IrtttMt1u:iaCtal &clviaer, 
I'r TbOIlpSOD, arrived iD Abu Dbab! OD 29 ~su-t~;" " ' , 
, .' "th":" ;. ',' ,"", ";" ',,,.. . 
tD Kuwait, aD 3 JUDe lNG, 'orelp matstir a.&lkJa 8a\all'al-1bed al-
"bAh deDled that the gover_at Jaad prapalad't~~: c~tlOD af. t"~tlDD 
~t' Culf 8balkbdoE. 1ft the fallow1 • ..u~'" t~j'.traiat~: S: .. , .t':'Sal •• 
","i: '1'_ " _ '" ,." ", ", [.-<- ,>, t'li:·~':.:~. f-~'~t ',;,~, ,:. e, t' ~' ",' .1~Sabdb, eDeled a four-da, vistt to Iraq c1uH:Di' *leJa asr-_at _ reacJaed 
:".): ... - .' _ . " >:' ~;' \ t "!-', '.',.:,. " '." ".'_ ~~:. .~> • :_ ,,_",' 
to tora a border co..tttee, aad l_tru.ate of retltloatloa wre atped tor 
tiae' ecoaaJlic co-operattaD agree_at. PreJlie~"~t~ '.bi~ .1~a..4 .1-8abU 
~ .. i ',"'-'" . .'_. ~ .J, _ ",-" ~ :''i';'JI; n.f·-''f·''~ ," :: :'),'f.i ~ \!y'-,. 
ntll.'rated the govenmeDt's oppDSftlOD to alUilM=iBua I*'ttI WitJata tJae 
&at,' _tioDS. OIl 3 July •• 1 •• _s "'~ •• 4 Pr~~.t_" t~:"t~ .a.'bJ.1eUeDt 
o¥;.' CeDerat Board far SoutJa'.rabt~D 'Uci Ara'bl~ 6;ait'et.te."io Caanttaate 
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~~nt appealed tot~ UAI to ~l~r},t& ~.1.10n not to attelld the 
, -
f.\Jl Arab &uBi t coaterenee but CJn 4 lupat the SOftra.nt aveec1 to ,tJae 
, .~ ,,- ... " .~ .' 
~l for the au-.1t's postpone_llt. 
In Iraq, 011 1 JUDe 1966, a cultural CQ"'"OPtratl.op ~l1t _d beeD 
~~, _ .'- . ~ _ " ,,1 >, _ ~, 
.,~,~. wi.th the USSR. two days later, Ue. I .. ~l ~rua~t~ _4 recelftd 
~r-. the USSR about £1.5 1I11U~n, tlDl't;ll ofequl~~t :tor three YOCIItloaal 
tF~lnl .. centres. On 6 JUDe tile. trl,alQ.1 ~19\ a.!lep4 ~~l,rators _4 a 
~rl~ before tlle first state secur~ t1. cour,t ~f,ore,. ~our,a1. yntlJ tJle 
fQ).l~ng mnth. On the nest day~.11~18terO~: »ete~~:~lr Iulalu4 ~ukrl 
~. .~. v " • ". - , ' >,~ i ~' . '" • 
.,.14 ~~t tJle arEd forces -.d rec.nt1J u~r~~aQ1) "U~. k1~,.,.trea. of 
~~ fro. the Kurdish iIlSUTpnt&. ~ o~ 15, Ju~ ~~,r'~ al-JaJaa,1l al-
Iaz.D, allnouDced that the 8Oftr .. n~" - pre"'f~~,. ~" ~~~1~ plall 
tp .• t1;le the Kurdish problea. nl. AJlll0Uace •• t ... tqll~, bJ:, BqJadacl 
~ '. • " , '.1 .:.. " " . - '", ',. • 
.. diD' e announce_nt on 18 JUiae t.t Bauaz ~ld, .~~~. t Tur"', ~; .1 l ... ~J 
a~ ~ on 27 July • 
. 0a21 June, Al-'kbbtr ,o,t Bag~ reportef1.~~,t.18~t~., ,~t,... ~,.. 
'. r' . ,'. _, \ ,--.,., ~," -.. '-'i",: -. . . " ".,:". 
a,Il.d govera.ellt forces had stopped l11t ... , IlOrtJa~ .I-Dura al-Arelt',. _1d 
~ . . . .~. .~ , ",' .' ;-. 
that .. tllpOrtant KurdlsJa clelept1~D "d ~~1~, ~~,,"'~; ~~'i~ to 
"ZZU'8 appeal for a aet~l~ae.t., aad OD., •. , ~,""Jm ~, fl,~-J .. -
,,', ' , , " "', "~."" •. ', ,,,',,,- "'. " "'1". ,', ," 
~~n\t ~ceplall to eDd t-. :civU, -r ~. ,~.; ~t-t ,~~.~~,o !'eJF'" 
t,p.t Ar~t aDC! Jazzaz had reqt1.~ t.~~ .. lfPtI ~f,fl;""""" .' .. 
a,pr~vJ.-s, tile plan. Tile -~ ~J'fiJ'l~t. ,",~~;:<\f\~'t~"ih-i.' ~'" :';",',', 
~~.1l.t1al bodyguard. cru~:~",,~ c:ou,~~t~~~ ~ ,.~ ~~:r,P'!~.r 
If!t, A¥ al-lazaaq. J1ght 8P,ld1~re -Jl! ~~~.,~~,~J'~:~"'"f~~. ;;:/" 
.... ~ •• , curfew _s ll1pO.,l~. ~~',~. ~~.,!!~ff,.!.J~/~'~. ~¥:ad 
~~rereporte4 t~t t,~~ ~, l~.~~~~,~;."., ~~ 
~Pl,ta.~· .. suz returae4froa. a},~J ~~~~t~F.:~~;,,!~.;"'; ".!~;~J a~t 
ea14 that tlte Iraq,1-VAI leaderallip tmuld _t Sa 8aptellber. u4 OIl 2'1 July 
-196 -
., ..... a _vell-da, official yl.1t to tJw! Soviet U.l0 •• OIl 3 Auguat, a 
,.-* ~Illque Issued III Baghdad aDd IIaecow said tat relaUa_ betweell 
.tM countries MJuld be deYelaped ucl trade eapll1ldecl. 1'Jaree cia,. Jater • 
....... Iadl0 a._1lCed tbat Ba.uz bad rea1ped. ucl tut ~ III rall b luad 
., .. ~. to fora a Cablaet. Altert.te_lft, .~cta wtU poUtlcal 
~, a ... Cablaet .. farEel O8,I,.AuSUat. 'aur days later T&lib 
•.• ""aeed Uat tile PUrpalie of Ills ~t .. to rall,aU uUaul aDd 
,.triotlc forces for joi.t actla. "da, later,Pac_elll, t- 'orelp 
AU.ireE.lster, de.led _EpIlper al1.tlO18, tat .lI'zuz'. pvenaE.t Jaad 
laU.s, Jaad bee. 111 league wt til reacUOJl; .. d l.perlal.l"ucl, laad act bell 
.k»Jalover the Te.ell prolt1ea. Tlle:. ~ .. t! decl4ed to rel...,. C19111 .. 
~'-1. ... s arrested foUawiag. the couP'" a. 21 AuS'l~faUb _iel ~Iunll~ 
pl ... :M.JUld be uplleld aDd. ezpreeeed tlaellope tar .~t, witll ~ VAL. OIl t_ 
, ,1,DJ,1". clay. lajab Abet. al-Jajld. Deput, ,Pre •• r all4 I.tarl~~.I1al .. ter. 
~. a four-da, 91&1 t to thf: DAR. .IIl tile faUOWf,agwaU Ta11b~ 1aI8I. all 
, .' 
~4er. deeequestr.tlag properties aDd fuads bel0Ja81ag to 241 pereoaa wIllell 
;",,~ Durl1l8tJa18 uastab1e period 1. Iraq •. Jr~'c" , ..... ~,pr~"r4lpld 
~c developEDt .coaU'DUed •. Oa 3,JvaellHA.".~,.c:, '~JI1~ateT 
-.,., ... 1u"111e led. deleptlQJl.taT.""~,~: 41~ ... ,~; ... of ~. 160 
;~~ credit .aegoUated ~. 106;t •. ne 11~~,~~, NtflUa ,~~ 
, • . 1~·, ' . . ., ' ..' ", ", 
r,JMtt'Jllll.far ~ eetabll ...... t of ~1;ve ~~JII'~IIIIIIt,aa ... k.1.Mc'~. 
~~.l ... 1.~tllf!.tot.,., l~ .1.J; .... \ .., ~. a, 1:1: I[I:il~ ,t~~"'_l 
l~~ ;,to.beeatabl1aMd 1. ~ .... t) •. wttk i~~t~~J.pa;_ ,a J.,. .. _ 
• , . ' ',,< . • "'. - " 
.. ~ \~eq .. lp tea .ta~r .. ~t"11al,~.~~1l1. Gf<~lYl .• ,~ . 
""'.jfil!llt .aircraft .. r., clap l~~r., . '~~~.~< .... ,;_~.for 
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till0Dal Iranian on eoiip6ny (IIOC) crude oU had been found In Arp.Una, 
'*ita aad Jape •. 
OIl 11 Ju.b, the goftr.-nt 81ped. a draft qree •• t With Paki.taD aDd 
't, , 
tile 'leJ1lOlds CoJIpaay of the US for the coastructloa of a 20,000 tOIl 
6'tUldlltu. pla.t at Dezful. 011 l' Ju.e ecoDDlllc -sotlatiGDS wre beld With 
t ... ~Ceylouese JU.lster of Co.-rce aacl the __ da, traD'. Paa .... rica. OU 
ea.paD, discovered a productive field 12 .tlee aartk of tile Cyprus fteld. 
~ ;Plan Orga.lzatio. aJ>P1"OYed _ftral projeci. alab _ t"t~,:; raUw, 
6w!lopEnts, establisheDt ofa RS010Sical cellt" a. tW)~COIItItructlOllof 
a/C.Mat factory. A Soviet delegattaarTI yed ID f."raD .. It Jw.to 
cftecuaathe IrOD a.d steel worts to bet buUt.ar let .... wit. SOri.t' ald. 
QD"'23' JUDe a contract Was .1pee1 wltJa a BritlM coIIpaD" I1rT1 ... Jat1ODal • 
.... ,. , . . 
to .. p))1, eight generators to prDYlde power far .... adana aacl laahaa. r., 
days I.tar, aseventeell-aD .1SSiOD frOllTehera. Cha"rofCGailEree 
atr1ftd iD London for a tWelve-day y18it. ney were to tour BlndlgJuaa, 
Lt~erpool and "nchester. 
OD 30 JUDe, ran rates wrecut by as llieli a. 50 p.r c:dt ....... to 
litrengthellthe State RaU_ys. OIl 1 July the pi.1l.1.touacll~locatecl a 
t .. rtherla 300 1I11110n for th.clliaetool pia.tlMtlaa bUtttat ta"':!z. 011 
(ii: __ day, the IranlaD ol'lOperat'lll8 CoIiIpail ... 1~ atl. 24 all_ 
Jltirth~~t of' ihwu. Jua1l1a.1tre1der taD~.urir-arrlftd itf •• raD 
cHF't21uly tor trade talks. OIl f!5 Ju1j. alrttS. tln1;luatoi ........ by 
~4 of tiDeolD, WOD .'tl.a _YUan coIltra~t ttt·_"lf~ .. _r.\crie:to" 
~ldc!J)ower tor fift tOWDS. .~ StaladArd'el""" "'cabi~at ~ 
.w~~~ed eoo, dOd ttio;tJaOf 'bdaChaCtato .. ,.aJ':~l ...... t fOr 
UWlo)Mtdt at Baacl4ft-'XaaJaur. 8tela tatld repleoe ..... _ tM ajor 
retl..d~·oU·iptGduct8 Fi.' 1'\ .s'~"1ecf'.;QiWd)_t· t\e"PerUltat JIact 
~'\o bUtld" .. 'plaat to ~'PtJi'" '"*"tfldtar Wt· ~ •• d"'ti" 
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Iran/USSR ga5 pipeline. The Plan Organization also allocated R5 11,(7 
.ullion for .uneral surveys. 
The World Bank approved on 20 July a S25 ~llion loan to the 
Industrial and .1n1ng Development Bank of Iran (IIDBI) to .eet foreign 
exchange costs of projects to be financed over the next two years. On 22 
July. the Higher Planning Council allocated an additional Rs762 ail110n for 
the Farahnaz Dam project. bringing the total allocation to Rs 2,900 
.ullion. On 29 July. Torrance Speciality Fixtures of the US won a S10 
million contract to supply a mill to roll pipe for the trans-Iranian 
natural gas line. On 5 August it was announced that Bank Relli NBS to open 
a branch in London. French companies won contracts for the supply and 
installation of a television transmitter and the construction of a 230.000-
volt electric link between Teheran. Jazandaran and Gargan. 
Rumania agreed on 8 August to supply $40 million worth of tractors and 
ploughs and to exchange another $52 million worth of goods over the next 
five years. On 19 August the lational Iranian Petrochemical Corporation 
(IIPC) announced the formation of a joint company - the Sbaput Company -
with Allied Chemicals of lew York to exploit natural gas reserves. As a 
result of the 1963 credit negotiations, it was agreed that a French firm 
would build the Shah Abbas Kabir dam on the Ziyandurd river. A trade 
mission bPgan a tour to Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The 
government on 26 August placed an order for five destroyers, surface-to-air 
missiles and patrol boats with Britain, for an estl.ated t22-t36 million. 
On 27 August, IIOC signed a revolutionary oil agreement with ERAP of France 
under which ERAP would be a contractor to the government rather than a 
concessionaire or partner. 
The Shah and bis wife on 1 September 1966 began a week's tour to 
Bulgaria, and on the following day Bulgaria agreed in principle to purchase 
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Iranian oil. On 7 September the Shah beRan a week's visit to HunRary. Two 
days later, the Export-I.port Bank of Washington authorized a $9 Billion 
loan for an 82.5 .egawatt ~enerator 1n Teheran. The next stage of the tour 
was a five-day visit to Poland. On 16 September the Iranian Oil Operatin~ 
Coapanies (IOOC) had set up an Iranian Investment Corporation (IIC) with a 
subscribed capital of 420 Billion rials. France agreed to extend an $80 
.ullion credit as a corollary to its 27 August oil agree~nt. On 23 
September the United States a~reed to sell the Iranian government fi~bter 
planes and air-to-air missiles. On the same day, cultural agreements were 
si~ned with Hungary and Poland. On 30 September India agreed in principle 
to supply 70,000 tons of railway lines in return for 1,000 Bdllion rials 
worth of petrochemical products. The Ministry of Economic Affairs on the 
same day granted Iran lational a licence to B6nufacture Iran's first home-
Bade car. Billard and Camperon-Bernard of France signed contracts to build 
the Shah Abbas dam near Isfahan on the Ziyandurd River. Technoexport of the 
USSR a~reed to undertake seismir. surveys and prospecting operations in the 
Caspian Sea on behalf of the lational Oil Company (IIOC). A week later, on 
7 October, the EXI~ Bank authorized a $13.1 Ddllion loan to finance the 
proposed petrocbendcal complex at Ahadan. On 14 October, British Insulated 
Callenders Cables Ltd (BICC) won a L500,OOO contract to supply the Teheran 
Regional Power Authority with cables and conductors, and on the same day 
Ell of Italy made two oil strikes, one onshore and the other offshore. In 
the following week the 'ational Iranian Shipping Company was established to 
carry out all Iran's shipping activities. The Ministry of Bconomic Affairs 
issued permits for the operation of a lead mine near Damaghan and a coal 
IUne near !mol. A canvas manufacturing company was also established. 
Teheran Radio reported that contracts had been concluded to supply two 
towns in Kburasan Province with running water. Premier Abbas Rovleda warned 
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the IOOC on 24 October to Beet government demands for increased oil 
production and a week later a British delegation arrived to study petroleum 
needs. It was announced on 1 lovember that Britain would help finance the 
natural gas pipeline from Iran to the USSR. On 4 loveaber Vered of Israel 
was awarded a S14 Billion contract to build an earth dam near Shiraz. 
Economic talks witb Poland began in Warsaw on 9 10veBber. Later that month 
the Sbapur Cbemical Company contracted to build a S170 million 
petrochemical complex at Bandar Shapur. The Abadan Petrochemical Company 
awarded LUBmUS Ltd a t7.5 Billion contract to construct a petrochemicals 
complex next to BlOC's Abadan refinery and the WalBSley Group of Britain 
was awarded a tl million contract to build a test linerboard plant for 
Teberan Paper Kills. The Kinistry of Economic Affairs licensed Citroen of 
France to produce its 'deux cbeveaux' car in aplant near Teheran. On 29 
Jovember, tbe government and lOOC agreed on a compromise solution on the 
demand for increased oil production. While this hectic and dynamic process 
of cbange was being pursued in Iran, significant if less spectacular 
developments were taking place elsewhere in tbe Gulf, some of which at 
least seem~d to point to greater co-operation in the region. 
On 4 September 1966 the Iraqi government complained to the Arab 
League tbat measures against cbolera adopted by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were threatening its economy - Iraq was hit by a 
cholera outbreak. The five countries were asked to simplify .easures in 
accordance with international regulations. On 16 September the government 
said that it would not participate in the continental shelf talks with 
kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Soviet Deputy Foreign Kinister Vladimir 
Semenev ended a a four-day visit to Bagbdad on 30 October and an 
announcement on the following day stated that an atomic research centre was 
to be built. However, this was open to various interpretations. A 
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reassuring note was struck during a meeting between Defence linister Shakir 
Xabmud Shukri and Kurdish leader Kulla lustafa al Berazani, the latter 
promising to cooperate fully with the Rovernwent's twelve-point progra~. 
On 6 October the disbanded Arab Socialist Be'ath Party announced support 
for a national coalition. President Arif on 26 October began a five-day 
tour of the north to check on Kurdish rehabilitation programmes. 
A spirit of co-operation was also manifest elsewhere in the Gulf. In 
October the Ruler of Abu Dhabi Shaikh Zaid held unofficial talks with the 
rulers of Dubai, Sharja, Ras al-Khaima, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman on the 
possibility of economic unity or federation. In Saudi Arabia, Faysal 
reaffirmed that his call for Islamic co-operation had no personal aims, but 
even so Saudi-UAR relations were not cordial. When, on 6 lovember, UAR 
planes operating from Yemen bombed the oasis of lajran killing four persons 
and wounding ten, the UAR told the Saudi government that tbe raid had been 
a mistake, but on 27 January 1967 the Kinistry of Defence and Aviation 
announced that ten Egyptian planes had raided lajran again that .vrning. 
Three days later, the government instructed the UI delegate to inform 
Secretary Genera] U Thant of the air raids on Bajran. On 9 February 1967 
the licences of the Cairo Bank and the Bank lisr to operate in Saudi Arabia 
were revoked. Within two days, on 11 February, Al-Ahram reported that King 
Faysal and members of his family would lose property in Egypt worth over 
$44.8 Dillion under an Egyptian confiscation order. 
Iraqi-Iranian relations did improve. On 19 December 1966, after 8 six-
day offical visit to Iraq, Foreign Kinister Abbas !ram of Iran announced 
that Iran and Iraq bad agreed to form a joint coDmrlttee to consider 
frontier problems, the question of the continental shel! and exploration of 
oil fields, and on 13 February 1967 it was announced that President Arif 
would pay a state visit to Iran from March 14-20. On 16 February, the 
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Cabinet approved a plan for reor~anizing the only le~al party in Iraq, the 
Arab Socialist Union (ABU). 10 details were given. A BOnth later, it was 
reported that Kurdish leaders were being consulted on joining the ABU, 
Iraq's only political body and on 20 February it was announced that a 
conference of all national groups would be held on 24 February to discuss a 
new basis for the ASU. 
In Teheran discussions were held to DOdify the current Soviet trade 
agreement by an expansion of trade froD $40 to $140 .tIl ion annually and by 
an extension froD three to five years of each period covered in the 
agreement. On 9 February the Soviet Union and Iran concluded an arms deal 
worth t32 Dillion. The Soviet Union was to provide armoured troop carriers, 
trucks and anti-aircraft guns in exchange for light goods, cotton and 
natural gas. A few weeks earlier, on 13 January, Iran had arranged 1220 
million of credits with Britain, France and Germany's bankinR houses to 
finance a pipeline froD Iran's southern oil fields to Astara on the Soviet 
border. A trade agreement was signed between Iran and the USSR on 2 Karch 
and trade in the next five years expected to be S540 Dillion. Arif, the 
Iraqi president arrived in Iran on 14 Karch for a Six-day state visit. On 9 
April the Shah called for an election of a constituent assembly to amend 
the constitution. The proposed amendment would enable the Shah to appoint a 
regent in case of his death until Crown Prince Riza was twenty. 
On 16 April, Soviet Deputy Premier likolai Baibakov and a thirteen-man 
delegation ended an eleven-day visit during which it was announced that the 
USSR would import twice as much natural gas as it was already doing, to be 
paid for by increased Soviet participation in Iranian industrial projects. 
A day earlier IIOC and the USSR reached an agreement giving Russia the 
right to explore and drill for 011. Russia agreed to buy up to 20 billion 
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cubic Betres of natural gas as well as large quantities of Iranian oil. On 
22 April for~r US Vice-President lixon conferred with the Shah. 
In Iraq, too, there was .are economic than .tlitary news. On 3 larch 
the chairman of KFAED. Abd al Latif aI-Hamad arrived to discuss Iraq's 
projecyed paper and electrical equip~nt plants. KFAED NaS erpected to 
finance the 15 million dinar projects and on 9 larch a joint comaunique 
issued at the end of the talks stated that a free trade policy would be 
pursued and barter deals to increase trade would be also encouraged. On 20 
April, however, Kuwait and Iraq were recalling their aBhassadors and BDvin~ 
their troops to tbe frontier after an Iraqi patrol had crossed the border 
near the Rumaila oil field and on tbe saDe day the authorities in BaRhdad 
uncovered a communist ring that reportedly planned to assassioate Idlitary 
leaders. Tension remained very near the surface. 
On the other hand, the Iraqi government on 3 lay reached an agreement 
with IPC over disputed royalties. The company aRreed to pay about Ll. 
million as an interest-free loan on future production. On 10 Kay a 'ational 
Coalition Cabinet was sworn in, described as including all political and 
racial groupin~s, as well as military blocs. President Arif, in a speech on 
Cabinet policy. emphasized four main areas of the governDent's proRrammei 
internal affairs 8nd national unity; agriculture, industry and exploitation 
of mineral wealth. 
The outbreak of the Six-Day war, however, inevitably produced a fresb 
crisis. A two-day Beetin~ of the oil ministers of all Arab 011 producing 
states ended on 5 June 1967 in Baghdad. The meeting agreed to three 
resolutions: tbe suspension of oil supplies from reaching any state which 
agreed to or supported aggression against any Arab state; that any 
ag~res5ion would Dean that properties of that country's co~nles and 
nationals would be subject to war resolutions; and that all Arab states 
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should hold an e.ergency ~eting to imple~nt the war regulations. On the 
Bame day, the Egyptian Armed Forces Supreme CoBDand charged that A.cr1can 
and British planes had provided fiRhter cover over Israel during raids by 
Israeli aircraft. The Coamand said it had actual proof that A.erican and 
British aircraft carriers played a role in the Israeli aggreSSion. Both the 
US and Britain denied the charRes. 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait declared war on Israel, while in Kuwait, 
on the same day, all oil companies in the country were placed under the 
direct control of the military governor and all demonstrations were banned. 
In Iraq on the following day the government instructed the IPC to shut down 
its pipelines. Saudi Arabia's government on 7 June announced that all oil 
shipments to countries aiding the Zionists were to be cut off. Qatar, Abu 
Dhabi and Bahrain announced the suspension of oil loading operations. The 
Iraqi government broke off diplomatic relations with the USA and this was 
followed by an Iraqi delegation on 9 June, led by Deputy Premier Ismail 
Kustafa, to King Faysal for discussions on the coordlnatfon of Arab 
solidarity to achieve victory and, two days later, by the arrival in 
Teheran of the Foreign Xinlster, Adnan Pachachi for an infor.al visit. On 
12 June ARAKeD restarted oil production. The ban on loading tankers bound 
for the United States and Britain was Daintained and, on 14 June, the 
Kuwaiti government and other Gulf states announced that loading of oil into 
tankers would be resumed, provided that the tankers gave signed guarantees 
that none of the oil would reach the USA or Britain. 
On 15 June the Iraqi government announced a boycott of all goods Dade 
in the United States, Britain and West Geraany, while on 22 June I1nister 
of Finance Abd aI-Rahman Habib announced that the govern.ent bad withdrawn 
all its balances and deposits in British and American banks, and closed all 
airports to American, British and West GeraaD aircraft. On 30 June Mecca 
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Radio asked all Oil-producing countries to consider carefully the effects 
on their econoDUes of their oil embargo directed against the United States, 
Britain and West Germany. It sURRested that the embargo was hurting the 
Arab economies .are than it was hurting the West; within two days a 
committee was formed under the Xinistry of Finance and Econoaic Affairs to 
review the state budget in the light of the oil stoppage. In Iraq, the 
Soviet President Podgorny arrived early in July in Baghdad for talks where, 
on 10 July, Arif resigned as Pri~ Xinister and appointed Tahir Yahya to 
head a new government. In Kuwait the next day the Saudi Arabian Oil 
Xfnister, Ahmad Zaki Yaman1 arrived for talks on the Arab oil embargo 
directed against the United States, Britain and West Germany. In Iraq, 
Prime Xinister Yahya announced on 26 July that the government would seek 
increased royalties from foreign oil companies and would maintain the oil 
embarRo against countries that had aided Israeli aggression against the 
Arabs. On 4 August the government lifted the oil embargo on aost Western 
European countries but continued to ban shipments to the United States, 
Britain and Vest Germany. On 2 September the Saudi Arabian government 
announced its decision to resume the pumping of oil to all countries 
without exception, and on the following day, in Kuwait, the Cabinet 
likewise decided to resume the pumping of oil to all countries. 
The Iraqi Oil Xinister announced on 28 lovember that a Soviet 
delegation of oil experts had arrived for talks with IIOC with a view to 
draWing up an agreement for oil exploration and development in the northern 
part of the country, and on 17 December the USSR signed an agree.ent to 
speed up the establishment of five Soviet-financed industrial projects in 
the country. This was followed by the USSR's agreement, in an exchange of 
letters on 24 December, to assist IIOC in the development of its oil 
industry by providing aid for drilling production 1n Southern Iraq, helping 
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the transport and .arketing of the oil produced and carryin~ out 
exploration for oil in specified areas in return for the delivery of Iraqi 
crude. Xeanwhile, in Iran, on 29 lovember the USA celebrated with Iran tbc 
official end of American aid to the country and this NBS followed by tbe 
arrival of an Iranian Dilitary delegation in Koscow on 1 December 
reportedly for talks on acquiring DOre Soviet aras. Here indeed appeared to 
be a major stage in the international history of the Gulf region. 
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taken in conjunction witb material listed in the thematic bibliography at 
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Chapter Six Prelude to British Withdrawal and the establi$hment of 
the United Arab Emirates 1967-1971 
On 16 January 1968 the recent display of unity and co-operation among 
the Gulf powers was put to the test. The British Prime Xinister, Harold 
Wilson, addressing the House of Commons, announced that Britain would 
withdraw its forces from the Gulf by 1971 but he declared that Britain's 
basic interest in the prosperity and security of the region remained. The 
next day, Bahrain's ruler, Shaikh Isa bin Salman AI-Khalifa, ended a two-
dav official visit to Saudi Arabia for talks with King FaysII on the 
implications of Britain's defence cuts in the KiddIe East. A joint 
communique was issued streSSing the need to strengthen mutual cooperation 
and agreeing to continue with plans for a causeway linking the island with 
Saudi Arabia. On 18 January, Bahrain's Director of Information Shaikh 
Kuhammad bin Kubarak al-Khalifa said he hoped the British would not 
withdraw before 1971 since defence would be a serious problem. He added 
that Bahrain felt threatened by Iran's claims. On 21 January, Shaikh Zaid 
bin Sultan of Abu Dhabi and other rulers of the Gulf Shaikhdoms reportedly 
offered to paV the entire cost of maintaining British forces in the area, 
but on the following day British Defence Secretary Healey rejected such an 
offer. 
In Iran on 28 January Prime Minister Hovleda explained his country's 
attitude towards the British withdrawal from the Gulf, saying that Iran had 
always favoured regional collaboration but that one polnt had to be made 
clear, namely that developments in the region did not concern countries 
situated outside the Gulf area. On the same day, an official Kuwaiti 
delegation headed by Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah aI-Ahmed al-Sabah ended 
a dav's visit to Bahrain as part of a factfinding tour of the Gulf which 
also included visits to Qatar and Dubai before the end of the month.On 31 
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January. the Shah announced the cancellation of his state visit to Saud1 
Arabia. set for 3-8 February. Three weeks later, on 19 February. Abu Dhab1 
and Dubai announced that the two countries had formed a federation for 
Joint action on issues of foreign affairs. defence, internal security. 
citizenship and immigration. Internal affairs and judicial matters would 
continue to be dealt with separately. Bahrain's ruler, Shaikh Isa, was at 
this time on a short private visit to London. On 27 February. the n1ne Gulf 
Amirates agreed to establish the Federation of Arabian Gulf ADdrates to 
safeguard their mutual security. safety and interests. The Federation. to 
take effect on 30 Karch, would have as its executive body a Federal 
Counciul. whose decisions would be subject to ratification by a Supreme 
Council. 
On 1 Karch. the Bahrain government announced that all Saudi Arabian 
citizens wo~~d be allowed to hold land and real estate in Bahrain and would 
enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by Bahrainis. On the day. the 
Kuwait newspaper aI-Ray al-Amre reported that the Ruler of Bahrain would be 
the first President of the Federation of Arab Emirates. with Dubai as the 
capital of the federation. However. on 1 April 1968, the Iranian government 
announced that it would not tolerate the new Em1rate Federation. calling it 
British inspired. and said it reserved all its rights in the Gulf and would 
not in any shape or form tolerate historiC inequity and injustices. On 3 
April, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended a three-day visit to Xuscat and Oman, 
after agree1ng to the 1ssue of a joint currency and to undertake complete 
econom1c. technical and cultural co-operation. On 11 April came tbe 
deCision of the UN Special Committee on Colonialism to appoint a five-man 
team to report on conditions in Kuscat and Oman. On 13 April the Rulers of 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai met in Abu Dhabi reportedly to discuss steps towards a 
closer union. 
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On 19 April, a British special envoy, Sir Harold Beeley arrived in 
Baghdad for five days of talks with acting Foreign Minister Khayrallah. 
This had followed President Arif's announcement on 17 February that if 
Britain asked officially for the renewal of diplomatic relations Iraq would 
agree; and on 1 Kay they were restored fully. In a further development, on 
17 May the Lebanese newspaper aI-AnWAr reported that two Kurdish ministers, 
Ihsan Shirzad <Vorks and Municipalities) and Abd al-Fatah al-Shahi 
(Development in the lorth) had offered their resignations in protesting 
against the government's suppression of the Kurdish newspaper al-Taakh1 in 
May and these resignations were accepted by the president on 22 June. On 26 
May, Soviet ships ended a Sixteen-day goodwill Visit, which was followed 
lnc1deutallv on 5 June by two Sov1et sh1ps on • f1ve-day goodwill viS1t to 
Iran. On 11 June, the period for objecting to sentences connected with the 
1966 Kurdish re~ellion was extended for two months. 
In contrast to the attitude of Iran, Iraq expressed support for the 
emirates and on 16 June, the Amir of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah aI-Salem al-Sabah 
ended a day's visit to Baghdad with a communique in which both countries 
expressed their complete willingness to back the Federation of Gulf 
Emirates in all political, economic, cultural and technical fields. On 29 
June the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced that the import of British 
goods, forbidden since the June war, was permitted. 
Baghdad Radio reported on 17 July 1968 that a coup had overthrown 
President Arif in order to preserve the 14 July revolution and the 
revolution of e Karch. Arif had been sent abroad. The announce .. nt said 
that all IraQi airports and government offices were closed and a twenty-
four hour curfew had been imposed. A day later, Kajar-General Ahmad Hasan 
Al-Batr was appOinted President and the Prime linister, Abd al-Razzaq al-
layif issued a communique which laid emphasis on the corruption of !rif's 
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government and stressed the necessity of bringing to account those 
responsible for the June war defeat. A Foreign Xinistry announcement on 21 
July said that the government was not considering the reeuaption of 
diplomatic relations with the USA since it had supported Ierael at the 
expense of the Arabs. During the same day, Prime Xinister layif, 
accompanied by the editor of a Kurdish newspaper, Salah Yusufi, flew to 
Irbil province to meet with the Kurdish leader al-Barazani. On the 
following day, Foreign Minister Hani said that Iraq would honour all her 
foreign agreements. 
On 30 July. the Revolutionary Command Council issued a co~nique 
ousting Prime Minister layif and some Cabinet members. President Bakr was 
appointed Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. A day 
later. the Revolutionary COmm3nd Council issued a communique explaining the 
change of government ~aying that the ousted officials had tr1ed to divert 
the revolution into a right wing reactionary direction and had tried to 
abolish the IN~C. Three days later, the Revolutionary Command Council 
issued a statement pledging itself to bring about a peaceful settlement 
which would safeguard the interests, security and stability of the country 
and the rights of the Kurdish people in the lorthi on the following day it 
announced that it would establish an academy of Kurdish culture and grant 
scholarships to Iraqi Kurds to study in foreign universities. 
At the same time as the Iraqis were trying to restore internal 
security, the Gulf States were making arrangements for theirs. On 26 Kay, 
the Rulers of Qatar. Bahrain and the Trucial states ended a three-day 
meeting in Abu Dhabi with a communique saying the Rulers would .eet again 
on 1 July, though the meeting was in fact postponed until 6-7 July in Abu 
Dhabi. The organization of emirates, it was agreed, would include the 
H1~her Council of the Gulf Emirates, with Deputy Ruler of Qatar, Shaikh 
Ihalifa bin Hema al-Thani. elected as its first chairman. The Council 
Chairmanship would rotate, as would the place of meeting and the tederal 
council of notables. A budget of $140,000 was adopted. On the following 
day. the Chairman of the Federation began an official five-day visit to 
London and on 15 July the Ruler ot Sharja arrived in Landon for an extended 
visit as the guest of the British govern.ent. On that day. the Chairman 
said that his government would welcome foreign investment and technical 
skills and announced incentives including a limit on import duties. minimal 
tax on income and profits, and absence of restrictions on the removal at 
capital and profits. 
Keanwhile. the Shah of Iran had ended on 12 June a two-day conference 
at the White House with President Johnson. getting his assurance of support 
in building an adequate modern defence force. A few weeks later. on 2 July, 
Crown Price Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia also met President 
Johnson. On 20 August. Saudi Arabian Xinister of Petroleum and Kineral 
Wealth, Yamani, arrived for a visit to Teheran and on the following day 
Saudi Arabia signed an agreement on the demarcation of the Gulf continental 
shelf. On 25 August the Ruler of Ras al-Khaima Shaikh Saqr bin Kahammed 
ended a ten-day state visit, while an the same day the Ruler of Fujaira 
arrived for a visit at the invitation at the Iranian government. On 18 
September, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi arrived in Landon for talks with British 
Foreign Secretary Stewart. In Iran. two squadrons of F-4 Phantom II 
aircraft entered service with the ~rmed forces. The Shah and Empress Farah 
began a ten-day visit to Xoscow on 24 September. while a visit to the 
United States an 4 December was announced on 18 October. On 25 September 
the Kuwaiti paper Akhbar aI-KUWAit reported that Sharja'. Ruler had 
reaffirmed his country's ownership of Abu Kusa i.land. On 11 October the 
Ruler of Dubai began a week's official visit to Iran and two days later the 
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rulers of the seven Trucial States ended a day's meeting in Dubai. On 18 
October they approved a development budget of t2 Dillion, with Abu Dhabi 
providing t1.7 million and Britain t300, 000: and on 23 October the Gulf 
rulers agreed in principle to form their own armed forces. On 26 October, 
in a bill submitted to the Senate, Iran agreed to recognize Saudi Arabia's 
sovereignty over al-Arabiya Island. and Saudi Arabia was to recognize 
Iranian sovereignty over al-Farisiyya Island. On 6 lovember Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Xinister Takriti ended a three-day official visit to Kuwait and said 
that Iraq did not wish to suggest a particular form for a Gulf Federation 
so long as the Gulf preserved its Arab character. A week later, the Shah of 
Iran began a three-day official visit to Kuwait. 
In Iraq in the period after the overthrow of Arif's regime and the 
revival of Ba'ath Party influence, the internal situation seemed to be 
still unstable. On 24 August 1968 it was announced that the Revolutionary 
Command Council had decided to dissolve the Preparatory Committee of the 
Arab Socialist Union. On 12 September, fighting broke out between Iraqi 
border guards and Kurdish nationalists who had taken refuge in the Iranian 
town of Karim Abbad. Two Iranian villagers were killed and several injured. 
A new provisional constitution was promulgated on 21 September. which 
concentrated almost all executive power in the Revolutionary Command 
Council, including all legislative powers. until such time as the lational 
Assembly convened its first meeting. latural resources were declared the 
property of the state. which would guarantee their sound exploitation. On 
24 September the Revolutionary Command Council decreed that 21 Karch would 
be known as Kurdish Day and would be a natIonal holiday. Three days later. 
it decreed that all Iraqi students expelled for polit1cal reasons would be 
allowed to return to their colleges and universities. On 3 October. reports 
in Beirut indicated that a clash had taken place near Baghdad on 27 
- 214 -
Septem~r between Arab tatlonallsts and lasserites and the Iraqi police 
force. The Belrut daily Arab World reported on 4 October the suspension of 
the Kurdish newspaper al-Taakb1. On 6 October a military delegation led bv 
Army Chlef of Staff Ibrahim Faysal al-Ansari ended a ten-day vislt to 
Poland and the USSR. On 7 October. the Beirut daily BoyraQ reported that an 
attempted coup had been thwarted on 28 September by the arrest of elghty 
people. most of them army offlcers. On 12 October a private nespaper ~ 
1uL. published by Kurdish intellectuals. began publication, while on 27 
October the Beirut daily aI-AnWAr reported that fighting had broken out in 
the lorth between followers of the Kurdish leaders Barazani and Talal 
Talabani. On 17 lovember, the Xinistry of Culture and Information announced 
the suspension of the al-Taakh1 for fifteen days because of the paper's 
negative attitude towards all positive steps and achievements of the 
government in the national sphere. On the same day, Baghdad Radio reported 
the assassination of former Foreign Xinister lasir al-Hani. 
On 18 lovember. as part of its effort to make a 'tresh start', the 
Ba'ath Party abollshed the public holiday celebrating the 1963 overthrow of 
Qassim. A Kurdish representative, Kamuran Badr Khan, sent a letter to UI 
Secretary-General U Thant on 19 lovember asking for a UI medlator to 
lntervene ln the dlspute between the Iraqi government and the Kurds, while 
the Iraqi embassy in Iran denied local and foreign reports of renewed 
clashes between Kurds and the government. The Syrlan official dally ~ 
Thawro said on 20 lovember that right-wing elements had been responsible 
tor the anti-Ba'ath purge on 18 lovember 1963 and said that the present 
Defence Xinlster Takvitl had worked in close associatiOn with former 
President Arit. On 4 December, the confessions of three Iraqis were 
broadcast in which Abd al-Hadl al-Bajjari told of a group he had formed 
with CEITO and certaln nelghbouring countries to reactivate the Kurdish 
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.avement in the forth. On 18 December, the government approved an amendment 
to the penal code prescribing the death penalty in wartime for anyone 
convicted of certain intelligence activities. On the same day, it was 
announced that former Prime Xinister Abd al-Rahman al-Razzaz and former 
Defence Xinister Abd al-Aziz al-Uqayli had been arrested on charges of 
participating in alleged spy networks. The Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan 
announced its forces had captured eleven soldiers and killed four others. A 
curfew was imposed on Halabajah district. The London I1maQ reported on 19 
December that the Iraqi air force had been used against a big force of 
followers of Kurdish leader Barazani and over 50 Kurdish and Iraqi soldiers 
killed. Baghdad Radio announced on 27 December that five Iraqi officers had 
been retired, among them the Chief of Staff. 
Meanwhile the Shah of Iran had been continuing on his travels. On 17 
lovember he ended a ten-day visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait: joint 
communiques noted the support of their respective countries for stability 
in the Gulf area and their continued desire for co-operation. Prime 
Xinister Hovieda ended a two-day official visit to the United States on 0 
December where he had had talks with President Johnson. On 11 December 
Iraqi Defence Xinister Takriti and Foreign Xinister Shaykhali ended a six-
day visit to Teheran for talks which were said to be fruitful and to have 
removed all past differences and coolness in relations between the two 
countries. The Deputy Ruler of Qatar began a five-day visit to Iran on 29 
December. 
In the meantime. there had been developments affecting the smaller 
Gulf states. On 16 Jovember, a meeting of the Federal Council of the 
proposed federation of the Gulf states, which was to have been held 1n 
Qatar, was postponed until 20-28 lovember, when it met in Sharja. It was 
reported in Aden on 26 lovember that the Dhofar L1beration Front would 
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change its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 
Arabian Gulf, and would extend its operations throughout the Gulf region. 
On 30 Bovember. a four-man Jordanian military mission began a four-day 
visit to Abu Dhabi for talks on military aid. The Chairman of the Oman 
delegation, Shaikh Sulayman bin Himyar, circulated a stateBent to the UI 
Trusteeship Council on 6 December charging that a wave of arrests and 
suppressive measures by British forces was sweeping Oman. Britain denied 
the charge. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf 
announced on 12 December that it had killed or wounded 65 men of the Xuscat 
and Oman forces in a clash near Salala. The UJ General Assembly on 18 
December adopted a resolution deploring the refusal of Great Britain to 
stop dominating Oman and deplored foreign exploration of oil resources 
without the consent of the people. It was announced on 29 January 1969 that 
the meeting of the council of the federation, which was to have been held 
on 28 January. had been postponed until 7 Karch. In a significant statement 
the Shah of Iran said on 4 January 1969 that if the people of Bahrain did 
not want to join his country, Iran would never use force to oblige them to 
do so. but it could not tolerate something which belonged to Iran being 
ceded to others. 
In Iraq. the Ba'ath Party was still trying to cope with internal 
instability. The Xinister of Culture Sallum said on 11 January that a 
special department of Kurdish culture would be established at his ministry. 
while on 27 January Kurdistan Radio reported that several clashes had been 
taking place between government and Kurdish forces over the previous few 
days. Fourteen Iraqis convicted on spying for Israel were executed in 
Baghdad and Basra on 27 January. Three days later, Baghdad Radio accused 
Zion1st. American and British intelligence of waging an anti-Iraqi campai~n 
over the 27 January executions, adding that the tight-lipped silence by 
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Arab progressive forces regarding this assault on Iraq was 
incomprehensible. 
Joint Iraqi-Iranian meetings concerning the demarcation of the 
continental shelf began on 1 February. The delegates also discussed the 
settlement of frontier problems in general and the joint use of the waters 
of frontier rivers. Saudi Foreign Affairs Xinister Umar al-Saqqaf ended a 
two-day visit for talks with President Bakr on 3 February. The Ba'ath Party 
broadcast a policy statement on 7 February recommending a scientific reform 
of the government to eliminate corruption, calling for implementation of 
the 29 June statement on the Kurdish problem and streSSing that the Arab 
character of the Gulf should be preserved. Soviet ships began a goodwill 
visit to the port of Umm Qasr on 15 February. On 1 March the IPC 
installations at Kirkuk were attacked, reportedly by Kurds led by al-
Barazani. There was further trouble on 6 March when Iraqi troops fired on 
three Iranian fishermen in the Shatt aI-Arab in waters claimed by the 
Iranian government, with one fisherman killed. Reuters published reports on 
14 Karch of a clash between Kurds, led by al-Barazani. and Iraqis. near the 
army garrison at .Zakho, where five people were killed and twenty wounded. 
While the Iraqi Foreign Minister was on an offic1al s1x-day visit to the 
Soviet Union Iraqi officials arrested and later released some Iranian 
fishermen 1n Khorowabad on 23 March. A clash between rival Kurdish groups 
on the Turkish-Iraqi border was also reported. w1th followers of Barazani 
claiming to have killed twenty one and captured nineteen on 9 April. The 
voice of Iraqi Kurdistan reported that Kurdish ground fire bad brought down 
an Iraqi Air Force KIG-17. 
The Iraqi government informed the Iranian Ambassador in Baghdad on 15 
April of its decision to enforce its territorial rights in the Bhatt al-
Arab, including the requirement that Iranian sh1ps using the waterway 
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strike their colours and refrain from carrying Iranian navy personnel. The 
Iranian government then publicly announced on 19 April that it had 
abrogated the 1937 agreement on the Bhatt al-Arab because at alleged Iraqi 
violations of the agreement and that it had put its frontier troops along 
the river on alert. The day following this Iranian announce.ent, Saudi 
Minister of state for Fore1gn Affairs, Umar al-S.qqaf, began a visit to 
Iran. On 22 April, the Iranian government announced that an Iranian 
freighter had sailed down the Shatt al Arab under military escort, and, 
within a few days, on 25 April, a second freighter did the same. On the 
follow1ng day. the Iranian Foreign Ministry formally rejected an Iraqi 
protest. In turn, on 29 April, the Iraqi government denounced Iran's 
rejection of the 1937 agreement and said it considered the treaty still 
binding. A Foreign Kinistry spokesman on 2 Kay stated that Iraq would be 
willing to begin negotiations with Iran, given a return to the situation 
prior to Iran's abrogation of the 1937 treaty. The Iranian delegate at the 
United lations. Vakil, said on 9 Kay that his country was prepared to 
conclude immediately a new treaty with Iraq under which the sovereign 
rights of both countries in the Bhatt al Arab would be safeguarded. Baghdad 
Radio announced on 12 Kay that an army officer had been convicted by a 
revolutionary court of spying for Iran and the American CIAj two days later 
ten more men were convicted of spying for Israel, the United states and 
Iran would be executed. 
Discussions, meetings and agreements among the smaller Gulf states 
themselves and with the bigger ones were taking place during these months. 
The Rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai signed an agreement on 1e February 
establishing a neutral zone between their two states. The rulers of Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Rasal-Khalma met in Dubai on 24 February to discuss 
progress on the proposed Gulf Federation and other matters. Agreement was 
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reached on the border between Abu Dhabi and Ras al-Khaima. On the same day, 
the Crown Prince of Bahrain, Shaikh Hamad bin lsa, ended a five-day 
official visit to Iraq. The Ruler of Ajman met with King Faisal on 4 March 
and two days later the Council of the proposed federation ended a two-day 
meeting in Dubai after agreeing on a unified currency, the establishment, 
in principle, of a sub-committee to draft a federal budget, a unified 
postal system. council procedural rules and the formation of committees to 
discuss federation foreign policy and the level of salary for council 
members. Peking Radio broadcast on 7 March a military communique issued by 
the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf savin~ 
that its forces had been active in Dhofar and Aden, killing or wounding 
more than one hundred British mercenaries. In Riyadh on 18 Karch it was 
announced that the Saudi government would appoint a cultural attache to the 
proposed Gulf Federation. 
Shell signed a concession agreement on 15 Karch for about 970 aquare 
kilometres of onshore territory in Ras al-Khaima. Five days later, the 
Rulers of Qatar and Abu Dhabi signed an agreement demarcating the offshore 
areas and establishing the ownership of islands. All revenues and other 
payments from the Bundug field were to be shared equally. On 21 March the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended a two-day visit to Qatar, and Iraq Deputy Prime 
Xinister Takriti, Foreign Xinister Shaykhali and Information Xinister 
Sallum ended a ten-day visit to the Gulf States on 13 April. The Ruler of 
Abu Dhabi named his son Shaikh Khalifa bin Zaid as heir apparent on 21 
April. Diplomatic travel continued on 3 Kay. when the Ruler of Qatar began 
a three-day visit to Bahrain, while on 14 May the rulers at the praposed 
Pederation's states ended a five-day meeting in Doha <Qatar) after 
agreement had been reached on drafting an interim constitution. Bahrain's 
Ruler regretted, however, that the conference had failed to agree on 
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important steps necessary for setting up the Federation. The Saudi Xinister 
of State for Foreign Affairs began a two-day visit to Kuwait on 17 lay for 
talks with h1s opposite number. 
In Iraq. the Xinister of Oil and Xinerals. Rashid al-Rafai, said 'we 
shall not tolerate an increase in production in any country at the expense 
of Arab oil output as a whole or at the expense of Iraqi oil in 
particular'. Baghdad Radio reported that seven Iraqis tried under a law 
forbidding conspiracy against the safety of the revolution had been 
sentenced to death. President Bakr denounced Iran's illegal ambitions in 
Iraqi territory and waters as well as in the Arab Gulf, and said that 
Iran's activity as well as the Barazani guerrilla movements were attempts 
to force a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the Israeli front. A day later, 
on 18 Mav. the Saudi Defence Xinister, Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, arrived in 
Iraq on a five-day visit. 
On 19 Kay. the Beirut daily a1-AnWAr published an Open Letter to the 
Shah of Iran by former Saudi Xinlster of 011 Tariqi, in which be took 
exception to the Shah's slanders against the Arabs and suggested that the 
best solution to Iran's revenue problems would be for Iran to take action 
with the backing of the producing countries to raise its tax rates on oil 
production. Bahrain's Finance Director, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman. had just 
ended a dav's visit for talks about 'Arabian Gulf affairs' in Saudi Arabia. 
Dubai's Crown Prince, Shaikh laktum bin Rashid, bad begun a visit to Iran 
which was to last for several days. He was followed. a few days later, by 
the Ruler of Sharja. Meanwhile, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arabian Gulf issued a communique saying that it. torces had killed 
or wounded 79 Xuscat troops in early lay. 
In Iraq. President Bakr said that a number of foraer Biniaters and 
directors of ministries were among the imperialist agents and Dembers of 
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spy networks recently arrested In Iraq. The Lebanese Arob world reported 
that full-scale flghtlng between Kurdish leader Barazanl's forces and Iraqi 
regular forces had been resumed. In Kuwait, Bahrain's Pinance Dlrector 
ended a day's visit about Gulf affairs. Jordanian Prime Xinlster Rlfai 
ended a two-day official visit on 21 Kay. He had had talks with President 
Bakr and government officlals. A day later, Baghdad Radl0 reported a clash 
between police and tribesmen In the Arabistan area In which seven pollcemen 
were killed, while the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) said on 23 KaV 
that the Iraqi government wanted a peaceful and just solution to the 
Kurdish problem and that a new law for local self-government in the 
northern districts would be issued soon. Baghdad Radio reported on 25 Kay 
that Kichel Aflaq, Secretary-General of the lational Command of the Ba'ath 
Party, had arrived in Baghdad. In Iran on 28 Kay, US Secretary of State 
rogers ended a four-day visit during which he had attended the CEITO 
meeting and had separate talks with the Shah and government leaders. 
King Hussein of Jordan ended a two-day visit for talks with the Shah 
on 29 May, reportedly concerning the Shatt aI-Arab dispute, and two days 
later the Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai ended a two-day visit to Iraq for 
talks, after which he said there was very great hope that the Shatt aI-Arab 
dlspute could be settled peacefully. On 29 Kay British Foreign secretary 
Stewart confirmed that Britain would withdraw its troops from the region by 
1971, as planned, and said that the defence of the region would then be the 
respons1b1l1ty of the Gulf States. 
On 1 June, the Kuwait daily al-Ra1 ol-Am reported the Shah's 
statement that the in1t1at1ve for the resumption of diplo .. tlc relations 
should come from Egypt but that Iran now did not require any formal apology 
as a prelude to discussion. Further, the Shah said that he would welcome 
the settling of the Shatt-al-Arab dispute through international legal Deans 
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and that the future of Bahrain should be deter.ined by an internationally 
supervised plebiscite. Bahrain's Foreign Affairs Department sa1d on 4 June 
that it viewed w1th concern and strongly opposed recent Iranian statements 
which referred to Iran's 'lawful' cla1. to Bahrain. 
Iraq's Defence M1n1ster Takr1ti ended an eight-day visit to the USSR 
on 3 June for talks wh1ch be called very cordial and fruitful. Four days 
later, a former layor of Baghdad. Xadbat aI-Hajj Sirri, confessed to having 
been a CIA agent since 1960. He said he had been recruited in Beirut by a 
~ and ~ correspondent, Abu Said Abu-Rish. and said that the Kurdish 
rebels under Barazani were receiv1ng aid and arms from the CIA. On 11 June 
a self-styled CIA agent. Yusuf al-Ximar, appeared on Baghdad television 
telling of a US plan against the state in co-operation wlth former Prime 
Minister al-Bazzazz, former Defence Minister al-Uqaili and other 
politicians. On the following day, Baghdad Radio announced that former 
President Arif had been a spy for the CIA and Israel. Bagbdad Radl0 
broadcast on 17 June a former Interior Xinister, Rashid lusllh's confession 
that he had been a CIA agent and said that he, former Defence linlster al-
Uqaili and former Finance Minister Zaki had been hired by an Iraqi living 
in Lebanon and had worked under the direction of former US Secretary of the 
Treasury. Robert Anderson. Two Soviet warships ended a five-day goodwill 
visit on 19 June and the Iraqi lews Agency announced that for .. r Iranian 
security cbief Bakhtiar had been granted political asylum in Iraq. 
On 21 June, rlDC s1gned an agreement under which the Soviet firm 
lachino-export agreed to supply IICC with equipment and service. for 011 
exploration and development worth up to $72 Idlllon in the al-Halfayah 
region and other regions assigned to IIOC, including fields where the 
presence of oil had been established. On 5 July, the USSR signed an 
economic and techn1cal agreement providing for the granting of several 
large loans to finance projects including dams costing an estimated $56 
million, an iron and steel mill and a $70 million loan for the development 
of the northern Rumaila oilfield by I!OC. The following day, Deputy Prime 
Xinister Ammash returned from a twelve-day visit to the USSR. Baghdad 
newspapers reported on 6 July that twenty IraqiS, including former Prime 
Xinistr al-Bazzazz and former Chief of Staff al-Ansari, would be faCing a 
revolutionary court on charges of conspiracy against the state. It was 
announced on 9 July that an Office for Kurdish Affairs was to be set up, 
directed by Xurtada Hadithi. 
Opening four days of celebrations of the 17 July revolution, PreSident 
Bakr said on 14 July that the Revolutionary Command would safeguard 
internal progressive achievements and national socialist aims and would 
make the country free from foreign exploitation of its native natural 
resources. A clandestine Kurdish radio station reported on 22 July a clash 
between Kurdish forces and Iraqi troops in the Kha1isan area, with seventy 
Iraqi troops reportedly killed. However, speaking at the UJ on 23 July, 
Iraq's delegate Adnan Raouf said that his country was willing and prepared 
to refer all disputes concerning the application of the Iraqi-Iran boundary 
treaty of 1937 to the World Court and to abide by the Court's decision. On 
28 July, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended a four-day visit to Iraq with a 
communique which referred to the support of the two countries for the 
Palestinian cause and stated that the proposed Gulf Federatlon constituted 
an urgent national demand and was to be regarded as a constructlve step 
along the road to Arab unity. 
On 18 August, the Iraqi government announced that twelve Iraqis 
charged with spying for Israel had been ordered to stand trlal and that 
they were part of the spy ring referred to the prevlous day by Army 
Intelligence. The Xinister of Economic Affairs Qudurl announced on 25 
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August that with effect from the following day the importation of goods 
from Iran or trans-shipped through Iran was prohibited. Baghdad Radio 
reported that f1fteen Iraqis convicted of spying for Israel and the United 
States had been executed and the Revolutionary Court eentenced a further 
six people to death in absentia on 26 August. On 27 August the government 
ordered that all private newspapers excepting al-lyr were to be closed 
down. Three days later it ordered that all Iraqi tourists in Lebanon leave 
within twenty-four hours because of the continuing Lebanese press attacks 
against Iraq; an Iraqi embassy spokesman in Beirut later reported the 
extension by a day of this time-limit. Two more Iraqi civilians and one 
Iraqi soldier convicted of espionage for Israel and the US CIA were 
executed on 8 September. 
The London Eyening lews published on 9 September an interview in which 
the Shah said that if his proposal for a referendum in Bahrain was turned 
down he would recognize neither a Gulf Federation of which Bahrain was a 
member nor an independent state of Bahrain. Five days later, Baghdad Radio 
announced that Iraqi troops had killed thirty Iranian soldiers and captured 
fourteen as they attempted to cross the border to help the Kurdish leader 
Barazani. The Iranian Foreign Xinistry denied the report. On 12 September. 
the Iraqi Foreign Xinister Abd al-Karim al-Shsykhli. arrived in Kuwait for 
talkswith government officials. In Saudi Arabia, linister of Communications 
luhammad Umar Tawfiq signed an agreement under which the Iranian company 
ITCD would make studies on the access roads connecting rural areas in the 
Bastern Province and parts of the Central Province with the .. in cities. 
The Iraq Foreign Minister Shaykhll on 15 Septe.ber ended hi. four-day visit 
to the Gulf states where he had had talks on the deteriorating .ituation 
generally in the KiddIe Bast, the future defence of the Arabian Gulf. and 
preparations for the Islamic summit ~onference. Three day. later, on 18 
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September. The T1me~ of London reported a statement by the Ruler of Bahrain 
that he would accept the idea of a UI commission to ascertain the wishes of 
tbe people of Bahrain about their future. However, tbe report was 
subsequently denied by official sources in Bahrain. Qatar signed an 
agreement on 20 September with Iran delimiting the boundary separating the 
countries' offshore areas. Baghdad Radio announced on 24 Septeaber that Koi 
Sanjac, north east of Kirkuk, bad been recaptured from the Kurds. On tbe 
following day the Kinister of Oil and Kinerals Rifai pointed to tbe rise in 
production in other areas of the Gulf and accused foreign oil companies of 
maintaining offtake at a level which conformed only to their plans and 
objectives, and warned that further measures to bring about the direct 
exploitation of all Iraq's natural resources would result from this 
attitude on their part. 
The Ruler of Abu Dhabi ended on 4 October a four-day visit for talks 
w1th the Shah of Iran on Iranian relations with the Gulf states. Two days 
later, the Shah warned that Iran's defensive role in the Gulf would be 
substantially increased with British withdrawal from the area. and tbat 
enormous armament expenses WDuld have to be faced. Sucb stateBents help to 
explain why, at this time, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Xinister was visiting 
East Berlin seeking support from Eastern bloc countries. Meanwhile. claims 
and counter-claims were being made about the war with the Kurds. On 9 
October Sh4fq Qazzazz presented a document to tbe UJ General ".embly 
charg1ng that Iraqi troops bad destroyed the Kurdish village of Dakan in 
August and on 13 August Barazani said that Kurdish loases in the struggle 
against Iraq1 troops amounted to 20,000 killed and wounded, 3.000 villages 
destroyed and over 200,000 people made hOBeless. He said that the Defence 
Xinistry statistics showed that the cost of the tyranny and oppression was 
IDs 500 million. During tbis period it is also worth noting that on 12 
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October Xinister of the Interior Amir Fahad ibn Abd al-Aziz ended a three-
day visit to London where he had talks with Foreign Office ministers. And 
on 17 October, King Faysal received the ruler of Ras al-lhaima. Three days 
later, on 20 October. Xinister of the Interior Fahad ended an eight-day 
visit to the United states for talks with President lixon and other 
government figures. The scale of these visits, criss-crossing the Gulf area 
at this time indicates the extent to which the British announcement had 
changed the atmosphere in the region. Thr rulers of the small states were 
having to learn to conduct their own affairs in the knowledge that the 
British shield would shortly be withdrawn. while both Iran and Iraq more or 
less sought to replace that shield themselves. 
The first meeting of the Supreme Council of the proposed federation 
ended a two-day session on 22 October after electing Shaikh Zaid of Abu 
Dhabi as President, Shaikh Rashid of Dubai as Vice-President and the Shaikh 
of Bahrain as Prime Minister. Abu Dhabi was selected as the provisional 
capital but it was agreed that a permanent capital would be built between 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The Consultative Assembly would be composed of 36 
members, with four from each amirate. Addressing the final meeting of the 
Supreme Council of the proposed federation on 25 October, the British 
political agent in Abu Dhabi. James Tradwill, read a message from the 
British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir Stewart Crawford. on 
negotiations over the federation saying that Britain would be extremely 
disappointed if these difficulties could not be overco.e. After the message 
was read, the Rulers of Qatar and Ras al-Khaima walked out and the latter 
later accused the British of flagrant intervention. However, the final 
communique affirmed the determination of the rulers to tederate, eaying 
that the Supreme Council hoped to proclaim as soon as posslble the blrth of 
the independent state of the Gulf imirates. 
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Tbe Iranian Foreign Xinister emphasized that so long as the future 
status of Bahrain bad not been legally clarified in accordance with 
applicable and accepted international principles, the Pederation would in 
no circumstances be acceptable to Iran. On 26 October the American TV 
programme 'Xeet the Press' broadcast an item in which the Shah said that 
Iran needed to sell more oil abroad to finance its imports and that if the 
United States would consent to incTease its imports of Iranian oil, Iran 
would. for every cent made. spend it locally to buy American goods. He said 
that the major threat to the region obviously could not be Soviet, but 
rather it stemmed from what he called weak and corrupt countries where the 
elements of subversion would have free ground for their activities. In 
Kuwait two days later. on 28 October. speaking at the opening of the 
lational Assembly, the Amir outlined economic plans to raise the standard 
of living. including desalting and telecommunications projects. He also 
re~orted that the rate of oil production growth had maintained an 
acceptable level and that the oil companles had been partiCUlarly active in 
expanding production capacity. 
In Iraq, the Jordanian Foreign Xinister ended a day's visit on 31 
October saying that be hoped the talks on the Shatt al-Arab dispute would 
produce fruitful results. On 4 lovember the Iraqi government announced that 
it had acquitted 21 people who were on espionage charges. The Revolutionary 
Command Council amended the constitution on 9 Jove.ber, expanding the 
Council from 5 to 14 'because the prinCiple of collective leadership 
requires the admission into the RCC of the party's leadera who partlclpated 
in the 17 July 1968 revolution', and giving the President eupre.e cO.a8nd 
of the armed forces. On the following day. Al-ThaWT' reported that Badam 
Hussain al-Takritl had been appointed Vlce-President of the Council. Le 
lond~ Veekly published reports on 12 lovember of continued fighting during 
- 228 -
August and September between Kurdish and government troops. including, on 
22 August, the massacre of the inhabitants ot Dakan by government troops 
and, on 21 September. the capture bv Kurdish troops of the Dakan Dam. 
The Beirut weekly al-Sayyed reported on 27 lovember that eix people in 
Iraq, 1ncluding former Interior Minister Rashid Xuslih had been sentenced 
to death for spying for the CIA. Former Premier Bazzaz had been acqUitted 
on spying charges but was nonetheless sentenced to prison for fifteen years 
for conspiracy against the government. The Kurdish radio announced on 8 
December that its forces had attacked Iraqi army camps in two assaults 
'last week' killing 25 Iraqi soldiers and wounding many others. The Voice 
of Kurdistan Radio further reported on 19 December that its forces had shot 
down two Air Force XIG-17s in the first week of December. On 9 December. 
Ch1e! of Staff Shihab ended a ten-day official visit to the USSR for 
talk;with officials on questions of mutual interest and on 1e December 
Baghdad Radio reported two agreements wlth the Soviet Union to survey the 
Shatt al-Arab canal and build a shipyard ln the country. The lew York Tlmes 
on 29 December quoted reliable sources in Baghdad as saying that a high 
level government delegation was ready to meet with Kurdish leader Barazani 
if he were willing to confer and on 12 January 1970 Le El1arp reported the 
arrival 'a tew days ago' in PariS ot an arms-purchasing mission to 
negotiate a contract for 50 French Kirages. The Forelgn Xlnistry denied the 
report. A few days later. on 21 January. the RCC issued a coamunique saying 
that on the night of 20 January 'a traltorous, .-licious group. in 
colluslon with foreign elements' had attempted to overthrow the government. 
All members involved in the plot were arrested. Baghdad Radl0 announced 
that 16 people. includlng 11 army officers. 2 police off1cers, and 3 
clvilians had been executed in connection with the attempted coup. On the 
following day. the government ordered the expulsion of the Iranian 
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ambassador and four officials on the pretext that the diplomats had been 
.eddling in the internal affairs of Iraq. The Iranian consulates in 
Baghdad, Kerbala and Basra were closed. Iraqi Radio announeed that a 
further eight army officers and 3 civilians were executed for their part in 
the attempted coup. In Iran, on the same day, the govern.ent notIfied the 
Iraqi ambassador and four of his staff that they were to leave the country 
within twenty-four hours. All Iraqi consulates were closed and IraqI 
eonsular officers expelled. Explaining the action, the Foreign Xinister 
aecused the ambassador and his staff of interfering in the internal affairs 
of Iran. 
A three-man special eourt announced on 24 January that the last three 
of the plotters in the attempted coup in Iraq had been executed. On the 
same day the government reportedly offered an amnesty to all Kurdish 
tribesmen who had been participating in insurrection in the north. Deputy 
Premier Takriti said that talks with Barazani to lay down a final peace 
formula had begun. Four days later, Le !Qnde Weekly reported that Kurdish 
leader Jalal Talabanl had been sent lnto exile, and in the following week. 
on 5 February. Le londe reported that the Iraqi govera.ent had requested, 
and WDuld receive, Turkish .ediation in its dispute with Iran. Iranian 
Pri.e Iinister Hoviede presented the 1970/1 budget to the Parlia .. nt on 8 
February and said that the increase of al.ast 50 per cent ia defence 
expenditure was necessary because of Iraqi provocation aDd the critical 
situation in the Gulf, indeed in the Kiddie Bast seDera11y. 
In the Gulf itself, the Popular Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arabian Gulf had issued a co..unique on 2e .ove~r 1069 reportiD8 
a elash with two British ships at lathyut during whick ODe of the ahips .. s 
severely da.aged. The Front clai.ad to have hit ODe of the British planes 
called in as a reinforce.ent. The Trueial States Develop.ent Council .et in 
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Sbarja aD 8 Dece~r fortalks aD tbe approacbiDg budget. A few days later, 
aD 13 Deceaber, BabraiD ladio reported that talks bettMeD the rulers of 
Qatar aDd Abu Dhabi aD tbe proposed federatioD had beeD aucceasful. On the 
II4E day, tbe UJ' GeDeral Asaeably voted to deplore coDtinued Britisb 
preseDce iD Xuscat aDd o.D. On 19 JaDuary 19'10, tbe Ruler of BahraiD 
aDDOUDced tbe couDtry's first CabiDet, which would be called the CouDcil of 
State aDd would replace tbe CouDcil of A~DiatratioD. It is wortb noting 
that tbe Ruler of Sharja ended a siz-day visit to IraD for talks thougbt to 
cover the proposed federatioD, the de .. rcatioD of the cODtineDtal abelf aDd 
geDeral expansion of trade. On 9 February, the Ruler of Dubai eDded a two-
day visit to Abu Dhabi for talks with Shaikh Zaid aD tbe i.,artance of 
streD~theDiDg frieDdship betweeD the two couDtries and on the fallowing day 
the Ruler of Dubai arrived in Qatar for talks an tbe proposed federation. 
The Suuday 11W:5 of LondoD published OD 15 February • reliable reports' of 
aD attack by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf 'so.e 
weeks ago' on aD airstrip at Salala which .as reportedly so accurate that 
Bri Ush RAF personDel narrowly escaped death and tbe base had to be 
reinforced by other British !dlitary personnel. On 21 February tbe Chinese 
lews Agency Hisuhuo published reports by the PFLOAG that fierce fightlag 
bad takeD place along the Bellllin highway in central Dhofar, with large 
nu.bers of British troops attacked. On 1'1 Karch Britain confiraad that 
reinforceaeDts had beeD sent to the RAP contingeDt at Salala follawtag the 
PFLOAG attacks. 
On 23 February, the IUNaiti IDterior aDd Defence Ii.iater Sbaikb Saad 
aI-Abdulla, eDded a visit to Iraq and on 2 larch begaD to si~y visit to 
Bahrain; a few days later, aD adviser to Saudi ling Fa,.l, IUI11 AcUaaa. 
arrived in Iuwait for talks with tbe ~r, while JordaDia. liDS BueaalD 
eDded a day's visit to Abu Dhabi on 24 larch. On 28 larch, n Secretary 
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GeDeral V ThaDt aDDouDced that he had agreed to use his good offices OD the 
questioD of the future status of BahraiD at the request of BritaiD and Iran 
aDd had appoiDted the Director-GeDeral of the VI iii_Ion to the couDtry; aD 
the followiDt; day, the IraDiaD Foreign JUni.ter, Zahecll. a.DOUDced a 
SOVerDEDt decisioD not to use force iD Its clal. over BeJaral. aDd 88id 
that the govern.ent would accept the findings of a VI lliesion seDt to the 
islaDd. During this tiE, the Qatar alii rate proclalaed Itself DD 2 April 
1970 an independeDt aDd sovereign state aDd pro.ulgated a provisioBal 
cOllStitution to COE into force withiD three aDDths, providing tor a teD-
.an Council of linisters aDd a thirty-three asD CoDsultatlve CouDcl1 with 
twenty Eabers chosen fro. directly-elected caDdidates by the luler. The 
CroWD PriDce was BaEd Priae IiDister. Four days later, the (u .. iti AI-IIi 
al-" published a stateEDt by a seDior official replyiag to a query OD 
Kuwait's view of Qatar's indepeDdeDce. Be declared that Ku .. it would be 
williDg to establish relations with the Arab Gulf Federal State. CD the 
saae day, Al-lAhar published aD interview iD which the Priae lliniater of 
Qatar said that the constitutioD stipulated that Qatar'. policy .as based 
OD the inevitability of the eaergeDce of the Pederatian of Arab s.drates 
aDd Qatar's inseparable adherence to it. At the aaae tiE, the declaratioD 
of iDdepeDdeDce aDd the CDDStitutlon provided the country wttb aD 
alternative Juridical aDd political status should the 'ederatioD fail. CD 7 
April, a delegatioD of the PFLOAG. led by Ge.eral Coaaan4 l..auti.e 
Co..t ttee aem,er talal Said lah.ud, eDded a alz-weks V181 t to Co .... lat 
China • 
• anwhile, the seem-D8l, eDdless round of Ylalta aad .m ...... toot 
place. CD 12 April the Ruler of las al-lbaias begaD a Y181t to Abu Dhabi 
for talks with Shaikh Zald; aDd aD the eaae day, the Ruler of Qatar eDded a 
six-day offtcial visit for talks an i~roved relatloDS aDd i.creased trade 
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aDd ecoDOllic assistaDce with Iran. On the tollowiDg day, the DeputJ luler 
at Qatar arrived iD Abu Dhabi. In LoDdon, the ti_a published aD lDterview 
in which the Shah of Iran said the Gulf states should 0rsaDize their own 
peace and securi ty. Be pledged Iranian co-operatiOD wi til the proposed 
Pederation or with the separate states if tlleJ chose to natD tDdepeDdeDt, 
aDd e~hasized that Iran wpould prevent the Tunb Islands and Abu IUsa 
Island fro. falling into hostile bands. On the aezt daJ, 14 April, saudi 
Ilnister of State for Poreign Affairs, Var al-Saqqaf, eDded a t1we-daJ 
visit to Iran and said the two countries would co-operate In defence of the 
Gulf region. The VI Special RepreseDtative VillSpeare Gulcciardi, ended his 
three-week fact finding masion in Bahrain on 18 April aDd 011 29 April, a 
Bahraini delegation, led by Shaikh Khalifa bin Sal .. n begaD a two-daJ visit 
to luwait for talks with governaellt leaders. On e lay, the Ruler of Abu 
Dhabi, Shaikh Zaid, ended a three-day visi t for talks with liDi 'a,..l. 
Three clays later, the Ruler of Dubai arrived tor the eaE purpose. III 
luwait on 12 Kay the Iraqi Vice-President ended a three-daJ visit for talks 
aD the Gulf and the Palestine proble •• 
In Iraq itself, the goveru.ent .ewe AgeIlCJ had reported the ez8Cution, 
aD 2 larch, of a police-officer conVicted of co~lic1tJ iD the JanuarJ 
atte~ted coup, and on the saE clay the anllounceEllt .s _de of the death 
seDtence passed 1D absentia aD torEr Pria Itlliater Abel al-luaaq hU. 
Bowever, the _in developEnts again concerned the lurds. The ICC aanoullced 
on 11 larch a settleEnt of the Kurdish proble.. It ... asreed that the 
Iraqi people were to cODSist of two _iD utioaal1tles, t. Arabs and the 
lurds. AEn~nts to the CoDStitution WDuld provide tor a Kur41ah '1ce-
PresideDt, proportional represeDtation of lurds In the Lesl.lature aDd 
Cabinet alld Kurdish to be all official language, with ArabiC, In areas wbere 
lurds were iD a ajorlty. PI aIlS were to be draWD up providhg tor 
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develop_nt at the lurdish areas in education aad agriculture. Two days 
later, Kurdish leader Barazani said that the 11 larch plan _t the 
a~itioDS of the lurdish people and the objectives of their atrusgle for 
utioDal independeDce. ID an interview with the Iraqi ... _ncy OD 15 
larch, Barazani said that the develop_Dt of natural resources would be the 
responsibility of the ceDtral goverllEnt because the laws aad aovereignty 
of the state of Iraq were indivisible. On 18 larch, the iCC farEd a nine-
_D co.m ttee headed by Jlurtada Badi thi to supervise the l!lple_ntatioD of 
the 11 )(arch settle_nt. On the following day, 41-Ju..,ri,a reported that 
the goverllEDt had ade a special allocatloD of IDs 3 ~lliDD tor 
recoDstruction aDd developEnt in the iuwandiz region. On 28 lareh, a 
three-an Soviet ~litary delegation began a two-week visit, aDd aD the 
saE day the South TeEni Defence .iDister, Ali lasaar Baaani baSaD a 
three-day official visit. The lurdish al-Jur ceased publication at the 
request of the .inistry of Culture and Inforation on 30 lareh; aDd on 25 
April, .inister of Labour and Social Affairs Jlurtada Badithi .. id that all 
irregular forces in northern Iraq had handed D98r their arwa to the 
goverllEDt and been disbanded. On 26 April the lew Xgr); IfMS reported a 
• recent' stateEDt by the Iraqi Ba' ath Party warning of au.picious 
.ave_nts in the Gulf which were part of i~rialist reactionary sche_s 
and accused Arab reaction of collaboration with Iran, Britain aDd the 
United States in an effort to keep the oil-produciD8 region uDder the 
do.Ination of i~rialis. and iDternationAl .auopoliea. 
lotwlthstanding such accusatioDS, the Gult rulers continued tbeir 
ezchanges. On 16 lay 1970 the Ruler of Abu Dhabi belaD a. otticial Vi8it to 
Iran. on the nen day. the Ruler of Dubai eDded a t....uy Vi8i t to lu_l t 
for talks with Pri_ Xinister Shaikh Jabir on Gult attairs; aD the 
fol1ow1~ day. 18 Kay, Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince ended a day's visit to 
Bahrain aDd a day later the Iraqi 11nister of BcODOldc Affairs began a 
tour-day visit to Ku.it. OIl 20 .y, Ku.iti JU.nister of the Iaterior and 
Defence Shaikh Baad aI-Abdulla denied reports that Ku_it _s _DdiDg a 
token force to Bahrain, but in the event of threats to the aecurity of any 
.~rate Kuwait WDuld not hesitate to do so. Be said that the ezistiDg 
situation locally taken together with international develop_nta de_Dded 
the i-.ediate birth of the federation in order to safeguard the eecurity 
and welfare of the area. On the sa_ day, Iran officially DDtitied the 
British gover~nt of its clai. to Abu lusa and the two Tunb islands and 
strongly i.plied that if the British govern.ent did DDt act to atop 
drilling operatioDS in the area pending a settleEnt, Iran would take 
_tters into its OWD haDds. OIl the other baDd, Foreigu Il1nister Zahedi 
announced on 24 Kay that the govern.ent WDuld recognize Bahrain at any ti_ 
it declared its independence and on the following day an eleven-.. n Iranian 
goodwill ~ssion ended a three-day visit to Bahrain for talks with the 
ruler Shaikh lea on Gulf security. 
lD Qatar on 29 lray the first Council of Il1nisters laS announced, and 
in lu~it the Ruler of Abu Dhabi Shaikh Zaid ended a three-day ylsit for 
talks on the proposed Gulf Pederation. A British IdDesweeper aD 1 June 
intercepted an Occidental rig nine Idles east of Abu !Usa aDd ordered it to 
.ave off. Speaking on 7 June while on a brief visit to Dubai, Saudi ling 
Paysal denied that his goverueDt had beeD ..ting aecret arraageEnts with 
Iran and said his country stood behind the Gulf States in the spirit of 
Isla. and Arabis •• A day later, L'Ez:press quoted the Shah as .JiD8 that 
when the British left the Gulf it .. st be for sood and that DD other potier 
should replace the.; he said that on the question at all the whole present 
syate. of ezploiting cOapBnies .. st disappear. Iran herself ... quite able 
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to produce her own all. The co~nles .ust cease to eKploit the countries 
of the region. 
On 16 June, the President of Bahrain's State Council eDded a four-day 
9isl t to Iran which he said bad been a collplete eucceas. Be declared that 
he had been illpressed by the Sbah's great uDderstandiDg of the Deed for 
peace and stability in the Gulf area. Ten days later, on 26 June, the Shah 
aDd BIipTess Parah eDded a four-day state visi t to Pinland after a statEnt 
by the Shah rejecting any British decision to re .. in in the Gulf after 
1971, but adding that British forces under the provision of the VI CHarter 
llight re_1n if there was an organization that enended a for .. l request or 
invitation to the British or others to co_ to its assistance. On 28 June, 
!J_n's heir to the throne began a visit to luw.ait for talks on the 
proposed federation, and on the Den day the Deputy Ruler of Qatar paid a 
brief visit for talks with the '-dr and the Pri_ Ilnister. On the ... 
day. the liddle East EconQJdc Digest reported a press state.ant distributed 
in Beirut announcing the for .. tion of the lational De.acratic Front for the 
Liberation of o.an and the Arabian Gulf. Its announced ai.e were to support 
the revolution in Dhofar and to establish reYOlutioDary aDd progressive 
conditions in the region. On 30 June the Ruler of las al-Khai .. ended a 
five-day visit for talks with llinisters on .. inta1nias the Arab character 
of the Gulf. 
The London Doily telegraph reported on " July that the Sui tan of 
luscat and OMn' s forces bad s .. sheed a rebel group in o.n trained by 
Chinese in Iraq and reportedly ar.ad with weapoDS s.ugled in fro. South 
le_n. In luwait on the following day the Iranian Poreip Bntster, Zahedi, 
ended a three-day vis1t with a co..un1QUe saying that the two countries bad 
agreed tbat a Gulf Federation WDuld achieve the stability that MaS 
funda_ntal to the progress aDd prosperity of the area and 88f'8ecl on 
iacreasiag bilateral trade. Two days later. the Shah .et the British 
Foreign Secretary. Sir Alec Douglas-Bo.e. for talts coaceraiag British 
latentioas in the Gulf. OD 13 July the Ruler of Dubs1 .. ld that 'the whole 
coast people and rulers would support the retention of British forces ln 
the Gulf. even though they ~ght Dot give a direct aDSWer out of respect 
for the geDeral Arab view'. On the followiag day. the IraDlaa Poreip 
Ilnister Zahedi said that IraD aDd Saudi Arabia agreed on the aacesslty of 
British withdrawal fro. the Gulf by the eDd of 1971, aDd oa the aaae day he 
began a three-day visit for talks with liag 'ayeal about the Gulf. Four 
days later, an 18 July, Iraqi PresideDt Batr prapaaed. the .. tabU.bRDt of 
aD Arab defence alliaDce in the Gulf area to iDclude the .. ia Gulf 
all1rates. Iraq, Saudi Arabia aDd luwai t. Reuters reported aD 20 July that 
aD assassination attempt aD Shaikh lhalid biD luha ... d of SharJa had 
falled. 
However, the Jew lork Ii-s on 26 July reported tbat the Ruler of 
Xuscat and OMn, Sultan Said bin Taymur bad beeD overthrOWD by hi. SOD 
Qabus biD Said in a palace coup on 23 July. Qabus ezplaiaed tbat he had 
watched with an increasing aager the lnability of his fatber to use the 
Dew-fouDd wealth of his couDtry for the needs of its people; that .as why 
he had takeD control. Be declared his support for the propoaed federatioD 
aD 31 July. Be also aDnouDced that' restricUoDS agai1Ult ... i •• claaciag 
aDd e,eglasses were lifted; a clinic was establiabed; palace ela ..... re 
freed; aDd a general allDesty was declared. The uacle of SuI taa Qabus, Tariq 
biD Tay.aur, was requested to act as Pri .. l1aiater aDd returaed fro. ezile 
aD 1 August. During the following ..ak SUltaD Qabua aaaouaced that la 
future J[uscat aDd Oan would be )mown as the Sultaute of DaIa. that 
freedo. of travel was restored aDd restrictioDS egalast the l.,artiag aDd 
ownerShip of agricultural .acbiDery .are lifted. The 114410 Beet Bggpn.'c 
Dipst reported on , Septemer that the o.ni Prl. Jlinister _s _yi~ 
tbat o-n plaODed to apply for VI aDd Arab League • __ rship 'ta ate 
ourselves baWD to the world'. Be added that a parUa.nt alld soverD.Ent 
representative of the people WDuld be set up In accordance with a 
popularly-approved constitution. 
A three-.. n delegation fro. Bahrain arrlged in Teheran on 6 Septe~r 
for preli~nary talks on de_rcation of territorial _terse Baghdad ladio 
said on 10 Septe.oer that the purpose of British .nvoy Sir 11llia. Luce's 
vlsit to the Gulf states was to persuade the Gulf lulers of the necessity 
of keeping British troops in the region. On tbe follOwing day Sir 1111i •• 
elided hls talks with the Gulf lulers and on 16 Septe~r he left Baghdad 
after two days of talks. On tbe __ day. Preslclent BUr called for a 
steadfast Arab front to support the guerrillas. Luce said In Cairo on 22 
September that Britain was not insisting on the for_tion of a Gulf 
Federation as a condition for the withdrawal of Britlsh troops but abe _s 
trying very hard to i~leEnt federation. Ia,Mp Ipter.tiOMI reported on 
10 October that tbe Shah had written to Sui tan Qabus bln Sald of o-.n in 
cordial ter.s - 'our geographical prozi~ty and co..an religion necesaitate 
the forging of friendly ties between Iran and o.an. especially in view of 
tbe illpending developEnts In the Gulf region'. Three days later. Luce 
returned to Bahrain for further consultations and the LaDdon ltMpeta1 
~ reported that Iran had _rned Britain 1 t would DOt recogaize a Gulf 
Federation unless Iranian clalas to Abu Xusa and the Tunbs lelands were 
accepted. In (u_i t on 20 October, in a speech at the openll11 of the 
lational Asse8bly, the Pri. Jlinister said that lu_it wauld accept DO 
aettleEnt not agreed to by the PalestlniaDS. Be welcoae4 the acceeslon of 
Sultan QabU6 bin Said in Dan and expressed the hope that the Gulf 
Federatton would be for.d 8OOn. On the sa_ day, o.n' e Pri_ Jlinieter 
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said that the Sultanate .ust settle its OWD iDterDal proble.a aDd could Dot 
JOiD aD Arab Gulf PederaUoD, though it aight be williag to Job iD a loose 
uniOD at a later date. 
OD 6 .oveaber, the Iranian aabaseador to BritaiD, &.dr Afabar, said 
that his couDtry .auld DOt overlook its right to oertaiD tiDY ielaDds lD 
the Gulf which belonged to Iran. Six days later, Poreign lfiDister lrdeshir 
Zahedi said cODcerning the Gulf that 'our ldea is to deter any foolish 
ldeas and to .. intaiD stability'. Be stated IraD's clai.e to Abu !Usa and 
the Tunbs Islands: 'These islands have beeD ours and they are 8DiDg to be 
ours. There is no cOlIProliiae. Look at the ChiDese eo-..nists in 'deD. If 
these islands go all our interests will be da_gad.' As if to uDderl1De his 
poiDt, on 20 .0veBber South Ye.eD's DefeDce I1nister 'Ii ~d lDtar left 
Iraq after a seveD-day visit. 
On 23 Deceaber, aD IraDiaD goverD.eDt Spokes"D said that a plot to 
assassinate 28 IraniaD leaders had been braken up by securlty forces. It 
was alleged that the late GeDeral Taymur BakhUar had CDDSpired with Iraqi 
Sa • athlsts to overthrow the goverD.eDt. Twnty ED wre arreeated. T.a 
weks later, OD 6 January 1911 units of the Soviet fleet arrl .. d 1n V .. 
Qasr on a goodwill visit .. rkiDg the fiftieth anaiveraary of the Iraqi 
aray. On 20 Pebruary TehersD Radio said that Iran's palicy In the Gulf was 
based on its indisputable owaersh1p of the Tunba and Abu Jru_ islands. 
There was a relli nder of its power to i-r>leEDt such a palicy three days 
later on 23 Pebruary wheD Prellier a.dr Bovieda 88id that recent all prlce 
lDCreases would perllit aD increase 1D the defeDC8 budpt fro. 1122 m1110D 
to 1895 llillion and a thirty per cent lDcreased 1a the deftlap_nt budpt 
for the year begiDning 21 larch. On the other haDd, tbere .... further 
SigD of Iraq's i~roved stability aD 22 Pebruary when 'I-T •• kh1 881d that 
the Kurdish De.acraUc Party (IDP) had decided to turD over to the 
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govern.eDt heavy weapoDs aDd a broadcasting statiOD, iD accordance with the 
11 "rch 1970 DeclaratioD. 
The British govern.eDt anDouDced On 1 larch that the treaties with 
the Gulf States would expire at the eDd of 1971 aDd .aat British forces 
would be withdrawn. Proposals for aid and a treaty of friendship with the 
proposed Gulf FederatioD were also announced. TeD days later, the luwaitl 
Foreign J[Dister left Saudi Arabia after talks to co-ordinate policies for 
pro.atiDg a Gulf FederatioD. On 14 larch, the Trucial States CouDcil eDded 
a two-day .eetiDg. 1 state.ent said that the questioD of the states jOining 
VI ageDcies had been discussed, but a decisioD had beeD postponed until the 
federation issue NaS settled. ID Iran, OD 25 Karch, Foreign Ilnister 
Ardshir Zahedi said significantly that the British withdraNaI fro. the Gulf 
WDuld be a big diplo.atic victory for Iran. 
The official O.ani newspaper Al-¥attaD reported OD 27 Kareh that the 
ar..., had begun a spring offeDsive against rebels in Dhofar and that the 
rebel harbour at 88dah had beeD captured. ID IUNait, after talks, Special 
Egyptian envoy Basan Sabri al-Ihull left on 29 "reh for a tour of the Gulf 
aadrates, aDd OD 12 April Abu Dhabi's ruler, Shaikh Zaid, returned after a 
visit to cairo. A joint ca..unique stated that VlR President Anwar al-Sadat 
expressed support for efforts to establish a Gulf Federation. Three days 
later, Bahrain's State CouDcil described luwaiti-Saudi efforts to bring 
about the Gulf FederatioD as positive aDd encouraging. On 21 April, a Joint 
luwaiti-Saudi delegatioD eDded a tour of the Gulf States and reported full 
understandiDg of the aiSSiOD'S proposals by the Gulf States. CD the 
follOwing day. BahraiD aDDounced that it had accepted the luwaiti-Saudi 
proposals for a federation, but aD 29 April the IUNaitl Foreign J[Dister 
said that Qatar had voiced certaiD reservaUoDS about the •• 
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os secretary of State Villia. Rogers arrived OD 1 Jay iD Riyadh aDd 
aet King Faysal. Five days later, OD e lay, British BDVOY Sir Villia. Luce 
reDewed his masion to the Gulf, arrlviDg in Bahrain tor talks OD the 
proposed Gulf FederatioD. OIn Iran two days later, an IraDiaD spokea.an 
said that Iranian ships had been ordered to sboot down any British planes 
that mght be violating Iranian airspace, as bad allegedly occurred ID the 
previous week over the Tunbs islands. The nezt day, however, Britain 
protested against the charge that British planes had .. de threateDing 
flights over Iranian ships and lslaDds iD the Gulf. On 1e lay, King Paysal 
of Saudi Arabia, while on a trip to the Far Bast, aet the Shah at "hrabad 
Airport. He went on to visit lationalist China, JapaD, the VSA aDd PraDce. 
ID luwait on 20 lay Luce .at the PoreigD IiDister to discuss the proposed 
Gulf Federation. Two days later. he flew on to IraD atter visiting Abu 
Dhabi and luwai t. A few days later, the Saudi Foreign IiDister Var al-
Saqaf also arrived in luwait for discussioDS with the ForeiS- lini.ter on 
the subject of the Gulf FederatioD. A aeeting of the Deputy Rulers of the 
Gulf Emrates scheduled for 29 lay to discuss the proposed federatioD .. s 
postponed. On the following day, the London Svpd'J TeI.V.ph reported that 
Britain had authorized the sale of 140 ChieftaiD taDks to IraD. It alao 
reported on 11 June that Britain would retain Daval forces iD the Gulf 
after land and air forces were withdrawn by the eDd at 1971. 
An agreeaent on the deaarcation of the continental shelf .as signed on 
17 June between Bahrain and Iran: and aD 28 JUDe, IraDiaD Poreis- IiDiater 
irdahir Zahdi returDed fro. a four-day visit to Bahrain. CD the follOwing 
day, Premer Bovieda said Iran WDuld take the TUDbs aDd Abu Jlllsa ls1aDds by 
torce unless they were turned over peacefully wbeD Britl8b forces were 
withdrawn fro. the Gulf. Three days later, on 29 JUDe, Iraqi PorelS-
.inister Abd al-lari. Shaythali called for a uDited Arab responae against 
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Iran' s e~pansionist echeEs in the Gul:t. On the saE day, in luwai t, 
Pre~er Shaikh Jaber al-Ahaed aI-Jaber told the lational Asaeably that 
efforts to accelerate the for.ation of a Gulf Pederation had not gone as 
hoped. 
On 1 July, Abu Dhabi's first Cabinet was farEd, and On 18 July it was 
announced that Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Aj.an, V .. al-Qaiwain and Fujaira 
had agreed to fora a federation that would have a Supre_ Council of the 
siz a.urs, a Cabinet and an elected Consultative AseeabIJ. In the following 
week, Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi said the new federation would take over the 
defence and foreign affairs responsibilities fro. Britain as SOOD as 
possible. Be added that a federal ar.,. based on the trucial Oaan Scouts 
would be farEd, wbile the states would also retain defence forces of their 
own. Over the nert few days, iaportant llinisters fro. both Abu Dhabi and 
Qatar arrived in London for talks with the British Pri_ linister Bdward 
Beath. On 5 August the Iraqi Foreign linister left Kuwait after three days 
of talks on tbe Palestine question and Gulf Affairs. The 114410 Beet 
Economic Digest reported on 13 August that las al-Khai. had issued a 
statelEnt saying that it was not prepared to accept the veto rights given 
to some states under the draft constitution of the Gulf Pederation. 
On the following day, Bahrain's Ruler declared Bahrain an in4ependent 
sovereign state and on 15 August Bahrain signed a friendship treaty with 
Britain calling for consultation in tiE of need. Bahrain for.ally applied 
for UI Eabersblp on 16 August. A day later, Bahratn'a Poretgn lintater, 
luha.aed bin lubarak al-Khalifa said Bahrain's indepeDdence did not 
conflict with its efforts to establish a PederatioD of Arab Gulf B8dratea. 
laseow Radio said on 17 August that Britain had foisted the new friendship 
treaty on Babrain. 
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On 26 August, Iran and o.an announced that diplo8Btic relations had 
been established between the two countries. On 1 Septe~r Qatar declared 
Its independence fro. Britain, ter~nating the special treaty relations and 
all agreeEnts, engageEnts and arrangeEnts arising therefrom that were 
concluded with the Britisb govern.ent. On 2 Septe~r, Iraq aDDounced that 
full dipaatic relations would be established with Bahrain and the Shah of 
Iran welcoEd the independence of Qatar. The Iranian Foreign Ilnister 
stated that an Iranian e-oassy would be established there 'in due course'. 
On 7 September, Abu Dhabi's linister of Oil returned from Iran where he 
said an agree_nt had been initialled deaarcating the continental shelf 
between the two countries. 
On 23 Septeaber the British Special Bnvoy Sir Villiam Luce returned 
to London after a three-week tour of the region. Five days later, the 
London Guardian published an interview in which the Shah said 'no power on 
earth can stop us fro. claiaing tbe Gulf islaDds of Abu !Usa and the Tunbs' 
and added 'Vhy should we cOlIProllise?' On 2 October, Luce arriYecl 1n Teheran 
for talks on the future of the Gulf. In Abu Dhabi, the first lational 
Asse~ly opened on 3 October. Ruler Shaikh Zaid told the Asae~lJ that a 
constitution of the Union of Arab B~rates would 8DOn be announced. Be said 
the AsseJibly would discuss laE aDd aake recomEndat10Da. Be ezpressed the 
hope that in tile Assembly Eabers would be elected rather than appointed. 
On the sa_ day It was announced In Saudi Arabia that .abIIasadors tIOuld be 
exchanged with Bahrain. Oaan was adldtted to the United I.tiona on 7 
October. Three days later, Luce returned to the region for a tea-day tour. 
On 21 October, Iran Prellier Bovleda said Iran was ready at any tiE to 
enter negotiations with Iraq to settle the dispute over Sbatt aI-Arab. On 
26 October, Iraqi Acting linister of Bducatlon Abd al-Satter al-Ja .. ri left 
for a tour of the Gulf States as President BakT's personal eaiaaary. It was 
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announced on 27 October tbat o..n aDd the United States had agreed to 
establish diplo.atic relations at a~ssadorial level. On the following 
day. Kuwait's Poreign .inister rejected ~litary occupation of the Tunbs 
aDd Abu Ilusa islands by Iran and favoured preserving their Arab character. 
A day later. Iraqi special envoy Ah.d Jawari arrived in luscat during a 
tour of the Gulf States. Be stressed Iraq's full readiness for JOint action 
to .intain the Arab character of the Gulf. 
an 2 love.ber. the Ruler of Sharja denied reports that he bad refused 
a proposal to partition the island of Abu .usa with Iran. Be said 
negotiations with Iran were continuing in an a!dcable fashion. Every effort 
was being _de to preserve the integrity of the Arab ho_land. Biz days 
later. on 8 loye~r. Kuwaiti Foreign .inister Shaikh Sabah al-Sabah said 
Iran had refused proposals of the Gulf states to lease Abu lusa aDd the 
Tunbs islands to Iran for 99 years or to station Joint Arab-Iranian forces 
on the islands. an 18 love.ber the LondoD I1aes quoted Luce as sayiug that 
Iran and Britain bad sorted out their differences over the disputed 
islands. He returned to London on 19 loveBber after siz days of talks in 
Iran and one day in Sharja. an 29 .ove~r. the Ruler of Sharja announced 
an agree_nt with Iran under which the people of Abu Ilusa island would 
re .. in under Sharja's jurisdiction. However. Iranian forces would be based 
on one point on the island and Sharja would receive up to .7.5 ~llion in 
oil revenue aDnually. On the following day, Iranian forces arrived on the 
islands. Ras al-Khai". which also laid clal. to the TUDba, lodged a 
protest with Britain - which was still responsible for the ~rate'a 
defence until 1 Deceaber. Baghdad Radio clai.ad that dlplo .. tlc relatiOns 
between IraD and Britain had been broken off because of tbe incident. On 1 
Deceaber. the Deputy Ruler of Sharja survived aD assasslaatloD atte~t. On 
the followiDg day. Abu Dhabi. Bharja. AJ_D. PUjalra aDd U .. al-Qai .. ln 
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proclai~ the independence of the United Arab B~rates and the new 
tederation signed a new friendship treaty with Britain. 
This was indeed a historic achieve.ent in the Gulf legion but it did 
DOt signify that the region as a whole had found stability. Por eza~le. 
there was in AI-lhAwra on 27 .ove.ber a report that dazeDS of lurds had 
been arrested in recent weeks and charged with plotting sabotage and 
polt tical assassillAtion. .evertheless. there was soae reason to look to 
the new year with a certain optia1s •. 
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The .aterial in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, 
taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at 
the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of the 
preceding and subsequent chapters for any items which transcend the 
chronological limits of this chapter. It has not been thought sensible to 
provide more detailed referencing: 
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Vol.IVII: January 1969-December 1970: pp.23105-24364 
Vol. XVIII: January 1971-December 1972: pp.23565-25644 
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Vol. 22: 16 February -15 August 1968: pp.324-494 
Vol. 23: 16 August 1968-15 February 1969: pp.63-208 
16 February 1969-15 August 1969: pp.364-528 
Vol. 24: 16 August 1969 -15 February 1970: pp.47-202 
16 February 1970-15 August 1970: pp.353-517 
Vol. 25: 16 August 1970-15 Jovember 1970: pp.58-78 
16 Jovember 1970-15 August 1971: pp.229-522 
Vol. 26: 16 August 1971-15 February 1972: pp.37-179 
Washington. 
3. Summary of WQrld Brgadcastsi Part IVi The Arab WQrld, Israel, 
Greece. Turkey. Iran 
Daily Series. Published by the Xonitoring Service of the British 
broadcasting Corporation. Caversham Park, Reading, Berks. 
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Chapter Seven: The Backgrpynd tp the Algiers Accprd. 1971-1975 
On 3 December 1971, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and South Yemen requested an 
urgent meeting of the UI Security Council to discuss Iran'S occupation of 
the three Gulf islands. Three days later, at the opening of a special 
session of the Arab League Council called to discuss the Iranian action, 
Iraq appealed to all Arab countries to break off diplomatic relations with 
Britain and Iran. Baghdad Radio on 7 December said that the new Iranian 
ambassador to Kuwait had returned to Teheran after being refused an 
audience to present his credentials to the Amir on 1 December. On 8 
December, Combat of Paris quoted the Iranian Foreign Xinister, Abbas 
Khalatbari as saying that Iran could aid the Iraqi Kurds militarily if open 
conflict started with government forces. On the same day, Libyan Radio said 
Libya had proposed to land troops on the three Gulf islands two days before 
the Iranian occupation but that certain Gulf states had objected. The 
Libyan leader Qadhafi arrived in Dubai for talks on the Iranian action in 
the Gulf. The UI Security Council meanwhile unanimously approved the 
admission of the United Arab Emirates to the UI. 
The United Arab Emirates announced their first Federal Cabinet on 9 
December. Two days later, Iraqi Information Xinister Shafiq al-Kamali said 
that Iran's occupation of the three islands was the result of collusion 
between Iran and imperialism, and was aimed at threatening the area's 
revolutionary movements. In Kuwait, the lational Assembly called on the 
government to cut diplomatic and economic relations with Britain and Iran 
in retaliation for Iran's occupation of the three islands in the Gulf. The 
Foreign Xinister of the UAE arrived in Riyadh for talks with King Paysal on 
strengthening neighbourly relations and Sultan Qabus of Oman also arrived 
in Saudi Arabia for talks. The Saudi government extended diplomatic 
recognition to Oman on 14 December. On 16 December, the WAshiDgtPD Ppst 
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reported 'diplomatic sources' as saying that Ras al-Khaima had offered the 
United States military bases in return for diplomatic recognition, but that 
the US administration had refused. In Iraq, meanwhile, the Soviet Defence 
.inister. Andrei Grechko ended a four-day official visit and on 19 December 
the USSR signed an agreement for co-operation in the peaceful use of atomic 
energy. 
The first meeting of the Cabinet of the UAE, on 20 December, approved 
a law under which the UAE assumed control of the Trucial Oman Scouts as the 
basis of the new state's defence forces. In the following week, the USSR 
announced diplomatic recognition of the UAE. On 29 December, an omani 
communique reported that 39 Dhofari rebels had been killed since October, 
that a total of 355 had surrendered in 1971 and that the rebel forces were 
running short of supplies since their lines of communication had been cut. 
Sultan Qabus announced on 2 January 1972 the resignation of Premier Tariq 
bin Taymour for health reasons. Teheran Radio announced that the first 
trade agreements with Saudi Arabia had been reached. Two days later, the 
Iranian government notified the UI that a dangerous situation had been 
created by the expulsion of more than sixty thousand Iranians from Iraq. 
The lew York Times on 6 January quoted State Department officials as saying 
that an executive agreement with Bahrain had been signed on 23 December 
allowing the US to set up a naval station on Bahrain as a flag-showing 
operation to manifest the interest of the United states in the area. On 8 
January Associated Press reported that the Iraqi government had halted-the 
expulsion of Iranians after protests by Kurds that the expulsion had led to 
nineteen deaths. In Iran on the same day the Foreign IIni.ter said that his 
country had absolutely no more territorial claims 1n the Gulf and would not 
use its strategiC position to block transit in the region. In Bahrain, on 9 
January, the Foreign Xinister said that reports of a naval base agreement 
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between his country and the United Stat res were exaggerated and that 
Bahrain had merely granted continued use of port facilities used by the 
United States for twenty five years. He stressed that the USA would not 
take over the former British naval base. 
On 13 January, the official Iranian delegation to the Afro-Asian 
Peoples' Solidarity Organization conference in Cairo withdrew because of a 
conference resolution regretting Iran's occupation of the three islands. On 
the following day the Kiddle East Econpmic Digest reported that Iorocco, 
Tunisia and Saudi Arabia were holding talks with Iran concerning the 
occupation. 
Then came several internal developments which testified to the 
underlying condition of uncertainty. Shaikh Khalid bin Xu hammed , Ruler of 
Sharja, was killed on 25 January in an attempted coup d'etat by Shaikh Saqr 
bin Sultan. Troops of the UAE helped to put down the coup. Shaikh Saqr bin 
Xuhammed, brother of the late Ruler, was appOinted in his place. Also, on 
22 February, Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad a1-Thani took over in Qatar. He 
promised to modernize the administration, cut consumer prices and raise 
civil service and military salaries by twenty per cent. On 11 Pebruary, Ras 
al-Khaima joined the UAE and the federation thus took on what was to be its 
final form. 
The Iraqi Foreign Xinister ended an official visit to Kuwait on 3 Kay 
and a joint communique was issued which denounced Iran's occupation of the 
three islands. Baghdad's anger had not disappeared in the intervening 
months. Later that day, he arrived in Bahrain for further talks on the Gulf 
situation, and by 8 lay he had completed talks with the government of the 
UAE also. A Joint comuunique reiterated that the three islands remained 
Arab despite the Iranian occupation. 
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In Saudi Arabia during these months oil questions appeared to be 
receiving the highest priority. The KiddIe EAst Ecgngmic D11est reported on 
25 February that King Faysal had warned ARAXCO that it would have to agree 
to Saudi participation in the company if it was to avoid compelling the 
Saudi government 'to take measures to implement partiCipation'. On 11 
Karch, ARAXCO accepted in principle the Saudi demand for twenty per cent 
participation by the government in the company; on the same day, OPEC 
accepted ARAXCO's offer of twenty per cent partICipation in the company by 
saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. On 20 Karch formal 
negotiations began with ARAICO in order to work out the details of an 
agreement. 
In Iraq on 17 February a government delegation led by Vice-President 
Sadam Hussain, returned from Xoscow. A joint communique said that further 
talks would be held to raise relations to a higher level in treaty torm. 
The USSR promised support for the Iraqi oil industry and said regUlar ties 
would be established between the Soviet Communist Party and the Ba'ath 
Party. It was announced that the Iraq, Basra and Xosul Petroleum Companies 
had agreed in principle to twenty per cent participation by the government 
in the oil industry. (It should be noted that the British Foreign Secretary 
bad been having talks about Gulf Affairs and bilateral matters in Teheran 
at the same time). In Baghdad on 6 April the Soviet Premier arrived for an 
official five-day visit and three days later signed a flfteen-year treaty 
of friendship between the USSR and Iraq. Kosygin declared that the treaty 
was not aimed at any other country. On the following day, L' Pil'tg quoted 
Kurdish leader lulla lustafa Barazani as saying that things were going 
badly between the Kurds and the government and that if Baghdad continued 
its policy, the Kurds would once again be obliged to take up arms and 
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resume war. A Soviet naval squadron began a five-day visit to the port of 
Umm Qasr on 11 April - thus giving a visible sign of Soviet support. 
The Iraqi government reported on 15 April that their troops had fought 
a four-day battle with Iranian forces on the border at Khanqin after 
Iranians had opened fire on a police vehicle on 11 April. The Iranian 
government denied Iraqi charges and said Iraq had attacked six Iranian 
border guards with troops and artillery. Four days later in Iran four 
terrorists were executed after a military tribunal had found them guilty of 
trying to overthrow the government. On 25 April, a Soviet economic 
delegation left Iraq after signing a protocal for Soviet aid to iron, 
steel, electrical and oil development projects. Two days later, the 
Revolution Command Council ratified the fifteen-year friendship treaty with 
Russia. Baghdad Radio said on 26 April that a complaint had been submitted 
to the UI warning that Iran's repeated military attacks against Iraq were a 
threat to peace in the KiddIe East. while on 2 Kay the Iranian government 
accused Iraq of initiating a three-hour gun battle on the border. Four days 
later, the Iranian government announced that a complaint had been filed at 
the UN charging that Iraq was the main source of support and subsidy for 
subversive elements in the Kiddle East. It was further announced that the 
government had called up military reservists in the western provinces for 
fresh training. There was no doubt what significance Iran would read into 
the news that two Communists bad been appOinted to the Iraqi Cabinet on 14 
lay, along with seven other new ministers. 
On 30 lay. President lixon arrived in Teheran for talks with the Shah 
on an official one-day visit. Officials reported on 3 June that three 
Iranians and six Iraqis had been killed in border clashes the day before. 
The Shah met British Prime Kinister Edward Heath in London on 22 June 
during the course of a four-day visit to Britain. During a press conference 
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in London he said that Iran would purchase the Anglo-French supersonic jet 
liner Concorde and that Iran was shopping for arms, millions of dollars 
worth of the best it could find, short of atomic weapons. He also said that 
Iran was not pressing for participation at all in the oil industry, but was 
seeking terms for getting more oil for its own purposes, such as refining 
and marketing abroad, and for a new price agreement linking prices to a 
constant purchasing power in Western markets. On 13 July. the London Jewish 
Observer reported that the USA had agreed to sell Iran F-14 and F-15 
fighters and laser-guided bombs. On 18 July, President Bakr of Iraq 
stressed in a speech his country's sincere desire to establish neighbourly 
relations with Iran. Various press sources reported that Iran was reacting 
to this speech with some interest. On 5 August, King Hussein of Jordan left 
Iran after a ten-day private visit and talks with the Shah. 
Meanwhile, an Omani delegation had flown to Beirut on 18 lay at the 
beginning of a tour to explain Oman's position in the border dispute with 
South Yemen. A week later, according to Beirut's AI-HawAd1th Oman had 
requested that Arab League observers be stationed on the border with South 
Yemen to reduce bordertension. On 28 May Oman said that ten rebels had been 
killed in attacks on supply lines in South Yemen andthat Oman would meet 
aggression with aggression. Sultan Qabus issued a decree on 18 July 
extending Oman's territorial waters to 12 miles and on 21 July an Omani 
army communique reported that 28 guerrillas had been killed in Dhofar 
during an attack on an army poet. British-piloted planes helped to drive 
off the attack, according to the report. The PPLOAG reported on 2 August 
that its forces had occupied the town of Kirbat in Oman for aoae time after 
shooting down three British helicopters and killing 12~ British and 
Jordanian soldiers. Meanwhile the Sultan pressed ahead with other schemes. 
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Qabus announced on 22 October the establishment of a Supreme Planning 
Council which he would head personally. 
The Defence Kinistry of the UAE reported on 11 June that the 
Defence Force, supported by units of the army of Abu Dhabi, had restored 
order on the borders of Fujaira and Sharja. Saudi Defence Xinister Sultan 
bin Abd al-Aziz met President lixon and Secretary of State Rogers on 15 
June and on 1 July Sultan returned home after a two-week visit to the 
United States and declared that the two countries would continue to co-
operate in building Saudi armed strength. Rogers arrived in Bahrain on 2 
July for a two-day official visit and on 3 July, having met with Bahrain's 
leaders, he said that facilities for the US lavy had been discussed and 
that such facilities posed no threat to any state, including the USSR. He 
then paid a two-day visit to Kuwait, leaving on 4 July. The Council of 
Kinisters of the UAE issued a statement on 13 July requesting the major oil 
companies to comply immediately with the demands of the oil producing 
states for participation in the oil industry. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia 
was quoted on 4 August in Cairo's al-Kyssawor as saying that the proposal 
to use Arab oil as a political weapon against the United States should be 
ruled out. He added that an oil boycott would be feasible. but very 
complex. However. he warned that United States interests in the region were 
in for a long hot summer. 
The London Daily Express reported on 23 August that Iran had placed an 
order for ~100 million worth of military equipment during the Shah's most 
recent visit to London. Empress Farah of Iran arrived in China on 1 
September for a ten-day visit to establish a closer understanding between 
the two countries. President Bakr of Iraq flew to XCscow on l' Septeaber 
for official talks. On 19 September. a joint cOmDUnique at the conclusion 
of the discussions stated that the two sides were satisfied with the 
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development of their co-operation and that agreement had been reached on 
specific measures to reinforce Iraq's defences. Two days later, Iraqi Oil 
Xinister Hammadi ended talks in Xoscow after signing an agreement by which 
the USSR would accept payment for all debts up to 1980 in crude oil. The 
next day. talks began in Baghdad between the Kurdish Democratic Party and 
the Ba'ath Party aimed at resolving differences. On 22 September, Yemeni 
Economic Affairs K1nister Abdulla al-Asnaj ended four days of talks on the 
dispute between Yemen and South Yemen. On the following day, Saudi Poreign 
Xinister Umar al-Saqqaf arrived in Iraq for three days of talks on 
bilateral relations and the common border; on 29 September he talked in 
London with British officials about the situation in the Gulf. On 30 
September, Saudi 011 Kinister Yamani proposed. in a speech at the KiddIe 
Bast Institute in Washington, that the US give Saudi Arabia an exemption 
from the oil import quota in exchange for Saudi investment in the United 
States. The lew York Times quoted a US official as saying that the US was 
studying Yamani's interesting suggestion, though it had not been formally 
proposed. 
On 10 October the Shah flew to the USSR for official talks and. two 
days later, the USSR signed an agreement to increase trade tenfold by 1978. 
In Kuwait on 13 October a1-lohar quoted the Kuwaiti Defence Xinister as 
saying that discussions had been opened with a number of arms suppliers. 
Barlier, on 25 September, a Kuwaiti delegation in Rome had criticized the 
United States and Britain for supplying Iran with large quantities of -
advanced military equipment. In Iraq. on 17 October, al-TbAwra reported 
that talks to discuss grievances between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP> 
and the government had begun in an atmosphere of clarity and frankness, but 
on 2 lovember al-Ihawra accused the Kurds of collaborating with Iranian 
intelligence and importing illegally Iranian arms. Three days later the 
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paper said that the criterion of loyalty for officials of the KDP was the 
extent to which they challenged the government and the law. It also stated 
that there were Kurdish plans to blow up army bases. Beirut's al-Hayat 
reported on 9 lovember that 90,000 troops had been moved to the north on 
special manoeuvres and on 15 lovember al-Tbawra said that suspected 
reactionary elements within the KDP would have to be removed 1f peace wasto 
be ensured in Iraq. Keanwhile, the Iranian KAyhan International reported on 
11 lovember that the Shah had said that the GIP would double 1n five years 
and that Iran's naval power would have to be increased several times 
because Iran's defensive frontiers extended beyond the Gulf and into the 
Indian Ocean. 
On 1 December, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman William 
Fulbright ended a two-day visit to the UAE and 'on the same day he arrived 
in Kuwait for a three-day visit and met the Amir. On 4 December Fulbright 
met King Faysal in Saudi Arabia on 4 December and on the following day 
Sultan Qabus met King Faysal. Saudi Foreign Kinister Umar al-Saqqat arrived 
in Iran on 7 December for four days of talks on ways to promote stability 
in the Gulf. The 11ddle East Economic Digest reported on 8 December that 
full Kuwaiti diplomatic relations with Iran had been restored with the 
return of the Iranian ambassador. On 10 December the Saudi Foreign Xinister 
said in Teheran that he had met the Shah and found that no ditterences 
existed between the two countries. Saqqat said that the Gult States should 
unite to defeat conspiracy in the region. The Saudi Defence Kinister lett 
Kuwait on 23 December after talks with his Kuwaiti counterpart, but three 
days later he denied that he was trying to organize an alliance in the Gulf 
region. On 2 January 1973 the Iraqi lews Agency reported that two Iraqi 
soldiers had been killed and four wounded in a clash with Iranian troops at 
Xondali on the border. The KiddIe East Economic Digest reported on 5 
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January that Richard Helms, former head of the CIA had been appointed the 
new United States ambassador to Iran. Le Ipnde of Paris reported on 6 
January that the Shah had informed British Petroleum on 14 December that 
Iran would take full control of the oil industry when existing agreements 
expired. 
It looked, therefore, as though the year 1973 was opening in much the 
same way as 1972 had done; oil and security issues appeared inextricably 
Dixed. On 8 January the Kuwaiti government signed the oil industry 
participation agreement negotiated by Tamani on behalf of the five Gulf 
States. In Iran on 23 January the Shah confirmed that his country would 
take over all domestic oil operations in 1979. Bahrain's Weekly Kirror 
reported on 13 January that Oman had captured large caches of Chinese-made 
weapons in a week-long sweep in Dhofar, while on 16 Karch the Kiddle Eost 
Economic Digest quoted Sultan Qabus's announcment of a new Defence Council 
to co-ordinate the government campaign against the PFLOAG. He arrived in 
Qatar on 27 Karch after official talks in the UAE. The lew York Times on 22 
February quoted US official sources as saying that Iran had recently 
contracted to purchase $2 billion worth of military equipment from the USA. 
The Chinese Foreign Xinister Chi Peng-Fei arrived in Iran on 24 February 
for wide-ranging discussions, and on 4 March Premier Abbas Hovieda 
presented to the parliament a new budget of nearly $7 billion, of which $2 
billion would be for defence. Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Iran on 14 
Karch to attend the inauguration of a steel mill in Asfahan. On 16 larch, 
the Shah said the oil companies had handed over total operatlon of the all 
industry to Iran, with the ownerShip of all installatlons. Chlna Signed a 
trade agreement with Iran on 8 April providing for an annual exchange of 
goods worth $70.4 Dillion. 
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Meanwhile, a new source of tension had been created by Iraq. On 1 
larch the Kuwaiti Foreign Xinister had returned from Iraq after talks in 
Baghdad on border delineation. On 3 Karch, an Iranian government news 
agency reported border clashes with Iraqi units. There was a further 
development on 20 Karch when the Kuwaiti government announced that Iraqi 
troops had occupied the border post of al-Samitah and shelled another. 
Iraq, for its part, accused Kuwait of starting the shooting and said two 
Iraqis had been killed. A state of emergency was declared in Kuwait and the 
border with Iraq was closed. On the following day, Kuwaiti troop 
reinforcements were sent to the Iraqi border. Arab League Secretary General 
14hmud Riyad arrived in Kuwait to mediate in the dispute with Iraq, and 
Lebanon also offered its good offices. The Syrian Foreign Xinister Abd al-
Hali. Khaddam arrived in Iraq to discuss the dispute, and Damascus radio 
said that he would proceed to Kuwait after his meetings in Baghdad. There 
were also possible international implications in another move at this time: 
the Washington Post reported on 23 Karch that Iran had proposed to Oman a 
plan to inspect all ships passing through the Straits of Hormuz to control 
pollution and regulate or monitor arms shipments. 
On 24 Karch, the Kuwaiti government said that two Iraqi jets had 
violated Kuwaiti airspace. The Cabinet and Assembly held emergency sessions 
to discuss the border situation. On the same day, Iraqi Vice-President 
Saddam Hussain returned from talks in MOscow. A joint communique said that 
the two sides reaffirmed their desire for deeper ties. The Saudi Defence 
Xinister Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz arrived in Bahrain on 25 Karch for talks on 
the Gulf situation. The Egyptian Special Envoy and Infor.at10n lin1ster 
Xurad Ghalib left Iraq on 28 Karch after a three-day visit and the Bgyptian 
Poreign Xinister Xuhammad al-Zayyat also arrived for talks before going on 
to Kuwait on 30 Karch for further discussions there. On 30 Karch the Kiddle 
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Bast Economic digest reported that the Iraqi Vice-President returned from 
Ioscow after his talks with Brezhnev and Kosygin. 
The purpose of all this activity then began to eBerge. The Iraqi 
Foreign Xinister, Xurtada Abd al-Baqi al-Had1thi said on 4 April that 
Kuwait had to g1ve up the Gulf islands of Warba and Bublyan to Iraq, one 
for military purposes and one for an 011 terminal. He said that without the 
islands Iraq would not be a Gulf state. On the following day, Iraq reported 
that its troops had withdrawn from land occupied on 20 Karch. Beirut's ~ 
Ba"ad on 5 April quote the Iraqi Foreign linister as again saying that the 
Gulf islands previously referred to should be Iraqi. He said they were of 
the utmost importance to Iraq since any force stationed on them could cut 
off Iraq's access to the Gulf. On the next day, the Iraqi Foreign Xinister 
arrived in Kuwait to begin talks on the border problem and, according to 
the Beirut daily aI-lahar Iraqi forces started to withdraw from SaDdtah 
border post in Kuwait. The KiddIe East Economic Digest reported that the 
Kuwaiti government would reconsider its policy of giving financial aid to 
the Arab conflict with Israel if the confrontation with Iraq continued. On 
8 April 1973 al-Had1thi left Kuwa1t after two days of talks on the border 
problem and on the same day the Brit1sh Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, 
arrived in Jidda for talks w1th the Saudi government. The Kuwait Minister 
of State Abd al-Aziz Hussain, said on 9 April that Iraqi and Kuwaiti views 
of the border problem were qUite different and that contacts would be 
resumed shortly. 
On the same day, Iranian Premier Hovieda arrived in London for five 
days of talks with Prime Xinister Heath. On his return from hie Buropean 
tour, Hovieda stopped over at Xoscow airport on 17 April for a meeting with 
Soviet Premier Kosygin. The Kuwaiti government announced on 2e April that 
army troops had reoccupied the border post at Samitah. Also on that day 
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King Faysal met the Egyptian Kinister of War. The Bahraini Defence Xinister 
arrived in Iran on 28 April for an official five-day visit and, on the 
following day, the Egyptian Kinister of War travelled on to Kuwait for a 
two-day visit. On 7 May the Shah attended major air and naval manoeuvres in 
the Straits of Hormuz and, at a banquet honouring Pakistani President 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 11 Kay, he said that Iran would not stand by should 
any misfortune befall Pakistan - no doubt he was thinking of the 
Baluchistan problem inside Pakistan and relations externally with India and 
Bangladesh. He also declared that Iran would do everything possible to keep 
open the Straits of Hormuz. On 23 Kay Pakistani service chiefs began high-
level talks in Teheran. 
Britain announced on 10 May a contract with the Saudi Arabian 
government to help operate Saudi air defences. The British Kinister of 
State for Defence, Ian Gilmour, said that two thousand Britons would be 
employed for five years on the project. Informed sources said that the 
contract was worth $625 million. King Faysal arrived in Paris on 14 Kay for 
a five-day official visit and to discuss arms purchases. On the following 
day he met the French President, Georges Pompidou, and it was announced 
that the two men had agreed to increase political, military and economic 
co-operation between their respective countries. The Woeh1nltpD Pgst that 
day reported that Kuwait was about to order $500 million worth of US 
military armaments, including 100 tanks, 32 Crusader jet fighters and anti-
aircraft missiles. On 18 May it reported that Saudi Arabia was negotiating 
to purchase up to 19 warships from the USA. Pentagon officials reported 
that negotiations were underway to sell Saudi Arabia a limited number of f-
4 Phantom jets. Kuwait, too. was seeking to buy Phantoms. A spokesman said 
that the countries of the region would have to take on more of their own 
security procedures following Britain's withdrawal from the region. He 
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added that the USA would not make sales which would place Israel in 
jeopardy. and that oil was another consideration. On 4 June. the Kuwaiti 
government said its projected $500 million worth of arms purchases in the 
Vest were for defensive purposes only. On the following day. the Kuwaiti 
Foreign Minister concluded a two-day visit to Bahrain. a joint communique 
declaring that preservation of the region's security and prosperity called 
for continuous co-operation and effective solidarity between its states to 
counter foreign intervention. 
The lew York Times on 7 June reported US officials as saying that 
Bgypt had urged Saudi Arabia to buy French Xirage jets instead of US 
Phantoms so that the Saudi air force would be compatible with the Libyan 
air force in the event of hostilities with Israel. The KiddIe East Economic 
Digest reported on 8 June an agreement between Kuwait and Iraq under which 
Iraq would increase water supplies to Kuwait from the Shatt aI-Arab 
waterway. On 9 June the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister arrived in Oman for a 
three-day visit and talks with Sultan Qabus as part of a ten-day tour of 
the Gulf states from which he returned on 11 June and which he said had had 
positive results. Sharja's Ruler Shaikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi 
arrived in the United States on 11 June after a two-day visit to Britain. 
Bahrain and Kuwait signed a long-range economic agreement on 19 June. the 
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister describing it as a decisive step forward towards 
Gulf unity and forecasting similar agreements with Oman and the UAE. Oman 
announced on 21 June that ten men had been executed and others sentenced to 
long prison terms for plotting to overthrow the government. The men charged 
were members of the PFLOAG. The Washin&ton Post reported on 22 June that an 
Inian air force mission was in Iraq to train Iraqi pilots to fly Russian-
built MIG jets under a secret agreement Signed two months previously. On 
the following day India denied that it was helping Iraq to fly XIG 21s. A 
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spokesman said that a small Indian air force team had been in Iraq for 
fourteen years. Iraq's relationship with the USSR was certainly becoming 
even more intimate. An agreement was reached on 25 June to form a joint 
planning committee to aid Iraq's economic development. 
Iran's Teheran Joyrnal reported on 27 June that Kurdish leader Xustafa 
Barazani had warned the Iraq government to pull its troops out of Kurdish 
regions or face total war. The report added that eleven men had been killed 
and twenty-two wounded in two days of clashes beginning on 24 June. On the 
following day, press reports in Teheran said fighting between the Iraqi 
army and the Kurds had spread to mountainous areas near the Iranian border. 
Two days later, on 30 June, the Christian Science lonitor reported that 
clashes between Kurdish forces and Iraqi army troops in the Kirkuk region 
had entered their third day. On 1 July, the Iraqi Defence Xinister was 
assassinated and the Interior linister wounded after being abducted from 
Baghdad to Zarbatiya. Baghdad Radio said that the leader of the plot, 
Security Chief lazim Kazzar, had been arrested. 
In Kuwait on 3 July the lational Assembly ratified a bill providing 
11.43 billion for defence spending over a seven-year period and approved 
agovernment request for t575 million for defence purposes. This followed US 
Deputy Assistant Defence Secretary James loyes's visit to Kuwait on 16 June 
to discuss arms purchases. In Riyadh on 5 July King Paysal met the Iranian 
Foreign linister Abbas Khalatbari. One the following day the Christian 
Science Ionitor quoted King Faysal as saying that Saudi Arabia would like 
to continue friendly ties with the United States but that this would be 
difficult unless the US took a more even-handed policy in the region. The 
Petroleum Xinister Yamani was quoted as denying a report that an agreement 
has been reached with the United States on investment by Petromin in the 
United States. 
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In Iraq, Kazzar and 22 others were executed on 7 July for 
participating in the attempted coup d'etat. On 11 July an agreement was 
reached between the Ba'ath Party and the Communist Party under which the 
Communists would be permitted to participate in a ruling Council of 
Xinisters. The lew York Times reported on 13 July that negotiations had 
been resumed between the government and the Kurdish leaders to settle their 
ditferences, and on the same day Vice-President Saddam Hussain said Iraq 
would welcome moves by Britain or the United States which could lead to the 
normalization of diplomatic relations. On the following day, President Bakr 
amended the constitution to name himself President, Premier and Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces with power to appoint or dismiss any official, 
including the Vice-President. Three days later, he said the terms of the 11 
Karch declaration to the Kurds would be fulfilled in 1974. On a less 
optimistic note. the Kurdish paper al-Taakhi said on 26 August that Kurds 
in Sinjar province had staged a strike the previous day to protest against 
an Iraqi army attack in the area a few days earlier. On the following day 
the official daily al-ThaWfa confirmed that troops had clashed with the 
Kurds in Sinjar several days earlier in an effort to wipe out sabotage 
activities. 
On 20 August, a Kuwaiti delegation headed by the Premier Shaikh Jabir 
al-Ahmed al-Sabah arrived in Baghdad for talks on the border dispute and on 
the same day the Defence Xinister of the UAB arrived in Teheran for a six-
day official visit. On 1 September, the Kuwaiti Amir concluded a four-day 
visit and series of talks with King Faysal. The Saudi Defence Xinister said 
on 6 September that Saudi Arabia would not make arBS deale with strings 
attached, and that defending the independence of other Arab countries was 
aelf-defence for Saudi Arabia. ren days later, the French Defence Xini.tar 
returned to Paris from Saudi Arabia after a five-day visit and talks on 
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arms sales. Diplomatic relations with West Germany were resumed on 18 
September after an eight-year break. On 23 September King Hussein of Jordan 
Bet King Faysal during a military ceremony in Tabuk in the north-west 
region where the latter was opening a major military base. In Iraq, on 28 
September, a curfew was imposed in Baghdad and outward flights from the 
airport halted while police searched for agents and traitors who were being 
blamed for a series of murders. On the following day, the curfew was 
lifted, although police continued to search for the alleged killers. 
On 1 October the British Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, arrived 
in Iran for a four-day visit. The following day the government announced 
the arrest of twelve persons for plotting to kill the Shah during a cinema 
award ceremony. The Washington Post reported on 2 October that the USSR had 
sent Iraq 12 TU-22 jet bombers with a range of 2,250 km. On 5 October the 
KiddIe East Economic Digest reported that the first trade agreement between 
Iran and East Germany had been concluded and that it was to last for five 
years. On the following day the West German Economics Xinister Hans 
Friederichs arrived in Iran for a week's visit to discuss jOint economic 
activities which he said would link the two countries economically and 
politically in a way unprecedented anywhere. On 8 October. the Iraqi 
government announced unilaterally the restoration of diplomatic ties with 
Iran and offered to begin negotiations in either capital to settle 
outstanding differences. A week later. Iran announced that diplomatic 
relations had been officially resumed with Iraq. On the saBe day. Iraq was 
elected to a two-year term on the United lations Security Council. 
Arms and oil continued to be related diplomatic the .... The US State 
Department said on 19 lovember that the United States was ready for talks 
on the possible sale of F4 Phantom jets to Saudi Arabia. despite the oil 
embargo. The next day, Jordan's King Hussein concluded a three-day visit 
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and talks with the Shah on the Kiddle Bast situation. On 16 December, the 
French Industry minister, Jean Charbonnel arrived in Iraq for two days of 
talks on expanding oil purchases and eight days later official French Radio 
reported that France had concluded an agreement with Saudi Arabia to 
purchase three million tonness of crude oil a year. On 4 January 1974 the 
KiddIe EAst Econpmic Survey cited reports that France and Abu Dhabi had 
concluded an agreement to exchange 35 lirage jets for oil supplies. Three 
days later. on 7 January, Saudi Oil Xinister Yamani confirmed that it had 
been agreed to sell France 800 million tonnes of crude oil over a twenty-
year period in exchange for armaments, including I1rage jet fighters. Two 
days later,a British linister of State, Lord Balniel, left London for a 
tour of the Gulf states to discuss receiving oil supplies. On 10 January 
the lew York Times cited US sources as saying Iran had agreed to buy 30 US 
F-14A jet fighters for $900 million. Beirut's Al-lahar reported on 25 
January that France had agreed to supply arms, including highly developed 
missiles, to Saudi Arabia in return for oil. On the same day, the lew Yprk 
Times quoted Kuwaiti officials as saying that the French Foreign Xinister, 
during a visit to Kuwait, had offered military arms and industrial 
investments in exchange for oil. In Iran it was announced on 9 February 
that a $5 billion oil agreement had been reached with Prance and on the 
same day the French Foreign linister concluded a three-day visit to Iraq by 
announcing that France was seeking closer ties with Iraq and would offer 
technical assistance to help Iraq's economic development. 
While this rather frantic round of oil diplomacy was in progress. the 
struggle for Oman was intensifying. On 18 love.ber 1973 ODan accused South 
Yemeni aircraft of bombing a military post in Oman and on 23 Jovember Oman 
appealed to the United lations to halt South Yemeni aggression. In a letter 
to the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. Oman said that units of south 
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Yemen's regular army were penetrating Omani territory. On 29 December a 
PFLOAG spokesman said Iran had sent additional troops to fight rebel forces 
1n Oman's Dhofar province and that an estimated 30,000 Iranian troops were 
then in Oman. On 8 January 1974 three members of the Kuwait parliament 
claimed that Iran had put a force of 1,500 men and 25 helicopters into Oman 
to attack South Yemen. 
Despite the recent restoration of diplomatic relations, the Iraqi 
government reported on 10 February that an artillery and armour clash with 
Iran had resulted in 70 Iranian and 24 Iraqi casualties. It charged Iran 
with overflying Iraqi airspace and with provoking a smaller skirmish on 4 
February. On the following day Iran in turn accused Iraq of aggression in 
this border clash and demanded compensation for the victims. On 12 February 
the Iraqi government requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council 
and accused Iran of massing troops along the border. Iran sent a strong 
note of protest to Iraq. On 15 February the UN Secur1.ty Council opened a 
debate on the border clash which each side accused the other of initiating. 
At this paint, on 16 February, the new Iraqi ambassador, Kidhat Ibrahim 
Juma, presented his credentials to the Shah. Iraq and Iran again blamed 
each other in the Security Council on 20 February for recent border 
fighting. Al-Saayad of Beirut reported on 21 February that the Baghdad 
government was on the verge of an open break with the Kurds over the 
question of control over the Oil-rich province of Kirkuk. 
Eventually, on 28 February, the UI Security Council decided on a one-
man three-month investigation of the border trouble between Iraq and Iran. 
On 5 Karch three Iraqi soldiers were killed and twelve wounded in clashes 
on that border and on the next day heavy casualties were reported on both 
sides as fighting continued. A day later, Iraq reported four more soldiers 
killed and dozens wounded in new clashes with Iranian forces. On 11 KArch, 
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the Iraqi government proclaimed local self-rule for the Kurdish minority in 
the north and on the following day gave the Kurds fifteen days in which to 
accept the plan for autonomy. Two days later, on 14 Karch, fighting broke 
out between Kurdish insurgents and government forces in northern Iraq. On 
16 larch the Pesh Merga, the Kurdish militia, was reported to be in control 
of large sections of Worthern Iraq. 
It was reported on 17 Karch that Iran had agreed to the Iraqi 
government's request for a cease-fire along the border. A week later 
President Bakr said that the government intended to enforce the Kurdish 
autonomy plan. Soviet Defence Kinister Grechko left Baghdad on 26 Karch, 
one day ahead of schedule. Baghdad Radio also announced that a mutual 
understanding had been reached between the Iraqi government and Kurdish 
rebels. The government also announced decrees implementing the plan for 
Kurdish self-rule that it had proclaimed earlier. On the following day, 
Kulla Mustafa Barzani said that Kurdish and Iraqi government troops faced 
the possibility of all-out war. On 1 April, Kurdish rebels were reported to 
have repulsed a government force of some 3000 troops in the Alibey Pass. 
Theforce was attempting to relieve besieged garrisons near Ruwandiz and 
Zebar. A week later, President Bakr replaced five Kurdish ministers who 
belonged to the Kurdish Democratic Party. On 10 April diplomatic ties were 
resumed with Britain after a thirteen-year break. On the same day, however, 
Vice-President Saddam Hussain accused the USA of supplying the Kurdish 
rebels via Iran, and accused Iran of massing troops along the border to 
'encourage Kurdish insurgents in our north'. 
Kurdish officials claimed on 13 April that four Iraqi JIGS had bombed 
Kurdish ground forces near Kirkuk and five days later Kurdish Radio 
reported that Iraqi planes had destroyed eleven Kurdish villages. It was 
also reported that the Kurds had killed twenty Iraqi soldiers. On the 
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fallowing day, Kurdish rebels declared all-out war against the Iraqi 
government. The decision was apparently made as a result of the alleged 
execution of eleven Kurdish leaders by the government. Two days later, on 
21 April. Taha luhyi aI-Din Karuf, a Kurdish diplomat, was appointed a 
Vice-President in Iraq. On 25 April it was reported that Iraqi tanks were 
pushing forward under heavy fire to relieve a besieged government garrison 
in Zakho. Hussain said that a firm economic siege would be imposed on areas 
held by Kurdish rebels. On the following day the Soviet press accused 
Turkey of arming and abetting Kurdish rebels. It was reported on 29 April 
that government forces had captured Habur Bridge and had lifted the Siege 
at Zahko. It was also reported that Iraqi forces had mistakenly shelled a 
Turkish border Village. On 3 Kay Kurdish rebels were said to have blown up 
two oil and gas tanks in the Kirkuk region, while on 10 Kay it was reported 
that Iraqi troops had set fire to the Kurdish town of Zakho. Fifty 
government troops were reported killed. It was further reported on 10 Kay 
that Iranian border guards had killed four Iraqi guerrillas who were 
attempting to kidnap four Iranians. Two Iranian soldiers had been killed. 
Elsewhere in the Gulf, Kuwait signed a contract with France on 10 
February to purchase armaments for about $85 million. On 22 February, Omani 
linister of State for Foreign Affairs, Qaysal-Zawawi, in a speech at the 
Lahore conference said that Arab countries which gave aid to South Yemen 
were helping Karxist rebels in Dhofar province. Sultan Qabus of Oman 
arrived in Teheran on 2 Karch for a week's visit and on the same day US 
Secretary of State Kissinger spent six hours in Riyadh. On the following 
day the Kuwaiti Defence and Interior linister announced that twenty-four 
Kuwaiti pilots would go to the United States for training. It was 
acknowledged on 7 Karch that Iran had started playing an active ailitary 
role in the guerrilla war in Dhofar Province in Southern Oman. On 2 April, 
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one Omani soldier was reported killed and two others wounded in fighting 
with rebels. Three days later, on 5 April, the Arab League was said to be 
setting up a five-member committee to mediate in the dispute between Oman 
and South Yemen. On the same day, Saudi Arabia and the USA announced an 
agreement to expand economic co-operation and to negotiate an American 
supply of weapons for Saudi defence reqUirements, while on 15 April it was 
also announced that the United States had agreed to modernize Saudi 
Arabia's National Guard at a cost of $335 million. 
According to the ArAb World on 9 Kay, Bahrain had offered its good 
offices to resolve the border dispute between Kuwait and Iraq. A new 
transatlantic link with the Gulf was the establishment at the end of Kay of 
diplomatic relations between Kuwait and Cuba, while on 6 June the Deputy 
Premier of Saudi Arabia reinforced old links when he was welcomed in 
Washington by President Nixon. Two days later, an agreement was signed with 
the Americans providing for Wide-ranging military and economic 
arrangements. On 9 June it was announced that ARAKCO and the government of 
Saudi Arabia had reached a settlement whereby the saudiS would take a 
majority 60 per cent ownership of the company's concessions and assets, a 
move apparently aimed at giving the Saudis more bargaining power at the 
meeting of OPEC to be held in Quito, Ecuador. According to lay production 
figures, Saudi Arabia had become the leading oil producer in the world, 
having surpassed the USA. On 14 June President Nixon arrived in Jidda and 
was welcomed at the airport by King Faysal; four days later, the 
possibility of a Saudi purchase of special US Treaury issues was reported, 
and on 20 July US Treasury Secretary Simon met King Faysal to discuss 
possible Saudi investment of oil revenues in the USA. On 29 July an 
agreement was initialled between the UAE and Saudi Arabia to settle their 
long-disputed and undefined border of several hundred kms. 
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As the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict wore on, the Kurdish leader Barazani 
asked for UN intervention on 7 June in what he described as a 'war of 
genocide' being waged by the Iraqi government. On 19 June four Kurdish 
nationalists were executed by the government. Further heavy fighting was 
reported in the Esbi1 area of Northern Iraq, with twenty-one soldiers 
killed. Two days later Reuters reported that Kurdish rebels had launched an 
offensive aimed at capturing Kirkuk. The rebel force claimed to have killed 
63 government soldiers and to have taken 200 prisoners. 
Iran's relations with Iraq, on the other hand, became more relaxed. On 
21 Kay UN Secretary-General Waldheim said that Iran and Iraq had agreed to 
prompt and simultaneous withdrawal of troop concentrations along their 
common borders, and agreed to resume talks on bilateral issues. Dixie Lee 
Roy, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy ComDdssion arrived in Teheran on 25 
lay with five top officials for discussions on co-operation between the two 
countries on plans to develop a major nuclear capacity in Iran. On 28 lay 
the UN Security Council approved an agreement between the two countries to 
end their border dispute and to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement. 
It was reported on 7 June that Iran had increased from 30 to 80 the number 
of F-14A fighter planes ordered from the United states. On 20 June, the 
Saudi Foreign Xinister ended talks with the Shah. 
In response to the question of whether Iran would someday have 
nuclear weapons, the Shah said on 23 June that there was no doubt about it, 
and that it would be sooner than expected. This led to government denials 
On the following day that the Shah had actually said that Iran would 
develop nuclear weapons: By then the Shah had reached Paris where he was 
welcomed by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and on 25 June an agreement 
for technological co-operation was signed with France, followed two day. 
later by a ten-year development agreement valued at $4 billion. The 
---
agreement included, significantly in view of the Shah's remarks, provision 
for the sale of five nuclear reactors, while on 30 June a ten-year 
agreement for the supply of uranium fuel was signed with the United States. 
Ioreover, on 5 July it was reported that agreements had been concluded with 
South Africa for co-operation in nuclear power generation and the expansion 
of trade. A week later, however, on 12 July, Iran asked the UN to take 
action to keep nuclear weapons out of the KiddIe East. 
On 22 July, an Iranian loan of $1.2 billion to Britain to bolster its 
economy was announced and on 25 July two agreements were signed with Oman 
dealing respectively with cultural matters and the continental shelf 
between the two countries. The Grumman Corporation disclosed on 13 August 
that Iran had offered to lend it enough money to continue production of the 
P-14 fighter plane. On the same day, a continental shelf agreement was 
signed with the UAE, defining the boundary along the median line. Later, on 
3 October the Corporation disclosed that Iran's Bank Kili had put up $75 
million, which, together with a $125 million loan from some American banks, 
would produce the F-14 plane Iran desired. In general, there seemed almost 
no limit to Iranian ambition. A preliminary agreement was signed between 
Iran and a West German firm on 19 November for the purchase of two nuclear 
plants. On 20 .ovember the Shah concluded a three-day visit to the USSR for 
talks on economic issues and on the KiddIe East situation. 
The border with Iraq remained troubled, despite agreement to talk. On 
17 August it was reported that Iraq had been shelling the Qasr-1-Shirin 
area since 4 August and on 24 August that Iraqi infiltrators killed three 
Iranians in an attack on a border post. In Iraq on the following day a new 
amnesty was declared for Kurds, provided they laid down their arms within 
twenty days. On 29 August Iraq accused Iran of massing troopS along the 
border in violation of the 7 Karch ceasefire agreement but the next day the 
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two-week-old talks between Iraq and Iran in Istanbul on border problems 
ended 1n an atmosphere of mutual understanding. However, there was no such 
understanding with the Kurds. Kore than 70,000 Iraqi Kurds were said to 
have fled to Iran from Iraqi military attacks and on 7 Septeaber Iraqi 
planes were reported to have bombed the village of Kuhnih Lahijan killing 
fifteen people. On 15 September Kurdish forces began an offensive against 
army positions in Rawandiz and Qala Diza, and next day four Iraqi soldiers 
were reported killed in border skirmishes with Iranian troops. Three days 
later, rebel Kurdish forces claimed to have killed 300 Iraqi troops and 
have launched a counter-offensive in the Kirkuk area. 
Elsewhere, on 17 October, the Omani Xinister of State for Foreign 
Affairs announced that Iranian troops which had been helping 1n the war in 
Dhofar were being withdrawn. He arrived in Iran for talks on 25 lovember. 
That day the US aircraft carrier Constellation and two destroyers entered 
the Gulf on a familiarization deployment during CEITO naval manoeuvres in 
the Indian Ocean. On the following day the United States said that the 
carrier had completed its exercises in the Gulf and was returning to the 
Indian Ocean. Three days later, on 29 love mber, the Xiddle Bast Econpmjc 
Digest reported that an Iraqi naval unit had concluded a goodwill tour the 
previous week of the Arab Gulf states. Its commander called for the setting 
up of a joint Arab naval force 1n the Gulf to protect Arab interests 
against threats to the tranqUillity of the region. 
In Iraq on 2 December the Communist Party organ Tariq al-ShAb reported 
that Party leader Salim Khabbaz had been assassinated by Kurds. On 4 
December the French Defence K1nistry reported that a contract had been 
signed to supply Saudi Arabia with S800 million in military arBS. On g 
December, in Kuwait, the Defence Xinister said an agreement had been signed 
with the USA to purchase 'the most up to date surface-to-air missiles' and 
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a large number of jet fighter planes. On 16 December the Iraqi government 
said that two Iraqi jet fighters hadbeen shot down near the Iranian border 
by American-made Hawk missiles. Two days later, Iran said that it had shot 
down two Iraqi planes which had violated Iranian airspace. The Cairo ~ 
Ahram reported on 22 December that President Anwar al-Sadat was in contact 
with the two countries to try to help resolve border tension. The Egyptian 
Foreign Xinister arrived in Baghdad for talks with President Bakr on 29 
December. Two days later the Iraqi government accused Iran of shelling 
Iraqi villages. 
On 3 January 1975 France announced that Iran had loaned the French 
Atomic Energy Commission $1 billion for fifteen years for a ten per cent 
share in an planned uranium enrichment plant in the Rhone Valley. On the 
same day, the Iraqi newspaper al-Thawra called for a quick response from 
Kuwait to Iraq's 'practical and flexible proposals' for ending the border 
dispute and said that any visit to Kuwait by Vice President Saddam Hussain 
to discuss the issue must have the 'prerequisites of success'. On 8 January 
a special diplomatic delegation departed from Iraq for visits to Abu Dhabi, 
Bahrain, Yemen and South Yemen to explain Iraqi policy in the Iraq-Iran 
border dispute. It was announced on 9 January that the USA had agreed to 
sell to Saudi Arabia 60 F5 jet fighters for $750 million. The United States 
said that the sale would contribute to the legitimate self-defence needs of 
Saudi Arabia. On the following day, the Sultan of Oman met President Ford 
in Washington. The relations between the two countries were described as 
excellent. The Iraqi Foreign Kinister arrived in Saudi Arabia on 11 January 
and held talks with King Faysal which were described as frank and 
fraternal. On the same day Hovieda said Iran had spent .250 ~llion in 
caring for Kurdish refugees from Iraq whose number had now reached 120,000. 
It was announced in Iraq on 19 January that a group of pro-Iranian spies 
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had been executed and that talks in Istanbul between Iraqi and Iranian 
officials on the Kurdish and Shatt aI-Arab problems were broken off after 
four days. Iran's Foreign Xin1ster Abbas Khalathari said that no decisions 
had been taken. 
Britain announced on 20 January that the USA was seeking occasional 
use of airfield facilities on lasirah Island off the coast of Oman. The USA 
confirmed this. saying that use of the base was needed on a contingency 
basis as an alternate landing base for carrier planes. The lew York Times 
reported on 24 January that terms had been agreed upon for the complete 
takeover of ARAKCO by the Saudi government whose monetary reserves were 
said by the IMP on 2 February to have reached $14 billion by the end of 
1974 and to be the third largest in the world after West Germany and the 
United States. On 2 February Iran had guaranteed Oman's airspace by 
committing Iranian planes to defend Oman against intruders should Oman 
request it. In the following week the lew York Times reported on 8 February 
that US anti-tank missiles and several instructors had arrived in Oman 
'recently'. It was also reported in the USA that US military veterans were 
being recruited by a private firm under a Defense Department contract to 
train Saudi troops to defend oilfields. 
The Iranian Pars lews Agency said on 9 February that Iraqi troops had 
attacked border positions but had been driven back by border police. On the 
next day. the lew York Times cited sources in Beirut as saying that Iraq 
was seeking a conference of Arab states of the Gulf region to proteat 
against Iranian aid to the Kurds. UJ Secretary-General Valdhei. arrived on 
12 February for talks with King Faysal on international proble .. and on 16 
February he went on to Bahrain. On 1 larch Amman Radio announced that 31 
Jordanian British-made Hawker Hunter fighers were to be given to Oman and a 
combat battalion would be sent to Dhofar. Some of the aircraft had arrived 
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by the end of the month. On 28 Karch the Libyan Iews Agency reported that 
Chairman al-Qadhaf1 had sent a warning to Oman and the Arab League that 
Libya would wage war against Sultan Qabus unless Iranlan troops were 
expelled from Oman. The Shah himself appeared quite unconcerned. On 2 Karch 
he had announced that Iran had become a one-party state to be governed by a 
new party. the lational Resurrection Party, 'for at least the next two 
years'. Premier Hovieda would lead the party. Two days later it was 
announced that the state would purchase up to eight nuclear reactors from 
the USA as part of a $15 billion trade agreement. Secretary of State 
Kissinger called it the largest agreement of this kind ever signed between 
two countries. However, on 5 Karch Qadhafi arrived in Saudi Arabia for an 
official visit and met King Faysal. On the following day, Bahrain's Foreign 
Kinister said that the future of American naval facilities and commercial 
relations would depend on the American stand on peace and stability in the 
KiddIe East. 
Peace and stability at long last seemed to have been boosted after the 
conclusion of a conference of OPEC heads of state in Algeria. PreSident 
Boumediane announced on 6 Karch that an agreement had been reacheed between 
Iraq and Iran that completely eliminated the conflict between two brotherly 
countries. A communique issued in Algiers on 7 Karch revealed that Iraq and 
Iran had agreed to proceed with a permanent demarcation of their land 
frontiers, to delimit their river frontier according to the Thalweg line, 
and to control their borders with a view to definitive cessation of all 
subversive infiltrations on both sides. The Shah, on the same day, returned 
to Iran and said that the agreement signed with Iraq finally ended the 
ancient differences between the two countries. It was not a development 
which had been widely forecast and, in the light of all that had been 
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happening it all seemed a little too good to be true. levertheless, for the 
tiDe being at least, a turning point appeared to have been reached. 
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The material in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, 
taken in conjunction with material listed in the thematic bibliography at 
the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of preceding 
chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this 
chapter. It has not been thought sensible to provide more detailed 
referencing: 
1. leesing's Contemporary Archiyes 
Vol. XXII: January 1976-December 1976: pp.27501-28124 
Vol. XXIII: January 1977-December 1977: pp.28125-28748 
VH~:iin; A~~H~r1 i~rA-P.~~I2~AAr +~rA.: FF;~AU~-~~f.lQO 
Vol. XV: January 1979-December 1979: pp.29381-30012 
2. The KiddIe East Journal The KiddIe East Institute, Washington. 
Vo1.30: 16 Iovember 1975-15 February 1976: pp.210-220 
16 February 1976-15 August 1976: pp.425-538 
Vo1.31: 16 August -15 February 1977: pp.47-203 
16 February-15 August 1977: pp.332-482 
V01.32: 16 August -15 Iovember 1977: pp.45-58 
16 lovember 1977-15 August 1978: pp.185-469 
Vo1.33: 16 August 1978-15 February 1979: pp.45-205 
3. Summary of Yorld Broadcasts; Part IVi The Arab Wor14. Israel, 
Greece. Tyrkey, Iran 
Daily Series. Published by the Konitoring Service of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, Caversham Park, Reading, Berke. 
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Chapter Eight: prom the Algiers Accord to the DoWDfall Of the ShIh 
1975-1979 
One consequence of the Algiers Accord was quickly apparent. Iran 
cut off aid to the Kurds. While offering a general amnesty to Kurdish 
rebels up until 1 April. the Iraqi government launched a major offensive in 
the north on 7 Karch and its rapid progress was admitted by the Kurds. One 
of their spokesmen. Aziz Reza, conceded on 8 larch that Iran's decision to 
cut off supplies would be a serious setback to their bid for real autonomy 
and democracy within Iraq. but he said that they would continue the 
struggle by switching to guerrilla tactics. On 12 March the lew York Times. 
quoting sources in Teheran. said that the Iranian decision meant that the 
Kurds were already running out of supplies. 
A further example of Gulf accord was announced on 12 larch after 
Kuwait's Premier, Shaikh Jabir aI-Ahmed al-Sabah had concluded a four-day 
visit to Saudi Arabia. A jOint communique said that the problems of the 
leutral Zone Partition Agreement had been discussed and solutions agreed 
upon. The Saudi Defence Xinister Sultan bin Abd al Aziz said that the broad 
outlines of an offshore boundaries agreement were also determined. Bahrain 
also made a beneficial deal. According to the liddle Bast Bconomic Dicest 
on 14 larch. the USA had agreed to a 600 per cent increase in the rent paid 
for the use of naval facilities. leanwhile. the Iraqi govern .. nt announced 
on 13 March a two-week ceasefire with Kurdish rebels at the request of Iran 
to allow Kurdish refugees to cross to Iran. Fighting was at first reported 
to be continuing, but on 15 larch a Kurdish spokesman in Iran .aid that It 
had ceased. On the same day talks began in Teheran between Foreign linister 
Abbas Khalatbari and Iraqi Foreign Xinister Hamadi on implementing the ~ 
larch Algiers Accord. The Algerian Foreign Xinlster Abdel Aziz Botefllca 
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was also present. The Kurdish leader MUsta!a Barazani said on 22 Karch that 
the fighting was over, that the Kurds had now no foreign support, and that 
he Bdght take refuge in the United states. 
Three days later, on 25 Karch. King Payeal of Saudi Arabia was 
assassinated by a nephew. Paisal bin MUsaid bin Abd al-Aziz. during a 
reception at the palace in Riyadh. an official announcement said that the 
assassin was mentally deranged. Crown Prince Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud 
was crowned in Faysal's place. Faysal was buried in the capital on the 
following day. On 28 Karch, King Khalid issued a decree saying that he 
would be keeping the Cabinet of his predecessor. He would himself be both 
Premier and Foreign Xinister. 
Iran's Premier Abbas Hovieda arrived in Iraq on 25 larch for an 
official four-day visit. On 29 larch Turkey reported the renewal of heavy 
fight1ng between Iraqi troops and Kurds near the Turkish border. A joint 
communique was issued at the conclusion of Hovieda's visit saying that the 
two sides were determined to expand co-operation in all fields of DUtual 
interest. Within two days of 31 larch the general amnesty for Kurds 
choosing to surrender was extended to 30 April. A joint co~ttee from Iraq 
and Iran began work on defining the land border between the two countries. 
The Iraqi army was ordered to advance into Kurdish-held areas and to take 
control. The Shah revealed on 9 April that the Kurdish leader Barazani had 
taken up residence with hie family somewhere near Teheran. He added, 
however. that Iran had ended its support of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq 
because it was useless bloodshed that could not CODe to anything. It had to 
be settled by negotiation. The Iraqi Vice PreSident arrived in the SoViet 
Union on 14 April for an official visit. On the following day, an agreement 
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for the peaceful development of nuclear energy was signed with the Soviet 
Union. 
In Saudi Arabia on 31 Karch, the Deputy Premier Prince Fahd delivered 
a policy statement on behalf of the new government. It said that the 
building of Saudi military forces would continue, that the nation would do 
everything possible to regain the lost rights of the Palestinian people, 
that a consultative assembly would be established within the system of 
government and that Faysal's policies would be sustained. The Chairman of 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Brown, arrived on 12 April for talks 
with King Khalid on arms sales. On 18 April a border agreement was signed 
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi negotiator, Abd aI-Rahman al-
Shaikh said the agreement was in accordance with the previous 
understanding. He also said that it now fixed the final demarcation. 
The Foreign Xinisters of Iran and Algeria began talks in Baghdad on 
19 April on implementing the Algiers accord. On 23 April President Anwar 
al-Sadat concluded a three-day visit and talks with King Khalid and then 
arrived in Iran on 24 April for talks with the Shah. Afterwards, on 28 
April, the Shah arrived in Saudi Arabia for a two-day visit and talks with 
King Khalid. On 27 April the Iraqi Vice-President called for a regional 
defence structure in the Gult to replace all foreign military bases; two 
days later he arrived in Iran for an official visit. In Iraq itself on 4 
Kay a military parade was held in Baghdad celebrating the end of the 
Kurdish rebellion. On 15 Kay the Shah conferred with Pre.ident Ford on the 
first day of a visit to the USA. The next day the Shah inspected A .. rican 
B1litary aircraft. On 18 May, the Shah denied reports that there were 
40,000 political prisoners in Iran. He said that there were less than 3,000 
persons in prison and they were there not for their political viewe but 
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because of terrorist acts. Three days later, on 21 lay, two US military 
officers were killed by terrorists in Teheran. Bahrain's Defence Xinister 
ended a four-day visit to Iraq on 23 May after talks on .aans of co-
ordinating solidarity and action among the Gulf states and, on 24 Xay, 
Bahrain's premier arrived in Iran for an official four-day visit. Saudi Oil 
Xinister Yamani said on 27 May that the United States had assured his 
government that there would be no military confrontation between thetwo 
countries. On the same day, after meetings with the Shah in Teheran, US 
Senator Edward Kennedy said that an unregulated flow of arms to the region 
might not be in Iran's interest or in the interest of the region as a 
whole. The lew York Times reported on 31 May that a multi-million dollar 
contract had been signed with Rockwell International of the USA to build a 
communications intelligence base in Iran. On 7 June the Shah warned of an 
unholy union between black reactionaries and stateless reds in opposition 
to national policy in his country. 
King Khalid met Sultan Qabus of Oman on 8 June. The following day the 
lew Tork Times reported that Iran would purchase three used submarines from 
the USA. Security officials reported on 10 June that religious 
conservatives had rioted in Qum on 5 and 7 June to protest against changes 
promoted by the government's policies. In Kuwait on the same day Saudi 
Crown PrincJe Pahd concluded an official visit and a JOInt communique said 
that the two sides had stressed their determination to strengthen their co-
operation. This was, perhaps, just as well in view at the threat by Libya'e 
Premier Abd al-Salam Jallud the following day to turn the Gult reglon into 
a war zone comparable to the recent one in South Bast !ela, unle.. Iranian 
troops were withdrawn from OBan. On 12 June, Saudi Crown Prince Pahd ended 
a four-day visit to Iraq, the first by a member of the Saudi royal faldly 
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in fifteen years. Pahd said that there was complete agreeaant on the issues 
discussed during the visit. On the next day in Iraq a treaty was signed 
with Iran, including a comprehensive delineation of the border. On 17 June 
Libyan Premier Jallud arrived in Iraq for a one-day visit. 
In Iran, police reported on 29 June that four political saboteurs had 
been killed the previous day in a gun battle near Teheran. An agreement 
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was signed on 2 July to divide the neutral 
zone by a straight border line through the middle where possible, or as 
near as possible. On 3 July Fahd ended a three-day visit and talks in Iran 
on regional issues. The liddle EAst Ecgngmic Dillet reported on 4 July that 
military advisers from Jordan, Kuwait and Saud1 Arabia had arrived in the 
UAB to help draw up plans to integrate the Emirate's defence forces. On the 
same day the Beirut aI-Anwar quoted Crown Prince Pahd ot Saudi Arabia as 
saying that his country wanted good relations with both East and West on 
the same footing 1n so far as their policies did not damage SaUdi 
interests. Two days of tlks with ARAXCO in Geneva finished on 6 July and 
011 Xinister Yamani said that negotiations for a 60 per cent takeover of 
ARAKeO were nearing completion. On the same day the Shah met the Secretary-
General of the Arab League in Teheran. On 10 July, the Boston Glghe claimed 
that the USSR had halted arms deliveries to Iraq in June, presumably as a 
protest against that government's conciliatory policy. Saudi Prince Pahd 
flew to France for an official visit on 21 July amud on the follOwing day 
had conversations in Paris with President Valery Giscard d'istalug about 
oil sales and French investments in Saudi Arabia. Two days later, on 24 
July, an agreement was signed with Prance which included provisions to 
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
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In Iran, it was announced on 29 July that two terrorists responsible 
for killing two US Air Force Colonels on 21 Kay had been arreated • On 4 
August it was reported that more than 7,750 persons had been arrested in a 
crackdown on profiteering. A week later police said that they had arrested 
four more terrorists involved in the killing of American military advisers. 
On 26 August, talks were concluded with an Iraqi delegation on sharing 
water and shipping in the Shatt al-Arab. On 1 September Sultan Qabus of 
Oman arrived for talks with the Shah. The KiddIe EAst Ecgngmic Digest 
reported on 19 September that the first contingent of Jordanian troops 
stationed in Oman had been withdrawnj two days later the last contingent of 
Jordanian troops arrived in Amman having been withdrawn from Oman. On 18 
October Iran said that Iranian forces were mopping up after they had 
captured a key rebel stronghold in Dhofar province. 
In Kuwait it was reported that the Defence linister had said that his 
country did not want to join in a Gulf military alliance. Xeanwhile, Iraq's 
Vice-President Saddam Hussain had returned from Prance on 11 September, 
after confirming that France had agreed to the sale of arms - such as the 
lirage jet. On 1 ~ovember, a US intelligence official said that the CIA had 
supplied the Kurds with millions of dollars worth of arms in 1972 at the 
request of the Shah of Iran. The Iraq Jews Agency announced on 3 loveaber 
that an Israell spy, Alexander Harun, who worked with the Kurdish rebels, 
had been hanged. A nuclear collaboration agreement with France was Signed 
on 18 Jovember in Baghdad during a visit by the French Xinlster of Industry 
and Research. On 29 ~ovember it was disclosed that the Kurdish leader 
lustafa Barazani had been visiting the USA tor nearly seven weeks and State 
Department officials confirmed that he had met Under-Secretary of State 
Jcseph Sisco during his visit. 
On 12 December, the Grumman Corporation acknowledged that it had 
arranged to pay Iranian lobbyists DOre than $20 million in cOmmission as 
part of a $2 billion deal to sell Iran 80 P-14 fighters, but contended it 
was normal practice. Three days later, the lew York Time$ reported that a 
US Senate sub-committee on multinational corporations WDuld investigate the 
disclosures by the GrUDDan Corporation. On the same day a Pentagon 
spokesman said that the USA had offered to sell Iran 10 Awacs surveillance 
planes at $187 million each. On 19 January 1976 the Shah said that the USA 
was asking unnecessarily for additional guarantees that would not be given 
with respect to eight nuclear power plants included in an economic co-
operation agreement signed in Karch. On 27 January the lew York Times cited 
US Defense Department sources as saying the head of the US military mission 
in Iran, Kajor-General Hoyt Vandenberg Jr., had been removed because he was 
too abrasive. It was further reported on 3 February that Iran was 
threatening to cut back its arms purchases from the USA because of sharply 
rising arms costs and a drop in Iran's oil revenues. 
On 10 February, Iran released a note by the President of the Grumman 
International which said that the corporation WDuld pay Iran $28 million in 
commission on the P-14 deal, but Grumman's Chairman said it had not agreed 
to pay the entire amount and that negotiations were still going on. Four 
days later, on 14 February, the Deputy Xinister of Yar said that he was 
determined to extract a $28 million penalty rebate from Grumman 
International and would, if necessary, deduct it from future payments for 
Grumman aircraft. 
In Oman as well as in Iraq government forces seemed to have prevailed 
In 1975. Sultan Qabus announced on 11 December 1975 that the ten-year 
insurrection in Dhofar province had ended and on 24 December he accused 
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South Yemen of massing troops and making other preparatlons with hostl1e 
intentions, while continuing artillery fire across the border. The 
followlmng day, South Yemen denied the charges by Qabus and sald the 
accusation had been made in order to justify the retention of Iranian 
troops in Oman. On 9 January 1976 Under-Secretary of the Forelgn Xinistry 
Yusuf al-Alawi said that how long Iranian troops would remain in Oman 
depended on whether a solutlon could be seen to the problem of South Yemen. 
A related development was reported on 6 February in the Kiddle East 
EcoPPmic Digest ; the first Omani ambassador to Iraq in six years had 
arrived in Baghdad. 
The reduction of armed conflict in the Gulf region was not accompanied 
by any slackening in arms purchases, while the detente between Iraq and 
Iran merely led to more attention being focused on the Shah's lnternal 
difficulties and the problems these occasioned for his alliance with 
Washington. On 18 February 1976 Iranian Vice-Xinister of War Hasan Tufanyan 
denied reports that Iran would reduce its purchases of Grumman F-14 Jet 
fighters. On the same day the US Defense Department said it intended to 
sell Saudi Arabia construction eqUipment worth $893 million for work on 
port and military facilities. On 20 February the Kiddie BAst Bcgppmic 
Dilest reported that Britain had won a contract to supply Kuwait with 150 
Chieftain tanks. The Kiddle East Econpmic Syrvey discussed the signing by 
Iraq and Saudl Arabia of a final border demarcatlon agreement for the 
Jeutral Zone. 
The lew Yprk Times reported on 5 Karch that Iran had for .. lly 
dlspensed with the services of a US advisory mission to its state police 
and on 14 Karch the Shah warned the USA that Iran could hurt ABerica as 
badly, 1f not more so, than it could hurt Iran it the US Congress i~osed 
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an embargo on arms sales to the Gulf region. On 28 Karch. King Khalid of 
Saudi Arabia ended a few days tour of a number of Gulf states - Kuwait. 
Bahrain, Qatar and UAE and, on 8 April, Iranian Premier Hovieda ended a 
two-day visit to Saudi Arabia for talks with Crown Prince Fahd. Iraqi Vice-
President Saddam Hussain arrived in Riyadh on 13 April at the start of a 
tour of Gulf nations. including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. the UAE. Qatar and 
Bahrain. A report from Iran on 27 April said that three members of an 
Islamic Marxist extremist group had been killed the week before in a gun 
battle with security forces in Teheran. US Federal Administrator Frank Zarb 
said on 9 Kay that the Iranian government had been holding talks with US 
companies about bartering billions of dollars werth of oil for American 
productsj two days later, on 11 Kay. three US companies confirmed that they 
had been negotiating a multi-billion dollar barter deal of oil for military 
equipment with the Iranian government. The lew York Times on 15 lay 
reported that the Iranian National assembly had approved a Treaty of 
Boundaries with Iraq during the week. after negotiations had resolved some 
final specific issues. On 18 Kay it was reported that at least eleven 
terrorists had been killed after the assassination of three Iranian 
security officers in Teheran. On the following day the lew York I1me§ 
reported that Iran had announced the arrests of four people in connection 
With the slaying of Xulla Abd al-Hasan Shamsabadi in April. 
The Libyan Premier Abd al-Salam Jallud arrived in Baghdad on 18 lay 
and met Saddam Hussain. On the followin~ day in Iran ofticials announced 
that ten guerrillas and four passers-by had been killed at three hideouts 
in northwest Teheran. The newspaper Ratakh1z claimed on 22 lay that Libya 
had paid 1100.000 to Iranian terrorists who opposed the Shah and had 
arranged to pay further sums in the future. King Khalid arrived in Teheran 
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on 24 Kay for talks with the Shah, and two days later the Kuwait newspaper 
al-S1ysoh reported that Iran was seeking to raise a $1.2 billion loan from 
Saudi Arabia. On the same day, the deputy director of SAVAK denied charges 
that the organization tortured political prisoners. This was countered on 
28 Kay by the International Commdssion of Jurists which said that there was 
abundant evidence showing the systematic use of impermissible methods and 
of torture of polittcal suspects in Iran. During a visit to France, 
Premier Hovieda denied on 28 Kay that Iran had any intention of using 
nuclear plants, to be built for her by France, in order to develop nuclear 
weapons. On 29 Kay, Soviet Premier Kosygin arrived in Baghdad on a four-
day visit. The KiddIe East Economic Survey reported on 31 Kay that Iran had 
signed contracts worth $1.2 billion for the purchase of two French nuclear 
power plants. On 1 June, about fifteen Iranian studen~s occupied their 
Consulate General in Geneva to protest against the repression of polit1cal 
diSSidents in Iran. 
Ihe Sultan of Oman arrived in Teheran on 21 June for talks with the 
Shah on Gulf security. The Saudi aspect of this security was the subject of 
a lew York Times report on 22 June. It cited a Raytheon Company spokesman 
as saying that the company had contracted with Saudi Arabia to provide it 
with a $1.03 billion anti-aircraft Hawk missile defence system. 
Increasingly, the Shah was simultaneously preoccupied with internal and 
international security. A policeman killed ten communist terrorists, 
including two women, in a gun battle in Teheran on 29 June. On 5 July a 
general amnesty was announced for a number of terrorist organizations not 
already on wanted lists. A day later, Pakistan Premier Ali Bhutto arrived 
in Teheran for three days of talks with the Shah and Premier Hovieda. The 
significance for the Shah of the American connection was underlined in a US 
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Senate study on 1 August which argued that after President lixon had 
decided in 1972 to sell Iran any conventional weapons .ystems that it 
wanted, Iran had become so dependent on US personnel to operate the systems 
it had bought that it could not go to war without US support on a day-to-
day basis. Five days later, on 6 August the Shah met US Secretary of State 
Kissinger in Iran. Later the Shah told reporters that the USA DUst continue 
to sell arms to Iran or risk instability in the area. On the following day, 
at the end of a two-day meeting of the Iranian-American Joint CoBDdssion, 
the two countries announced that Iran planned to spend S10 billion on 
military purchases from the USA between 1976 and 1980. On 27 August 
KiSSinger told a Senate subcommittee that the USA had agreed to sell Iran 
160 F-16 fighter planes at a cost of about S3.4 billion. On the next day 
terrorists killed three American employees of the US firm Rockwell 
International in Teheran. A few days later, the Turkish Poily Jews reported 
that Switzerland had expelled an Iranian diplomat accredited to the United 
lations for being involved in prohibited intelligence activities. 
Saudi-US relations over arms purchases were also under scrutiny. On 1 
September, the White House asked the Congress to permit the sale of 850 
Sidewinder and 650 Kaverick missiles to Saudi Arabia. Previously, 2,000 
Sidewinders and 1,500 lavericks were to have been sold. Three weeks later, 
on 24 September, the US Senate Foreign Relations CoDldttee voted by 8 to C 
to block the sale of 650 Kaverick missiles to Saudi Arabia. On 26 
September, the 11ddle Bast Jews Agency reported that Saudi Arabia had 
threatened to impose a new oil embargo against the USA it Congress enacted 
legislation against the Arab oil boycott. On the following day, Saudi 
Arabia denied published reports that it had threatened the USA with an oil 
embargo either in connection with anti-boycott legislation or with the sale 
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at US Dissiles. That day Kissinger met the Senate Poreign Relations 
ComDdttee and subsequently it reversed its vote blocking the Kaverick 
~ssile sale. 
French President Valery Giscard d'Bstaing's arrival in Teheran on 4 
October for a four-day visit confirmed the more cordial link with Paris. 
The Shah and the President signed a nuclear co-operation agreement on 6 
October by which France would build two nuclear reactors in Iran. Signs of 
US concern over tension and instability in Iran grew. On 17 October Iran 
said that security police had killed at least five terrorists during the 
previous week. On 25 October the Shah said that the US Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff George Brown had apologized for suggesting in an 
interview that the Shah might be thinking of reviving a Persian empire. US 
officials announced on 2 lovember that the US ambassador to Iran, Richard 
Helms, had decided to retire from his post. On the same day, an Iranian 
Bmbassy counsellor was critically wounded by a gunman in Parisi an Iranian 
terrorist organization claimed responsibility and a day later Prench police 
detained ten Iranians for questioning about the wounding of the Iranian 
diplomats. On 4 lovember the Iranian Cabinet was reshuffled. On 10 loveaber 
officials said a terrorist linked to the killing of the three Americans in 
August had been killed with a companion in a clash with police the day 
before. The Grumman Corporation said on 6 December that it was being sued 
for $114.0 million concerning the sale of 80 Grumman P-14 jets to Iran. The 
Iranian government announced on 23 December that security forces had killed 
eight guerrillas and captured eleven in two gun battles in Teheran. On 1 
January 1977 a report of the US State Department on hu.an rights in Iran 
was made public by a House at Representatives Committee. 
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Iran and India signed an agreement on 25 February for co-operation in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on 11 April the USA and Iran signed 
a nuclear co-operation pact. On 13 lay the new US Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance met the Shah during a visit to Iran and on 8 June the State 
Department denied reports that the USA had made a decision not to sell to 
Iran 250 F-18L fighter planes. But the impact of international criticism of 
the Shah was obvious. The lew York TimeS reported on 23 June that the 
International League for Human Rights. a UJ affiliate. had protested to the 
Shah that it had evidence of mass arrests and torture of Iranian citizens 
at home and of harassment of Iranian citizens abroad by secret police. 
In Bahrain on 29 June the government announced that an agreement 
giving US naval vessels rights at the port of Jufayir would be terainated 
on 1 July. The talks between Kuwaiti Interior and Defence Xinister Shaikh 
Baad aI-Abdulla al-Sabah and Saddam Hussain ended in Baghdad on 3 July. It 
was agreed to set up a joint committee to work out a settlement. On 20 July 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti troops began to withdraw from frontier pOSitions as a 
result of a disengagement agreement reached the week before. The US Defense 
Department notified Congress on 7 July of a proposed $1.2 billion sale of 
seven radar planes to Iran. but on 28 July US President Carter agreed to 
withdraw the notification and resubmit it to Congress in the year. On 31 
July Iran indicated that it was withdrawing its request to buy the radar 
planes. Premier Amir Abbas Hovieda resigned on 7 August and on the 
following day Jamshid Amuzgar was named as Preaier and the .. aber. of the 
new Cabinet were introduced to the Shah. Carter asked Congr ... on 7 
September to agree to the sale of $1.2 billion worth of AVACS radar planes 
to Iran. On 13 September gunmen on the French Riviera attacked a car in 
which Princess Ashraf Pahlavi was zi41DC. killing one person and wounding 
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another. The Princess herself was unhurt. In the following month, on 7 
October, the US Senate majority leader Robert Byrd urged an immediate 
.aratorium on arms sales to Iran. Iran signed contracts with France on 16 
October for two megawatt nuclear power plants and a ten-year supply of 
enriched uranium fuel. On 8 Iovember Iran confirmed that it had purchased 
seven AWACS planes from the USA and on 14 lovember the Shah arrived in the 
USA for talks with US leaders. On the following day he met President Carter 
in Washington where opponents of the Shah clashed with his supporters near 
the White House and 119 people were left injured. 
The Shah arrived in Xuscat on 5 December for a four-day visit to Oman 
and on 8 December he returned to Iran after talks on Gulf security and 
economic co-operation. The next day. Italian police arrested twelve Iranian 
students who had entered the Iranian Embassy in Rome, burned documents and 
committed acts of vandalism. On 15 December, the Grumman Corporation said 
that a compromise settlement had been reached with Iran in which 124 
million of spare parts for F-14 interceptors would be delivered to Iran. 
Meanwhile, the London Financial Times reported that troop movements on 
both sides of the northern border between Oman and the UAB reinforced 
reports that Oman was claiming a northern portion of Ras al-Khai ... On 16 
December the Kiddle East Economic Digest cited Omani Foreign Affairs Under-
Secretary Yusuf al-Alawi as saying that Oman did indeed claim part of Rae 
al-Khaima where oil had been discovered, but that it was not considering 
the use of force to back up its claim. On 29 December the VAS Preeident 
flew to Oman to meet with Sultan Qabus on thls border lesue. The Am1r af 
Kuwait died of a heart attack on 31 December and Shaikh Jablr a1-Ah.ad a1-
Jabir al-Sabah succeeded. 
-~-
It was on the last day of 1977 too that President Carter arrived in 
Teheran and had talks with the Shah. On 9 January 1978 a demonstration by 
dissidents in Qum resulted in at least five deaths when police fired on the 
protestors. On the following day, the Shah met King Khalid and Crown Prince 
Fahd of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh for talks on the Kiddle East situation and 
bilateral relations. On 2 February the Shah arrived in Jew Delhi on a four-
day visit. Students clashed with police during demonstrations against the 
Shah. There were riots against the government in Tabriz on 18 February, 
leaving six dead and a hundred and twenty five injured. Tanks and troops 
were still patrolling the streets two days later. On 21 February the death 
toll was stated to have reached nine. Troops were finally withdrawn on 23 
February. Four days later, East German police stormed the Iranian Bmbassy 
in Berlin and arrested Iranian students who had occupied the building. On 
16 larch a motion to censure the government for its handling of the riots 
in Tabriz was introduced into parliament. The lew York Times reportedthat 
the government had announced a shakeup of the Tabriz branch of SAVAK. King 
Hussein of Jordan arrived in Teheran on 23 larch for talks with the Shah. 
Demonstrators in three towns on 2 April attacked public buildings, causing 
some damage. Four days later Iran said that it had smashed a Soviet 
espionage network and arrested a retired Iranian general. On 13 April Bast 
German Foreign Xinister Oskar Fischer ended a twenty-tour visit to Teheran 
during which he had talks with the Shah concerning the incident in Berlin 
in February. Police arrested a total of 83 people on 22 April tor 
distributing anti-government pamphlets in a number of towna and Villages 
and it was reported on 2 lay that security forces had surrounded Azerbaijan 
university in Tabriz after a long and violent clash between supporters and 
opponents ot the Shah. Four days later, on e Kay, security policemen 
-m-
~te423 students in Babol after an anti-government demonstration turned 
violent. Two days later police clashed with dissidents in several cities. 
Disturbances in Qum and Tabriz left at least seven people dead. On 10 Kay 
rioting against the government broke out in Qum once more and also in other 
cities. The Shah postponed a planned trip to Eastern Burtope and took 
command of troops acting to break up demonstrations by thousands of rioters 
in Teheran. On 15 Kay troops patrolled the capital after opponents of the 
Shah called for the closure of all stores. The next day police clashed with 
students in Teheran University. The lew Jerk Times reported on 22 lay that 
police had arrested fifteen people after a bomb had exploded in Qum. In the 
following week, on 31 Kay. about 2,500 students rioted at Teheran 
University and on the next day police used tear gas to break up a 
demonstration by female students at the same institution. On 3 June 
dormitories at the University were closed because of the riots. On 6 June 
the Shah named limat Allah lasiri, the head of SAVAK, to be ambassador to 
Pakistan. 
A general work slowdown. called by religious leaders, took place in 
Qum on 17 June. Peaceful protests against the government were aleo held in 
Tabriz and other cities. Two days later, on 19 June, the Pan-Iraniat Party 
was officially revived after its leader and three others announced their 
resignation from the Rastakhiz Party. Xinister of Information Daryueh 
Humayun said that membership of the Rastakhiz Party waa voluntary and there 
would be no recrimination against those who left it. On 24 July a Cabinet 
reshuffle occurred and on the following day riots in Iashha4 resulted in 
the death of a policeman. King Hussein of Jordan arrived 1n Teheran again 
on 27 July for a private visit and two days later the Bgyptian Vice-
President Husni Xubarak met the Shah in Teheran. On 1 August the government 
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confirmed that seven people had been killed and more than three hundred 
arrested in riots in thirteen towns during the week. Disturbances in Shiraz 
left three people dead and on 10 August about a hundred and thirty people 
were arrested. A day later clashes between police and demonstrators left 
four people dead in Isfahan. A curfew was imposed. On 12 August, 
demonstrators and police clashed in Shiraz. Several deaths were reported 
and on the following day a bomb exploded in a restaurant in Teheran killing 
one person and injuring forty five. On 17 August the Washingtgn Pgst 
reported that the USA had turned down a request by Iran to purchase 31 F-4G 
fighter bombers. It also quoted Information Xinister Humayun's accusation 
that the Palestine Liberation Organization had helped foment recent riots 
in Iranian cities. 
On 19 August there was a fire at a cinema in Abadan in which at least 
377 people died. A day later a cinema in Shiraz was destroyed by arsonists, 
and a bomb exploded in a restaurant. In Teheran on 21 August an export bank 
branch was set on fire. On the same day the Abadan police chief said that 
ten people had been arrested for their role in the fire. The Abadan victims 
were buried on 22 August. Demonstrations after the mourning ceremonies 
turned into riots and on the follo~ing day tanks and troops took up 
position in Abadan to prevent rioting. The Iranian Embassy in The Hague was 
attacked on 23 August by nine Iranian students who issued a atate .. nt 
blaming security police for starting the fire in Abadan and then 
surrendered to the Dutch police. Two days later, on 25 August, anti-
government demonstrations erupted into violence again in 'badan. 
On 27 August. a new Cabinet was sworn 1n. The iaeh1nliQP Pgst on 30 
August reported that Iraq had returned an Iranian alleged to have confessed 
to playing a role in the Abadan arson, after he had attempted to enter Iraq 
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illegally. In Xashhad on the following day, police opened fire on 
demonstrators killing two people. About 150 people were arrested in Los 
Angeles on 1 September after a demonstration against the Shah had turned 
violent. Three days later, the washington Post reported that riots over the 
weekend in Teheran and fourteen other cities had left at least twelve 
people dead. On the same day, peaceful demonstrations were held in Teheran 
and other cities, but it was reported that four people had been killed in 
clashes between demonstrators in the city of Ilam. 
On 6 September the government ordered a ban on public proceSSions and 
meetings without official permission. Yet on the following day a DaSS rally 
was held in the capital. Demonstrators demanded the ousting of the Shah and 
his replacement by the exiled religious leader Ayat Allah Ruh Allah 
Khumayni. On 8 September the government declared a six-month period of 
martial law in Teheran and eleven other cities. Troope fired on anti-
government demonstrators in Teheran killing at least 86 and injuring 205. 
On 9 September the Shah postponed a visit to East Germany and Rumania in 
order to deal with the unrest at home. Former Premier Hovieda reSigned his 
post as Xinister of the Imperial Court on the same day. Pakistani Chief 
Martial Law Administrator Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq arrived in Teheran and met 
the Shah. On 10 September, one person was killed in Qum when troops fired 
into a crowd. On the same day in a telephone call to the Shah, President 
Carter expressed regret at the recent violence in Iran and hoped that the 
movement towards political liberalization would nevertheless continue. line 
members of parliament disrupted and then walked out of a .peach by Praa1ar 
Imam!. On 12 September the government arrested or issued warrants tor 
scores of opponents of the Shah. Two days later, the Teheran Dopestlc 
Seryice reported that former Minister of Culture Xansur Ruhani and toraer 
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Agriculture Xinister Faridun Xahdavi had been arrested. The government 
received a vote of confidence in the Xajlis on le Septeaber by a vote of 
17e to le. Debate prior to the vote of confidence was televised nationally. 
The next day eighteen opposition XPs walked out of the debate on the 
introduction of martial law in the twelve cities. On 24 September police 
fired into the air to disperse demonstrators in Golayegan. 
In Saudi Arabia on 30 September King Hussein of Jordan met Crown 
Prince Fahd in Jidda and on 2 October the Iraqi Vice-President Saddam 
Hussain arrived there also to meet Fahd before going on to Kuwait where he 
had talks with Crown Prince Shaikh Saad al Abdulla al-Sabah. In Iran itself 
the government promised on 3 October to meet in full the demands of 
striking bank. telecommunications and oil refinery workers. Three days 
later, on 6 October, exiled opposition leader Khumayni flew to Paris from 
Iraq where he had lived for more than eleven years. On 8 October Health 
Xinister Mazdhi resigned his post. Iran's ambassador to the United States, 
Ardashir Zahidi met the Shah on 9 October to discuss the disturbances. On 
11 October journalists staged a strike to protest against Dilitary 
censorship. Troops and student demonstrators clashed in Teheran. Two days 
later the government agreed to the demands of the journalists. Also on 13 
October the opposition lationsl Front Party called a peaceful general 
strike for 16 October. On 15 October the government deployed tanks in 
Teheran on the eve of the threatened general strike. It was reported three 
days later that the Xinister of Science and Higher Bducat1on, lahavand1, 
had resigned in protest against the wage increase awarded after strikes. On 
22 October police opened fire on demonstrators in Ramadan killing five 
people. 
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On the following day, the government said that 1,451 prisoners would 
be released to mark the Shah's birthday. Justice Xinister Bahiri said that 
those released would be fully compensated. On 24 October, however, riots 
took place in the town of Gorgan: government bUildings, cinemas. banks and 
other structures were burned by rioters and the next day similar attacks 
were made in Rasht. On 26 October snipers in Jahrom killed the police chief 
and critically wounded the martial law administrator of the town. Troops 
clashed with student demonstrators once more in Teheran. The next day 
rioting in several towns and cities left a further five people dead. On 29 
October the government dismissed or retired 34 senior offlclals of the 
intelligence organization SAVAK. Bahiri and Xinister of State Azmun 
tendered their resignations on 30 October and the new Cablnet was 
announced. On the next day, the oil lndustry was paralysed by a strlke. 
Also on the last day of October Crown Prince Riza met President Carter in 
Washington. Carter reaffirmed American support for the Shah on 3 lovember. 
The opposition lational Front leader Karim Sanjabi met Ayat Allah Khumayn1 
in Paris. In Teheran itself violent demonstrations agaln erupted with at 
least ten people killed. On 5 lovember demonstrators in Teheran toppled a 
statue of the Shah at the university and set hotels and public buildings 
allght. The Britlsh Embassy was set on flre, but troops repulsed an attack 
on the United States Embassy. Imami resigned the Premiership. 
From Paris on 5 lovember came a declaration from Khumayn1 and Sanjabl 
that they would not support any coalitlon government unless the Shah agreed 
to a referendum on the monarchy. On 6 love abe r, when the new milltary 
Cabinet was named. Khumayni said that the oppositlon would flnd some other 
means of solving the problem if political Bethods falled. The milltary 
government announced on 7 lovember that it had arrested fourteen prominent 
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officials, including the tormer head of SAVAK and six former Cabinet 
ministers, while on the following day former Premier Hovieda was arrested. 
The military government announced that 54 indictments ot tormer public 
officials and businessmen had been issued on charges of corruption. The 
Shah ordered an investigation into all investments and business dealings of 
the royal family. 
Such concessions failed to quell disorder and were accompanied, in any 
case, by more familiar measures. On 11 lovember the military government 
arrested Sanjabi in Teheran. When demonstrations took place in Ahwaz and 
Khorramshah, eight people were killed in clashes between demonstrators and 
troops. On the following day, the military government ordered striking oil 
employees to go back to work and threatened to dismiss those who refused. 
On 13 lovember oilfields reported that more than 60 per cent of their 
workers had returned to their jobs. On 14 lovember demonstrators again 
clashed with troops in the bazaar of Teheran and there were clashes in 
Sunqur and Lahjan between security forces and demonstrators which left a 
total of six people dead. On the same day, however, oilworkers in the 
Abadan refinery and the offshore installations returned to work, though 
higher absenteeism was reported in the Ahwaz fields. On 10 lovember the new 
ministers were presented to the Shah by Ghulam Riza Azharii on the same day 
troops clashed with demonstrators protesting against the Shah in Xashhad, 
Isfahan and other cities. On the following day, an armed forces parade was 
held in Teheran. A statement issued by the Acting Chief ot Statf pledged to 
preserve the constitution and the monarchy. However, turther demonstrations 
took place in eleven cities across the country. Troops fired on 
demonstrators in Kushhad, killing at least three people. 
- 297 -
US Treasury Secretary Xichael Blumenthal arrived in Jidda on 17 
lovember for a two-day official visit to Saudi Arabia. The following day 
Bmpress Farah left Teheran for a visit to Baghdad and al-Iajaf in Iraq, 
while Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was 
against any foreign interference in the internal affairs of Iran. On the 
following day the United States issued a statement saying that it did not 
intend to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. The Iranian 
government released a further 210 political prisoners. Blumenthal arrived 
in Abu Dhabi on 19 lovember on a two-day official visit. On 20 lovember the 
bazaar of Teheran reopened for business at the end of a strike lasting one 
month. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing warned Khumayni on 21 lovember 
not to call for violence in Iran from French territory. On the same day, 
the army t09k over the operation of an electric power station near Teheran 
after a strike by workers had blacked out the capital. That day also 
Treasury Secretary Blumenthal met the Shah in Teheran on oil matters and on 
the next day he met the Amir in Kuwait. On the same day in Iran the Xajlls 
voted by 191 to 27 with 6 abstentions to approve a government programme to 
restore order. Troops clashed with demonstrators in the bazaar of Teheran. 
The government reported that three people had been killed in demonstrations 
in Shiraz during the previous two days and on 23 lovember clashes between 
demonstrators and security forces in two towns near Shiraz left twa people 
dead. 
Three days later, on 26 love mber, demonstrations and work stoppages 
were carried out in all major cities in response to a call for a one-day 
strike by opposition and religious leaders. At least nine people were 
killed in demonstrations in Gargan. King Hussein of Jordan appeared in 
Teheran once DOre. The Kuwaiti AmiT Bet King Khalid in Riyadh on 28 
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lovember and on the following day the President of the UAE also arrived to 
confer. In Iran Premier Azhari announced a ban on all processions in any 
form during the month of Xubarram and banned all religious gatherings not 
cleared in advance. It was announced, however, that laws in Iran would be 
revised to conform with Islamic principles. On 30 Iovember the Qatari Amir 
also arrived in Riyadh for discussions with King Khalid. On the following 
day clashes took place in Teheran between soldiers and demonstrators who 
were violating a curfew. On 2 December, when demonstrators defied a ban on 
marches on the first day of Xuharram, soldiers dispersed the demonstrators, 
killing at least six people. Other protests were held in Isfahan, Shiraz 
and Bushire. On 3 December troops fired on protestors in Teheran. Ayat 
Allah Khumayni urged a resumption of strikes by oil workers in Iran and 
called on the armed farces to desert if ordered to fire on demonstrators. 
On the following day the French government issued a further warning to 
Khumayni to show reserve in his pronouncements. Renewed strikes crippled 
oil production. Urban guerrillas attacked a police station with grenades, 
killing one policeman. On 5 December, Azhari blamed the strife in Iran on 
saboteurs who were the tools of foreigners. On 6 December, Karim Sanjabi, 
leader of the opposition lational Front, was released from prison. He said 
the next day that he would refuse to join any coalition government under 
the illegal monarchy. The USA announced that it would allow dependents of 
US personnel to leave Iran at government expense. On 8 December !zhari 
lifted the ban on process1ons for a forty-eight hour period. On the same 
day in Bahrain the Kuwaiti Crown Prince met with Bahrain'S !mir in lanama. 
On 10 December, hundreds of thousands of protestors marched through 
Teheran in a peaceful demonstrat1on against the Shah. Smaller 
demonstrations took place in Qum, Xashad, Tabriz and other cities and on 
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the next day, massive demonstrations continued throughout the country. In 
Isfahan troops clashed with rioting demonstrators, killing five people. 
Amnesty International accused Iran of continuing to torture political 
prisoners. On 12 December the Kuwaiti Crown Prince ended a visit to Qatar 
during which he had talks with the Qatari Aair, and on the same day he met 
the UAB Vice-President Shaikh Rashid in Abu Dhabi. In Iran soldiers fired 
on rioters in Isfahan, killing at least forty people. lost oil workers 
refused to return to work in the oilfields. President Carter stated that it 
was uncontrolled statements made from foreign countries that were 
encouraging violence and had exacerbated the situation in Iran. He stated 
that the Shah had the support and confidence of the United States but that 
the United States had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs 
of Iran. On the following day, 13 December, Ayat Allah Khumayni said that 
henceforth any head of state who supported the Shah would be deprived of 
Iranian oil and all treaties with his country would be considered annulled. 
At the sametlme, troops in Isfahan led a demonstration in support of the 
Shah and forced some motorists to join in the demonstration. On 14 December 
the Shah met Sanjabi and other opposition leaders in an effort to form a 
coalition government; on the same day demonstrators for and against the 
Shah confronted each other in Isfahan and other cities. Three men 1n 
Idlitary uniforms opened fire at the Levlzan military camp. On 15 December 
the Ayat Allah called for a general strike to support striklng 011 workers 
and declared a day of mourning to be observed for thoee killed in the 
disturbances. 
Three days later, on 18 December, troops in Tabriz refu.ed to fire on 
anti-Shah protestors. A day of mourning was held ,for those killed in 
demonstrations. Clashes took place in Qum and Tabriz. On the same day, Ayat 
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Allah Huasaiun Ali Xuntaziri met Khumayni near Paris. In ODen on 19 
December the Kuwaiti Crown Prince had talks on consolidating bilateral 
relations. The lew Ygrk TimeS cited Iranian government sources as saying 
that the Shah had ruled out the possibility of a Regency Council as a 
solution to the political crisis. Ayat Allah Xutaziri said he had been 
tortured by SAVAK while in the prison from which he had been released in 
October. Two days later, on 21 December, the Majlis moved to adjourn early 
and delay a censure debate. On 23 December, soldiers opened fire on 
demonstrators in Xashhad, killing thirteen people, while on the same day 
gunmen murdered a US oil executive and an Iranian oil official in separate 
attacks near Ahwaz. On the next day, US Embassy guards fired into a crowd 
that had gathered outside the Embassy when projectiles were thrown into the 
Embassy grounds. Students demonstrated in Teheran. Sanjabi said on 25 
December that the only solution would be forthe Shah to abdicate. The 
following day petroleum exports halved as production fell to the level of 
domestic consumption. Soldiers in Teheran fired into a funeral procession 
on 27 December, killing their own colonel and five others. Demonstrations 
in the capital turned into riots. The USA stated on the same day that it 
believed that the Shah had an important role to play in the transition to a 
stable political situation. On 28 December, strikes closed the central bank 
and the state airline. Oil refineries stopped production. 011 rationlng 
began. As demonstrations continued in Teheran, Prayd~ reported that a 
special group had been sent to the US Bmbassy in Teheran to help keep the 
Shah in power. On 29 December a Jational Front leader Shahpur Bakhtiyar 
said the Shah had asked him to form a government. US otficials said an 
aircraft carrier task force had been ordered to depart frOB the Philippines 
for possible movement to the Gulf. The State Department revealed that the 
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Shah's mother had arrived in the United States. On 30 December the lational 
Pront expelled Bakhtiyar. Demonstrators in Xashhad hanged three police 
agents and when troops arrived on the scene they fired into the crowd. 
Rioting was repeated in Xashhad and other cities the following day leading 
to renewed clashes with troops. The US government advised dependents of 
Americans in Iran to leave the country. Similar recommendations were made 
by Canada and Britain. 
On 1 January 1979, the government said that the death toll from 
violence in Mashhad during the previous two days was 170. On the same day 
the Shah said that he would like to take a vacation if the situation 
permitted. Air traffic controllers struck in Teheran, closing down the 
airport. On the following day, 2 January, violence in Qazvin left an 
undetermined number of casualties. Troops at Teheran airport were 
reinforced to enable foreigners to depart from the country. In the United 
States, Iranian demonstrators marched on the home of the Shah's sister in 
Beverly Hills, California, starting fires and causing damage. On 3 January 
Bakhtiyar said he had formed a Cabinet. Both houses of parliament passed 
votes inviting him to head a government. The Shah on the same day appointed 
Abbas Qarahbaghi as Chief of Staff and on 4 January he signed a decree 
appointing Bakhtiyar Premier before, leaving Teheran for a holiday in a 
nearby resort. The United States said it was prepared to co-operate fully 
with the new government. Army Commander Ghulam Ali Uvaysi left Iran for 
the United States. it was reported that he had reSigned. Two days later, on 
6 January, the Cabinet was presented to the Shah. The Ayat Allah Khumayni 
called the new Cabinet illegal and a plot against the people. The Shah 
appOinted a new military governor of Teheran. Jewspapers were published for 
the first time in two months. On the same day the Shah said he would take a 
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rest after he had become confident about what was happening in the country. 
On the following day, 7 January, demonstrations again took place in Teheran 
and other cities and on 8 January it was reported that Faridun Jam had 
refused to serve as War Xinister. An anti-government demonstration was held 
in Qum. US officials said that their government had advised the Shah that 
it would be best for stability in Iran if he left the country temporarily. 
It was reported that Azhari had already left on grounds of health. 
On the next day, 9 January, strikes and demonstrations continued in 
Teheran and other cities and it was announced that the Shah would turn over 
the private holdings of the royal family to the Pahlav1 Foundation. He also 
named Abd aI-Ali Badrai Commander of the Army. The government ended martial 
law in Shiraz. On 10 January, Ayat Allah Khumayni said relations with the 
United States would be good 50 long as Washington left Iran to deCide its 
own destiny. The following day US Secretary of State Vance said that the 
United States felt a decision by the Shah to form a Regency Council and 
leave the country had been a sound decision and said the new government 
should be given every chance to find a peaceful solution. Jatar Shataqat 
was named War Xinister. Bakhtiyar pledged to disband SAVAK, to abolish 
martial law and free all political prisoners. he announced that 868 
political prisoners had been released earlier in the day. On the following 
day, 12 January, the United States said it had urged the military to give 
full support to the government. The next day a Regency Council that would 
carry out the duties of the Shah after his departure was announced. On the 
same day Khumayni announced the formation of a Council of the Islamic 
Revolution that would be charged with selecting and installing a 
provisional government in Iran. Demonstrators marched in Teheran after 
ceremonies reopening Teheran University had taken place and on the next day 
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demonstrators 1n support of Khumayni were active on the streets of Teheran. 
On 15 January the Senate approved the appointment of Bakhtiyar. Ten 
diplomats at the Iranian Embassy in the United States said that they would 
not work with Ambassador Ardshir Zahidi. An American engineer was murdered 
in Kerman. 
On 16 January the Shah left Iran and flew to Aswan in Egypt where he 
was met by President Anwar al-Sadat. The Ayat Allah Khumayni hailed the 
departure of the Shah as the preface to his Victory. The Majlis, however, 
approved the appointment of Bakhtiyar. On the following day, 17 January, 
the Ayut Allah called on Cabinet Xinisters to resign their illegal posts. 
President Carter urged the Aynt Allah to give the new government a chance 
to succeed. On the same day renegade troops in tanks and jeeps fired on 
anti-government demonstrators in Ahwaz. lewspaper accounts put the death 
toll at more than ten people. The lew York Times reported that Justice 
Xinister Yazdi had resigned. On 18 January Ay~t Allah Shariatmadari 
expressed the fear that Iran might be faced with terrible turmoil if the 
government were toppled suddenly. The head of the Regency Council, Jalal 
aI-Din Tihrani travelled to France to meet Khumayni. In Iran clashes 
between demonstrators and troops took place in Ahwaz and Dizful. On the 
following day, 19 January, Khumayni refused to see the Head of the Regency 
Council unless he resigned his post. On the same day, hundreds of thousands 
of demonstrators marched 1n Teheran in support of Khumayn1. The next day 
Khumayni said he would return to Iran in a few days, but on 21 January 
Bakhtiyar said that he was the legitimate ruler of Iran and would defend 
his post. On 22 January Ayat Allah Xahuud Talaghani warned that the Iranian 
people might undertake a holy war against the army if it attempted a coup. 
Meanwhile, Tihanl resigned from the Regency Council and delivered his 
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resignation to Khumayni. The Shah arrived in Xarrakesh on a private visit 
by King Hassan of Xorocco. In Iran the Chief of Staff Qarabaghi said that 
the military would support the Bakhtiyar government. 
On the 23 January about 1,200 special troops marched in support of the 
Shah in Teheran. The State Department said on the following day that the 
USA had agreed to send 200,000 barrels of diesel fuel and gasoline to Iran. 
When. on 25 January. the government closed the airport in Teheran Khumayni 
postponed his scheduled return to Iran and condemned the government for its 
treasonable action. lore than 50,000 people gathered in Teheran in support 
of the government. The government said that it would start enforcing a 
prohibition on public demonstrations. On the following day, demonstrations 
were nonetheless held against the government in Teheran. At least fifteen 
people were killed when soldiers fired on the demonstrators. Troops clashed 
with demonstrators in Tabriz. On 27 January demonstrations against the 
government continued in the capital after the closure of all the airports 
was extended until further notice. It was. however, announced that 
Bakhtiyar would fly to France to discuss the future of the nation with 
Khumayni. Khumayni promptly retorted that he would not meet Bakhtiyar 
unless the Premier first reSigned. and he urged Iranians to struggle for an 
Islamic republic to the last drop of blood. Further demonstrations took 
place in Teheran and further killings. 
On 29 January the government announced that it would re-open the 
airports on the following day. Demonstrators rioted in Teheran. The US 
Consul in Isfahan was beaten by a hostile crowds. The government said that 
a $6.2 billion contract for the construction by a French concern of two 
nuclear plants had been cancelled. On 30 January the government authorized 
the return of Khumayni to Iran. The US Embassy ordered all government 
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dependents to leave the country. On 31 January columns of troops moved 
through Teheran in support of the government. On 1 February the Ayat Allah 
Ihumayni returned to his homeland from his exile in France. At least three 
Bdllion people lined the streets to welcome him. Bven DOre than the 1958 
revolution in Iraq. the Iranian revolution of 1979 was to change the course 
of international history in the Gulf, and would do so more promptly and 
drastically than all the bustling diplomacy and arms dealing of the 
previous twenty years. 
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The material in this chapter has been derived from three main sources, 
taken in conjunction with aaterial listed in the thematic bibliography at 
the conclusion of the thesis. See the notes at the conclusion of preceding 
chapters for any items which transcend the chronological limits of this 
chapter. It has not been thought sensible to providp. more detailed 
referencing: 
1. Keeslng's Contemporary Archl~ 
Vol. XXII: January 1976-December 1976: pp.27501-28124 
Vol. XXII I: January 1977-December 1977: pp.28125-28748 
Vol. XXIV: January 1978-December 1978: pp.28749-29380 
Vol. XV: January 1979-December 1979: pp.29381-30012 
2. The KiddIe East Journal The KiddIe East Institute, Washington. 
Vol. 30: 16 lovember 1975-15 February 1976: pp.210-220 
16 February 1976-15 August 1976: pp.425-538 
Vol.31: 16 August -15 February 1977: pp.47-203 
16 February-15 August 1977: pp.332-482 
Vol.32: 16 August -15 lovember 1977: pp.45-58 
16 lovember 1977-15 August 1978: pp.185-469 
Vol.33: 16 August 1978-15 February 1979: pp.45-205 
3. SummorYof world Broadcastsi Part IVi The Arab world. Israel, 
Greece. Turkey. Iran 
Daily Series. Published by the Xonitoring Service of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, Caversham Park. Reading, Berks. 
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Chapter line: Conclusion 
In this thesis we have examined the international history of the Gulf 
region during the period from 1958, which marked the end of the Iraqi 
Hashemite dynasty and the birth of a revolutionary Socialist regime which 
was totally new to the area, until 1979 which was marked by an even more 
remarkable event: the downfall of the strong Shah, whom some had seen as an 
'American King'. It was obvious when the Shah left Iran on 1e January 1979, 
even to his most ardent supporters, that whereas a year earlier he could 
rightly have claimed to have been in full control the situation 1n the 
ensuing twelve months had rapidly deteriorated. He lost control of the 
administrative system he had developed so painstakingly to enable him to 
govern Iran. The failure of the Shah's organizational hierarchy to respond 
to the first serious Challenge to his regime in two decades contributed, 
more than any other factor, not only to the demise of that particular Shah 
but also to the ending of the monarchical system in Iran, a system that had 
lasted, in different forms, for many centuries. The Shah's fall not only 
ended the American 'sweet dream', but it brought the smaller Gulf states 
together in a common search for security in the light of the threat the new 
regime in Iran might pose. 
Over the twenty-one years with which we have been concerned the 
region went through various experiences which might be described as 
'normal' for new-born countries and nations. The states had to adjust to 
far-reaching internal social and economic changes in a difficult 
international context. It is not surprising that there were certain initial 
difficulties and setbacks before a real degree of positive co-operation 
proved possible. In the early 19605 there was an understandable concern 
with domestic social and economic developments. Overshadowing all was the 
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increasing interference and involvement of the superpowers, particularly 
because both Iran and Iraq needed assistance with technology and the supply 
of arms. The rivalry between Iraq and Iran has emerged in our study as 
constant, only occasionally modified by apparent accords and agreements. 
That rivalry, of course, finally issued in a war which is still continUing . 
• otwithstanding their need to co-operate against external pressures. 
we have noted among the smaller Gulf states a series of obstacles to more 
fundamental unity. These obstacles had, in varying degrees, raCial, 
political, ideological or economic causes. They created or reinforced a 
strong sense of individual self-interest. Generally speaking, however, we 
have noted that the roots of the tension between the centripetal and 
cenrtrifugal forces in Arab politics lie in different understandings of the 
nature of Arab identity and nationalism. An acceptance of a common 
language, a common heritage and. to an extent, a common history has existed 
alongside differing emphases of potentially great significance. We have 
seen the extent to which , on the one hand, Saudi Arabia and the smaller 
Gulf states have stressed Islam rather than Arabis. while on the other Iraq 
has stressed both Arabism and Socialism. 
Ve have seen that it was the differences between Iran and Iraq which 
gave great scope for the activities of the superpowers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union respectively. Local rivalries therefore were caug~t up 
in, and sometimes transformed by, this wider international dimension. Bven 
so, the Gulf states were generally willing to accept Iraq's domestic regime 
so long as it was not accompanied by active interference in their own 
affairs. Likewise in the case of Iran. Events since 1979 .uggeats that our 
decision to end the thesis in that year is wise. The balance of power and 
the political atmosphere has changed considerably in the aftermath of the 
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Shah's departure. In this new situation, however, there still remains the 
necessity for the Gulf states to cope with the complexity of nationalism, 
regionalism, language and culture, and economic and social change in an 
international environment which remains uncertain. It has been this need 
which has led to the work of the Gulf Co-operation Council. It has been 
welcomed by the Gulf people and seen as the positive outcome of these two 
decades of political development which we have tried to trace. Despite all 
the conflicts and disputes which have emerged from time to time it can be 
seen as a positive achievement. Of course, certain substantial differences 
of conviction and interest remain, but the pattern of connexions and 
contacts which we have sought to trace seems to rule out simple struggles 
between 'Arabs' and 'Persians', or between 'Sunnis' and 'Shia' as the 
fundamental cause of conflict. These differences have only become 
important, from time to time, for political or economic reasons. 
The achievement of security remains vital since 'instability' serves 
as a pretext for outside intervention, colonial or otherwise. Whatever the 
motives for that intervention, either Soviet or American, our thesis 
suggests that it is in any case likely to have many unintended as well as 
intended consequences. Security, of course, is not only vital for the 
states of the Gulf region themselves, but it is also important for the 
whole world, given their geographical location and their petroleum, gas and 
mineral reserves. That security is only likely to be achieved by 
negotiations at regional level, by practical co-operation, trust and non-
interference from outside. It is in this context that the elaborate network 
of visits by rulers and their advisers, which we have traced, DUst be seen. 
Political stability also reqUires both social and economic progress and, in 
turn, the achievement of greater stability would allow a reduction in 
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Dil1tary spending and the further diversion of resources to BOre beneficial 
long-term developments. The fate of the Shah suggests, in any event, that 
Bassive military expenditure can in turn become counter-productive. 
There 1s, therefore, no firm 'conclusion' which can be reached about 
the international history of the Gulf, although we can point to the 
continuing work of the Gulf Co-operation Council in establishing a clear 
locally-based perspective. Although no mention of defence or security was 
made in the original constitution, the summit meeting which ratified its 
constitution also issued a statement rejecting any foreign presence in the 
Gulf region. The Supreme Council of Xinisters in lovember 1981 agreed to 
include defence co-operation in the activities of the Council. As a result, 
defence ministers met in January 1982 to discuss a standardization of 
weapons. Ground forces of the member states held a Joint military exercise 
in October 1983, followed by naval and air exercises in 1984. In lovember 
1984 member states agreed to form a joint defence force for rapid 
deployment against external aggression, comprising units from the armed 
forces of each country under a central command. Between 1981 and 1986 the 
Council made repeated offers to mediate in the war between Iraq and Iran. 
In lovember 1986 the Supreme Council reiterated its demand that Iran should 
agree to submit to mediation in the conflict and urged Iran to atop its 
attacks on merchant shipping in the Gulf .. It scarcely needs to be said 
that these appeals have not yet been successful. The international history 
of the Gulf has still to be settled. 
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